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Executive Summary 
The 2004 Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary Logistics Integrated Project 
represents the combined effort of 50 students and 18 faculty members from different 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) departments.  Utilizing tasking provided by the office 
of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs 
(OPNAV N7) to the NPS Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, the project 
examines logistics flow to, within, and from a Sea Base to an objective in a joint warfare 
environment.  The OPNAV N7 tasking requests the Meyer Institute to conduct a study to 
develop system of systems conceptual solutions for Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary 
Logistics (JELo) which use current systems, programs of record, and other proposed 
systems extending over the next 20 years.  The Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 
Six (SEA-6) Team uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) as a systems engineering framework to conduct the multidisciplinary study. 
Seabasing is an important part of Sea Power 21; however, analysis in this study 
indicates that 2004 capabilities, and the capabilities expected through the  
2015 time frame, cannot support the aggressive operational timelines envisioned for 
future doctrine.  In order to achieve these timelines by the 2025 time frame, several 
materiel and nonmateriel solutions are identified that offer promising investment 
possibilities to address the capability gaps. 
Much of the current discussion involving the Sea Base and expeditionary 
operations revolves around a 10/30/30 construct and a brigade-size force.  The 10/30/30 
construct calls for expeditionary forces to seize the initiative within 10 days of a 
deployment order; achieve their expeditionary objectives within 30 days; and then 
reconstitute and redeploy within the next 30 days.  Seizing the initiative is defined as the 
employment of ground forces to the initial objectives.  In order to accomplish this, the 
expeditionary forces must rapidly transit to the Sea Base in the Area of Operations (AO) 
(Close) and marry up with prepositioned equipment (Assemble) through a  
Forward Logistics Site (FLS).  Seizing the initiative also involves delivering  
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3 Battalion Landing Teams (BLT), 2 surface and 1 vertical, from the Sea Base to the 
objective ashore (Employ) in one 10-hr time period.  The expeditionary forces are then 
supported for up to 30 days (Sustain) as they establish control of hostilities and achieve 
their objectives.  The 2004 project employs the 10/30/30 operational construct to 
investigate the Closure, Assembly, Employment, and Sustainment Phases of seabased 
expeditionary operations. 
Using JCIDS, the SEA-6 Team defines the problem, creates a scenario, develops 
modeling and simulation tools, and conducts analyses to draw conclusions and make 
recommendations.  The team designs a 2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA) for the 
Sea Base that is centered on the Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future (MPF(F)) ship.  
The project identifies, defines, and quantifies capability gaps, develops platform 
solutions, and generates three alternative architectures for Seabasing and JELo out to the 
2025 time frame. 
One of the alternative architectures for the 2025 time frame incorporates a  
high-speed assault connector ship1 (Joint Amphibious Combat Cargo Expeditionary 
Support Ship (Joint ACCESS)) designed by students in the NPS Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (TSSE) Group to address a specific capability gap identified during the 
Employment phase of operations.  A collaborative war game against a near-peer 
competitor is conducted with students in the NPS Operations Research Department in 
order to gain a different perspective on the performance of the 2015 BLA, based on  
man-in-the-loop simulation. 
In order to identify and quantify the potential capability gaps for each 
architecture, SEA-6 develops a simulation model, the Systems Engineering and Analysis 
Baseline Architecture and Solution Evaluator-Six (SEABASE-6) model, using 
EXTEND™, a process-based, discrete-event modeling and simulation tool.  A  
threat-based capability study results in the development of an operational scenario to 
                                                 
1 Total Ship Systems Engineering Team, (2004), “Joint ACCESS: A High Speed Assault Connector for 
Amphibious Seabasing Operations and Joint Expeditionary Logistics,” Naval Postgraduate School 
Technical Report, Monterey, CA, December 2004. 
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judge system performance under realistic and expected environmental and combative 
conditions.  A designed experiment is used to plan an efficient data collection effort and 
operational requirements are used to formulate critical operational issues (COIs), 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of performance (MOPs) to evaluate 
overall system performance. 
Scenario effects are captured in the input variables of the SEABASE-6 simulation 
model to evaluate JELo system performance.  Each of the JELo system architectures are 
influenced by sea state, level of combat (consumption rates), and range (both Sea Base to 
shore and shore to objective).  Given the varying degrees of technological maturity, 
technological and operational risk, and affordability, the study focuses on the capability 
of various platforms and systems to meet requirements without trying to determine a 
specific combination for an overall best architecture design.  Additionally, although cost 
is not a determining factor in the design of the various architectures, it is used as a tool to 
make relative comparisons. 
The key findings of this study are: 
• Programs of record for 2015 Sea Base forces are challenged to meet a 
10/30/30 response timeline.  Major capability gaps are highlighted in the 
various phases associated with these expeditionary operations  
(Closure, Assembly, Employment and Sustainment).  Using three  
top-level performance measures as well as estimated cost, Table 1 
provides a side-by-side comparison of each of the architectures evaluated 
in the study.  It is apparent that each of the alternative architectures 
performs better than the 2015 BLA at a relatively lower cost; however, 
further analysis of the performance and cost of the three alternatives is 
required to determine which one holds more promise. 
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Table 1: Architecture Summary and Total Cost (FY04$B). 
• Dedicated Strategic Lift assets are needed to move a brigade-size force in 
order to seize the initiative within 10 days.  Since expeditionary forces are 
our nation’s first responders, it is important that they arrive as early as 
possible during a crisis so they can control the initial phases of hostilities 
and influence subsequent courses of action.  Seizing the initiative 
encompasses the Closure and Employment phases.  Specific capability 
gaps include the transport of non-self-deploying aircraft (NSDA) to the  
Sea Base, especially aircraft that must be disassembled for transport and 
subsequently reassembled.  The additional time required for the  
Air Mobility Command (AMC) to plan, coordinate, and establish an air 
bridge to transport the NSDA and all nonprepositioned equipment to the 
FLS degrades the performance of the 2015 BLA and  
Alternative Architecture I as shown in Figure 1.  This delay is not present 
in Alternative Architectures II or III since they incorporate dedicated 
strategic lift assets to improve their performance. 
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Dedicated Lift For Fast Response
These Options Rely On
Joint  Airlift
 
Figure 1: Dedicated lift is required to seize the initiative within 10 days.2 
• Rapid force employment is hindered by multiple at-sea transfers.  The 
Employment Phase is defined as the elapsed time to complete the insertion 
of the 2 surface and 1 vertical BLTs.  Relatively small craft, such as the 
Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicle and even the Heavy Lift 
LCAC (HLCAC) vehicle, require multiple at-sea transfers in order to load 
vehicles during the Employment Phase.  These transfers are  
time-consuming, even under ideal conditions, and may be impossible in 
heavy seas.  Large assault connectors, such as the Landing Craft Utility, 
Replacement (LCU(R)) and the Joint ACCESS, designed by students in 
the TSSE Group, are beneficial in that they reduce the number of  
at-sea transfers and improve architecture performance during the 
Employment Phase.  Each of the three alternative architectures in Figure 2 
                                                 
2 HSAC is High Speed Assault Craft.  RSLS is Rapid Strategic Lift Ship.  ATT is Advance  
Theater Transport. 
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incorporates a large assault connector, enabling them to outperform the 
2015 BLA. 
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Figure 2: Large-payload craft reduce at-sea transfers. 
The 2015 architecture uses LCAC as its primary assault connector and 
requires 127 total trips and transfers (loading and unloading).  Alternative 
Architecture II and Alternative Architecture III use the larger LCU(R) and 
average 50-60 trips to insert the two surface BLTs.  Alternative 
Architecture I utilizes 12 preloaded Joint ACCESS vessels, which are able 
to off-load the 2 surface BLTs with no additional at-sea transfer.  The 
large-payload Joint ACCESS and the LCU(R) yield fewer trips, which 
eliminate or reduce the at-sea transfer accompanying each trip. 
• Future nonmateriel proposals look promising.  Reassembling the CH-53 
aircraft while en route to the Sea Base reduces the time required to 
complete the Closure phase.  Additionally, a simple change in the type of 
air asset utilized for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) lift addresses a gap 
in capability for the Sea Base to provide advanced medical care within  
1 hr during the Sustainment phase.  In order to increase the probability of 
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survival following massive trauma, the 2015 BLA uses the UH-1Y as the 
primary MEDEVAC platform, while each of the three alternative 
architectures utilize the MV-22.  As illustrated in Figure 3, each of the 

































Similar Results For Each Alternative Architecture
Uses UH-1Y
 
Figure 3: Nonmateriel change eliminates MEDEVAC gap. 
• Future materiel proposals look promising.  Dedicated strategic lift assets, 
such as high-speed surface ships (Rapid Strategic Lift Ship) and  
lighter-than-air ships (SkyCat™ 1000), may provide an answer to the 
capability gaps identified in the Closure Phase.  In order to allow the 
expeditionary forces to seize the initiative within 10 days, the  
Closure Phase must be completed within 9.6 days (10 days minus  
10 hrs to complete the Employment Phase).  Figure 4 shows that reliance 
on nonorganic strategic lift assets results in a gap of at least  
six days.  Transporting the NSDA to the FLS is the primary cause of this 
performance shortfall. 
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Figure 4: Dedicated lift assets increase Closure Phase performance. 
Other key findings include: 
• A near real-time asset-visibility system is critical in order to avoid 
building a large stockpile of supplies at the objective ashore. 
• A majority of the operating air deck spots in the Sea Base are needed to 
sustain troops at the objective (few spots remain for  
nonlogistical missions). 
• The MV-22 is best suited for troop transport.  Its benefits diminish when 
used for cargo resupply or when the mission radius is greater than 150 NM 
(in the external lift mode, the MV-22 is much less capable of resupply 
than the CH-53). 
SEA-6 recommends further study efforts in the form of a detailed survivability 
analysis of the MPF(F), and a survivability and reliability analysis of the alternative 
connectors used in this study.  Further study and experimentation is also warranted to 
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investigate and measure tactical at-sea transfer performance for lighterage and Integrated 
Landing Platforms (ILPs) under various sea states.  Additionally, a Unified Expeditionary 
Command concept, vis-à-vis Special Forces Command (SOCCOM), or other alternative 
command structures, should be explored in conjunction with a conceptual design for  
Sea Base Common Logistics Picture (CLP) architecture. 
The 2004 Seabasing and JELo Integrated Project is an academic exercise and is 
not endorsed by either the Navy or any other U.S. military service.  Examining Seabasing 
and JELo in its entirety is extremely challenging.  The regional conflict and near-peer 
competitor scenarios are used to facilitate analysis and do not represent official views or 
policies of the Navy or any government.  Although all elements of Seabasing and JELo 
are not evaluated to the greatest extent possible, they are evaluated to the extent practical, 
given the time available for the study.  SEA-6 nonetheless concludes that the results are 
informative and provide insights to a decision-maker involved in addressing the complex 
issues associated with this topic. 
   

























This section presents the guidance Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) 
Cohort Six (SEA-6) received for its campus-wide integrated project.  It also sets the stage 
for the remainder of the Technical Report. 
 1.1.1 Project Assignment 
Early in 2004, the faculty of the SEA curriculum requested project inputs from the 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs 
(OPNAV N7).  In April 2004, OPNAV N7 tasked the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of 
Systems Engineering to conduct a study on Joint Expeditionary Logistics.  The  
Wayne E. Meyer Institute assigned this study to SEA-6 as a campus-wide integrated 
project.  OPNAV N7 specifically tasked the Wayne E. Meyer Institute for Systems 
Engineering to “examine Expeditionary Warfare Logistics and associated platforms  
and systems.”3 
The study’s initial objective to analyze “logistics flow to, within and from the  
Sea Base in a joint warfare environment.”4  The SEA-6 study is the third follow-on study 
from Systems Engineering and Integration Cohort Three’s (SEI-3) study on 
Expeditionary Warfare.  SEI-3 used a “system of systems” approach to analyze and 
engineer architectures to execute ship to objective maneuver (STOM) in the littoral.5  The 
two other studies by Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Four (SEA-4) and 
Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Five (SEA-5) address Force Protection of the 
Sea Base and Maritime Dominance in the Littorals, respectively. 
The SEA-6 study’s primary objective is to examine the possibilities for delivering 
and sustaining an expeditionary brigade-sized force at an objective within the 10/30/30 
                                                 
3 OPNAV N7, Expeditionary Warfare Logistics Study, (Unpublished Memorandum: 2004). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Systems Engineering and Integration Cohort Three, “Expeditionary Warfare,” (Unpublished Research 
Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: 2002). 
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construct.  The 10/30/30 construct calls for the expeditionary forces to seize the initiative 
within 10 days, achieve the expeditionary objectives within 30 days, then reconstitute and 
redeploy within the next 30 days.  The study examines combinations of current systems, 
systems of record, and other proposed systems out to the year 2025.  Proposed systems 
are primarily limited to Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and 
Advanced Concept Demonstrations (ACDs).  The study occurs from  
June to December 2004 and partially fulfills SEA-6’s requirements for a Masters of 
Science Degree in Systems Engineering. 
 1.1.2 Logistics Definition 
“Logistics comes from the Greek word λοχιστικοσ  (logistikos), meaning skilled 
in calculation.”6  Today the Department of Defense (DOD) defines logistics as: 
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.  In its 
most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: 
a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; 
b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; 
c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of 
facilities; and 
d. acquisition or furnishing of services.7 
 
The science of logistics dominates today’s society.  Examples range from going to 
the supermarket to buy groceries to having a package delivered from a favorite online 
shopping Website.  The civilian sector has improved and streamlined its logistic systems 
because these systems affect company profits. 
                                                 
6 David Olwell and David Schrady, OS 4580 Logistics Systems Analysis, course notes (unpublished, 
September 2003), pp. 7-27. 
7 Defense Technical Information Center, “logistics,” DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, n.d., 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/l/03104.html> (23 September 2004). 
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1.1.3 Logistics Importance 
 “Amateurs discuss strategy; professionals study logistics.” 
        -Anonymous 
The annals of military history are filled with examples of how logistics have 
influenced military operations both positively and negatively.  Recent conflicts such as 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom highlight logistics’ 
importance in successfully conducting operations.  In these U.S.-led Operations, two 
critical vulnerabilities8 are identified:  the requirement to establish an “Iron Mountain” 
and the denial of access for basing.  These two vulnerabilities are logistical vulnerabilities 
that, historically, have greatly influenced U.S. military operations. 
 1.1.4 The Iron Mountain 
In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Commander-in-Chief Central Command 
(now Combatant Commander), General Norman Schwarzkopf, ordered 60 days of Class I 
(Subsistence) and Class V (Ammunition), and 30 days of the remaining supply classes be 
brought into the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) to support the operation.  
Table 1-1 shows the classes of supply.  Table 1-2 shows the numbers of people and 
equipment in the Allied order of battle (OOB) that required logistical support for the 
ground and air component of Operation Desert Storm. 
                                                 
8 Critical Vulnerabilities – weakness (and sometimes strengths) that are open to the enemy’s attack or can 
be exploited by the enemy.  Milan N. Vego, “Operational Warfare,” (Newport: Naval War College Press, 
2000), p. 636. 
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Table 1-1: Classes of Supply.9 
 
                                                 
9 Global Security.org, “Classes and Subclasses of Supply,” 29 September 2002, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/supclass.htm> (15 November 2004). 
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Allied OOB 
01 December 1990 
Allied Personnel 
Armed Forces Total Strength 1,110,000
Allied Ground OOB 
Ground Force Equipment 27,350 
Allied Air OOB 
Air Assets 3,262 
 
Table 1-2: Operation Desert Shield Ground and Air Allied OOB.10 
 
Supporting this vast number of personnel and equipment meant stockpiling items 
in Saudi Arabia.  This supply stockpile is referred to as the “Iron Mountain.”  Post-war 
analysis shows that Allied forces did not require as much of the “Iron Mountain” as 
originally forecast.  For example, the United States Air Force sent 350,000 tons of 
ordnance into the AOR and around 69,000 tons of it was actually used.  The remaining 
amount (some 80% of the total accumulated) was shipped out at the conclusion of the 
operation.11  The “Iron Mountain” is considered a critical vulnerability because the 
supplies provide the enemy an easy target of opportunity for attack and limit mobility. 
 1.1.5 Denial of Access 
In the fall of 2002, members from the European Command (EUCOM) “…had 
been in close consultation with the Turkish armed forces and civilian leadership…,”12 to 
base Allied Forces, specifically the Fourth Infantry Division (4th ID), on Turkish soil to 
launch an attack on Iraq from the north.  As ships containing the 4th ID’s equipment 
appeared off the Turkish coast and requested permission to enter port to off-load cargo, 
the Turkish government “…refused to allow offensive operations from its soil.”13  The 
ships containing the equipment bound for Turkey waited for a decision off the Turkish 
coast.  Negotiations between Turkey and the United States did not resolve the issue and 
when hostilities began, Commander Central Command, General Tommy Franks, ordered 
                                                 
10 Global Security.org, “Operation Desert Storm,” Operation Desert Storm, 19 September 2004, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_storm-orbat.htm> (24 September 2004). 
11 Foss, John W. [GEN, USA, Ret.].  “Challenge for Operations Research in the Coming Decade,” Phalanx 
(newsletter of the Military Operations Research Society), March 1994. 
12 Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, “On Point - The United States Army in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom,” On Point, n.d., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/ 
ch-2.htm#deployment> (23 September 2004). 
13 Ibid. 
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the ships and the 4th ID to transit the Suez Canal and proceed to Kuwait.  The operational 
plan (OPLAN) was altered and Iraq was only attacked from Kuwait in the south.  
Turkey’s refusal to allow forces to begin operations from inside the Turkish borders 
exposed another critical vulnerability for the United States—its reliance on foreign access 
to support military operations.14 
 1.1.6 Critical Vulnerabilities 
The Navy’s Sea Power 21 transformation involving Seabasing is part of the 
United States military’s vision to convert the critical vulnerabilities of the  
“Iron Mountain” and the denial of access into a center of gravity.15  In June 2002, the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, unveiled Sea Power 21 as the 
Navy’s strategy for the twenty-first century.  Sea Power 21 is comprised of three primary 
pillars:  Seabasing, Sea Shield, and Sea Strike, all of which are shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1: Sea Power 21.16 
                                                 
14 The original OPLAN called for a two-pronged attack, with the 4th ID and certain air assets attacking from 
Turkey in the north and the remainder of the forces attacking from Kuwait in the south. 
15 Center of Gravity – that source of massed strength—physical or moral, or a source of leverage—whose 
degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s 
or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective.  Milan N. Vego, “Operational Warfare,” 
(Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), p. 634. 
16 Admiral Vern Clark, USN, “Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine: Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive 
Joint Capabilities,” Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine Online, n.d., 
<http://www.usni.org/PROCEEDINGS/ARTICLES02/proCNO10-2.htm#seabasing> (27 September 2004). 
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Because current logistics cannot support future concepts of movement and 
sustainment of a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) without reliance upon foreign bases and 
their infrastructure, Seabasing is recognized as a critical objective.  In the CNO’s article, 
he describes Seabasing’s17 impact on the battle space as: 
• Pre-positioned warfighting capabilities for immediate employment. 
• Enhanced joint support from a fully netted, dispersed naval force. 
• Strengthened international coalition building. 
• Increased joint force security and operational agility. 
• Minimized operational reliance on shore infrastructure.18 
 
The last two items aim at resolving the critical logistics vulnerabilities mentioned 
previously.  The fourth item, “Increased joint force security and operational agility,” is 
addressed in SEA-4’s integrated project on Force Protection of the Sea Base.  This 
addresses the critical vulnerability shown from Operation Desert Shield/Storm that 
operational agility is increased when there is no burden of an Iron Mountain.  The final 
item, “Minimized operational reliance on shore infrastructure,” addresses the critical 
vulnerability of access denial shown in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 1.1.7 Seabasing Concept 
The Seabasing concept was designed: 
“… about placing at sea—to a greater extent than ever before—
capabilities critical to joint and coalition operational success: 
offensive and defensive firepower, maneuver forces, command and 
control, and logistics.  By doing so, it minimizes the need to build 
up forces and supplies ashore, reduces their vulnerability and 
enhances operational mobility.  It leverages advanced sensor and 
communications systems, precision ordnance and weapons reach 
                                                 
17 “Seabasing,” a national capability, is the overarching transformational operating concept for projecting 
and sustaining naval power and joint forces, which assures joint access by leveraging the operational 
maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea. 
Naval Warfare Development Command, “Seabasing SharePoint Site,” Seabasing SharePoint Site, n.d., 
<https://nwcportal.nwc.navy.mil/nwdc/sea_basing/> (27 September 2004). 
18 Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, “Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine: Sea Power 21: Projecting 
Decisive Joint Capabilities,” Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine Online, n.d., 
<http://www.usni.org/PROCEEDINGS/ARTICLES02/proCNO10-2.htm#seabasing> (27 September 2004). 
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while prepositioning joint capabilities where they are immediately 
employable and most decisive.  It exploits the operational shift in 
warfare from mass to precision and information, employing the 
70% of the earth’s surface that is covered with water as a vast 
maneuver area in support of the joint force.”19 
 
Seabasing is transformational and is intended to change the way the United States 
conducts military operations.  It addresses the critical vulnerabilities of the Iron Mountain 
and the reliance on foreign basing by having a majority of the logistics associated with an 
operation at sea under the protection of Sea Shield, thereby reducing the Iron Mountain 
ashore.  Since the Sea Base is in international waters, it will not be constrained by the 
rules and regulations of foreign nations.  To make the Seabasing concept a reality, the 
military must develop the logistics infrastructure to support this transformational concept. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of the SEA-6 Technical Report on Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
(JELo) is to provide the Navy with insight into this important and timely issue and to 
simultaneously fulfill the project requirements for a Masters of Science Degree in  
Systems Engineering.  Presenting a systems and analytical view of Seabasing and JELo 
highlights important issues related to achieving the Seabasing vision.  The  
Iron Mountain’s critical vulnerabilities and reliance on foreign nations for basing of 
forces are problems for the United States.  The SEA-6 study examines the architectures 
and systems needed to rapidly deploy and sustain joint expeditionary forces operating 
from a Sea Base.  It identifies the necessary tasks, describes current gaps in required 
capabilities, and proposes potential approaches to reduce and/or eliminate those 
capability gaps.  SEA-6 expects the study results to provide decision-makers with 
insights into the potential ways to improve current capabilities and the possibilities for 
developing new capabilities. 
                                                 
19 Moore, Charles W., Jr., VADM, USN and Hanlon, Edward, Jr., LTG, USA, “Sea Basing Operational 
Independence for a New Century,” appearing in Proceedings, January 2003. 
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1.3 Scope 
Since logistics involves the building, movement, and sustainment of forces, there 
are numerous areas of Seabasing and JELo upon which it would be appropriate to focus a 
study.  Based on the tasking received, the research conducted, and the six-month time 
frame with which to complete the study, SEA-6 focuses on the areas believed most 
important to high-level decision-makers. 
The SEA-6 analysis covers the Sea Base’s capabilities to support a brigade-sized 
force performing Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO).  Since Seabasing is a primary 
component of the Navy’s transformational concept for projecting and sustaining combat 
power from the sea, non-Sea Base solutions are not considered.  A brigade-sized force is 
selected based on the CNO’s Guidance in the Naval Transformation Roadmap.20  
Although the United States Army (USA) has a description of their envisioned  
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), much of the associated equipment is still under 
development and exact sizes and weights cannot be determined.  The  
United States Marine Corps (USMC), however, has published a detailed description of 
their envisioned expeditionary brigade for the 2015 time frame.  Therefore, SEA-6 uses 
the USMC force numbers as a surrogate for analysis of a Joint Expeditionary Brigade 
(JEB) throughout the study, with the assumption that minor modifications to these force 
numbers would produce similar results. 
Particular focus is placed on the Seabasing issues revolving around the inter- and 
intratheater platforms and connectors for both airlift and sealift of forces, equipment, and 
logistical supplies in the 2015 time frame and beyond to 2025.  Systems and platforms 
are initially limited to those systems and platforms considered Programs of Record during 
FY 2004 and those that are currently in inventory and expected to remain active through 
the 2015 time frame.  Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and 
Advanced Concept Demonstrations (ACDs) are the primary materiel considerations for 
the 2015 to 2025 time frame.  Other factors are also addressed, including system 
                                                 
20 Honorable Gordon England (Secretary of the Navy), ADM Vern Clark (CNO), Gen. James Jones 
(CMC), “The Naval Transformation Roadmap,” July 2002. 
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reliability, supply consumption rates, sea-state effects, and vertical lift capacity.  The 
analysis is conducted using unclassified source material. 
In order to evaluate the logistics process in manageable pieces and put a boundary 
on the scope of effort, SEA-6 divides the Seabased JELo system operational flow into 
four functional subsystems: command and control (C2), inventory and storage, connector 
platforms (both sea and air), and transfer systems (between the connector platforms).  
Additionally, given the limited time frame and number of personnel to accomplish the 
study, SEA-6 narrows the scope of the project to the Closure, Employment, and 
Sustainment phases of Joint Expeditionary Operations.  Withdrawal and Reconstitution 
of forces are considered to be outside the scope for this study.  The details of these phases 
and their associated logistics concepts are described in Chapter 2 [Operating Concept]. 
 1.3.1 Simplifications 
Although Seabased combat operations may occur in any of the littoral regions of 
the world, day or night and in all weather,21 only weather up to sea state 4  
(4-8 ft waves)22 and sustained winds up to 20 kts23 are considered in this study. 
Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) are currently resupplied with the existing fleet of 
Combat Logistics Fleet (CLF) ships.  Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) operate 
independently of external logistical networks.  They provide all of the provisions and 
equipment to the embarked fighting force.  Therefore, the logistics needs of these  
Sea Base platforms are not considered in this study. 
Of the logistic commodities classes (I-X) for support of the JEB force and the  
Sea Base shown in Table 1-1, only food and water (Class I), fuel (Class III), and 
                                                 
21 All weather implies rain, snow, ice, reduced visibility, high and low temperatures. 
22 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 14. 
23 Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, The American Practical Navigator,  
1995 ed., Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, Bethesda, 1995, p. 535. 
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ammunition (Class V) are examined since they “make up 98% of the weight of daily 
replenishment requirements”24 for operations ashore. 
1.4 Methodology 
This section reviews the systematic approach SEA-6 uses to conduct its analysis 
of Seabasing and JELo. 
 1.4.1 Systems Engineering 
There are many systems engineering approaches and processes.  A definition that 
captures the essence of systems engineering originates from the International Council on 
Systems Engineering (INCOSE).  They define systems engineering as: 
Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and 
means to enable the realization of successful systems.  It focuses 
on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the 
development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding 






• Cost and Schedule 
• Training and Support 
• Disposal 
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and 
specialty groups into a team effort forming a structured 
development process that proceeds from concept to production to 
operation.  Systems Engineering considers both the business and 
the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a 
quality product that meets the user needs.”25 
This top-level definition of the systems engineering approach is useful in 
understanding the overarching principles that guide the systems engineering process, but 
                                                 
24 Center for Naval Analysis, “Project Culebra: Seabased Combat Service Support for Ship-to-Objective-
Maneuver,” [CNA CRM 95-144], September 1995, p. 11. 
25 “What is Systems Engineering,” available from http://66.34.135.97/whatis.html; accessed on  
03 November 2004. 
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it is not a cookie-cutter approach readily applied in every project.  Just as no two projects 
are exactly alike, no two systems engineering methodologies are exactly alike.  The 
systems engineering approach serves as a guide to the systems engineer and acts as a 
blueprint to frame a problem so validated “tools” or techniques can guide the design, test 
and evaluation of the overall system. 
 1.4.2 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
SEA-6 uses the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) as its systems engineering blueprint to guide the analysis 
of the Seabased and JELo problem.  JCIDS is the current DoD systems engineering 
framework approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to guide the services in 
system development and acquisition. 
The need for JCIDS stems from the traditionally inefficient and costly  
service-oriented practice of stove-piped acquisition, where single-service system 
solutions frequently result in a duplication of assets among the services.  JCIDS inspires 
more objective system analysis and joint war fighting needs prioritization.  It seeks to 
transform the services out of the stove-piped acquisition paradigm by providing a 
methodical process to identify, describe, and prioritize capability gaps.  In addition, the 
JCIDS approach promotes the exhaustion of often over-looked nonmateriel solutions 
prior to committing to costly materiel acquisition programs. 
JCIDS encompasses a structured, four-step methodology that identifies capability 
needs, capability gaps and approaches to provide capabilities within a specified 
functional or operational area.  The approach is based on national defense policy and is 
centered on Joint Operating Concepts and current integrated architectures.  The analysis 
enables the development of integrated joint capabilities from a common understanding of 
existing joint force doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
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personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities and deficiencies.26  A depiction of the 
JCIDS approach is shown in Figure 1-2. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Schematic of the DoD JCIDS Systems Engineering Approach.27 
 
JCIDS’ first step is the Functional Area Analysis (FAA).  The FAA identifies the 
operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives.  It uses 
DoD strategic guidance, Joint Operating Concepts, current integrated architectures, and 
the anticipated broad range of threat capabilities as input.  The output of the FAA is the 
tasks that are reviewed in the follow-on Functional Needs Analysis (FNA).28 
The second step of the JCIDS approach is the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA).  
It assesses the ability of current and programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the 
tasks identified in the FAA, under the full range of operating conditions, and to the 
designated standards.  The inputs to the FNA are the tasks identified during the FAA.  
The FNA’s output is a list of capability gaps or shortcomings that require solutions, as 
well as the time frame in which those solutions need to be addressed. 
The third step of the JCIDS approach is the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA).  
This phase is an operationally based assessment of potential DOTMLPF approaches to 
                                                 
26 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01D, 12 March 2004, Enclosure A, p. A-1. 
27 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01A, 24 June 2003, Enclosure A, p. A-1. 
28 Ibid., p. A-2. 
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solving one or more of the capability gaps identified in the FNA phase.  The outputs of 
the FSA phase are potential solutions to fill the gaps identified in the FNA phase.  This 
phase also specifies a priority of solutions in that alternative architecture designs first 
focus on nonmateriel solutions to narrow or close the capability gaps to prevent unneeded 
and costly new materiel starts.  Existing product improvements are the next priority, with 
costly and time-consuming new materiel acquisition programs as a last resort.29 
The final phase of the JCIDS analysis approach is the Post Independent Analysis.  
In this phase, the sponsor considers the compiled information and analysis results to 
determine which integrated DOTMLPF solution best addresses the joint capability gap in 
the functional area.30  This final JCIDS phase is out-of-scope for the SEA-6 project and is 
left to the project sponsors for their consideration. 
 1.4.3 SEA-6 Approach 
The JCIDS framework satisfies both the classical systems engineering process, as 
well as the unique DoD transformational need to improve interoperability and to exhaust 
nonmateriel solutions prior to implementing unneeded, costly and time-consuming 
materiel ones.  The classical systems engineering process maps directly to the four-step 
JCIDS process as depicted in Figure 1-3. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 















Figure 1-3: Mapping the Classical Systems Engineering Process to the Four-Step JCIDS Process. 
 
In the past, many SEA and DoD projects have focused on materiel acquisition 
solutions and failed to explore the significant amount of trade space that the additional 
nonmateriel analysis makes available.  The recent DoD change in systems engineering 
toward JCIDS analysis permits SEA-6 to explore the additional nonmateriel trade-space 
and focus on both materiel and nonmateriel centric alternative solutions to fill capability 
gaps.  SEA-6 views the JCIDS approach as an extension of the classical systems 
engineering process and one that is tailored toward enhancing joint military operations.  
In the military environment, a materiel solution alone is insufficient to define an 
architecture or to create a complete war fighting solution.  Synchronization across the 
DOTMLPF spectrum is required to provide a balanced, cost-effective, and reliable  
war-fighting system.  SEA-6 uses the JCIDS with the system engineering process 
depicted in Figure 1-4 as a framework for the Seabasing and JELo study. 


















Figure 1-4: Flowchart of the SEA-6 JCIDS Framework. 
 1.4.4 Program Management Plan 
The first phase of the SEA-6 project is one of problem definition and organization 
into a team-of-teams that focuses toward a common goal.  Aiding SEA-6 in this endeavor 
is the JELo Project Management Plan (PMP).  The PMP defines the JELo tasking, 
problem definition, scope, system boundaries, and initial program assumptions and 
constraints.  It further defines program deliverables, quality assurance, and acts as a risk 
mitigation tool by which schedule risk may be evaluated against the budgeted work 
breakdown structure. 
An additional role of the PMP is to depict both the SEA-6 external and internal 
team organization.  The Seabasing JELo problem is complex and collaborative 
partnerships with external research teams is essential for successful project completion.  
A list of collaborative partnerships for the SEA-6 Seabasing JELo project is found in 
Table 1-3. 
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External Partnership Location Level of Effort 
Total Ship Systems Engineering 
(TSSE) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS),  
Monterey, CA 
Design of an alternative solution High Speed 
Assault Connector. 
N703 
(CDR Mark Becker) 
Pentagon, VA Responsible for the Seabasing Transformation 
Roadmap.  Share ideas with SEA-6 concerning 
Sea Base Operating Concept (OPSCON).  
Parallel effort to determine the most effective 
mix of Sea Base components, interfaces, and 
operations.  Main focus on major theater of war 
scenarios vice small-scale operations.  Using 
Extend™ to develop a Sea Base simulation. 
N42 
(LCDR Futcher) 
Crystal City, VA Share ideas with SEA-6 concerning the  
Sea Base Logistics CONOPS. 
Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) 
Quantico, VA Supporting information on 2015 Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade components  
and operations. 
Naval Research Advisory Committee 
(NRAC) 
 Share preliminary findings concerning capability 
gaps.  Review of NRAC Seabasing study for the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and 
Development (ASN (RD&A)). 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) 
(Mr. Jeff Koleser) 
Carderock, MD Parallel analysis of the Seabasing JELo problem 
with specific focus on generating operational 
requirements for connector and transfer systems.  
Share ideas and data concerning at-sea,  
skin-to-skin transfer mechanisms.  Using 
Extend™ to develop a Sea Base simulation. 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) 
(Mr. Steve Wynn) 
Carderock, MD Supporting cost data and performance 
specifications for the Rapid Strategic Lift Ship 
(RSLS). 
NSWC Pt. Hueneme 
(Mr. Marvin Miller) 
Pt. Hueneme, CA Supporting information on connected 
replenishment and skin-to-skin transfer programs 
and technologies. 
NDIA-Sea Viking 2004 War Game Quantico, VA Sea Viking 04 (SV04), a two-week U.S. Joint 
Forces Command and Marine Corps experiment 
examining how to best project joint force power 
ashore relying heavily on a joint Sea Base. 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)  Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F) 
Analysis of Alternatives Study. 
Operations Research Department  
War Game 
(LTC Saverio Manago) 
NPS, Monterey, CA Participation to gain a different perspective on 
the performance of the 2015 Baseline 
Architecture based on man-in-the-loop 
simulation. 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT) 
Dayton, OH SEA-6 generation of operational requirements 
for AFIT design of Joint Air Operations Center 
(JAOC). 
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC)-
Monterey 
NPS, Monterey, CA Supporting information for Army BCT. 
Operations Research Department 
(LtCol Greg Mislick) 
NPS, Monterey, CA Supporting information for cost estimation  
and analysis. 
Information Systems Department 
(Prof. Rex Buddenberg) 
NPS, Monterey, CA Supporting information for command and control 
system composition and analysis. 
 
Table 1-3: SEA-6 External Team Collaborative Partners. 
 
External team relationships are important since they define the  
chain-of-command and hierarchal relationships of the integrated and collaborative 
    18
partnership teams.  The hierarchal relationship diagram governing the SEA-6 JELo 
collaborative partnerships is depicted in Figure 1-5. 
 
 
Figure 1-5: SEA-6 JELo Collaborative Partnership Hierarchal Chart. 
 
Internal team organization and alignment is also a top priority in order to meet 
milestone requirements.  A literature review of prior studies and an analysis of 
alternatives suggest that the most critical JELo functional areas contributing to capability 
gaps correspond to the following functional subsystems: 
1. Command and control. 
2. Inventory and storage management. 
3. Transfers at nodes between transportation connectors. 
4. Point-to-point transportation connectors. 
SEA-6 utilizes a competency-aligned organizational structure to build subject 
matter expertise along these subsystem functional areas.  This competency alignment 
provides the backbone for the organization of the SEA-6 Team.  Integrated product teams 
(IPTs) are developed to form a matrix organization to tackle specific tasks across the core 
competency functional areas.  This competency aligned organization is envisioned to 
form the structure depicted in Figure 1-6.  The command and control team serves as the 
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foundation for the JELo system and the other three functional teams form the support 







































































Figure 1-6: SEA-6 Project Team Internal Competency Alignment Organization. 
 1.4.5 Operating Concept 
The first step in JCIDS is the Functional Area Analysis (FAA).  However, before 
the FAA can begin, one important question must be answered: “What do we want the 
system to accomplish?”  Answering this question requires research into published DoD 
strategic guidance concerning military objectives (i.e., Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Defense Planning Guidance, National Security Strategy of the United States, Joint Vision 
2020, etc.).  Other resources include the published Joint Operational Concepts (JOC), as 
well as planned integrated architectures.  Since much of the information for Seabasing 
and JELo is ill defined for the 2025 time frame, SEA-6 authored an Operating Concept to 
postulate its view of these operations in one coherent document.  The SEA-6 Operating 
Concept [Chapter 2] captures the general nature of operations independent from the level 
of war and enables the generation of traceable high-level mission requirements in the 
follow-on FAA. 
 1.4.6 Functional Area Analysis 
The FAA [Chapter 3] answers the question, “What needs to be done?”  It defines 
the tasks, conditions, and standards for Seabasing and JELo and draws on the SEA-6 
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OPSCON to provide the strategic and operational construct for the problem.  The output 
of the FAA is a list of Seabased JELo tasks derived from the Universal Joint Task List 
(UJTL) and a corresponding list of conditions and standards for each task.  These tasks, 
conditions and standards collectively form the operational requirements for the  
Seabased JELo system.  Design requirements from this analysis are furnished to the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Total Ship Systems Engineering curriculum for their 
collaborative design effort.  Additionally, these requirements are used in the design of the 
2015 Baseline Architecture [Chapter 5]. 
 1.4.7 Functional Needs Analysis 
The primary purpose of the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) [Chapters 4-11] is 
to evaluate a current or planned integrated architecture against the requirements 
generated in the FAA to identify any potential capability gaps.  The FNA helps answer 
the question, “What capability gaps exist between what we have now and what 
capabilities we will have with proposed future improvements?”  SEA-6 uses current 
(2004) Programs of Record to establish a 2015 Baseline Architecture for Seabasing and 
JELo operations.  The SEA-6 Team uses a trade study, analysis of alternatives, and 
literature review to select from existing systems and programs of record to form the  
2015 Baseline Architecture. 
SEA-6 then uses a simulation model to identify and quantify potential capability 
gaps of the 2015 Baseline Architecture.  The simulation model is designed as an 
extensible, parameterized model to simulate not only the 2015 Baseline Architecture, but 
also to accommodate the evaluation of alternative architecture designs.  A design of 
experiments is used to plan an efficient data collection effort.  Operational requirements 
generated in the FAA phase are used to formulate critical operational issues (COIs), 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of performance (MOPs) to evaluate 
system performance. 
A SEA-6 threat-based capability study results in the development of an 
operational scenario to judge system performance under realistic and expected 
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environmental and combative conditions.  Scenario effects are captured in the input 
variables of the simulation model to evaluate JELo system performance.  Additionally, a 
collaborative war game with the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations Research 
Department is conducted to gain a different perspective on the performance of the  
2015 Baseline Architecture based on man-in-the-loop simulation.  The cost of the  
2015 Baseline Architecture is also estimated to provide a baseline for future cost-benefit 
decisions concerning follow-on alternative architectures. 
 1.4.8 Functional Solution Analysis 
The Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) [Chapters 12-13] is the third and final 
phase of the SEA-6 systems engineering project.  The FSA helps answer the question, 
“How can we close or reduce the capability gaps?”  The Seabasing and JELo system 
capability gaps identified in the FNA are used as inputs for the design of alternative 
architectures.  The output of this phase includes designs of alternative architectures 
intended to close or reduce the capability gaps previously identified in the FNA.  
Additionally, the costs of these alternative architectures are estimated for comparison 
with the 2015 Baseline Architecture. 
SEA-6 divides into three competing design teams utilizing the DOTMLPF trade 
space to design alternative architectures for the 2025 time frame.  A sensitivity analysis 
of the JELo simulation model parameters is conducted to gain insight into the Seabasing 
and JELo system architecture component performance sensitivities enabling design teams 
to focus toward specific, high-impact DOTMLPF changes.  Alternative architectures are 
also subjected to the same scenario in the simulation model as the 2015 baseline, 
facilitating a side-by-side comparison.  This pair-wise comparison allows identification 
of any statistical or militarily significant performance gains and/or reductions in 
capability gaps realized by the alternative architecture designs. 
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2. OPERATING CONCEPT 
2.1 Overview 
This Operating Concept describes Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 
Six’s (SEA-6’s) postulated view of Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO) and the 
associated Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) in the 2025 time frame.  Emphasis is on 
full integration, where all aspects of United States-led military power are fused and 
synchronized and accommodate one or more allied partners.31  JEO can be considered in 
phases: Pre-Deployment, Closure, Employment, Sustainment, Withdrawal, and 
Reconstitution.  The SEA-6 Operating Concept is intended to describe the entire 
operation: 1) Pre-Deployment, 2) the application of military power until objectives are 
reached, and 3) the withdrawal and redeployment of that military power.  Figure 2-1 
depicts this operating concept. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Joint Expeditionary Operations. 
 
The Expeditionary Forces seize the initiative within 10 days, achieve the 
expeditionary objectives within 30 days, then reconstitute and redeploy within the next 
30 days.  The Expeditionary Logistics systems meet the demand of the  
Combined Task Force Commander (CTF CDR) without creating an operational pause. 
JEO apply to the full spectrum of conventional conflict whether against a  
Non-state Actor or a Near-Peer Competitor.  Mission capabilities range from  
                                                 
31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 2004, p. 7. 
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Presence/Deterrence Operations to Major Combat Operations just short of  
Strategic Nuclear War, as shown in Figure 2-2.32 
Adversaries range from:











































Figure 2-2: Spectrum. 
 
These operations may occur in any of the littoral regions of the world, day or 
night, all weather,33 up to sea state 4 (6-8 ft. waves)34 and sustained winds up to  
20 kts.35  The Area of Operations (AO) and objectives are in a geographic location where 
conventional access (road/rail, neighbor over flight, and/or permissive port/airfield 
facilities) is not available.  The objectives may be at sea, on land, in the air, in space, or in 
                                                 
32 OPNAV N703, Sea Basing Concept of Operations (CONOPS), DRAFT, unpublished PowerPoint brief, 
11 March 2004, p. 10. 
33 All weather implies rain, snow, ice, reduced visibility, high and low temperatures. 
34 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 14. 
35 Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, The American Practical Navigator, 
1995 ed., Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, Bethesda, 1995, p. 535. 
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cyberspace.  Power is projected and sustained from a Sea Base in crises or conflicts 
where a Sea Base adds combat capability.36 
2.2 Planning 
Although some situations may be preplanned, expeditionary implies rapid 
response using Crisis Action Planning procedures.37  As such, the CTF may be forming 
and planning while the expeditionary forces are en route to the AO. 
2.3 Pre-Deployment Phase 
The Pre-Deployment Phase describes the configuration and disposition of the  
Expeditionary Forces (EXFORCES), shown abstractly in Figure 2-3 with no preexisting 
connections.  Since JEO applies at the operational level of war, the situation is described 
in terms of Space, Force, and Time. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Pre-Deployment. 
                                                 
36 Sea Basing CONOPS, pp. 1-3. 
37 May be en route to the AO on any of the Connectors. 
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 2.3.1 Space 
The Area of Operations (AO) may include limited38 land-based  
Forward Logistics Sites (FLSs)39 which support the EXFORCES.  These FLSs are as far 
as 2,00040 NM from the AO (actual transit distances may be longer due to geography).41  
Critical straight-line air routes are not available and plans are based on flight through 
international airspace.42  The littoral region of the AO may include regions that are both 
favorable and unfavorable43 to amphibious landings. 
 2.3.2 Force 
EXFORCES are those that… 
 “…are rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable 
throughout the global battlespace regardless of antiaccess, 
or area-denial environments and independent of existing 
infrastructure.  Designated elements based in the  
United States, abroad or forward deployed [are] configured 
for immediate employment and sustained operations in 
austere environments.  These forces [are] capable of 
seamlessly transitioning to sustained operations as a crisis 
or conflict develops.”44 
Dependent on the nature of the conflict, the EXFORCE will either accomplish 
limited operational objectives itself, or prepare the battlespace for follow-on forces and 
sustained operations.  Where it adds cost-effective combat power, the Joint Expeditionary 
Forces (JEFs) use common expeditionary equipment.45 
                                                 
38 The requirement for expeditionary forces is driven, in part, by an antiaccess environment.  As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that the number available will not be in the ideal location nor have every  
desired capability. 
39 Schrady, David, Professor, “Joint Sea Basing Logistics: Analysis Roadmap,” unpublished notes,  
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 30 April 2004. 
40 OPNAV N42 Draft Sea Base Logistical CONOPS, 04 June 2004. 
41 May be the case when a strategic strait is between the FLS and the AO. 
42 The whole Sea Base concept assumes an antiaccess environment.  This would be worst case.  
Additionally, many U.S. strategic lift aircraft do not have Global Airspace Management Technology 
(United States Air Force Vision 2020). 
43 Examples: mangrove swamps, high-rugged cliffs, barrier reefs/islands, etc. 
44 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts, November 2003. 
45 Certain units may require unique equipment. 
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The Combined46 Expeditionary Force is a United States-dominated, joint force 
augmented by one or more allied partners.  This force uses the Component Commander 
construct as used in the Joint Component Commander organization.  JEFs are fully 
integrated.47  Specifically, they share common equipment, training, doctrine, and 
terminology.  These forces range in size from a two-man Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) unit to a Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB)-sized force (~14,500 personnel; 
~4,800 of which are ground combat troops).48  Some elements of EXFORCES are 
forward deployed.49  EXFORCES and their materiel will be moved, assembled and 
sustained using multimode vehicles called connectors.  EXFORCES and their materiel 
are transferred between separate connectors and between connectors and geographic 
objectives by means of transfer systems. 
The core competency of the Combined Land Component is sustained, medium 
and heavy ground combat.  The expeditionary elements (EXFOR LAND) of the 
Combined Land Component include land-focused SOF, light, some medium ground 
forces, and their support. 
The core competency of the Combined Maritime Component is sea power and 
sealift.  The expeditionary elements (EXFOR SEA) of the Combined Maritime 
Component include Sea Base, expeditionary force protection and expeditionary strike. 
The core competency of the Combined Air Component is air power and airlift.  
The expeditionary elements (EXFOR AIR) of the Combined Air Component include 
rapid, long-range strike, mobility, and sustainment. 
                                                 
46 U.S. Joint Force and another state entity. 
47 Modeled after the SOF and Special Operations Command, Commander Forces. 
48 Approximate JEB size, based on the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Baseline Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of February 2002 (the 2015 MEB) or the combination of an Army Stryker 
Brigade and a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit. 
49 National Military Strategy, 2004, p. 10. 
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 2.3.3 Time 
Within ten days of the Deployment Order,50 the CTF CDR will seize the initiative 
by putting the preliminary elements51 of the ground forces at the initial objectives.  These 
objective(s) may be within 240 miles52 of the Sea Base.  The Sea Base may be within  
25-100 miles of the coastline.53  The preliminary elements shall deploy to the initial 
objective(s) within one period of darkness (10 hrs).54  These elements are able to either 
complete the operation or prepare the battlefield for follow-on forces.  Expeditionary 
operations end when the operation’s objectives are met or when the strategic environment 
warrants for the combined force to shift to traditional follow-on support.  The 
EXFORCES will then withdraw, reconstitute, and redeploy.  Some or all portions of the 
initial expeditionary force may remain behind with the follow-on forces. 
 2.3.4 Threat 
The assumed threat includes any adversary ranging from non-state actors 
(terrorists, insurgents, etc.) with low technology to a near-peer competitor with one or 
more comparable or superior defense technologies.55  In both cases, the potential for 
highly asymmetric threats is assumed. 
2.4 Pre-Deployment Phase Logistics Concepts 
Table 2-1 lists the critical logistics concepts needed to enable the  
Pre-Deployment phase. 
                                                 
50 Quote by VADM Nathman in the Navy League of the United States, June 2004. 
51 Preliminary elements will vary by situation and objectives within that situation.  Table summaries of 
these elements are provided in Enclosure 1A and 1B of Chapter 5. 
52 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 14. 
53 Ibid., p. 15. 
54 Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
Capability List,” 16 June 2003, p. 21. 
55 National Military Strategy, 2004, p. 2. 
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Functional Area Associated Logistics Concepts 
Command and Control • Uses self-forming, rapid, reliable networks 
• Integrates operational and logistical information flows 
• Uses synergistic command structures 
• Ensures operational security through secure networks 
• Is unaffected by environmental conditions 
• Integrates warriors, sensors, networks, platforms, and weapons over a range 
of distances 
• Provides disposition of forces information where needed in a timely manner
• Scales to operation 
Inventory and Storage • Scales to operation 
• Incorporates diverse and adaptable materiel handling systems 
• Minimizes the number of materiel relocations and handling before reaching 
ultimate destination(s) 
• Protects cargo from environmental damage 
• Protects cargo from motion damage 
• Restock/resupply of forces does not impact operations 
• Manages inventory to achieve consistent visibility and tracking from the 
strategic to the operational 
• Utilizes adaptive stowage systems for ease of selective offloading and 
flexibility of materiel handling 
• Standardizes joint packaging for shipping, handling, and storage 
• Enhances survivability so that Stow and Breakout operations do not impede 
operational capabilities 
• Provides for Intermediate Maintenance capabilities 
• Automates movement of supplies onboard individual Sea Base platforms 
Connectors • Reach around the globe  
• Scale to conflict level 
• Berth and sustain crew and troops 
• Interface with the Forward Logistics Site(s) 
• Transfer materiel and personnel (onload/offload) while underway 
• Survive expected threats 
• Integrate with the Expeditionary Force Protection 
• Defend themselves commensurate with their role (transport/Sea Base) 
• View sufficient Common Operational Picture (COP) elements to meet 
mission tasking 
• Support Unmanned Vehicle (UV) operations 
• Interface among each other and the Sea Base 
• Carry, deploy, and support Preliminary Elements 
• Handle medical specific functions (air handling, fluid handling, x-ray, O2) 
• Berth wounded personnel 
• Use modular repair facilities that are equipment- /parts-oriented 
• Maintain mobility against expected combat damage 
• Augment Underway Replenishment (UNREP)/Vertical Replenishment 
(VERTREP)/Connected Replenishment capabilities 
• Enable assembly of personnel and materiel 
• Reconfigure to meet mission requirements 
• Scale in capacity, speed, range, and interoperability 
• Balance between onload/offload speed and platform stability/maneuvering 
• Maintain capacity, speed, range, and interoperability so that weather effects 
don’t adversely impact operational tempo 
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• Have sufficient throughput to meet logistical needs 
• Maintains sufficient availability to complete mission 
Transfers • Move all types of personnel and materiel (Class I-X—see 
definition/examples in Glossary, water, and MISC) between all types of 
connectors (large, small, surface, air) 
• Move personnel and materiel between connectors in sea states 0-5 and in 
sustained winds of up to 20 kts 
• Move materiel in all weather conditions (rain, sleet, snow, ice, low 
visibility) so that operational tempo is not degraded 
• Ensure equipment materiel condition is durable to withstand long-term 
exposure to the natural elements 
• Maintains sufficient availability to complete mission 
 
Table 2-1: Pre-Deployment Associated Logistics Concepts. 
 
2.5 Closure Phase 
Once the nation decides to employ military power, the JEB begins closing on the 
AO.  Portions of forces come direct from forward locations, some forces direct from 
home base and some forces through a Forward Logistics Site (FLS) on their way to the 
AO.  Because of their location and equipment, key elements of these forces arrive ahead 
of the others. 
 2.5.1 Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
As the EXFORCES are closing toward the objective, strategic, operational, and 
tactical intelligence preparation of the battlespace will begin or intensify.  Space, air, sea, 
land, and cyberspace assets will deploy, gather, fuse, and disseminate intelligence. 
 2.5.2 Special Operations Force 
All Special Operations Forces (SOF) are jointly commanded and controlled and 
may be comprised of forces from all of the services.  SOF perform various missions such 
as Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Psychological Operations, Combat Search and 
Rescue, etc.56  These missions occur prior to and/or during the formation of the Sea Base.  
Prior to the formation of the Sea Base, SOF insertion, support, sustainment, and 
extraction comes from the continental United States or an FLS.  Communications are 
                                                 
56 Federation of American Scientists, Special Operations Force Reference Manual, Website: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1, [June 2004]. 
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established between the SOF unit and the CTF CDR; however, once the Sea Base has 
formed, those units already deployed or any additional SOF required may be supported 
from the Sea Base. 
 2.5.3 Expeditionary Force Protection 
Expeditionary force protection projects layered organic and external defensive 
power to protect joint and combined assets and to dissuade and deter possible adversaries 
during expeditionary operations.  Expeditionary force protection defends against the 
threats described in Section 2.3.4.  The Seabased Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) 
system supports the requirements of Expeditionary Force Protection. 
 2.5.4 Expeditionary Strike 
Expeditionary strike provides offensive lethal and nonlethal effects to shape the 
battlespace as EXFORCES are closing on the AO, as shown in Figure 2-5.  It includes the 
use of Joint and Combined strike aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as assault forces, 
information operations, and SOF.  The expeditionary logistics systems, including  
Sea Base, support the requirements of expeditionary strike. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Closure (Cont.). 
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 2.5.5 Sea Base Formation 
The Sea Base is considered established when there is sufficient  
Command and Control (C2) and logistical systems in the maritime environment to 
support expeditionary operations, shown in Figure 2-6.  The composition of the Sea Base 
will vary depending on the requirements and tempo of expeditionary operations. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Sea Base Formation. 
2.6 Employment Phase 
Forcible Entry Operations are used in a nonpermissive environment to locate, 
counter, or penetrate vulnerable seams in an adversary’s access denial system to enable 
the flow of follow-on forces.  The essence of Forcible Entry Operations is  
Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), in order to expedite the speed of action relative to 
the enemy over time.  This superior tempo uses the rapid buildup of focused combat 
power ashore via vertical and surface lift capabilities, tactical/operational flexibility, and 
maneuver at and from the sea.57 
                                                 
57 Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), Concept Paper,  
25 July 1997. 
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2.7 Closure and Employment Phase Logistics Concepts 
 Table 2-2 lists the key logistics concepts needed to support the Closure and 
Employment Phase. 
 
Functional Area Associated Logistics Concepts 
Command and Control • Same as Pre-Deployment 
Inventory and Storage • Reduces the time required for assembly of forces and equipment 
Connectors • Have space and modular facilities to support en route and  
on-station planning 
• Possess space and facilities to complete final assembly of EXFORCES 
(forces should be assembled to maximum extent possible prior to onload) 
• Support SOF equipment and operations  
• Secure SOF equipment and information 
• Maintain forward progress sufficient to preserve operational tempo 
• Resupply in transit up to sea state 5 
• Interface among each other and the Sea Base 
• Launch and recover strike assets 
• Transport and sustain strike-specific personnel and equipment 
• Keep position within the Sea Base and within the AO 
• Keep station automatically at commander’s desire 
• Work with Transfers to move personnel and materiel within the Sea Base 
• Work with Transfers to move personnel and materiel to and from the  
Sea Base 
Transfers • Are on-station in the AO in time to enable the formation of the Sea Base 
and/or expeditionary operations 
• Are operational within a short time period to enable short-fused movement 
of materiel and personnel 
• Are interoperable with connector equipment to enable in-transit supply  
of materiel 
• Utilize equipment that is hardened against expected threats 
• Can decontaminate arriving personnel and materiel 
• Maintain operability against expected combat damage 
• Maintain sufficient throughput to complete mission 
 
Table 2-2: Closure Associated Logistics Concepts. 
2.8 Sustainment Phase 
At some point, a majority of the force is employed at the objective(s) and 
operations have reached a steady level of effort.  Figure 2-7 shows the level of 
complexity of the logistics lines needed to support this phase. 
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Figure 2-6: Sustainment Operations. 
 2.8.1 Sustainment Operations Concept 
Geographically, objectives may be widely scattered throughout the AO as shown 
in Figure 2-8.58  The objectives during Expeditionary Operations generally fall into two 
categories.  The first objectives are those that delay/deter/defeat enemy forces to prevent 
them massing their own combat power.  The second set of objectives enable  
Follow-on Forces, if necessary.  This second set of objectives focuses primarily on 
logistics enablers: beachheads, ports, airfields, landing zones, etc.  Some objectives are 
time phased and other objectives are simultaneous.  Each specific situation determines 
the order in which the forces engage these objectives, if at all.  Only force size constrains 
the number and sequence of objectives engaged.  The logistics system does not impede 
the number of objectives or the tempo of the operation. 
                                                 
58 Expeditionary Operations Area/Sea Base Operations Area is that volume that extends out to 240 NM 
from the Sea Base. 
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(from N42 Seabasing Logistics CONOPS)
 
 
Figure 2-7: Dispersed Objectives. 
 2.8.2 Sustained Expeditionary Operations 
Sustained expeditionary operations (Figure 2-8) are those that last 30 days or 
longer.  During this period, EXFORCES at the objectives receive supplies from the  
Sea Base at distances up to 200 NM. 
2.9 Sustainment Phase Logistics Concepts 
Table 2-3 lists the key logistics concepts needed to support the  
Sustainment Phases. 
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Functional Area Associated Logistics Concepts 
Command and Control • Same as Pre-Deployment 
Inventory and Storage • Predicts resupply of EXFORCES 
• Provides medical support to include rapid movement of medical casualties 
when required 
• Permits simultaneous Sea Base and land-based logistics 
• Allows for a smooth transition from Sea Base logistics to  
land-based logistics (as ports and/or bases become available) 
• Ensures adequate decontamination facilities are available for the Sea Base 
and the EXFORCES 
Connectors • Change configuration to support given mission 
• Have organic C2 facilities and support modular C2 additions that scale to 
mission requirements 
• Decontaminate themselves 
• Assist in the decontamination of other platforms 
Transfers • Scale to operations 
• Move personnel and materiel between Connectors at a sufficient throughput 
so that operational tempo is not degraded 
• Move standardized containers (cubic size, weight, dimensions) 
• Move oversized materiel 
• Move wheeled/motorized vehicles 
• Move materiel between airborne Connectors and surface 
Connectors/objective 
• Move wounded personnel quickly without causing further injury (i.e., low 
vibration, low acceleration/deceleration forces, protection from the elements)
 
Table 2-3: Employment and Sustainment Associated Logistics Concepts. 
2.10 Reconstitution Phase 
Depending on the operation, the EXFORCES either return to the Sea Base or 
remain engaged and new EXFORCES repopulate the Sea Base.  EXFORCES  
“left behind” reconstitute as part of the sustained operations forces reconstitution59 effort 
and redeploy as needed.  Seabased EXFORCES reconstitute as the Sea Base is 
redeploying and/or relocating. 
 2.10.1 Withdrawal 
Once the EXFORCES complete the desired objectives, they start to flow away 
from the objectives and out of the AO. 
                                                 
59 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 28. 
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 2.10.2 Sea Base Reconstitution 
Due to equipment failure, combat losses, and/or higher direction, the Sea Base 
itself may need to be reconstituted.  The Sea Base Commander, CTF CDR, and the 
Regional Combatant Commander combine to restore the Sea Base to the required  
mission capability. 
2.11 Withdrawal and Reconstitution Phase Logistics Concepts 
Table 2-4 lists the key logistics concepts needed to support the Withdrawal and 
Reconstitution Phase. 
Functional Area Associated Logistics Concepts 
Command and Control • Same as Pre-Deployment 
Inventory and Storage • Enables rapid reconstitution of forces 
• Allows for a smooth transition from Sea Base logistics to  
land-based logistics (as ports and/or bases become available) 
Connectors • Provide space and facilities for force reconstitution 
• Provide space and facilities to repackage returning forces 
• Resupply, reload, and reconfigure the Sea Base platforms 
• Maneuver to orderly disband the force 
Transfers • Are reliable, maintainable, available and supportable so as not to impact the 
operational tempo 
• Move personnel and materiel day or night 
• Move personnel and materiel between connectors within the Sea Base 
 
Table 2-4: Withdrawal and Reconstitution Associated Logistics Concepts. 
2.12 Sea Base Dissolution 
At the conclusion of expeditionary operations and when ordered, the components 
of the Sea Base will detach and proceed on duties assigned.  The Sea Base is formally 
dissolved when C2 and logistics systems support for current expeditionary operations are 
no longer required. 
2.13 Command and Control 
The CTF CDR has superior situational awareness of the AO.  This situational 
awareness includes near-real time visibility on logistics information that prevents 
logistics from impeding operations.  This logistics information is contained in the 
Common Logistics Picture, a subset of the Common Operational Picture.  The CTF CDR 
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sets transport cargo priorities based on the nature of the operations.  His designated 
representative manages the real-time transport operations. 
The CTF CDR designates a Sea Base Commander.  The Sea Base Commander is 
in charge of coordinating Sea Base components to support the operations.60  While the 
CTF CDR may not actually be in the Sea Base, the Sea Base Commander is embarked on 
the Sea Base.  “[The] CTF Commander needs must drive the logistics process.  He should 
have an in-theater Regional Logistics Commanding Officer to manage all common 
support/services in theater (peacetime training and war).  The Regional Logistics 
Commanding Officer reports directly to the CTF Commander.”61 
2.14 Medical Operations 
The EXFORCE has organic medical capability to treat personnel and the capacity 
to move their force to dedicated medical facilities (afloat or ashore).62  Medical 
evacuation priorities for the connectors are set locally based on triage information from 
the objectives.  Critically injured personnel receive advanced care within 1 hr of injury.63  
EXFORCE medical capability also supports the post-expeditionary operations as 
required. 
2.15 Maintenance and Repair 
Engaged EXFORCES will have only limited repair capability and resources 
organic in the field.  However, to maintain speed of maneuver, disabled equipment may 
be replaced vice repaired.  At the appropriate time during operations, a more capable 
repair team can be deployed to the disabled equipment.  To mitigate this need, 
expeditionary equipment is highly reliable and easily repairable.  FLSs and the  
                                                 
60 The role of the Sea Base Commander is similar to a current U.S. Naval Base Commanding Officer (CO).  
Specifically, the Naval Base CO coordinates all of the base’s functions to best support tenant commands 
and forces. 
61 Defense Science Board 1998 study on Department of Defense (DoD) Logistics Transformation, Vol. II. 
62 Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council Executive Summary: Maritime Prepositioning Force 
(Future) Capabilities Update and Center for Naval Analysis, Analysis of Alternatives In Progress Review 
Update #3, 17 September 2003, p. 15. 
63 For certain critical cases (severe burns, internal bleeding, etc.), probability of survival increases 
dramatically if advanced trauma care can be administered within 1 hr.  [“Golden Hour” from Website 
www.wikipedia.org, June 2004]. 
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Sea Base have limited on-board maintenance and repair.  Sea Base maintenance and 
repair capability is primarily for connectors, specifically for the hard to resupply, hard to 
remove-and-replace equipment.  The Sea Base can also maintain and repair critical 
embarked equipment. 
2.16 Survivability 
Survivability ensures the functional effectiveness of the expeditionary force that is 
degraded by damage.  Survivability encompasses both susceptibility and vulnerability.  
Logistic forces, platforms, sites, transportation modes, lines of communication, and bases 
are all high-value targets.  Ships, aircraft and bases are vulnerable to direct attack by 
enemy forces or terrorists.64  All connectors whose mission is to transport expeditionary 
troops and materiel into a hostile environment and maintain station provide  
self-protection for personnel from expected hostile threats.  Connectors whose primary 
mission is to shuttle expeditionary personnel and materiel between a non-hostile logistics 
hub and the AO provide defense and protection against asymmetrical terrorist threats.  
Connectors whose mission is to shuttle personnel and equipment within the AO to the 
objective protect themselves and their personnel from expected threats. 
2.17 Decontamination 
Should the expeditionary forces receive nuclear, biological, or chemical 
contamination at the objectives, the contaminated equipment will be decontaminated 
prior to returning to the Sea Base.65  The Sea Base components have organic 
decontamination for their own equipment. 
2.18 Summary 
This Operating Concepts sets the stage for follow-on analysis through the 
Functional Area Analysis (FAA).  Operational phases of Closure, Employment, and 
Sustainment require detailed definition regarding both process and conditions under 
which the EXFORCE will operate. 
                                                 
64 Marine Corps Warfare Publication 3.21.2, Aviation Logistics, p. 4015. 
65 This precludes contaminating the Connectors. 
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3. FUNCTIONAL AREA ANALYSIS 
3.1 Overview 
The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) identifies the operational tasks, conditions, 
and standards that collectively form the requirements needed to achieve the military 
objectives involved in Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo).  To identify 
these requirements, SEA-6 uses the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and the  
Operating Concept (OPSCON) in Chapter 2 of this report.  The UJTL is a guide to, 
“…provide a standardized tool for describing requirements for planning, conducting, 
evaluating and assessing joint and multinational training.”66  The UJTL is organized 
according to the three levels of war and includes joint/interoperability tactical tasks and 
the applicable Service tasks as follows: 
• Strategic level - National military tasks 
• Strategic level - Theater tasks 
• Operational level tasks 
• Tactical level tasks 
The requirements identified in the FAA are inputs to the Functional Needs 
Analysis (FNA) phase to assist in the identification of capability gaps or shortcomings 
that require solutions.  Additionally, the information in the FAA is furnished to the  
Naval Postgraduate School Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) curriculum for their 
collaborative design effort of a high-speed assault connector. 
3.2 Tasks and Conditions 
Seabasing and JELo require that unique tasks be accomplished under a variety of 
conditions.  Figure 3-1 illustrates the link between high-level UJTL tasks across the three 
levels of warfare (strategic, operational, and tactical).  The SEA-6 functional teams 
identify these high-level tasks that enable Seabasing operations.  Table 3-1 shows the link 
between the high-level UJTL tasks and the Seabased JELo operational phases  
(as described in the OPSCON) that are within scope of the SEA-6 analysis. 
                                                 
66 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCSM 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List Version 4.2, 
p. 1. 
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Figure 3-1: UJTL Task Linkage with Levels of Warfare. 
 
OPERATIONAL PHASE TASK DESCRIPTION
ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate and Maneuver Theater Forces
OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver
Employment Phase TA 1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver
OP 4 Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support
OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control (C2)
TA 4 Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support





Table 3-1: Seabased JELo Operational Phases and Associated UJTL Tasks. 
 
Operational conditions are the variables of an operational environment or 
situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect 
performance.67  Conditions are organized by three broad categories: physical, military, 
and civil.  The conditions applied to the Closure, Employment, and Sustainment Phases 
of Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO) are listed in Figure 3-2.  This study does not 
address and civil environment conditions. 
                                                 
67 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manual 3500.04C, 01 July 2002, Universal Joint Task List 
Version 4.2, Glossary, Definitions, p. 1. 
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Figure 3-2: UJTL Conditions. 
 
Each task in Table 3-1 must be performed under a variety of conditions depending 
on the phase of operations.  Conditions are expressed within the framework of the phrase, 
“Perform this task under conditions of….”68  This phrase is useful when reading the 
tables of tasks and conditions associated with each operational phase in the  
following discussion. 
                                                 
68 Ibid., Enclosure 3, p. C-2. 
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3.3 Operational Standards 
Standards provide a way to express the level of proficiency required to 
accomplish the desired tasks under the stated conditions.69  The standards give the 
Combatant Commander a training guideline when evaluating the readiness of the force to 
accomplish the required mission. 
3.4 Closure Phase 
The Operating Concept [Chapter 2] states that once military force is required, a 
Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) begins closing on the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to 
seize the initiative within 10 days.  Forces may travel direct from forward locations, 
home base, or through a Forward Logistics Site (FLS).  Figure 3-3 shows the current 
locations of some U.S. military FLSs, which include Guam, Diego Garcia, Sigonella, and 
Rota.  Each FLS is depicted at the center of a 2,000 NM range ring.  The closure phase 
consists of force deployment, transit, and assembly. 
 
Figure 3-3: Positions of Current Forward Logistics Sites with 2,000 NM Range Rings.70 
                                                 
69 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCSM 3500.04C, 01 July 2002, Universal Joint Task List 
Version 4.2, Appendix B to Enclosure B, p. B-B-1. 
70 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC), Sea Base CONOPS Brief, April 2004. 
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 3.4.1 Deployment and Transit 
The UJTL contains subtasks that further define the high-level tasks under ST-1 
and OP-1 regarding deployment and transit to the JOA.  Table 3-2 shows this  
subtask breakdown. 
    CLOSURE PHASE 
TASK SUBTASK DESCRIPTION 
ST-1   Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces 
ST-1.1 Conduct intratheater strategic deployment 
ST-1.1.2.3 Provide onward movement in the theater 




  ST-1.3 Conduct theater strategic maneuver and force positioning 
OP-1  Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver 
OP-1.1 Conduct operational movement 
OP-1.1.2 
 
Conduct intratheater deployment and redeployment of 
forces within the joint operations area (JOA) 
OP-1.1.2.1 Conduct airlift in the joint operations area (JOA) 






  OP-1.3 Provide operational mobility 
 
Table 3-2: Deployment and Transit Subtasks. 
 3.4.2 Assembly 
The UJTL contains subtasks that further define the high-level tasks under ST-1 
and OP-1 regarding assembly of the JEB.  Table 3-3 shows this subtask breakdown.  
Figure 3-4 shows a generic timeline needed to seize the initiative within 10 days. 
    CLOSURE PHASE 
TASK SUBTASK DESCRIPTION 
ST-1   Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces 
  ST-1.2 Assemble forces 
OP-1   Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver 
OP-1.1.3 Conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 
integration (JRSOI) in the joint operations area (JOA) 
  
  
  OP-1.2.3 Assemble forces in the joint operations area (JOA) 
 
Table 3-3: Assembly Subtasks. 
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Employment of the 
Force to the Objective





Figure 3-4: Timeline for Force Closure. 
 
The high-level UJTL tasks associated with the closure phase are ST-1 and OP-1.  
Table 3-4 summarizes the tasks, associated conditions, and JELo requirements for the 
Closure Phase as defined by SEA-6. 
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Table 3-4: JELo Closure Phase Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements. 
3.5 Employment Phase 
The SEA-6 OPSCON [Chapter 2] specifies that the JEB be employed at the 
objective within one period of darkness (POD).  For this analysis, one period of darkness 
is defined as 10 hrs.71  The Employment Phase consists of task TA-1.  Table 3-5 lists the 
subtasks under TA-1.  Table 3-6 summarizes the task, associated conditions, and JELo 
requirements for the Employment Phase as defined by SEA-6. 
                                                 
71 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare List, 16 June 2003, p. 21. 
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    EMPLOYMENT PHASE 
TASK SUBTASK DESCRIPTION 
TA-1   Deploy/Conduct Maneuver 
TA-1.1.1  Conduct tactical airlift 
TA-1.1.4 Conduct sea and air deployment operations 
  
  
  TA-1.2.3  Conduct amphibious assault and raid operations 
 




Table 3-6: JELo Employment Phase Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements. 
 
3.6 Sustainment Phase 
There are two primary components of sustainment identified in the  
SEA-6 OPSCON [Chapter 2]:  sustainment of forces ashore and sustainment of the  
Sea Base.  This logistical sustainment includes provisions, ammunition, personnel, 
equipment, fuel, and other support.  The SEA-6 OPSCON states that both the Sea Base 
and the components ashore be sustained for a minimum period of 30 days.  The 
Sustainment Phase consists of tasks OP-4 and OP-5, as well as TA-4 and TA-5.   
Table 3-7 shows the subtasks for the Sustainment Phase.  Table 3-7 summarizes the tasks, 
associated conditions, and JELo requirements for the Sustainment Phase. 
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    SUSTAINMENT PHASE 
TASK SUBTASK DESCRIPTION 
OP-4  Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support 
 
4.1 Coordinate supply of arms, munitions, and equipment in the  
joint operations area (JOA) 
 4.2 Synchronize supply of fuel in the JOA 
 4.3 Provide for maintenance of equipment in the JOA 
 4.4.3.2 Manage flow of casualties in the JOA 
OP-5  Provide Operational Command and Control (C2) 
 5.1.1 Communicate operational information 
 5.1.4 Maintain operational information and force status 
TA-4   Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support 
  TA-4.2  Distribute Supplies and Provide Transport Services 
  TA-4.4  Conduct Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore Operations (JLOTS) 
 TA-5   Exercise C2 
 5.2.1 Establish, operate, and maintain baseline information exchange 
 
Table 3-7: Sustainment Phase Subtasks. 
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Table 3-8: JELo Sustainment Phase Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements. 
3.7 Summary 
These tasks, conditions, and standards further define Seabasing and JELo 
requirements.  Figure 3-3 lists the standards for the high-level UJTL tasks required to 
accomplish Seabased JELo operations.  This foundation feeds into the next project phase 
where the allocation of these requirements defines the systems and platforms required to 
provide the desired capabilities. 
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TASK DESCRIPTION STANDARDS
ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate and Maneuver Theater Forces
OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver
TA 1 Deploy/Conduct Maneuver
Complete Employment of 3 Battalion 
(2-Surface, 1-Vertical) Landing 
Teams Within One Period of Darkness 
(10 hours)
OP 4 Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support
OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control (C2)
TA 4 Perform Logistics and Combat Service Support
TA 5 Exercise Command and Control
Complete Closure Phase within 10 
Days of Deployment Order
Sustain the Joint Expeditionary 




Figure 3-5: JELo System Standards. 
    50
4. DESCRIPTION OF 2004 CAPABILITIES 
4.1 Overview 
The Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Chapter 3, describes the  
Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) requirements.  As mentioned in the Methodology 
portion of Chapter 1, the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) assesses current and 
programmed capabilities to meet those requirements.72  Other studies have also assessed 
current seabasing capability.  The purpose of this analysis is to identify and quantify the 
performance gaps between the capabilities of current (2004) systems and the 
requirements of the FAA. 
To achieve this, a current (2004) equivalent to the Joint Expeditionary Brigade 
(JEB) is defined, based on the 2015 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) described in 
Chapter 5.  Once the force is defined, then its seabasing capability is assessed.  Once a 
seabased JEB is defined, its performance against the key requirements of the FAA is 
assessed.  These key requirements are: 
• Can the combat maneuver element get boots on the ground within  
10 days? 
• Can the combat maneuver element deploy to the objective from the  
Sea Base within one 10-hr period of darkness? 
• Can the combat maneuver element be sustained at the objective for  
30 days? 
Performance against these requirements is assessed in several ways.  Previous 
analytical efforts recorded in the literature are reviewed.  The literature review, while 
extensive, is not exhaustive.  Where previous studies do not specifically address 
performance, or the performance assessment is vague, analysis is performed using 
simple, deterministic estimates.  Closure estimates are performed based on 
time/speed/distance against the South East Asia scenario (Andaman Sea/Burma) 
                                                 
72 CJCSM 3170.01A, “JCIDS Process,” 12 March 2004, p. A-2. 
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described in Chapter 9.  The 2004 systems are not modeled.  This analysis is conducted 
without any formal relationship with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC).  Outside 
interaction is limited to informal conversations with USMC personnel at the  
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and phone conversations with personnel on the 
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific staff. 
4.2 Joint Expeditionary Brigade Force 
Expeditionary brigades have existed throughout U.S. military history, and exist 
today.  In the last several years, the USMC has returned to the Expeditionary Brigade 
name and unit organization.  The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade Website shows that 
today’s MEB is well defined.73  Although expeditionary and amphibious, the current 
MEB is not purpose-built around the Sea Base concept.  Arriving at a 2004 equivalent to 
the future MEB concept described in Chapter 5 requires modifying the current MEB 
structure and organization.  This modification is based on the core unit of a MEB, the 
Battalion Landing Team (BLT).  The current packaging of a BLT is the  
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 
 4.2.1 Marine Expeditionary Unit74 
The MEU is task-organized to accomplish a broad range of mission requirements.  
With a total strength of about 2,200 personnel, the MEU is built around a reinforced 
infantry battalion, a composite aircraft squadron, and a service support group.  
Specifically, it is made up of a command element (CE); a reinforced infantry battalion as 
the ground combat element (GCE); a reinforced helicopter squadron as the aviation 
combat element (ACE); and a combat service support element (CSSE) designated the 
MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). 
The Command Element (CE) provides command and control of the three  
Major Subordinate Elements (MSEs). 
                                                 
73 “2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade,” (02 August 2004 [cited 20 November 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/2meb.htm. 
74 “Marine Expeditionary Unit,” (09 June 2003 [cited 20 November 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/meu.htm. 
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The Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MEU is a BLT, a reinforced infantry 
battalion of approximately 1,200 Marines, including three rifle companies.  This element 
normally includes artillery, engineers, light armored infantry, anti-armor, assault 
amphibian and division reconnaissance units as listed below: 
• Artillery battery configured with six 155mm howitzers.  The artillery 
battery includes its own truck platoon with a mix of 1-ton and 5-ton trucks 
for carrying ammunition and towing artillery pieces. 
• Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) detachment configured with  
16 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV). 
• Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) platoon configured with 15 AAVs. 
• TOW platoon: provides a heavy anti-armor capability with eight TOW 
anti-armor missile launchers. 
• Tank platoon (when required for a specific operation) configured with  
four M1A1 main battle tanks. 
The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of a MEU is a reinforced, medium-lift 
helicopter squadron.  The reinforcements include a mix of transport helicopters, attack 
helicopters, a detachment from the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), a Low Altitude 
Air Defense (LAAD) section and a detachment from the Marine Wing Support Group 
(MWSG), and VSTOL attack aircraft.  Land-based aerial refueling and transport aircraft 
provide support if within range.  A typical ACE includes: 
• Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM), configured with  
12 CH-46E helicopters, that provides medium-lift assault support and is 
the core of the ACE. 
• Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) detachment, configured with 
4 CH-53E helicopters, that provides extended-range, heavy-lift  
assault support. 
• Marine Light Attack Squadron (HMLA) detachment, configured with  
4 AH-1W attack helicopters and 3 UH-1N utility helicopters, that provides 
close air support, airborne command and control, and escort. 
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• Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) detachment, configured with  
6 AV-8B Harrier aircraft that provide organic close air support (when 
required for a specific operation; not all MEU deployments include the 
Harrier).  The AV-8B Harrier may be substituted for the attack 
helicopters.  When appropriate shipping (i.e., LHA, LHD) is not available, 
they are placed on CONUS standby and prepared to deploy within 96 hrs. 
• Marine Aerial Refueling/Transport Squadron (VMGR) detachment, 
configured with 2 KC-130 aircraft: in CONUS or at the forward logistics 
site, on standby and prepared to deploy within 96 hrs. 
• Marine Air Control Group (MACG) detachment that encompasses the 
LAAD battery detachment that provides low level, close-in air defense. 
The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) is formed from less than  
300 Marines and sailors.  It provides combat service support (i.e.,  supply, maintenance, 
transportation, explosive ordnance disposal, military police, disbursing (pay services), 
water production and distribution, engineering, medical and dental services, fuel storage 
and distribution) and other services to the deployed MEU. 
The MEU is normally embarked aboard three amphibious ships to form a 
forward-deployed, naval expeditionary force.  The unique capability of this force is to 
quickly employ armored forces, including M1A1 battle tanks and heavy assault vehicles, 
and logistically support them from the amphibious ships.  The Landing Craft Air 
Cushioned (LCAC) carry the heavy equipment ashore, while Amphibious Assault 
Vehicles (AAVs) carry the troops ashore.  Both launch via the well decks of the 
amphibious ships.  The helicopters bring troops, lighter vehicles, and supplies to  
the objective. 
To sustain themselves, the MEU brings 15 days of supplies in classes I, II, VIII, 
and IX.75  The amphibious ships themselves carry 15 days of class III (B), IV, and V 
                                                 
75 Global Security.org, “Classes and Subclasses of Supply,” 29 September 2002, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/supclass.htm> (04 November 2004). 
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aboard; these supplies constitute the Landing Force Operational Readiness Material 
(LFORM) to support the embarked MEU. 
 4.2.2 A MEB of MEUs 
Troops, vehicles, and assault connectors (surface craft and aircraft) are the major 
units of combat power in a MEU.  A MEB is approximated by aggregating equivalent 
numbers of these components.  The following calculations show the approximation.  
Table 4-1 shows the side-by-side comparison of key platforms.  Figure 4-1 shows a 
similar comparison. 
• 1 JEB SBME = 3 BLT ≈ 4,800 combat troops 
¾ 1 MEU ≈ 1,200 combat troops 
¾ MEU ≈ 4,800 combat troops 
¾ 1 JEB Sea Base Maneuver Element ≈ 4 MEU 
• 1 MEU ACE afloat ≈ 30 aircraft 
¾ MEU ACE afloat ≈ 120 aircraft 
¾ 1 JEB Sea Based ACE ≈ 120 aircraft ≈ 4 MEU 
• 3 BLT ≈ 500 vehicles ≈ 4 MEU 
¾ 1 MEU ≈ 120 vehicles 
¾ MEU ≈ 480 vehicles 
 
2004 MEB Combat Troops Tanks LAV AAV LCAC CH-46 CH-53 AV-8B AH-1/UH-1
Four MEUs 4,800 16 84 60 36 48 16 24 16/12 
2015 MEB Combat Troops Tanks LAV EFV LCAC MV-22 CH-53 JSF AH-1/UH-1
 4,845 20 75 98 24 48 20 36 18/9 
Table 4-1: Notional 2004 MEB vs. 2015 MEB. 
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Figure 4-1: MEB/MEU Comparison. 
The additional 1,200+ troops listed in the first column of the current MEB 
organization in Figure 4-1 do not deploy to the objective, making that total approximately 
4,800.  This estimate shows that 4 MEUs approximate the equivalent numbers of ground 
combat troops, equipment, and assault connectors as a MEB.  Although the  
four MEUs have significant fighting capability, they do not have equivalent logistical or 
command and control personnel.  The support structure in a MEB is not found within a 
MEU, even with multiple MEUs combined. 
4.3 Expeditionary Strike Group 
The current means of deploying a MEU is a U.S. Navy Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG), shown in Figure 4-2.  An ESG is built around a mix of amphibious ships 
(LHA, LPD and LSD)76 plus an escort force that includes a cruiser, destroyer, frigate and 
                                                 
76 “Expeditionary Strike Group” (02 August 2004 [cited 20 November 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/esg.htm. 
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submarine.  These escort ships provide Sea Shield for the ESG, as well as Sea Strike in 
the form of Tomahawk and gunfire support. 
 
Figure 4-2: Sample ESG.77 
In general, an ESG deploys with one big-deck amphibious ship and two smaller 
ones.  The big-deck ship will be either a LHA or a LHD.  An LHA-1 Tarawa Class can 
deploy approximately 1,800 Marines, 4 CH-53s, 12 CH-46s, 2 UH-1Ys, 4 AH-1Zs,  
6 AV-8Bs, and 4 LCACs via its well deck.  If the ESG deploys with a LHD vice an LHA, 
the LHD-1 Wasp Class can deploy 1,600-1,900 Marines and can carry 4 CH-53s,  
12 CH-46s, 4 UH-1Ys, 4 AH-1Zs, and 6 AV-8Bs.  Additionally, 3 LCACs and  
40 AAVs are deployed from the LHD via its well decks. 
The two additional smaller amphibious ships in an ESG are an LPD and LSD.  
The LPD-4 Austin Class can deploy 800 Marines by receiving and launching CH-46 and 
CH-53 helicopters and its own LCAC.  The last LPD Austin Class is expected to be 
decommissioned in 2008.  The LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class and the LSD-49  
                                                 
77 “Expeditionary Strike Group,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/esg.htm. 
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Harpers Ferry Class can deploy 400 Marines, 2 CH-53s, and 4 LCACs via a well deck.  
Table 4-2 summarizes the ESG amphibious ships and their embarked MEUs. 
 Combat Troops Tanks LAV AAV LCAC CH-46 CH-53 AV-8B AH-1/UH-1
LHA 600 4 8 0 4 12 4 6 4/3 
LHD 600 4 8 0 3 12 4 6 4/4 
LPD 400 0 0 15 1 0 0 0 0 
LSD 200 0 8 0 4 0 0 0 0 
Total MEU/ESG 1,200 4 16 15 9 12 4 6 4/3 
Four MEU/ESGs 4,800 16 84 60 36 48 16 24 16/12 
Table 4-2: Major Platforms of a ESG-based Notional 2004 MEB. 
4.4 Closure Phase 
As discussed in the JELo Operating Concept, Chapter 2, closure is the process or 
phase where troops and equipment move to the Sea Base.  System performance in the 
closure phase is highly dependent on the distance and speed the units must travel.  Other 
studies have assessed the closure performance of ESGs.  In 1998, the Naval Studies 
Board report on Naval Expeditionary Logistics78 said “30 days or more…”  In 2000, the 
OPNAV N7 Draft Sea Basing CONOPS,79 states “…4-6 weeks…”  In 2003, the OPNAV 
Naval Capabilities Plan80 states “within 14 days…”  Due to the variability in previous 
studies, one is performed here. 
 4.4.1 Closure Estimate 
Currently, there are 7 MEUs in the USMC.  At any given time, 1 is in Okinawa, 
Japan; 2 are on each coast of the U.S. (Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton); and 2 are 
forward-deployed in ESGs.  Figure 4-3 shows a notional distribution of ESGs.  
Historically, 1 ESG is deployed in the Mediterranean and 1 in the Pacific, including the 
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.  The performance estimate below assumes a peacetime 
deployment schedule that has only 2 MEUs forward-deployed at a time.  If the U.S. is 
                                                 
78 Naval Studies Board, “Naval Expeditionary Logistics,” (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 
1998), p. 3-1. 
79 OPNAV N7, “Draft Sea Basing CONOPS,” unpublished working papers, 11 March 2004, p. 6. 
80 Cited by Kaskin, Jonathan (OPNAV N42) in “Rapid Strategic Lift Ship Brief,” unpublished working 
papers, slide 5. 
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engaged in a major operation such as Iraq or Afghanistan, the time to close will be much 
longer, as they will have to prepare and deploy MEUs during their stand down period. 
 
Figure 4-3: Notional MEU Disposition. 
 
Closure performance is estimated using the following assumptions: 
• ESG Speed of Advance (SOA) = 15 kts; based on amphibious ship  
speed limitations.81 
• A deployed ESG can be headed toward the Area of Operations (AO) 
within 6 hrs.82 
• The nondeployed ESGs are at-sea, performing workups and can deploy in 
4 days (96 hrs). 
                                                 
81 LT Ivan Jimenez, LT Bill Partington, and LT John Gainey, interview, written notes, Monterey, CA,  
25 November 2004. 
82 2nd MEB Website: www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/2meb.htm. 
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Enclosure 1 shows the actual routes taken and time calculations from the various 
points of debarkation for deployed and nondeployed ESGs to the Andaman Sea as stated 
in the South East Asia Scenario (Burma) in Chapter 9.  Table 4-3 summarizes the 
estimated performance using these assumptions. 
 
START POSITION END DISTANCE (NM) ARRIVAL CHOKEPOINTS 
Persian Gulf Andaman Sea ~ 3,200 C + 8 Strait of Hormuz 
Japan Andaman Sea ~ 3,500 C + 9 Malacca Strait 
Mediterranean Andaman Sea ~ 5,600 C + 15 Suez Canal/Bab el Mandeb
Camp Pendleton Andaman Sea ~ 9,300 C + 24 Malacca Strait 
Camp Lejeune Andaman Sea ~ 9,900 C + 27 Suez Canal/Bab el Mandeb
Table 4-3: Time-Speed-Distance Calculations for MEU Arrival. 
This estimate shows that an ESG, transiting at 15 kts from the Persian Gulf, could 
be in the Andaman Sea in approximately 8 days.  The second ESG leaves from Japan, 
expending a day to load the Marines at Okinawa, and arrives at the AO in 9 days.  The 
third, next-closest ESG deploys from the Mediterranean Sea and arrives in approximately 
15 days.  In 16 days, three-fourths of the JEB is assembled and ready for operations.  The 
last ESG, assumed to be in workups such as Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX), sorties 
from the U.S.  This ESG takes an estimated 96 hrs to prepare and deploy.  Without 
considering the time to prepare forces to deploy, approximately 25-30 days of steaming 
are required to reach the objective area from either coast.  With the preparation and 
transit time, an estimated 30-35 days are required to arrive at the AO, which greatly 
delays the start of operations.  From the time the deployment order is given, it takes at 
least 30 days to begin an assault with a MEB-sized force supported completely by a  
Sea Base.  Figures 4-4 and 4-5 show a notional force arrival timeline.  Only 50% of the 
force is closed by day 10—a 50% gap.  Stated another way, the four ESGs arrive in  
28 days; 18 days longer than the required 10 days. 
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Figure 4-5: Combat Troop Arrival Timeline. 
 
4.5 Employment Phase 
Because the ESGs deploy with organic Sea Shield and Sea Strike capability, the 
ESG can go right to the AO and on to the Sea Base while protecting itself.  To employ, 
the 4-ESG Sea Base closes to 25 NM—the maximum range that assault craft can reach 
the shore and keep the ship out of any shore-based radar horizon.  Landing the BLTs will 
take approximately 12-24 hrs, but an additional 48-72 hrs is required to land all support 
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equipment and personnel.83  This delay for support materiel represents an operational 
pause for supply and reorganization.  This pause loses momentum, which decreases 
operational tempo.84  The following quotes from the 1998 Naval Studies Board report on 
Naval Expeditionary Logistics summarize their findings on employment:85 
 “…air (employment from 85 NM) …took 12 hrs…” 
 
“ …25 miles at sea…took 5 days…unacceptably long…” 
 
“To move…ashore in (2 days)… had to close within 4 miles…” 
 
Current MEU employment requires close coordination and effective command 
and control.  A detailed traffic flow plan and real-time coordination via radio is used to 
ensure proper synchronization and phasing, and to prevent congestion at the beach 
landing area.  For multiple MEUs into the same objective area, additional delay for 
friction is anticipated.  The MAGTF Planner’s Reference Guide allows up to 60 minutes 
per wave for friction.86 
4.6 Sustainment Phase 
The Sea Base concept envisions the troops ashore being resupplied from the ships 
of the Sea Base.  Implicit in this vision is that the ships themselves are resupplied. 
 4.6.1 ESG Sustainment 
Current ESG amphibious ships carry approximately 15 Days of Supply (DOS) of 
commodity class III, IV, and V for each MEU.87  If combat operations are expected to 
exceed 15 days, the ESG must be resupplied.  The larger amphibious ships can refuel the 
escort vessels, but they themselves need resupply.  Although all ships in the ESG are 
                                                 
83 CWO3 Jerousek III, Albert E, EXPWARTRAGRUPAC [albert.jerousek@navy.mil], “MEU Assault 
Timeline,” 09 November 2004, office communication (11 November, 2004).  Major Rosen, Kevin C., 
EXPWARTRAGRUPAC [kevin.rosen@navy.mil], “MEU Assault Timeline,” 09 November 2004, office 
communication (11 November 2004). 
84 Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  2003.  Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing. 
85 Naval Studies Board, “Naval Expeditionary Logistics,” p. 3-3. 
86 USMC, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Guide, April 2001, p. 35. 
87 “Marine Expeditionary Unit,” (09 June 2003 [cited 20 November 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/meu.htm. 
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capable of Underway Replenishment (UNREP), a Combat Logistics Force (CLF) 
resupply ship is not assigned to the ESG88.  The CLF supports the Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSG) and are not loaded with the USMC-specific materiel and ammunition.  
Resupplying the ESG requires either sending the amphibious ships to a secure forward 
logistics site and then back, or sending a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ship, 
which carries extra equipment and supplies.  An MPF ship could arrive in the Andaman 
Sea from Diego Garcia within four days.  However, the MPF ships are commercial-
design cargo ships and cannot UNREP; they require a secure, developed port facility or 
lighterage in sea state two or less, to off load their cargo.  If no port facility is available, 
but a secure airfield is available, heavy airlift assets can provide limited re-supply.  
Resupply is limited because airlift cannot easily deliver the volume of fuel and ammo 
required to sustain operations. 
This current sustainment capability requires that the initial combat troops secure a 
port facility and/or an airfield to permit the delivery of the additional troops, equipment, 
and supplies in a benign environment, free from hostilities.89  If both of these facilities 
were available in the objective area, the sustainment functions of the ESG could be 
moved ashore.  While this would lessen the requirement on the ESGs, it would increase 
the requirements for force protection and the “footprint” ashore.  However, a basic 
premise of the Sea Base concept is to minimize the footprint ashore and keep logistics 
functions at sea.  Therefore, because the Sea Base concept is based on the premise that no 
port facility or airfield is available, the 15-day limitation on at-sea sustainment is the 
primary gap in the 2004 capability. 
                                                 
88 Based on SEA-6 calculations, one T-AOE could resupply all four MEUs in one trip.  The required 
amounts of the four classes of supplies, calculated using Table 4-4 factors multiplied by four MEUs, is 
expected to be 200 tons of food, 504,000 gallons of water, 863 tons of ammunition, and 76,252 bbls of fuel.  
A single T-AOE can supply 650 tons of dry stores, 1,800 tons of ammo, and 156,000 bbls of fuel to the 
ESGs in one trip. 
89 Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, National Research Council.  1999.  
Naval Expeditionary Logistics: “Enabling Operational Maneuver From the Sea.”  Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press. 
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 4.6.2 Objective Sustainment 
Table 4-4 displays the four primary classes of supplies and the required amount of 
each per man per day. 
Food (Class 1) Water (Class 1) Fuel (Class III) Ammunition (Class V) 
Constant Constant Assault Phase Assault Phase Sustain Phase Sustain Phase 
5.58 lbs/day/troop 7.00 gal/day/troop 63,842 gal/day 64.21 gal/day/troop 48,145 lbs/day 3.88 lbs/day/troop 
Table 4-4: MEU Logistics Planning Factors.90 
To calculate the amount of supplies required to sustain the troops ashore, the  
per Marine per day planning factors listed in Table 4-4 are multiplied by the number of 
troops employed ashore.  For the ~ 5,000 troops of the JEB maneuver element, this 
equates to over 760 short tons of supply (JEB DOS calculation in Chapter 6) that need to 
be moved every 24 hrs.  To the extent possible, the combat troops ashore are resupplied 
by vertical lift.  Vertical sustainment enables direct-to-objective maneuver by reducing 
reliance on supply lines that are stretched over long distances.  Additionally, such logistic 
convoys are especially vulnerable to enemy attack. 
Using the lift capacities and mission radii in the MAGTF Planner’s Reference 
Guide for the CH-46 and CH-53 assets listed in Table 4-1, and an assumed operational 
availability of 0.7 for both types, a quick estimate based on weight alone shows that they 
can lift one DOS every 24 hrs from a range of 50 NM. 
 4.6.3 Medical Evacuation 
Either UH-1N or CH-46E aircraft evacuate the wounded.  At 100 kts, each 
helicopter can cover the 25 NM to the beach in 15 minutes flight time each way.  Since 
the UH-1N has a range of only 150 NM,91 wounded will only be able to reach advanced 
medical care onboard ship within the “golden hour” when the Sea Base to objective 
radius is less than approximately 70 NM. 
                                                 
90 Marine Corps combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001, 
(UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA,  
20 April 2001), p. 118. 
91 Ibid., p. 24. 
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4.7 Survivability 
The ESG brings its own Sea Shield and a Sea Strike capability.  The multiple 
ESGs and their associated Marine air wing have robust capability, including combat air 
patrol, suppression of enemy air defenses, conventional strike, and close air support.  The 
addition of a CSG augments these capabilities, providing the capability to use the  
4-ESG MEB against a robust enemy.  Additionally, all ships are built to NAVSEA 
survivability standards and have large, well-trained damage control teams to limit any 
damage to the ships from enemy action. 
4.8 ESG Cost Data 
Since the MEUs and ESGs already exist, the cost estimate includes only 
Operations and Support (O & S) only; the acquisitions costs are considered sunk costs 
and are not included.  The cost to operate 4 ESGs is about $1-1.5 billion per year.  
Therefore, the cost of 4 ESGs for the 10-year period 2004-2015, is approximately  
$10 billion-$15 billion (FY04$). 
4.9 U.S. Army Expeditionary Brigade 
The U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division asserts that it can deploy a third of their 
Division’s 14,000-man strong combat power within 18 hrs by parachutes from C-17 or  
C-130 aircraft.92  Historically, a third of the Division is on ready alert, a third in a training 
status, and the last a third is ready to provide logistical support to speed deployment of 
the ready unit.  The 82nd Airborne is light by design, taking only what can be rapidly 
mobilized and parachuted with the combat troops.  One hundred paratroopers will fit on a 
C-17.  Approximately 45 C-17 flights are required to deploy the 4,600 troops alone. 
The Army’s Stryker Brigade, a heavier, mechanized force than the 82nd Airborne, 
advertises 350 C-17 sorties93 to deliver its troops and equipment.  This gives an idea of 
the magnitude of the strategic airlift required to move a mechanized brigade.  After initial 
                                                 
92 “82nd Airborne Division,” (02 August 2004 [cited 20 November 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/82abn.htm. 
93 “Joint Military Operations Brief,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, (26 August 2004 [cited  
03 December 2004]). 
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assault, the deployed troops must secure an airfield to receive logistical support and any 
heavy assault vehicles needed.  This need for an airfield limits their mobility and ability 
to assault heavily armored enemy forces. 
4.10 2004 Gap Summary 
No joint, seabased expeditionary force exists today that meets the requirements in 
the FAA.  The closest approximation of the seabased JEB is a 4-ESG, 4-MEU unit.  Even 
with optimistic positioning and readiness assumptions, this force closes the AO in  
25-30 days—15-20 days slower than the 10-day requirement.  This force employs to the 
beach/objective in 5 days from the desired range of 25 NM—4 2/3rd days longer than the 
10-hr requirement.  This force is only able to self-sustain for a maximum of 15 days— 
15 days less than the 30-day requirement. 
Army expeditionary forces, while able to close and employ very light forces by 
air within the 10-day requirement, cannot bring their heavier units of combat power in 
that same time.  Once employed, the Army expeditionary forces are critically dependent 
on an airfield and/or a developed port facility to sustain their troops.  For this reason, they 
do not meet the austere access criteria that led to the Sea Base concept. 
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Enclosure 1: MEU Closure Calculations 
 
Time-Speed-Distance for ESG from Persian Gulf to Myanmar. 
 
 
Time-Speed-Distance for ESG from Japan to Myanmar. 
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Time-Speed-Distance for ESG from San Diego to Myanmar. 
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Time-Speed-Distance for ESG from Norfolk to Myanmar. 
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5. 2015 BASELINE ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the process used to define the 2015 Baseline Architecture 
(2015 BLA).  The 2015 BLA is limited to systems and platforms that are Programs of 
Record,94 as of Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, and those that are currently in inventory and 
expected to remain active through the 2015 time frame. 
The 2015 BLA is developed using the vision of the Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
(JELo) Operating Concept [Chapter 2] and the JELo Functional Area Analysis (FAA) 
[Chapter 3].  As mentioned in Chapter 1, SEA-6 uses the 2015 BLA to identify, analyze, 
and quantify capability gaps.  The steps taken to define the 2015 BLA  
include determining: 
• the scope and assumptions; 
• the methodology to down-select systems and platforms; 
• the architecture views, based on the Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DODAF);95 
• the force structure of the specific components (U.S. Army (USA), U.S. 
Navy (USN), U.S. Air Force (USAF), and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)); 
• the Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future (MPF(F)) vessel;96 
• the platforms eliminated from the 2015 baseline composition; 
• the composition of the 2015 Baseline Architecture; 
• the distribution of air assets among the MPF(F) ships; and 
• the 2015 Baseline Architecture Concept of Operations. 
                                                 
94 For the purpose of this study, a Program of Record is defined as any Department of Defense (DoD) 
program that has an established program office and manager. 
95 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group, “DoD Architecture Framework (DODAF)95 Version 1.0, 
Vol. I: Definitions and Guidelines,” 15 August 2003. 
96 Robert M. Souders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Summary Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D0009814.A2/Final, 
April 2004). 
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SEA-6 is organized into four functional teams: Connectors, Transfers,  
Command and Control (C2), and Inventory and Storage (I & S).  This chapter is 
organized in the same manner: 
• Connectors are modes of transport carrying assault troops, medical 
patients, cargo, and equipment.  Section 5.8 of this chapter  
discusses Connectors. 
• Transfers are the physical systems or equipment that moves these same 
items between Connectors or between Connectors and the objective.  
Section 5.9 of this chapter discusses Transfers. 
• C2 is the information system that is established to facilitate the 
coordination of these operations.  Section 5.10 of this chapter  
discusses C2. 
• Inventory and Storage include systems and processes that enable cargo 
and equipment to be stored and moved within the Sea Base platforms.  
Section 5.11 of this chapter addresses other functions and provides a more 
detailed and precise definition of Inventory and Storage. 
Defining the 2015 BLA includes determining the Joint Expeditionary Brigade 
(JEB) force structure, the platforms and systems to support the JEB, and the concept of 
operations for that collection of people and equipment.  The platforms and systems 
considered for the 2015 BLA are limited to those currently in the inventory and expected 
to remain active through the 2015 time frame, and Programs of Record as of FY04. 
Funded and unfunded future concepts, including Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstrations (ACTDs) and Advanced Concept Demonstrations (ACDs) are not 
considered for the 2015 BLA.  Although no specific MPF(F) ship designs are  
Programs of Record, for the purpose of conducting analysis, the MPF(F) design97 chosen 
by SEA-6 is considered a Program of Record. 
                                                 
97 Souders et al., 2004. 
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Equipment and personnel from either the in-theater Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) are considered outside the scope of the 2015 BLA.  
Although part of the Sea Base, both are assumed to have their own logistics 
infrastructure.  The JEB will not be employed in sea state greater than 4.  Budgetary 
constraints limit materiel selections. 
The 2015 BLA is developed to meet the following key requirements from the 
FAA [Chapter 3]: 
• Must support a JEB of approximately 14,500 personnel.98 
• Preliminary forces deploy to the objective within ten days. 
• Preliminary elements deploy from the Sea Base to the objective within one 
10-hr period of darkness. 
• MPF(F) ships have 30 days’ worth of food, water, fuel, and ammunition 
on board. 
• The JEB must be sustained for 30 days. 
• MPF(F) ships maintain a 50% reserve of food, water, fuel, and 
ammunition on board. 
The following assumptions are made in determining the 2015 BLA: 
• All Programs of Record platforms/equipment considered and chosen by 
SEA-6 are fielded. 
• The chosen MPF(F) design includes selective offload capability with 
sufficient space to access cargo using current methods. 
• MPF(F) ships replace current Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) 
ships at the Forward Logistics Site s(FLSs) of Guam and Diego Garcia. 
                                                 
98 “MPF(F) 101 Brief,” slides 22-28 (January 2003 [cited 18 August 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/POE/POE-60/MPF-
F/Updated2015MPF(F)MEB.ppt. 
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• MPF(F) ships are based at the same FLS as current MPF ships  
(Guam, Diego Garcia, Sigonella), but may be underway in the vicinity of 
the FLS. 
• Port facilities/airfields are not initially available at the objective, but may 
be taken as an objective for sustainment. 
• Equipment and personnel supported from the Sea Base are provided from 
the MPF(F) ships. 
• The JEB has common supplies and equipment common to any service. 
• USA JEB requires USN and USMC Sea Base personnel and connectors 
for support and transport. 
• Sea Strike and Sea Shield establish maritime dominance and air 
supremacy by the time the Sea Base assets arrive in the AO. 
• Naval Special Operations Force (SOF) components are based on the CSG 
or ESG and not on the MPF(F). 
• Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCACs) are forward deployed at the FLS 
• The MPF(F) assault connectors support the JEB and are not  
otherwise tasked. 
• MV-22 and F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) aircraft self-deploy to either 
the FLS or directly to the MPF(F) ships. 
• Helicopters are airlifted to the FLS. 
• Military forces use a single type of fuel by 2015. 
• The JEB deploys from the closest forward base to the AO. 
• Any mission requiring the rapid deployment of a JEB has sufficient 
priority to get the strategic tanking and Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
airlift in time to meet their deployment timeline. 
The 2015 BLA is designed to meet the key requirements using the systems 
currently being discussed for Sea Base force planning: current systems expected to 
continue operation into 2015 and Programs of Record systems (FY04).  The JEB force is 
defined in detail as input to determine the composition of platforms and systems required 
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to support them.  A Concept of Operations that describes how the platforms and systems 
function together to perform the mission is defined in Chapter 3.  Platform and system 
characteristics, such as fuel burn rate, material capacity, and range, are researched to 
determine various logistical requirements. 
A JEB as described in the Operating Concept [Chapter 3] is not yet developed.  
The Marine Corps, however, defines an expeditionary brigade to the level of detail 
required to pursue this study.  To quantify the JEB logistics footprint, SEA-6 uses a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) as a surrogate.  SEA-6 does not claim that this is 
the force of the future, or that it is the optimum force.  No attempt is made to analyze or 
develop alternative forces from a combat effectiveness perspective. 
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) generated 
spreadsheets of the 2015 MPF(F) MEB equipment items broken down by Sea Base 
Maneuver Element (SBME), Sea Base Support Element (SBSE), Sustained Operations 
Ashore Element (SOAE), and the Forward Base Echelon (FBE) [Enclosures 1A and 1B].  
These spreadsheets provide needed information to calculate load and ship capacity 
requirements.  The total number of MPF(F) ships is derived from the information 
contained in these sources. 
SEA-6 evaluates the USMC 2015 MPF(F) MEB concept and the USA Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) concept as logistical surrogates for a JEB combat force.  Both 
concepts are designed to the same set of missions.  No effort is made to determine which 
force is more effective.  Predicted compatibilities are used for analysis to the degree to 
which the concepts were defined in the literature. 
5.2 U.S. Air Force 
The Closure phase described in the Operating Concept [Chapter 3] may rely on 
strategic airlift and aerial refueling to get the aircraft to the FLS.  The assets required for 
this mission have traditionally come from the USAF AMC. 
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USAF future plans indicate that there will be 126 C-599 and 180 C-17100 aircraft in 
the 2015 time frame and that AMC will provide the necessary assets to accomplish the 
Sea Base mission.  This assumption is optimistic; in Desert Storm, USMC aircraft waited 
for days for airlift and aerial refueling support into theater.101 
5.3 U.S. Marine Corps 
The USMC has published a detailed description of their envisioned 2015 Baseline 
MEB Organization.102  The 2015 MEB consists of two possible configurations: an 
Amphibious MEB and a MPF(F) MEB.  SEA-6 selects the MPF(F) MEB for the  
2015 BLA. 
The MPF(F) MEB consists of four distinct elements: the Sea Base Maneuver 
Element (SBME), the Sea Base Support Element (SBSE), the Sustained Operations 
Ashore Echelon (SOAE), and the Forward Base Echelon (FBE).  The MEB to be 
stationed and transported on the Sea Base is the combat element of approximately 4,900, 
the support element of approximately 3,200,103 a USN element of approximately 1,200,104 
and a Joint Staff comprised of approximately 500 mixed-service personnel.105  The 
current USMC concept says the 2,200 personnel of the FBE and the 4,200 of the SOAE 
are not onboard the Sea Base, but their equipment is onboard and can be transferred 
ashore if needed. 
The personnel of the SBME and SBSE are transported to the FLS for onward 
movement to the MPF(F) ships.  According to the USMC 2015 Baseline MEB 
organization, the majority of the MEB equipment is prepositioned on the MPF(F) 
ships.106  The USMC does not envision operating the FBE and SOAE from the Sea Base, 
                                                 
99 “C-5 Galaxy,” (August 2003 [cited 12 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=84.  
100 “C-17 Globemaster III,”( October 2004 [cited 12 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web 
@ http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=86.  
101 Hopkins, J.I., MGen, USMC, “This Was No Drill,” appearing in Proceedings, November 1991. 
102 Update “Baseline” 2015 MEB Organization, pp. 22-28. 
103 Ibid. 
104 MCCDC Concepts Branch Futures Division, “Baseline 2015 MEB,” 24 January 2003, p. 37. 
105 Souders et al., p. 24. 
106 Ibid. 
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however, as their equipment is positioned on the MPF(F), SEA-6 uses it in the sizing of 
the Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG). 
 5.3.1 Sea Base Maneuver Element 
The SBME is the force necessary to conduct Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
(OMFTS)/Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) operations by maneuvering from the  
Sea Base.  There are 4,859 personnel in this element, organized into 2 surface Battalion 
Landing Teams (BLT) and 1 vertical BLT.107  Mr. Jeffrey Koleser from  
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) provided SEA-6 with spreadsheets developed 
in 2004 by the Naval War College and the Navy Warfare Development Command 
detailing the equipment and troops for the surface BLT shown in Enclosure 1A (SBME 
Equipment Breakdown (surface BLT)).  SEA-6 developed the vertical BLT, shown in 
Enclosure 1B (SBME Equipment Breakdown (vertical BLT), by subtracting the surface 
BLT from the total MEB equipment contained in the MCCDC Baseline 2015 MEB.108 
The SBME is further divided into initial and follow-on forces.  The initial force, 
consisting of both surface BLTs and the vertical BLT (4,300 personnel), deploys with 
their associated equipment, detailed in Enclosure 1A as landing priorities 1-19 and 
Enclosure 1B as landing priorities 1-8.  This initial landing priority includes the only 
portion of the force constrained by the one period of darkness employment.  The  
follow-on force, consisting of 540 support personnel and the remaining equipment 
landing priorities of Enclosures 1A and 1B, deploys prior to the initial force’s supply 
depletion.  A summary of the Marine equipment transported ashore is displayed in  
Table 5-1. 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 





































4K Forklift 8 8 8 8
Assault Breaching Vehicle (ABV) 4 4 16 16
AN/TPQ (4 HMMWV & 4 Trlr) 2 2 24 24
Avenger 10 10 20 20
Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge 
(AVLB) 2 2 8 8
Contact Truck 4 14 18 16 20 36
D7 Bulldozer 2 2 2 2
Expeditionary Fire Support System 
(EFSS) 8 8 8 8
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
(EFV) 98 8 106 1,760 40 1,800
High Mobility Artillery Rocket 
System (HIMARS) 18 18 54 54
Internally Transportable Vehicle 
(ITV) 16 16 48 48
Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 50 25 6 3 84 210 105 12 6 333
Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) 36 36 76 76
High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 162 129 54 14 359 588 1071 134 22 1,815
HMMWV with Trailer 42 12 54 118 32 150
M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank 20 20 80 80
M1A1 w/ Track Width Mine Plow 
(TWMP) 8 8 32 32
M88A2 Recovery Vehicle 2 2 4 10 8 18
M9 Armored Combat Earthmover 
(ACE) 8 8 8 8
Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement (MTVR) 2 6 8 8 16 24
MTVR with Trailer 36 46 82 162 118 280
Trlr, Lowbed 2 2 0 0
Total 474 162 206 17 859 3,116 1184 512 28 4,840  
Table 5-1: Summary of MEB equipment and personnel. 
 
Each surface BLT consists of 1 infantry battalion, 1 artillery battery, 1 tank 
company, 1 amphibious assault company, 1 light armored reconnaissance company,  
2 combat engineer platoons, 1 detachment engineer support company, 1 air defense 
section, and 1 direct support (infantry battalion).  The vertical BLT consists of 1 infantry 
battalion, 1 Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) battery, 2 combat engineer 
platoons, 1 air defense section, and 1 direct support (infantry battalion).  The SBME is 
comprised of 3 maneuver elements; all SBME equipment and personnel are located on 
the MPF(F) ships. 
 5.3.2 Sea Base Support Element 
The SBSE is defined as the personnel and services necessary to provide sea based 
support (C2, aviation, logistics, and base support) to maneuver units conducting 
OMFTS/STOM operations ashore.  There are 3,203 personnel in this element, comprised 
of a MEB Command Element, Ground Combat Support Elements and the Sea Base Air 
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Combat Element (ACE).  The Sea Base ACE is comprised of 48 MV-22s, 18 AH-1s,  
9 UH-1s, 20 CH-53s, 6 Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAVs),  
36 F-35s, and the Sea Base ACE Direct Support Company.  The SBSE equipment and 
personnel remain on the MPF(F) ships. 
 5.3.3 Sustained Operations Ashore Echelon (SOAE) 
The SOAE represents the capabilities necessary to transition from 
OMFTS/STOM operations to Sustained Operations Ashore (additional logistics, C2, and 
infrastructure).  The SOAE equipment is located on the MPF(F) ships and is not 
configured for selective offload; it requires a port facility be secured to offload.  The 
SOAE personnel are on alert at home station (or at a base located closer to, but not 
within, the AO).  The Command Element and Brigade Service Support Group forces total 
4,199 personnel.  These forces are brought in when, and if, the rapid maneuver operations 
ashore transition to sustained operations ashore. 
 5.3.4 Forward Base Echelon 
The FBE is the basing for the non-Sea Base MEB ACE and Air Port of 
Debarkation (APOD) functions.  There are 2,223 personnel in this element, organized 
into KC-130, EA-6B, and F-35 squadrons (as necessary), as well as Airbase Support and 
Operations personnel and a non-Sea Base ACE Direct Support Company.  The FBE 
equipment is located on the MPF(F) ships (with the exception of aircraft) and the 
personnel are located within the JOA, but not actually on the Sea Base ships.  The FBE 
requires a land-based airfield.  This element is not part of the Sea Based operations that 
SEA-6 is considering. 
5.4 U.S. Army 
The Army’s expeditionary force concept is the 2010-2020 Army Objective 
Force.109  This force is organized into a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that is composed of 
                                                 
109 Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), “The United States Army Objective Force 
Operational and Organizational Plan Maneuver Unit of Action,” Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, 
Change 2 to the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-90 O & O,  
30 June 2003. 
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various service elements.  In a small-scale contingency, one or more BCTs could operate 
under a Joint Task Force (JTF).110  A single Army BCT is roughly equivalent to a  
USMC MEB.  Although the Army describes their BCT concept in some detail, much of 
their equipment is still under development; exact sizes and weights have not been 
determined.  The Marine Corps, however, has published a detailed description of their 
envisioned 2015 Baseline MEB Organization, including personnel numbers and specific 
equipment lists.  Because the Marine Corps has defined the necessary details for analysis, 
SEA-6 uses the 2015 MEB as the logistical equivalent of a JEB.  However, based on a 
comparison of troops and equipment, an architecture that can move and sustain a MEB 
can support other comparable size forces. 
 5.4.1 Brigade Combat Team Design 
The BCT Increment 1 Threshold design shown in Figure 5-1 (scheduled to be 
operational by the 2010-2012 time frame) consists of 6 major unit types totaling  
2,976 soldiers and approximately 1,530 platforms/equipment.111  The personnel numbers 
shown in Figure 5-1 belong to each of the major units, identified as 1 headquarters 
company (HHC), 1 brigade intelligence and communication (BIC) company, 3 combined 
arms (CA) battalions, 1 aviation squadron, 1 non-line-of-sight (NLOS) battalion, and  
1 forward support battalion (FSB). 
 
Unit of Action Design




HHC BIC NLOS FSB
 
Figure 5-1: Army Brigade Combat Team Increment 1 Threshold Design. 112 
                                                 
110 Ibid., p. 1-3. 
111 Ibid., pp. 3-1, 3-2. 
112 Ibid., p. 3-60. 
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 5.4.2 Brigade Combat Team Deployment 
The Army does not currently envision prepositioning the BCT equipment on  
MPF ships; the BCT equipment deploys with the troops via airlift from their home base.  
This force is designed to be transportable by several different aircraft and ships, including 
the C-130 and the Theater Support Vessel (TSV).113  The Army deployment vision is to 
arrive in the AO within 96 hrs of transport vehicle departure.  This transportable design 
lends itself to Sea Base operations.  If the JEB is comprised of an Army BCT, it is 
transported, with equipment, via strategic airlift from their home base to the FLS, where 
they will board the MPF(F) ships. 
 5.4.3 Brigade Combat Team Required Support 
The BCT requires external support in the following areas: employment 
transportation, information superiority, battle space preparation, sustainment, air and 
missile defense, long-range fires, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), engineer assets, 
casualty evacuation, and aircraft for air assault operations.114  Sea Strike conducted by 
CSG forces covers some of these missions and some are covered by the Navy personnel 
assigned to the MPF(F); however, some entail having additional units assigned stationed 
aboard the MPG (such as JSF, air and surface connectors).  For the purpose of this 
analysis, USMC assault connectors (CH-53X, MV-22, AH-1Z, LCAC, etc.) are assigned 
and fulfill the sustainment, casualty evacuation and transportation needs and that the 
other units of the Sea Base provide the remaining support. 
 5.4.4 Unit of Action Resupply 
The BCT is designed to carry supplies for three days of medium to intense combat 
or up to 7 days of low combat operations.115  The Army’s vision is to have the BCT 
resupply by aerial delivery.  For the purpose of this study, extended BCT operations will 
require resupply from the MPF(F) via its connectors.  It is assumed that if a MEB can be 
supported, the Army BCT can also be supported. 
                                                 
113 Ibid., p. 1-6. 
114 Ibid., pp. 1-6, 1-7. 
115 Ibid., pp. 4-18, 4-19. 
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 5.4.5 Brigade Combat Team Equipment 
The Army estimates the BCT equipment weight to be 14,878 short tons.116  
Quantities of equipment assigned to specific units with their personnel numbers are 
broken down in Enclosure 2 (Army BCT Equipment Breakdown).  Specific size and 
weight information is not yet available. 
5.5 U.S. Navy 
Both the MEB and the BCT need a Naval Support Element (NSE) to accomplish 
the mission. 
 5.5.1 Naval Support Element 
For each MPG deployed, a NSE consisting of approximately 1,200117 personnel is 
required for such tasks as LCAC crews, Underway Replenishment (UNREP) details, 
medical personnel, etc.  The 1,200 personnel are distributed across the MPF(F) ships, 
including not less than 2 crews per LCAC.  Each LCAC crew consists of 5 persons, 
totaling 30 persons per MPF(F) ship specifically allocated for the operation of the  
three LCACs that can be carried onboard each of the MPF(F) ships.  Additionally, the 
NSE contains approximately 100 personnel specifically dedicated to provide both routine 
and emergency medical care of the combat forces.118 
The USAF AMC, and the USN NSE and Joint Task Force Staff,119 comprised of 
approximately 500 mixed-service personnel, are considered as supporting forces. 
5.6 Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future 
The functional core of the 2015 BLA is the MPF(F) ship.  Only designs from the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives: Final Summary 
                                                 
116 Ibid., p. 3-60. 
117 “Baseline 2015 MEB,” Power Point brief from MCCDC Concepts Branch Futures Division,  
24 January 2003, p. 37. 
118 Neil Carey, James Grefer, Robert Trost, and Robert Levy, “Future Deployable medical Capabilities and 
Platforms for Navy Medicine,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CRM D0005085.A2/Final 
February 2002), pp. 61-63. 
119 Souders et al., p. 24. 
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Report120 are considered.  Table 5-2 lists the characteristics of these ships.  The CNA 
study refers to their ship design concepts as either constrained or unconstrained in size 
and either distributed capability or families of specialized ships.  The constrained size 
indicates that any of the expected U.S. shipyards would have the capability of building 
the ship.  The unconstrained size refers to the inability of at least one of the expected  
U.S. shipyards to build the design.  Distributed capability refers to ships built to the same 
design with the forces and equipment distributed among the ships.  Families of 
specialized ships refer to a squadron composed of several different types of ships, each of 
which are specialized for a particular function (i.e., aviation and command ships, logistics 
ships, personnel ships, etc.). 
Consistent with the Marines’ desire to avoid a single point of failure,121 SEA-6 
eliminated the families of specialized ships.  Of the remaining designs, only those 
capable of carrying a JEB with its associated aircraft are considered.  The two 
constrained-size, distributed-capability ship designs could not fully support the Sea Base 
requirements across all envisioned functional areas.  One of the constrained-size designs 
was not capable of operating the F-35 aircraft.122  The other design had insufficient 
surface craft stowage.123 
Of those remaining, SEA-6 compares the cargo volume, area, weight and 
personnel numbers.  Cargo area and total JEB personnel requirements drive the selection.  
The unconstrained ship design124 is chosen based on the ability to carry the entire JEB in 
the fewest number of ships.  Eight of these ships are required to carry the JEB. 
                                                 
120 Souders et al., pp. 33-46. 
121 Roxana Tiron, “Navy Downsizing Could Weaken Marine Corps Expeditionary Posture,” in  
National Defense, para. 23 [online journal] (August 2004 [cited 05 November 2004] ); available from 
World Wide Web @ http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1538. 
122 Souders et al., p. 36. 
123 Ibid., p. 35. 
124 Unconstrained-size, distributed-capability, as defined in the CNA study refers to their design concept.  
Constrained-size would indicate that any of the expected U.S. shipyards would have the capability of 
building the ship.  Unconstrained-size refers to the inability of at least one of the expected U.S. shipyards to 
build the design.  Distributed-capability refers to ships built to the same design with the forces and 
equipment distributed among the ships. 




































































# Combat Personnel 50 50 2,020 1,430 2,100 670 1,311 1,570 1,085 2,000
# Ship Crew 45 45 80 80 49 59 80 80 59 45
Cargo Weight (tons) 33,705 26,202 23,838 16,880 13,884 14,972 20,594 24,090 32,845 Unknown
Cargo Size (sq ft) 184,000 184,000 213,000 144,000 17,000 0 4,300 280,000 194,200 33,000
Cargo Area (sq ft) 0 0 18,300 11,400 12,900 24,000 367,000 14,500 23,500 30,000
# MV-22s 0 0 21 13 40 0 0 0 0 36
# CH-53s 1 1 5 4 6 1 3 2 1 11
LCAC stows 0 0 3 2 0 0 6 4 3 0
Total People 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WEIGHT (tons) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Unknown
SQUARE (Feet) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MV-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CH-53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
Table 5-2: Comparison of MPF(F) alternate ship designs. 
Figure 5-2 shows the chosen MPF(F) ship.  Table 5-3 shows the detailed 
characteristics of the unconstrained-size, distributed-capability MPF(F).125 
 
Figure 5-2: Chosen MPF(F) Ship.126 
Although there are five spots for normal air operations, because vertical 
replenishments require additional flight deck space, only two vertical replenishments can 
be accomplished simultaneously.127 
                                                 
125 Ibid., p. 34. 
126 Ibid., p. 34. 
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 Unit Dimension 
Length overall ft 1,030 
Maximum beam ft 202 
Full load draft ft 34.8 
Lightship tonnage MT 61,179 
Full-load tonnage MT 82,850 
Full time MSC crew Number of personnel 80 
USMC accommodations Number of personnel 2,020 
Cargo fuel bbls 44,600 
Cargo square sq ft 213,000 
Cargo area sq ft 18,300 
Number of containers Number of TEUs 238 
Aviation stowage and maintenance space sq ft 158,700 
CH-46 equivalent parking spots Number of spots 47 
CH-53 operational spots Number of spots 5 
LCAC stows Number of stows 3 
Craft interface Number of interfaces 1 
Detailed Information per Ship 
Personnel berthing space     2,020 people 
Vehicle cargo space 213,000 sq ft 
Combat gear space (nonvehicle)   18,300 sq ft 
Aircraft storage space 108,700 sq ft 
Surface craft storage space            3 LCACs 
Medical space     5,000 sq ft 
Maintenance space   50,000 sq ft 
Assembly space     7,000 sq ft 
Fuel space   44,600 bbls 
Interface (Surface)            1 
Interface (Vertical)            2 
Water production 500,000 gal/day 
Additional Squadron Requirements 
Non-Prepositioned cargo     3,000 tons 
JTFC Staff Personnel        500 people 
JTFC Staff space   30,000 sq ft 
MEB C2 space   30,000 sq ft (split across two ships) 
Table 5-3: Breakdown of chosen MPF(F) ship.128 
The eight ships are each loaded with complete JEB sub-units (i.e., rifle company, 
tank battalion, artillery battery, etc.).  The eight distributed-capability ships provide the 
maximum number of simultaneous surface and vertical connector interfaces for 
employment of the force to the objective. 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 Souders et al., pp. 34-35. 
128 Ibid., p. 35. 
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5.7 2015 Baseline Architecture Composition 
The 2015 BLA composition consists of a MPF(F) squadron of 8 ships, 1 resupply 
ship, 26 surface assault connectors, 77 air assault connectors, and 70 nonconnector air 
assets.  Although no plans exist to forward deploy a CLF asset specifically designated to 
support the MPG, SEA-6 preliminary analysis demonstrated the need for a  
Combat Logistics Force (CLF)-capable ship to refuel the MPF(F) ships.  To meet the 
requirement for 30 days of sustainment, SEA-6 includes 1 CLF asset in the 2015 BLA 
composition.  The remainder of this section describes the functional subsystems: 
Connectors, Transfers, C2, and Inventory and Storage. 
5.8 Connectors 
Connectors are modes of transport that carry assault troops, medical patients, 
cargo, and equipment.  Based on open literature and internal analysis, the  
SEA-6 Connectors Team assesses the characteristics of the connectors to be as described 
below.  The cargo capacities listed are not necessarily the rated capacities, but are 
calculated capacities, based on standard packaging of food, water, ammunition, and fuel.  
The quantity of each type of connector is taken from the MCCDC 2015 Baseline MEB 
Organization,129 MPF 2010 Ship-to-shore Movement, Seabased Logistics Support,130 and 
the CNA MPF(F) study.131 
 5.8.1 Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG) 
The MPG consists of a squadron of eight MPF(F) ships along with a supporting 
CLF ship and two Landing Craft Utility, Replacement (LCU(R)) ships.  Speed of 
advance for the MPF(F) is expected to be around 20-22 kts. 
One Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE).  The T-AOE is the Navy’s largest 
combat logistics ship possessing the speed to keep up with the MPG.  It can rapidly 
replenish ships and carries more than 156,000 bbls of fuel, 1,800 tons of ammunition, and 
                                                 
129 MPF(F) 101 Brief, pp. 22-28. 
130 Keith R. McAllister, “MPF 2010 Ship-to-shore Movement and Sea-based Logistics Support Volume 1: 
Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, May 1998). 
131 Souders et al. 
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650 tons of stores.132  The T-AOE can simultaneously service 2 ships, 1 on either side.  
The T-AOE has 2 SH-60R helicopters embarked for conducting vertical replenishment 
(VERTREP). 
Two Landing Craft Utility, Replacement (LCU(R)) ships.  The LCU(R)s are 
chosen for inclusion in the 2015 baseline composition as they are capable of sustained sea 
operations for approximately 10 days133 and are assumed to be capable of operation in 
higher sea states than the LCAC.  It is assumed that the LCU(R) is capable of in transit 
refueling from either the MPF(F) or CLF ship.  These LCU(R)s will  
self-deploy from the FLS and will be used to transport equipment (tanks, artillery, 
equipment, motor vehicles—tracked or wheeled) and troops to the shore.   
LCU(R) characteristics: 
• Cargo Area Dimension: 2,800 sq ft 
• Weight Capacity: 495,000 lbs 
• Class I Cargo (food):  411,945 lbs of Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) 
• Liquid Cargo Class III (fuel): 18,000 gals 
• Liquid Cargo Class I (water): 56,160 gals 
• Class V (artillery ammunition): 316,176 lbs 
• Class V (small Arms ammunition): 493,920 lbs 
• Speed: 36 kts (kts) maximum intermittent speed, 30 kts cruise.  Assume all 
loads are moved at 30 kts 
• Range: ~ 900 nautical miles (NM) averaging 28 kts 
 5.8.2 Surface Assault Connectors 
Surface assault connector characteristics are taken from the sources listed in 
Section 5.8 of this chapter. 
                                                 
132 Schrady et al., pp. 7-9. 
133 “Landing Craft Utility (LCU),” (18 August 2004 [cited ]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcu.htm. 
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Twenty-four LCACs.  The LCAC is the primary surface assault Connector 
capable of transporting weapons systems, equipment, cargo and personnel of the assault 
elements of the brigade-sized force both from ship to shore and across the beach.  The 
LCAC is a high-speed, over-the-beach, fully amphibious landing craft, capable of 
carrying a 60-75 ton payload.134  LCAC characteristics: 
• Cargo Area Dimension: 1,809 sq ft 
• Weight Capacity: 120,000 lbs 
• Class I Cargo (food): 119,442 lbs of MREs 
• Liquid Cargo Class III (fuel): 6,000 gals 
• Liquid Cargo Class I (water): 13,500 gals 
• Class V (artillery ammunition): 116,684 lbs 
• Class V (small Arms ammunition): 117,600 lbs 
• Speed: 40 kts with payload, sea state 2.  Above sea state 2 planning speed 
is 25 kts fully loaded.  Operations > sea state 4 are precluded. 
• Range: sea state 2≤  = 200 NM at 40 kts fully loaded, 300 NM at 35 kts 
empty.  Sea state ≤ 3 = 300 NM at 25 kts fully loaded.  Sea state > 4 
operations precluded. 
• Troops: 180 with Personnel Transport Module (PTM).  This module is 
installed on the LCAC during transportation of troops.  If not needed, it 
will be stowed in the LCAC deck spot onboard the MPF(F) ship. 
 5.8.3 Air Assault Connectors 
The number and type of air assault connectors are taken from USMC sources.  It 
is important to note that the air assault connector numbers mentioned here are not the 
maximum number of air connectors that the 2015 BLA MPG is capable of transporting; it 
has sufficient deck space to transport 45 additional MV-22s or 37 additional CH-53s. 
                                                 
134 “Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC),” (17 July 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcac.htm. 
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Forty-eight MV-22s (Marine Corps version of the V-22 Osprey).  The MV-22 
is a tilt rotor, vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL), multimission aircraft 
developed to fill multiservice combat operational requirements.  The MV-22 is the 
Marine Corps’ assault helicopter in the medium lift category contributing to the dominant 
maneuver of the Marine landing force, as well as supporting focused logistics in the days 
following commencement of an amphibious operation.  The tilt rotor design combines the 
vertical flight capabilities of a helicopter with the speed and range of a turboprop airplane 
and permits aerial refueling and worldwide self-deployment.135  MV-22 characteristics: 
• Cargo Area Dimension: 5.4 ft high, 5.7 ft wide, 16.84 ft long 
• External Weight Capacity: 10,000 lbs 
• Internal Capacity limited to troop movement only 
• Class I Cargo (food): 9,982 lbs of MREs 
• Liquid Cargo Class III (fuel): 1,000 gals 
• Liquid Cargo Class I (water): 1,080 gals 
• Class V (artillery ammunition): 7,528 lbs 
• Class V (small arms ammunition): 6,720 lbs 
• Speed: With max external load (pallets): 150 kts; with max external load 
(vehicle): 110 kts 
• Speed:  With max internal load: 234 kts 
• Range: External Load: 290 NM; Internal Load: 530 NM 
• Troops: 24 
Twenty CH-53X Super Stallions.  The CH-53 is the U.S. Marine Corps’  
heavy lift helicopter, designed for the transportation of material and supplies.  The 
aircraft can retrieve downed aircraft, including another CH-53.  It is equipped with a 
refueling probe and can be refueled in flight, giving the helicopter indefinite range 
                                                 
135 “V-22 Osprey,” (17 December 2003 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22.htm. 
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subject to aircrew limitations.136  The CH-53X is assumed to be a CH-53E airframe with 
new 6,150 shaft horsepower engines, improved rotor system, and the associated airframe 
modifications, including the improved three-point lift system.137  It is also assumed that 
the CH-53X will have the same fuel capacity and payload bay dimensions as the  
CH-53E.  CH-53X characteristics: 
• Cargo Area Dimension: 225 sq ft 
• Weight Capacity: Internal load = 30,000 lbs; External load = 35,000 lbs 
• Class I Cargo (food): 29,650 lbs of MREs 
• Liquid Cargo Class III (fuel): 2,000 gals 
• Class I (water): 3,240 gals 
• Class V (artillery ammunition): 30,000 lbs 
• Class V (small arms ammunition): 26,880 lbs 
• Speed: 150 kts 
• Range (loaded) = 480 NM; (empty) = 1,175 NM 
• Troops (combat-loaded) = 24 
Nine UH-1Y Iroquois.  The UH-1Y is used for C2, medical evacuation, and to 
transport personnel, equipment and supplies.  The primary mission of the UH-1Y in a  
Sea Base environment will be medical evacuation.  The UH-1Y has a speed of 120 kts at 
sea level, a range of 170 NM, and can carry 12 troops.  Configured as air ambulances, 
they can transport 3 litter patients and 4 ambulatory patients.138 
 5.8.4 Other Components 
The MPF(F) has several embarked air assets that do not function as Connectors, 
but will have other Sea Base-related missions. 
                                                 
136 “CH-53E Super Stallion,” (09 March 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ch-53e.htm. 
137 Nelms, Douglas W., “A Bigger, Better Giant,” [online journal] (01 November 2003 [cited  
26 September 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ http://defensedaily.com. 
138 “UH-1 Iroquois (Huey),” (30 September 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/uh-1.htm. 
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Eighteen AH-1Z Super Cobras.  The AH-1Z is a two-seat, twin-engine attack 
helicopter capable of land and Sea Base operations.  It provides close air support (CAS), 
armed escort, visual reconnaissance, and supporting arms coordination for the  
assault forces.139 
Six Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAV).  The VTUAV’s 
premier missions are reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.  
They also provide substantial support to intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 
situation development, battle management, battle damage assessment, and even rear area 
security to monitor the operations security posture.140 
Thirty-six F-35s.  The F-35 JSF is a multirole fighter with in-flight refueling 
capability that is optimized for the air-to-ground role and is designed to meet the needs of 
the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and allies.141  Its mission is to attack 
and destroy surface and air targets, and perform reconnaissance and armed  
escort missions. 
In early 2004, the Air Force announced plans142 to purchase some of the  
Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL) versions of the F-35.  Since no documentation 
could be found concerning deployment of these assets onboard the Sea Base, these assets 
are not considered.  However, if deployed onboard the Sea Base they could be supported. 
Ten SH-60Rs.  The SH-60R Seahawk is a twin-engine helicopter.  It can be used 
for anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, drug interdiction, antiship warfare,  
cargo lift, and special operations.  The SH-60R embarked on the MPF(F) will be used 
primarily in a plane guard status and will be equipped with a rescue hoist with a  
                                                 
139 “AH-1 Cobra,” (30 September 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-1.htm. 
140 “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UAVs,” (02 August 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/uav-intro.htm. 
141 “Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),” (11 March 2002 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/jsf.htm. 
142 Marc Selinger, “USAF to buy ‘hundreds’ of STOVL JSFs Gen. Jumper says,” in Aerospace Daily & 
Defense Report, [online journal] (14 September 2004 [cited 13 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ 
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/jsf09144.xml. 
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250-ft (75 meter) cable that has a 600-lb (270 kgs) lift capability, and a retractable  
in-flight refueling probe.143  The SH-60R can carry 11 soldiers or 2,600 lbs (1,170 kgs) 
of cargo internally or a sling load of 9,000 lbs (4,050 kgs) of cargo externally.144  It also 
performs combat search and rescue missions as required. 
 5.8.5 Sea Base Air Asset Distribution 
In 2015, 1 CH-53X squadron contains 10 aircraft, 1 MV-22 squadron contains  
12 aircraft, 1 UH-1Y squadron contains 9 aircraft, 1 AH-1Z squadron contains 9 aircraft, 
1 SH-60R squadron contains 10 aircraft, and 1 F-35 squadron contains 12 aircraft.  
Complete aircraft squadrons are deployed onboard individual MPF(F) ships.  During 
daily logistics operations, these air assets are redistributed as required, and return to their 
home ship at the end of operations.  The specific aircraft are distributed on the 8 MPF(F) 
ships as listed below: 
• MPF(F) 1: 1 MV-22 squadron of 12 aircraft and 1 AH-1Z squadron of  
9 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 2: 1 MV-22 squadron of 12 aircraft and 6 VTUAVs. 
• MPF(F) 3: 1 MV-22 squadron of 12 aircraft and 1 F-35 JSF squadron of 
12 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 4: 1 MV-22 squadron of 12 aircraft and 1 SH-60R squadron of  
10 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 5: 1 CH-53X squadron of 10 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 6: 1 CH-53X squadron of 10 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 7: 1 F-35 JSF squadron of 12 aircraft and 1 AH-1Z squadron of  
9 aircraft. 
• MPF(F) 8: 1 F-35 JSF squadron of 12 aircraft and 1 UH-1Y squadron of  
9 aircraft. 
                                                 
143 “SH-60 Lamps Mark III Seahawk,” (08 November 2001 [cited 27 September 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60.htm. 
144 “SH-60 Lamps Mark III Seahawk,” (08 November 2001 [cited 27 September 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60.htm. 
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This aircraft distribution is developed because each squadron’s manning and 
maintenance support equipment is not sufficient to support separate aircraft detachments 
onboard each individual MPF(F) ship.  Table 5-4 shows the total deployed aircraft for the 
eight MPF(F) ships and the CH-46 equivalent parking space required for each type  
of aircraft. 
Aircraft Number of Aircraft CH-46 Equivalent Space Required 
MV-22 48 2.22 
CH-53X 20 2.68 
AH-1Z 18 0.92 
UH-1Y 9 0.94 
SH-60R 10 0.87 
VTUAV 6 0.80 
Total Rotary Wing Aircraft 111 199 
STOVL F-35 36 2.05 
Total Aircraft 147 273 
Table 5-4: Total Deployed Aircraft.145 
5.9 Transfers 
Transfers are the systems that move troops, cargo and equipment between 
connectors or between connectors and the objective.  Based on open literature and 
internal analysis, the SEA-6 Transfers functional team assesses the characteristics of the 
transfers to be as described below. 
Cargo and equipment transfer capability onboard the selected MPF(F) ships is 
accomplished using several different applications.  Two large, stabilized,  
sea state 3-capable cranes are incorporated into each MPF(F) ship to allow for  
skin-to-skin transfer146 of heavy cargo loads and the onload and offload of LCACs. 
Each MPF(F) ship is designed with an external Integrated Landing Platform (ILP) shown 
in Figure 5-3.  The ILP allows an LCAC to land on and load vehicles via  
roll on/roll off (RORO) operations.  Displacement craft such as the LCU(R) will moor to 
the end of the ILP and set their ramp down on the ILP to allow RORO operations.147  The 
ILP is lowered to the sea surface and is held against the MPF(F) ship to prevent 
                                                 
145 Souders et al., p. 21. 
146 Souders et al., p. 35. 
147 Souders et al., p. 21. 
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separation from the ship, but is free-floating and is allowed to move vertically with the 
action of the waves.148 
 
Figure 5-3: Integrated Landing Platform.149 
To allow for the sending and/or receiving of both liquid and dry cargo,  
Standard Tensioned Replenishment Along-Side Method (STREAM) rigs with  
Heavy Underway Replenishment (Heavy UNREP) capability is utilized for the at-sea 
replenishment of the MPG ships as shown in Figures 5-4 and 5-5.  Aircraft are refueled 
on board each MPF(F) ship utilizing current aircraft refueling practices.  As mentioned 
above, each MPF(F) ship has sufficient flight deck space to accomplish two  
simultaneous VERTREPs. 
                                                 
148 Personal conversation with Guinevere Boyd of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
(NSWCCD) on 20 October 2004. 
149 “Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future (MPF(F)),” (18 October 2004 [cited 20 October 2004]); 
available from the World Wide Web @ http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/futureships/MPF(F)/MPF.htm. 
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Figure 5-4: Fuel STREAM Rig.150 
 
Figure 5-5: Cargo STREAM Rig.151 
 5.9.1 STREAM Transfer Rates 
Each STREAM rig installed onboard the MPF(F) and CLF ships provides the 
capability of transferring, on average, approximately 2,600 bbls per hr (109,000 gals per 
hr) of diesel fuel, Marine (F-76), or approximately 3,000 bbls per hr  
(126,000 gals per hr) of JP-5 (F-44).152  Additionally, for the transfer of dry cargo, the 
                                                 
150 Naval Warfare Publication 4-01.4, Underway Replenishment Guide, March 2001, pp. 3-39. 
151 Ibid., pp. 3-39. 
152 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 
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proposed Heavy UNREP enhancement of the STREAM system allows for the transfer of 
cargo up to 12,000 lbs per lift, at a rate of approximately 210 tons per hr.153 
 5.9.2 MPF(F) Shipboard Crane System Capabilities 
Each heavy lift crane system onboard the MPF(F) ships has a lift capacity of 
approximately 150 tons (300,000 lbs) allowing it to unload an LCAC weighing 
approximately 140 tons.  Each LCAC is offloaded from the MPF(F) ship by the use of 
the heavy lift crane in sea states up to sea state 3.  In sea state 4, the MPF(F) ship is held 
perpendicular to the prevailing seas to create a lee side that is locally at sea state 3. 
 5.9.3 Shipboard Aircraft Refueling 
Each MPF(F) ship’s flight deck can hot refuel five aircraft at once.  The transfer 
rate of the aircraft refueling pumps is 125 gals per minute (7,500 gals per hr).  Each CLF 
ship is equipped with one aircraft refueling station with a transfer rate of  
125 gals per minute (7,500 gals per hr). 
5.10 Command and Control 
The joint publications do not specifically define logistics Command and Control 
(C2).  However, Joint Publication 4-0 gives this summary for the Doctrine for Logistical 
Support of Joint Operations.154 
“Unity of command is essential to coordinate national and theater logistic 
operations.  Logistics is a function of command.  This principle is met 
through the combatant command’s (COMCDRs) directive authority for 
logistics, which gives the COMCDRs authority to direct logistic actions 
and resources necessary to meet mission and operational tasking assigned 
to the command.  To exercise control at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war, subordinate joint force and theater-level  
Service component commanders must also exercise control over their 
                                                 
153 Underway Replenishment Department Port Hueneme Division Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
“Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concepts for Resupply of Marine Corps Cargo to Sea-Based ARG/MPF 
Ships” (Port Hueneme, CA: January 2002), 4. 
154 “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” Joint Publication: 4-0, p. II-5, (06 April 2000 [cited 
15 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf. 
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respective logistic resources subject to the directive authority of  
the COMCDR.” 
 5.10.1 Functional Overview 
The logistics C2 system provides information to a decision maker in such a 
manner that knowledge can be gained, understood, and acted upon.  This system relies on 
a robust communications network and user interfaces to provide asset visibility that 
predict consumption rates.  Many commanders need to know the supply levels of the 
deployed force to plan the pace of future operations.  The logistics C2 system’s main 
purpose is to provide an accurate and quantifiable assessment of supply quantities and 
usage rates.  From this assessment, operational commanders can evaluate real-time 
sustainment level and make real-time adjustments to prevent unintended operational 
pauses due to inadequate supply quantities.  Figure 5-6 gives a skeletal structure for the 
logistics C2 system as developed by the C2 functional team. 
 
Figure 5-6: Taxonomy of the Logistics C2 System. 
To exercise Command and Control of the logistics operations, the commander 
needs understanding, which is derived from data. 
Item consumption is read from the operating units via passive means and 
transmitted to a central database (data).  This central database will be either on the  
Sea Base or at the FLS.  The raw data are manipulated by the system to obtain the desired 
variables needed to calculate a force sustainment level (information).  The operational 
schedule is defined by discrete events.  A combat force’s operational plan lays out a 
ranked list of objectives.  Despite the best planning, chance and the enemy influence the 
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planned schedule.  The combat force adapts to accomplish the mission objectives.  This 
also changes the amount of supplies needed.  If logistic planning is based on combat 
events, the operational commanders are able to match supplies with operational  
events (knowledge). 
Total asset visibility creates the avenue for real-time adjustment and delivery of 
the appropriate supplies to the combat force, thus alleviating the need for an operational 
pause for logistics (understanding).  However, even with perfect asset visibility, the 
logistics system is only as good as the connectors that move the supplies.  Connectors are 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.8 of this chapter. 
The logistical system represents supply information in terms of a sustainment 
level as shown in Figure 5-8.  The desired sustainment level is situational, but once 
defined by the commander, sustainment performance is easily calculated and reported. 
 
Figure 5-7: Calculating Sustainment. 
 5.10.2 Command Structure 
The United States military has successfully conducted amphibious operations in 
the past.  Traditionally, the command of the operation has been a function of where the 
amphibious troops are located.  When the amphibious forces are aboard ship, they 
support the Maritime Component Commander and when the forces were en route to or 
ashore, they support the Ground Component Commander.  SEA-6 assumes this same 
command structure is used in 2015.  Figure 5-9 shows the command structure of 
Supporting and Supported Commanders (Commander, Sea Base (CSB) and  
Commander, Sea Base Maneuver Element (CSBME)) during each phase of the 
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expeditionary operation.  During any phase of the operation, the Supported Commander 
controls the logistics. 
 
Figure 5-8: Supporting and Supported Commander over the 10/30/30 Timeline. 
 5.10.3 Control Structure 
The system uses a Sense-and-Respond scheme to control the logistics flow.  The 
information system is a combination of a communications system and a data system.  The 
data system provides the total asset visibility and the communications system enables the 
action and feedback. 
Sensing is performed by systems such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
tags, interrogators, and transmission units.  These sensors supply data to the routable 
theater network.  This routable network, the Global Information Grid (GIG), transfers the 
asset data to the processing applications.  Information latency is an important 
performance driver of the system.  Based on the Logistics Automatic Information 
Technology Concept of Operations, the time delay for intratheater shipments is  
1-2 hrs.155 
The data system receives the transmitted supply usage data from the operational 
units and manipulates it into the information required for the decision maker.  The  
Joint Total Asset Visibility156 program and the Global Command and Control System-
Joint (GCCS-J) are currently working toward this solution.  The supply usage data are fed 
into the Force Planning and Situational Awareness modules of GCCS-J. 
                                                 
155 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (logistics), AIT Task Force, “Logistics Automatic Identification 
Technology Concept of Operations,” November 1997. 
156 “JTAV Joint Total Asset Visability,” (2001 [cited 10 October 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.dla.mil/j-6/jtav/default.htm, 2004. 
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 5.10.4 Supply Consumption Rate 
The logistics community manages supplies using the 10 classes shown in  
Table 1-1.  Classes I (food and water), III (fuel), and V (ammunition) supplies are 
focused on for this study. 
If the logistics C2 loses asset visibility, supplies are shipped to the objective based 
on the planning factors listed in Table 5-5.  These planning factors are from the  
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) planning guide.157 
Food (Class I) Water (Class I) Fuel (Class III) Ammunition (Class V) 
Constant Constant Constant Assault Phase Sustain Phase 
5.58 lbs/day/troop 7.00 gals/day/troop 134,388 gals/day 64.21 lbs/day/troop 3.88 lbs/day/troop
Table 5-5: Logistics Planning Factors. 
5.11 Inventory and Storage 
The JEB, its equipment, and 30 days’ worth of food, fuel and ammunition is 
preloaded on the MPF(F) squadron of ships.  The baseline MPF(F) ships have selective 
offload capability and other improvements to the current cargo inventory and storage 
system, such as RFID tags and automated inventory management systems, which utilize 
RFID supplied data via the logistics Automated Information System (AIS).158 
Inventory and Storage consists of strike-up/strike-down, which includes 
storerooms, inventory management systems, and all equipment and space necessary to 
manage, store, repackage, and move cargo.  Inventory and Storage includes assembly, 
assembly spaces, equipment storage spaces, ground vehicle and aircraft maintenance 
spaces, hangar spaces, medical facilities, and all other spaces and services required for  
a JEB. 
Inventory and Storage in the 2015 period is improved from present systems 
through the use of RFID technology.  Current policy states that RFID tags will be 
                                                 
157 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001, 
(United States Marine Corps MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 20 April 2001), Part IV. 
158 The “Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Policy” for the Department of Defense (DoD) was issued 
by the Under Secretary of Defense in July 2004.  This policy outlines the criteria for active and passive 
RFID as well as Electronic Product Code TM (EPC) tags. 
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interoperable throughout the DoD and that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will 
manage active RFID tags.159  This policy also establishes the rules for active and passive 
RFID tags, as well as the use of Electronic Product CodeTM (EPC) data constructs.  These 
rules include phase-in dates, frequencies, placement and interoperability. 
Active RFID tags contain their own power source in the form of a battery and can 
both send and receive radio frequency signals.  These tags will be used on both 
consolidated sustainment and retrograde shipment containers (i.e., 20- or 40-ft 
International Standards Organization (ISO) containers, engine containers, and air pallets).  
Active tags include information on both the container and its contents (through the use of 
nested visibility) and are updated whenever changes occur so that they accurately reflect 
the current container contents.  Active RFID tags are required on prepositioned supplies 
and equipment.160 
Passive RFID tags use the energy from the interrogating equipment to generate a 
response to queries; this means a much shorter range, approximately three meters,161 but 
sufficient to provide nested visibility to active tags.  Passive RFID tags will be used on 
case, pallet and item packaging (unit pack) for all unique identification (UID) items 
beginning in 2007.  A graphic depiction of the RFID tagging system is shown in  
Figure 5-10. 
                                                 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 “Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tags,” in Frontline [online journal] (2003 [cited  
21 September 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.frontlinetoday.com/frontline/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=114683. 
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Figure 5-9: Graphic Depiction of RFID Tag Use.162 
Packaging of supplies in the 2015 time frame is not changed from the way they 
are accomplished today.  Although there are several ongoing studies concerning 
packaging, they do not meet the criteria of being a Program of Record.  Cargo arrives at 
the Sea Base packaged in various containers and is broken down prior to storage, and 
repackaged prior to transport to the objective. 
Fuel is packaged using different methods depending on the connector type used.  
Fuel is transported via air connectors in 500-gal fuel bladders or loaded onboard tanker 
trucks for transport by surface connectors.  The CH-53X can carry up to 4 bladders163 and 
the MV-22164 up to 2.  The LCAC165 and LCU(R)166 can carry fuel via  
1,500-gal trucks only.  The LCAC can carry up to four trucks and the LCU(R) up to 12. 
                                                 
162 The “Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Policy” for the Department of Defense (DoD) was issued 
by the Under Secretary of Defense in July 2004.  This policy outlines the criteria for active and passive 
RFID as well as Electronic Product Code TM (EPC) tags. 
163  “CH-53E Super Stallion,” (09 March 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ch-53e.htm. 
164 “NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model MV-22B Tiltrotor,” 01 June 2000, p. 9.5. 
165  “Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC),” (17 July 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcac.htm. 
166  “Landing Craft Utility (LCU),” (18 August 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcu.htm. 
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 5.11.1 Strike-up/Strike-down 
Strike-up is the time it takes to break out, move cargo from a storeroom to a 
staging area, and prepare that cargo for transfer to a connector.  This process begins when 
C2 receives a demand and ends when the transfer begins and the inventory system is 
updated to reflect the removal of the cargo from inventory.  The ships’ elevators, 
forklifts, pallet jacks, and other material handling equipment move the cargo.  The 
process of strike-up is comprised of several steps in the logistics process onboard the 
MPF(F) ships.  These steps occur sequentially, but contain delays while waiting in 
queues throughout the process.  A simplified strike-up process flow is shown in  
Figure 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-10: Strike-Up Flow Chart. 
Each MPF(F) ship has three elevators and all elevators have access to all levels 
where storerooms are located.  Elevators are assumed to be standard Navy elevators, 
rated for 10,500 lbs, that normally transport up to 3 standard pallets (3,000-lb, 54-sq in) 
or 2 loaded weapons skids (MHU-191M) per trip.167  Eight 4,000-lb forklifts and  
12 pallet jacks are also used for material handling. 
                                                 
167 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWCCD), “CVN Cargo Movement Process 
Study,” November 2002. 
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Strike-down is the reverse process of strike-up.  Strike-down is the time it takes to 
breakdown rigging and move cargo from the staging/receiving area to the storeroom, 
secure the cargo, and update the inventory management system with C2.  Both the  
strike-up and strike-down process and inventory management must be capable of 
maintaining pace with the connector transfers.  Inventory management is accomplished 
through use of RFID tags connected to the logistics AIS. 
 5.11.2 Assembly 
Assembly is the time it takes to prepare vehicles for off-load to include 
preoperation checks, fueling, equipping, munitions loading, and matching troops with 
their equipment.  Assembly requires a sufficient area to accommodate not only the 
assembly of the initial assault wave, but also an area where inoperable equipment can be 
set aside. 
Each MPF(F) ship has 7,000 sq ft of assembly space allocated for each loading 
interface.168  This assembly space is sufficient for one group of ready vehicles and  
two groups of vehicles in the process of being prepared for transfer.169 
 5.11.3 Aircraft Maintenance 
Aircraft maintenance spaces accommodate Organizational Level (O-Level) and 
limited Intermediate Level (I-Level) repair.  Depot Level repair is not conducted on board 
the MPF(F) unless a depot level team accompanies the ship or is sent to fulfill a specific 
request.  Each squadron has their own O-Level workspaces to support their aircraft. 
A CNA study170 recommended that 50,000 sq ft of space would be required for 
maintenance, but did not specify if this was O-Level, I-Level, or both.  Each MPF(F) has 
a total of 50,000 sq ft of maintenance space.  The 50,000 sq ft of maintenance space is 
used for both ground vehicle and aviation maintenance. 
                                                 
168 Souders et al., p. 20. 
169 Ibid., p. 17. 
170 Ibid. 
    103
The O-Level spaces include electronics/electrical, airframes/hydraulic, power 
plant, aircrew flight gear, line, ordnance, quality assurance, and maintenance control 
workspaces.  Many of these spaces are shared between like squadrons.  Additionally, a 
ready room and various administrative spaces are provided for the squadrons. 
The I-Level maintenance is conducted by an Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
(IMA) and is limited in nature.  Based on the fleet experience of various SEA-6 team 
members, much of the avionics will need to be Organizational to Depot (O to D) Level 
repair as the expense, extensive maintenance, and calibration of avionics benches are 
prohibitive to the MPF(F) system.  Additionally, the maintenance required to provide 
operational and calibrated avionics benches (after long periods in storage) cannot be 
accomplished within the 10-day requirement.  A smooth supply system is needed to 
support the O to D repair needs of the Air Combat Element.  The current Mobile Facility 
system (maintenance vans) can be used to meet the needs for an IMA onboard the 
MPF(F) ships; however, the maintenance vans cannot be shipped and installed onboard 
the MPF(F) ships within 10 days.  If located on the MPF(F), these vans will still require 
the same maintenance and calibration needed for regular shops.  The I-Level spaces are 
listed below: 
IM 1 - Maintenance/Materiel/Admin/Quality Assurance (QA) Division 
• Production Control 
• QA 
• Maintenance Admin 
• Aeronautical Material Screening Unit (AMSU) 
IM 2 - General Maintenance Division 
• Power Plants (limited to engine build-up) 
• Tire/Wheel and Brakes 
• Hydraulics (Hose and Tube) 
• Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
• Airframes (includes Welding) 
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• Paraloft 
• Aircrew Survival Systems (oxygen and ejection seats) 
• Other Administrative Spaces 
IM 3 - Avionics/Armament Division 
• Battery 
• Mini/Micro Repair (soldering) 
• Radio Repair (utilizing suitcase test sets provided by embarked squadrons 
in a fully operational and calibrated status) 
• Controlled Material Security (CMS) Vault 
• Ordnance Repair (bomb racks/rails) 
• Other Administrative Spaces 




• General Vehicle Repair 
• Corrosion and Painting 
• Preventative Maintenance 
• SE training and licensing 
• Other Administrative Spaces 
SEA-6 assumes that the IMA SE Division is expanded to accommodate vehicle 
repair required for assembly and reconstitution of the ground vehicles used at the 
objective.  The use of this division requires special consideration in the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP)171 to accommodate the unique nature of this dual use.  
The duplication of repair equipment and space for vehicle maintenance may be cost 
                                                 
171 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “OPNAV INSTRUCTION 4790.15D, 
Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP),” 26 June 2002. 
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prohibitive and unnecessary, unless vehicle maintenance is combined with  
IMA SE spaces. 
 5.11.4 Ground Vehicle Maintenance 
Ground vehicle maintenance space is required to repair vehicles found faulty 
during the assembly phase and all vehicles brought back to the ship for repair during the 
sustainment and the reconstitution phase.  Vehicle maintenance spaces will be largely the 
same as those required for the IMA SE spaces, only magnified to accommodate the 
increased vehicle size and number.  The IMA SE spaces could be used in conjunction 
with aircraft support equipment if needed or desired as stated above. 
As mentioned in Section 5.11.3, the space required for ground vehicle 
maintenance would be approximately 50,000 sq ft.  The chosen MPF(F) design allows a 
total of 50,000 sq ft of maintenance space, which was assumed to be a combination of 
both ground vehicle and aviation maintenance.  The spaces would also require special 
equipment (heavy lift jacks and maintenance stands) to accommodate maintenance on 





• General Vehicle Repair 
• Corrosion and Painting 
• Preventative Maintenance 
• Air-conditioning Servicing 
• Ordnance Repair 
 5.11.5 Aircraft Hangar Space 
Hangar bays require sufficient space to park approximately 25% of the embarked 
aircraft.  It is assumed that one aircraft elevator is available to move aircraft between the 
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hangar bay and the flight deck.  This elevator is large enough to accommodate two 
aircraft simultaneously.  The elevator may also be used to move cargo from the flight 
deck to the hangar deck during VERTREP evolutions. 
The minimum required hangar bay space is 8,750 sq ft to accommodate 25% of 
the ACE aircraft.  The recommended hangar bay space is increased to 10,000 sq ft to 
facilitate maneuvering and maintenance. 
 5.11.6 Medical 
Medical spaces are able to accommodate the casualties expected for each MPF(F) 
ship’s share of the ground forces utilized during a beach assault or other heavy combat.  
The chosen MPF(F) ship includes 5,000 sq ft of medical space for a total of 40,000 sq ft 
per MPG. 
Based on a recent CNA study172 (centered on 6-8 MPF(F) ships) it is 
recommended that each ship have 6,500 sq ft of medical space to include 90 beds and the 
capacity to handle approximately 40 casualties per day.  The medical requirements for 





• Blood storage 
• Operating Rooms 
• Acute Care Room/Beds 
• Overflow Area/Beds 
• Screening/Waiting Area 
• Other Administrative Areas 
                                                 
172 Souders et al. 
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5.12 Eliminated Platforms 
This section summarizes the platform designs that were not selected for the  
2015 BLA.  Platforms eliminated from the 2015 BLA composition include  
High Speed Vessels (HSVs), CH-46 helicopters and Amphibious Command Ships 
(LCCs).  The HSV is eliminated from this study because it does not meet the criteria of 
being a Program of Record.  The CH-46 is eliminated because it is being phased out and 
will not be available for operational use in 2015.  LCCs are eliminated as C2 is 
incorporated into the chosen MPF(F) ship.  Preliminary analysis, reinforced by a recent 
CNA study, identified the need for replenishment at sea for the MPF(F) ships.  Of the 
current Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship classes, the T-AKE class is eliminated from 
consideration because the fuel capacity of 18,000 bbls is insufficient to fulfill the 
refueling requirements of the Sea Base. 
5.13 2015 Baseline Architecture Views 
Architecture defines “the structure of components, their relationships, and the 
principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.”173  The 
architecture views selected reflect the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DODAF).174  DODAF is chosen because it is the current format used within the DoD.  It 
provides a common approach for description development, presentation, and integration 
of DoD architectures to assist in the ease of understanding across  
organizational boundaries. 
Architecture views describe attributes and relationships within the architecture.  
The three prominent views—Operational View (OV), Systems View (SV), and  
Technical Standards View (TV)—and their relationships are shown in Figure 5-12.  The 
OV describes, “The tasks and activities, operational elements, and information exchanges 
required to accomplish DoD missions.”175  The SV “describes systems and 
                                                 
173 “Glossary of Terms/Acronyms,” (02 August 2004 [cited 08 September 2004]); available from  
World Wide Web @ http://www.army.mil/aeioo/toolkits/glossary.html. 
174 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group, “DoD Architecture Framework (DODAF)174  
Version 1.0, Vol. I: Definitions and Guidelines,” 15 August 2003. 
175 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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interconnections providing for, or supporting, DoD functions” and “associated systems 
resources to the OV.”176  The TV is “the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, 
interaction and interdependence of system parts or elements.”177  The final views defined 
by the DODAF are the All-Views (AV).  The AV provides general information 
applicable to the entire architecture.  AVs are not specific diagrams, but are descriptions 
of the overall scope. 
 
Figure 5-11: Architecture View Relationships. 178 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)179  
recommends the following products be developed for any new Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities  
(DOTMLPF) solution: 
• OV-1: High-Level Operational Concept Graphic 
• OV-2: Operational Node Connectivity Description 
• OV-3: Operational Information Exchange Matrix 
• OV-5: Operational Activity Model 
• OV-6c: Operational Event-Trace Description 
                                                 
176 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
177 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
178 Ibid., p. ES-1. 
179 “Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,” in Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01, (12 March 2004 [cited 08 September 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m317001.pdf. 
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• SV-1: System Interface Description 
• SV-2: Systems Communications Description  
(for communications networks) 
• SV-6: Systems Data Exchange Matrix 
• TV-1: Technical Standards Profile 
The DODAF recommends the following additional products: 
• AV-1: Overview and Summary Information 
• AV-2: Integrated Dictionary 
Of these, SEA-6 uses the following architecture views: 
• OV-1: 2015 Baseline Architecture Operational Concept Graphic 
• OV-2: 2015 Baseline Architecture Operational Node  
Connectivity Description 
• SV-1: 2015 Baseline Architecture Systems Interface Description 
 5.13.1 Operational View 
Figure 5-13 shows the 2015 BLA Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1).  This 
view depicts SEA-6’s graphic representation of the architecture.  The FLS shown in the 
distance at left represents the starting point for the MPG.  The MPG is depicted as 
MPF(F) ships, which carry the JEB from the FLS to the Sea Base, a resupply ship used to 
resupply the MPF(F) ships, and a LCU(R) ship, which assists in the initial movement of 
troops and equipment to the beach.  The LCAC and aircraft represent the connectors 
providing logistical support between the MPG and objective.  The lightening bolts 
represent the C2 system linking all assets together.  The single CSG in the right 
background represents the inclusion of CSGs and ESGs in the Sea Base. 
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Figure 5-12: OV-1 2015 Baseline Architecture Operational Concept. 
The 2015 Baseline Architecture Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) is shown 
in Enclosure 4 (OV-2 2015 Baseline Architecture Operational Node Connectivity).  This 
graphic shows operational nodes with information exchange needlines.  The operational 
node is an information source and/or sink and may be external or internal to the  
2015 BLA.  Operational node types include, but are not limited to roles and 
logical/functional types such as connectors and organizations. 
Needlines represent the requirement to exchange information between operational 
nodes.  Annotated on the needlines are the primary types of information required.  The 
arrows indicate the direction of information flow. 
 5.13.2 Systems Views (SV) 
The 2015 Systems Interface Description (SV-1) is shown in Figure 5-14.  This 
diagram shows the system nodes180 with the system function listed inside the node 
                                                 
180 System nodes are defined in the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) as nodes 
with the identification and allocation of resources (e.g., platforms, units, facilities, and locations) required 
to implement specific roles and missions. 
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symbol.  The lines connecting the nodes are the system interfaces between the nodes.  
Several of the interface lines are denoted as “key interfaces.”  For this architecture, key 
interfaces are considered mission critical.  In order to achieve C2 functions or to provide 
total asset visibility, these key interfaces must be maintained.  Additionally, since the 
nodes do not necessarily represent platforms from the same service, interoperability is a 
critical system attribute to allow the information exchange across these interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 5-13: SV-1 2015 Baseline Architecture Systems Interface Description. 
5.14 2015 Baseline Architecture Concept of Operations 
As described in Chapter 3, within 10 days of the deployment order, the Combined 
Task Force Commander (CTF CDR) deploys the 3 BLTs to seize the initiative.  These 
forces deploy to the initial objective within one period of darkness.  Using the 
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deployment order receipt as a starting point, this section describes a possible concept of 
operations for the 2015 BLA. 
5.15 Closure Phase 
 5.15.1 Deployment and Transit  
Upon receipt of the deployment order, the personnel and aircraft that deploy 
aboard the MPF(F) ships begin moving to the FLS.  If not already in port, two of the 
MPF(F) ships will dock at the FLS pier and all other MPF(F) ships will rendezvous at the 
FLS anchorage site. 
Movement of JEB personnel from their base of origin to the designated FLS is 
accomplished by the use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).181  “The  
Civil Reserve Air Fleet is made up of US civil air carriers who are committed by contract 
to providing operating and support personnel for DoD.  The CRAF program is designed 
to quickly mobilize the nation’s airlift resources to meet DoD force projection 
requirements.”182  Table 5-6 shows CRAF aircraft types with their approximate  
passenger capacities. 
Aircraft Number of Passengers
Boeing B747 364 
Douglas DC-10 242 
Lockheed L-1011 246-340 
Table 5-6: CRAF aircraft types and passenger numbers.183 
Personnel are expected to begin boarding the aircraft within 24 hrs of receipt of 
the deployment order.  Aircraft begin transiting to the FLS upon completion of  
personnel boarding. 
Air assets are not based at the FLS and require either self-deployment or transport 
by means of surface or air.  The MV-22 and F-35 aircraft self-deploy and fly either 
                                                 
181 “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” (18 November 2001 [cited 18 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/craf.htm. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
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directly to the MPF(F) ships or to the FLS.  MV-22s have an unrefueled ferry range of 
1,100 NM and the F-35’s unrefueled ferry range is estimated to be approximately  
1,200 NM based on a combat range of 600 NM.184  Transit distances and flight times are 
calculated from various flight points of origin to each of the FLS locations and are 
detailed in Enclosure 3 (Transit Time Analysis). 
Although SEA-6 assumes that these air assets are deployed from the closest 
forward base, the worst-case scenario, deployment from the Continental U.S. (CONUS), 
is also considered.  Tanker support for inflight refueling of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft 
is required on most of the trip legs from the CONUS to Guam or Diego Garcia.  Although 
not every leg requires tanker refueling, it is desirable to have tankers escort the aircraft 
the entire way.  Likewise, the trip from the East Coast to Sigonella does not require 
tanker support, but should be provided if tankers are available.  If tanking is not available 
for the Sigonella trip, the aircraft are required to make numerous refueling stops, 
increasing the flight times and the risk of breakdowns.  If aircraft do break down while 
enroute, rescue missions are required. 
For the large number of MV-22 and F-35 aircraft required, squadrons will most 
likely deploy from several locations over the course of several days.  Additionally, the 
launching of such a large number of aircraft requires that they be launched in waves so as 
not to overwhelm the tanking support and the support structure of the refueling and 
remain over night (RON) locations. 
Although the CH-53X has in-flight refueling capability, it is limited to 
approximately 8 hrs due to pilot fatigue185 and therefore is transported to the FLS.  One 
method of transport is onboard an aircraft carrier that transits directly to the FLS or  
Sea Base.  While this method of transport has several advantages, it also relies on a 
                                                 
184 “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Specifications,” (08 November 2001 [cited 18 October 2004]); available from 
the World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/jsf-specs.htm. 
185 Captain Daniel Stimpson, USMC, <dstimpso@nps.edu>, “RE: CH-53 Transport Times,”  
02 November 2004, office communication (02 November 2004).  Captain J. Mark Lozano, USMC, 
<jmlozano@nps.edu>, “RE: CH-53 Transport Times,” 02 November 2004, office communication  
(02 November 2004).  CAPT Thomas H. Hoivik, USN (Ret), <thhoivik@nps.edu>, “RE: SEA-6 project 
question,” 02 November 2004, office communication (02 November 2004). 
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carrier being available and prevents that carrier from being utilized in its primary role.  
Travel time leaving from San Diego takes approximately 7 1/2 days to Guam, almost  
14 days to Diego Garcia, and 6 days to reach Sigonella from Norfolk. 
Considering the 10/30/30 time constraint, the quickest transport method is to load 
the helicopters onboard C-5 or C-17 aircraft and fly them to the FLS.  Only 2 CH-53Xs 
can fit in a C-5 and only 1 in a C-17.  Maintenance personnel, tools, parts, and support 
equipment could also be loaded onboard the transport aircraft for immediate use upon 
arrival.  The C-17 has a range of 5,200 NM at 450 kts.  The C-5 has virtually the same 
range and speed as the C-17.  Enclosure 3 shows travel times and routes to the FLS for 
both C-5 and C-17 aircraft. 
The CH-53X requires considerable preparation prior to loading into a C-5 or  
C-17.  SEA-6 contacted several CH-53X pilots to obtain information concerning this 
evolution186 reflected in the following discussion of CH-53X preparation for transport 
and restoration following transport. 
The entire main gearbox, rotor head, and tail pylon is removed and the tires are 
replaced with smaller tires to allow clearance into the aircraft.  If maintenance personnel 
work around the clock, one CH-53X can be prepared for loading in approximately  
18 hrs.  Since it requires 18 hrs of maintenance per aircraft, and each squadron has  
10 aircraft, and the squadrons can work on 3 aircraft simultaneously, this requires four 
18-hr periods totaling approximately 3 days. 
Once at the FLS, each CH-53X aircraft requires approximately 1 day to 
reassemble, perform vibration analysis and complete a Functional Check Flight (FCF).  
Again, each squadron can work on 3 aircraft simultaneously.  With 10 aircraft to 
complete per squadron, each squadron requires approximately 4 days to complete all  
10 aircraft.  This optimistically assumes all maintenance actions go as planned.  Although 
                                                 
186 Major Mike Carter, USMC, <macarter@nps.edu>, “RE: CH-53 pilot question,” 02 November 2004, 
office communication (02 November 2004).  Captain Daniel Stimpson, USMC, <dstimpso@nps.edu>,  
“RE: CH-53 Transport Times,” 01 November 2004, office communication (02 November 2004).   
Captain J. Mark Lozano, USMC, <jmlozano@nps.edu>, “RE: CH-53 Transport Times,”  
01 November 2004, office communication (02 November 2004). 
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the plan is to complete the maintenance and FCF on the aircraft prior to getting 
underway, ultimately, any helicopters not completed will need to be craned onboard the 
MPF(F) ships and completed en route. 
The UH-1, AH-1, and the SH-60 aircraft do not require disassembly prior to 
transport or reassembly at the FLS.  Eight AH-1Zs, 6 UH-1Ys, or 6 SH-60Rs can fit into 
a C-5.  Four UH-1Ys, 4 AH-1Zs, or 4 SH-60Rs can fit in a C-17.  Once at the FLS, these 
helicopters are quickly prepared for operations prior to flying aboard the MPF(F) ships. 
 5.15.2 Assembly 
Each MPF(F) ship is already loaded with the prepositioned equipment, minus 
aircraft and LCACs.  The LCACs are located at the FLS and are craned onboard the 
MPF(F) ships while the troops are loading.  Helicopters arrive at the FLS as discussed in 
the previous sections and are flown aboard the MPF(F) ships once maintenance 
preparations are complete.  MV-22 and F-35 aircraft rendezvous with their MPF(F) ship 
if at sea or at the FLS if their ship is in port. 
Upon arrival at the FLS, personnel debark the airlifts and are transported to the 
pier where two MPF(F) ships are docked.  Personnel distribution and load out plans are 
prearranged so all personnel are located on the same MPF(F) ship as their equipment.  
Once personnel boarding is complete, each ship transits to the anchorage area to await the 
arrival of its designated aircraft.  After the first MPF(F) ship boards all personnel and 
clears the pier, the next MPF(F) ship will take its place.  This process will continue until 
all MPF(F) ships are loaded. 
Once personnel boarding is complete, the ground vehicle maintenance personnel 
will begin preparing the vehicles for use.  This preparation takes place in the vehicle 
storage spaces, and takes an average of four days.187 
The assembly process begins and must be completed prior to the initial movement 
of personnel and equipment from the Sea Base to the objective.  The LCACs are 
                                                 
187 Major Robert E. Cote, USMC, <CoteRE@bic.usmc.mil>, “RE: MPF(F) studies at NPS,”  
04 October 2004, office communication (19 October 2004). 
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offloaded and the initial wave of eight LCACs is prestaged on the Integrated Landing 
Platforms (ILP).  Ammunition, food, and water is brought up from the MPF(F) ship 
storerooms and prestaged in the assembly areas.  Approximately 12 hrs prior to offload, 
ground vehicles begin moving to the assembly areas, where the loading of ammunition, 
food, equipment, and water occurs. 
 5.15.3 Sea Base Formation 
The MPF(F) ships that are transporting F-35 or MV-22 aircraft will begin transit 
to the JOA upon completion of their personnel boarding, but no more than one day prior 
to aircraft arrival at the FLS.  The MPF(F) ships designated as home ships for the 
helicopter squadrons remain at anchorage until all their helicopters have successfully 
completed required checks and are ready to begin fly-on as discussed in Section 5.15.1.  
Once each MPF(F) ship has embarked its helicopters, the ship begins transit to the  
Sea Base.  The T-AOE and LCU(R) are either at the FLS, or underway near the FLS.  
They begin transit to the Sea Base along with the first MPF(F) ships. 
Just prior to conducting the first wave of troop and equipment movement to the 
objective, the MV-22s and CH-53Xs redistribute from their home ships to the other 
MPF(F) ships.  Once this redistribution is complete, the movement of troops and 
equipment from the Sea Base to the objective commences. 
5.16 Employment Phase 
The troops transported from the Sea Base to the objective during one period of 
darkness are described in Section 5.3.1 of this chapter.  The MV-22 aircraft transports 
these personnel.  Each MV-22 is capable of transporting 24 combat troops, along with 
their personal equipment, directly to the objective.  Personnel required to operate the 
equipment being transported on the LCU(R)s and LCACs are transported, along with 
their equipment to the ashore location. 
Equipment is transported from the Sea Base by the use of air and surface 
connectors.  The equipment required to be transported ashore during the first period of 
darkness is discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this chapter.  The equipment designated for  
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air transport is moved by the CH-53Xs and is specified in Enclosure 1B, landing  
priorities 1-8.  The equipment designated for surface transport is moved by the LCU(R)s 
and by the LCACs and is specified in Enclosure 1A, landing priorities 1-19.  The 
equipment moved by air connectors is taken directly to the objective and the equipment 
moved by surface connectors is offloaded at the beach and moved under its own power to 
the objective. 
The remainder of equipment not specified in the previous paragraph is transported 
from the Sea Base in the same manner described above.  This equipment is detailed in 
Enclosure 1A, landing priorities 20-28 and Enclosure 1B, landing priorities 9 and 10 and 
is transported immediately following the initial equipment movement. 
5.17 Sustainment Phase 
At the objective, ammunition is carried by the use of heavy tactical wheeled 
vehicles (i.e., MK48 Logistics Vehicle System (LVS)) and medium tactical vehicles  
(i.e., XM1091 Fuel/Water Tanker) carry fuel with a 1,500-gal capacity.  Two days’ worth 
of food and water are carried by the individual troop vehicles listed in Enclosures 1A and 
1B.  The total capacity of the ammunition carriers is 3 days’ worth of ammunition and the 
total capacity of fuel carriers is 2 1/2 days’ worth of fuel. 
The MV-22s and CH-53Xs resupply the forces at the objective.  Supplies 
delivered by these connectors are brought directly to the forces at the objective.  Once all 
cargo is offloaded, the connectors return to the Sea Base, where they reload.  Supply 
priorities are established by sense and respond logistics.  An on-hand ratio is calculated 
by dividing current on-hand quantity of a particular type (fuel, water, food, or 
ammunition) by the carrier vehicle capacity.  The lowest ratio calculated becomes the 
highest priority for resupply. 
5.18 Medical Evacuation 
In the event that medical evacuation of combat forces becomes necessary, the 
closest UH-1, MV-22, or CH-53X is diverted.  If no connector is airborne, one is 
launched from the Sea Base, transits directly to the location of the injured personnel, load 
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the injured personnel according to the capacities detailed in Section 5.11.6 of this chapter.  
Patients are returned to the Sea Base, where they receive medical attention. 
 
   119   Enclosure 1A 
Enclosure 1A: Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME) Equipment Breakdown (Surface BLT) 
NOTE: UNITS LISTED ARE PER SURFACE BATTALION LANDING TEAM (BLT).  THE SBME CONTAINS TWO SURFACE BLTs.  TOTAL WEIGHTS 

















Rifle Co 1 
(Reinforcement) AA Plt 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0 
2 Tank Plt 1 8 M1A1  2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0 
    8 M1A1 w/TWMP 2 141,075 282,150 506.8 1013.6 
3 
Rifle Co 2 
(Reinforcement) AA Plt 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0 
4 Tank Plt 2 8 M1A1  2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0 
    8 M1A1 w/TWMP 2 141,075 282,150 506.8 1013.6 
5 A Command 143 EFV-P 10 71,344 713,440 360.0 3600.0 
       AA Plt 8 EFV-C 1 66,351 66,351 360.0 360.0 
6 
Rifle Co 3 
(Reinforcement) AA PLT 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0 
7 Tank Plt 3 16 M1A1 4 133,815 535,260 387.0 1548.0 
8 Tank Co Hq 8 ABV 2 1,350 2,700 468.0 936.0 
  Det, CEB Co 4 AVLB 1 93,194 93,194 468.0 468.0 
  Det, Engr Spt Plt 8 M1A1 2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0 
   ABV and ACE 5 M88A2 1 141,173 141,173 340.5 340.5 
  Det, AT Plt, Tank Bn 4 M9 ACE 4 37,799 151,197 215.3 861.0 
    8 M998 HMMWV w/M101Trailer 2 12,118 24,236 185.3 370.7 
    3 M998 HMMWV w/M116 Trailer 1 12,778 12,778 196.1 196.1 
    3 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 8,720 17,440 64.8 129.7 
    4 M1043 HMMWV 1 10,158 10,158 109.8 109.8 
    18 M1045 HMMWV 6 9,918 59,508 109.2 655.2 
  9 M998 HMMWV 3 8,918 26,754 109.3 327.9 
9 CAAT Plt 24 ITV 8     
  Scout Snipers 40 M1043 HMMWV 10 10,158 101,580 109.8 1,097.9 















  TACP 32 M1045 HMMWV 8 10,218 81,744 109.2 873.6 
    9 M998 HMMWV 3 8,918 26,754 109.3 327.9 
    2 MRC JTRS HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 1 11,770 11,770 140.9 140.9 
10 B Command 18 EFV-P 1 72,454 72,454 360.0 360.0 
  Det, AA Plt 12 EFV-C 1 67,551 67,551 360.0 360.0 
  Arty Bn LNO Tm 4 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 1 12,118 12,118 185.3 185.3 
  NGLO Team 9 MRC JTRS HMMWV 3 9,170 27,510 64.8 194.5 
11 LAR Co B 84 LAV 25 14 28,685 401,590 173.3 2,425.5 
    4 LAV AT 4 30,624 122,496 171.5 686.0 
    6 LAV C2 1 29,121 29,121 174.6 174.6 
    2 LAV L 3 29,429 88,287 173.5 520.6 
    3 LAV M 2 30,047 60,094 172.2 344.4 
    6 LAV R 1 31,103 31,103 200.0 200.0 
12 A Command Veh/Pers 8 M1043 HMMWV 2 10,158 20,316 109.8 219.6 
    12 M998 HMMWV 3 9,218 27,654 109.3 327.9 
    12 MRC JTRS HMMWV 4 10,670 42,680 64.8 259.4 
    4 MRC JTRS HMMWVw/M101 Trlr 1 10,870 10,870 140.9 140.9 
13 Det Arty Btry C (3 Guns) 3 M1043 HMMWV 1 9,858 9,858 109.8 109.8 
    12 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 3 12,118 36,354 185.3 556.0 
    24 MTVR w/LW155 3 46,208 138,624 214.4 643.1 
    9 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 3 53,068 159,204 310.6 931.9 
    6 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 9,170 18,340 64.8 129.7 
14 Avenger Section 10 Avenger 5 13,613 68,065 116.5 582.3 
    3 MRC JTRS HMMWV 1 9,170 9,170 64.8 64.8 
15 Arty Btry C (-) (3 Guns) 4 M1043 HMMWV 1 10,158 10,158 109.8 109.8 
  Det, CBR Plt, HQ Btry 4 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 1 12,118 12,118 185.3 185.3 
    3 MRC JTRS HMMWV 1 9,170 9,170 64.8 64.8 
    4 MTVR 1 45,008 45,008 214.4 214.4 
    24 MTVR w/LW155 3 46,208 138,624 214.4 643.1 
    15 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 5 53,068 265,340 310.6 1,553.1 















    3 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,308 50,308 307.8 307.8 
    2 4K Forklift 2 12,004 24,008 106.2 212.3 
    4 M1035 HMMWV 1 8,890 8,890 106.3 106.3 
    12 AN/TPQ (4 HMMWV & 4 Trlr) 1 53,476 53,476 108.5 108.5 
16 Det CEB Co B  6 MTVR Dump truck w/MK155 3 52,541 157,623 339.0 1,017.1 
    3 M998 HMMWV 1 8,918 8,918 109.3 109.3 
17 B Command (Veh/Pers) 18 M998 HMMWV 6 8,918 53,508 109.3 655.7 
    9 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 3 11,818 35,454 185.3 556.0 
    6 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 9,170 18,340 64.8 129.7 
18 Inf Bn Combat Trains 6 M1035 HMMWV 2 8,590 17,181 106.3 212.5 
    8 M997 HMMWV 2 11,550 23,101 122.4 244.9 
    21 M998 HMMWV 7 8,918 62,426 109.3 765.0 
    3 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 1 11,818 11,818 185.3 185.3 
19 Inf Bn DS CSS Co B 2 4K Forklift 2 12,004 24,008 106.2 212.3 
    10 M1043 HMMWV 2 10,458 20,916 109.8 219.6 
    10 M997 HMMWV 2 11,850 23,701 122.4 244.9 
    24 M998 HMMWV 6 9,218 55,308 109.3 655.7 
    8 Contact Truck 2 22,200 44,400 214.4 428.8 
    16 M998 HMMWV w/M101 Trlr 4 12,118 48,472 185.3 741.4 
    3 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 8,720 17,440 64.8 129.7 
Totals Per Bn Task Force 1,558  237 2,604,574.4 8.760,044.2 14,594.7 49,081.7 
Totals for SBME (Surface) 3,116  474 5,209,148.8 17,520,088.4 29,189.3 98,163.3 
 
Table 7: SBME Surface BLT Composition Inserted Within Initial 10-Hour Period.
















20 Plt, HIMARS Btry 9 HIMARS Launcher 3 47,118 141,354 214.4 643.1 
  Inf Bn Combat Trains 18 HIMARS Reload Veh w/Trlr 6 80,328 481,968 310.6 1863.8 
    3 M1043 HMMWV 1 9,858 9,858 109.8 109.8 
    24 M998 HMMWV 8 8,918 71,344 109.3 874.3 
    12 M998 HWWMV w/M101 Trlr 3 12,118 36,354 185.3 556.0 
    6 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 9,170 18,340 64.8 129.7 
21 Det, H&S Co, AA Bn 3 EFV-P 1 67,954 67,954 360.0 360.0 
    3 EFV-C 1 64,851 64,851 360.0 360.0 
    4 LVS MK48 w/MK14 2 114,050 228,099 332.7 665.3 
    6 M998 HMMWV 3 8,618 25,854 109.3 327.9 
    2 MRC JTRS HMMWV 1 8,870 8,870 64.8 64.8 
    2 MRC JTRS HMMWV w/M116 Trlr 1 12,730 12,730 151.6 151.6 
    2 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 1 52,768 52,768 310.6 310.6 
    2 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,008 50,008 307.8 307.8 
22 Det, H&S Co, Tank Bn 6 EFV-P 1 68,854 68,854 360.0 360.0 
    8 EFV-C 1 66,351 66,351 360.0 360.0 
    2 LVS MK48 w/MK14 1 114,050 114,050 332.7 332.7 
    2 LVS MK48 w/MK17 1 114,950 114,950 319.3 319.3 
    3 M1043 HMMWV 1 9,858 9,858 109.8 109.8 
    6 MRC JTRS HMMWV 2 9,170 18,340 64.8 129.7 
    6 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 2 53,068 106,136 310.6 621.3 
    3 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,308 50,308 307.8 307.8 
23 Det, H&S Co, LAR Bn 2 LAV 25 1 27,485 27,485 173.3 173.3 
    2 LAV C2 1 27,921 27,921 174.6 174.6 
    2 LAV L 1 29,609 29,609 173.5 173.5 
    2 M1043 HMMWV 1 9,558 9,558 109.8 109.8 
    4 M998 HMMWV 2 8,618 17,236 109.3 218.6 
    3 MTVR 1 44,708 44,708 214.4 214.4 
    6 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 2 53,068 106,136 310.6 621.3 















    3 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,308 50,308 307.8 307.8 
24 Det Combat Engr (Rein) 1 D7 Dulldozer 1 49,020 49,020 208.0 208.0 
    3 LVS MK48 w/MK14 1 114,350 114,350 332.7 332.7 
    3 LVS MK48 w/MK16 1 69,590 69,590 294.0 294.0 
    0 Trlr, Lowbed 1 40,000 40,000 466.7 466.7 
    2 M998 HMMWV 2 8,318 16,636 109.3 218.6 
    2 M998 HMMWV w/M116 Trlr 2 12,178 24,356 196.1 392.1 
    3 MRC JTRS HMMWV 1 9,170 9,170 64.8 64.8 
    3 MTVR Dumptruck 1 46,732 46,732 214.4 214.4 
    3 MTVR Dumptruck w/M149 WB 1 49,332 49,332 307.8 307.8 
    4 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 2 52,768 105,536 310.6 621.3 
25 Tank Co DS Sec, CSS Co 2 MTVR Wrecker 1 48,033 48,033 265.3 265.3 
    6 LVS MK48 w/MK14 3 114,050 342,149 332.7 998.0 
    4 M88A2 1 140,704 140,704 340.5 340.5 
    2 M998 HMMWV 1 8,618 8,618 109.3 109.3 
    4 Contact Truck 2 21,600 43,200 214.4 428.8 
    4 MTVR w/M105Trlr 2 52,768 105,536 310.6 621.3 
    2 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,008 50,008 307.8 307.8 
26 AAAV Co DS Sec CSS  6 LVS MK48 w/MK14 3 114,050 342,149 332.7 998.0 
    2 M998 HMMWV 1 8,618 8,618 109.3 109.3 
    2 Contact Truck 2 21,300 42,600 214.4 428.8 
    6 MTVR w/M105Trlr 2 53,068 106,136 310.6 621.3 
    6 MTVR w/M149 WB 2 50,308 100,616 307.8 615.5 
27 LAV Co DS Sec, CSS Co 4 LVS MK48 w/MK14 2 114,050 228,099 332.7 665.3 
    2 M998 HMMWV 1 8,618 8,618 109.3 109.3 
    2 Contact Truck 2 21,300 42,600 214.4 428.8 
    3 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 1 53,068 53,068 310.6 310.6 
    3 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,308 50,308 307.8 307.8 
28 LW155 Btry Spt Plt, CSS  8 LVS MK48 w/MK14 4 114,050 456,198 332.7 1330.6 
    2 Contact Truck 1 21,600 21,600 214.4 214.4 















    4 MTVR w/M105 Trlr 2 52,768 105,536 310.6 621.3 
    2 MTVR w/M149 WB 1 50,008 50,008 307.8 307.8 
Totals Per Bn Task Force 1,814  340 5,510,167.6 13,771,327.8 29,423.5 73,590.5 
Totals for SBME (Surface) 3,628  680 11,020,335.2 27,542,655.6 58,846.9 146,199.1
 
Table 8: SBME Surface BLT Composition Inserted After Initial 10-Hour Period. 
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Enclosure 1B: Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME) Equipment Breakdown (Vertical BLT) 
 
SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BY LANDING SEQUENCE PRIORITY 










1 Rifle Co 4 233 M998 HMMWV 246,296 109.3 2,404.4 
2 Rifle Co 5 233 M998 HMMWV 246,296 109.3 2,404.4 
3 Rifle Co 6 233 M998 HMMWV 246,296 109.3 2,404.4 
4 EFSS Det 8 EFSS 42,400 88.6 708.8 
5 Inf Bn Combat Trains 6 M1035 HMMWV 17,181 106.3 212.5 
  8 M997 HMMWV 23,101 122.4 244.9 
  21 M998 HMMWV 70,444 109.3 874.3 
6 Rifle Co 7 233 M998 HMMWV 246,296 109.3 2404.4 
7 LAR Co 84 LAV 25 401,590 173.3 2,425.5 
  4 LAV AT 122,496 171.5 686.0 
  6 LAV C2 29,121 174.6 174.6 
  2 LAV L 88,287 173.5 520.6 
  3 LAV M 60,094 172.2 344.4 
  6 LAV R 31,103 200.0 200.0 
8 CAAT Plt 24 M1043 HMMWV 96,780 109.8 1,097.9 
 Scout Snipers 40 M1045 HMMWV 84,144 109.2 873.6 
 TACP 32 M998 HMMWV 33,654 109.3 327.9 
Totals Per Bn Task Force 1,184  2,159,642.4 2,366.4 19,182.9 
Table 9: SBME Vertical BLT Composition Inserted Within Initial 10-Hour Period.










9 Det, H&S Co, LAR Bn 2 LAV 25 27,485 173.3 173.3 
  2 LAV C2 27,921 174.6 174.6 
  2 LAV L 29,609 173.5 173.5 
10 Inf Bn Combat Trains (Rein) 22 M998 HMMWV 118,852 109.3 1530.1 
Totals per Bn Task Force 28  203,867 630.7 2051.5 
 
Table 10: SBME Vertical BLT Composition Inserted After Initial 10-Hour Period. 
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Enclosure 2: Army Brigade Combat Team Equipment Breakdown188 









Mobile Command Group 1 14 1 1
Mobile Command Group 2 13 1 1
Tactical Command Post (TACP) 71 7 1 4
Company Headquarters Section 8 1 3 2
Medical Support Section 6 1 1
Totals 112 9 3 1 5 4 2
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) Personnel
Vehicle Type
 




Company Headquarters Section 6 1 1
Range Extension Section 22 1 6 6
BIC Company (NETOPS Section) 22 1 6
BIC Company (Analysis Processing Section) 24 6
BIC Company (Collection & Integration Section) 17 2 2
Totals 91 5 6 20 1










Aviation Squadron Headquarters 31 2 2 5 1
Aviation Flight Troop 42 2 7 6
Aviation Flight Troop 42 2 7 6
Aviation Service Troop (Maintenance) 77 1 20 4
Aviation Service Troop (Support) 23 1 5 2





                                                 
188 Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, “The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan Maneuver Unit of Action,” 
Change 2 to the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-90 O & O, 30 June 2003, pp. 3-61 - 3-91. 
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Color Indicates - Not Fully Funded  
ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (CONTINUED) 
 











Aviation Squadron Headquarters 1
Aviation Flight Troop 1 4 X* X
Aviation Flight Troop 1 4 X X
Aviation Service Troop (Maintenance)
Aviation Service Troop (Support) 2 2 4






Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) Battalion Personnel







CIC & Command Group 25 2 4 1       
NLOS LS Platoon 27     1 12     
NLOS Battery Headquarters 3     1       
Sensor Platoon  5 1           
RADAR Section 12     6   3 3 
Meteorological Section 3     1       
UAV CL 3 Section 10   1   3     
Support Section 7     1 1     
NLOS Battery 48   4   12     
NLOS Battery 48   4   12     
NLOS Battery 48   4   12     
Totals 236 3 17 11 52 3 3 
 
Color Indicates - Not Fully Funded 
* “X” indicates that the required numbers are yet to be determined  
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ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (CONTINUED) 
 
Vehicle Type 
NLOS Battalion (continued) UAV CL III 
L/C Units 
UAV CL III 
Vehicles 
FCS  






(Water) HEMTT Fuelers 
CIC & Command Group             1   
NLOS LS Platoon       24         
NLOS Battery Headquarters             1   
Sensor Platoon                  
RADAR Section                 
Meteorological Section                 
UAV CL 3 Section 3 12             
Support Section               1 
NLOS Battery     6 12 2 4 1   
NLOS Battery     6 12 2 4 1   
NLOS Battery     6 12 2 4 1   
Totals 3 12 18 60 6 12 5 1 
 
Color Indicates - Not Fully Funded  
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ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (CONTINUED) 
 
Forward Support Battalion Totals 
Personnel 453 
Vehicle Type Total 
HMMWV (C2) 22 
HMMWV (Support) 27 
HEMTT-LHS 61 
HMMWV Ambulance 4 
MV-E 4 
MV-T 3 
Future Recovery Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV) 10 
Camel (Water) 3 
UAV CL 1 L/C 3 
UAV CL 1 Vehicle 6 
Hippo (Water) 5 
PLS Trailer 39 
POL Tank Rack 10 
HEMTT Fueler 46 
4K Forklift 8 
10K Forklift 2 
HMMWV (Contact Maintenance Truck (CMT)) 11 
HEMTT Wrecker 13 
Forward Repair System (FRS) (LHS Mtd) 4 
Set, Standard Automotive Tools (SATS) Trailer 2 
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ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (CONTINUED) 
 
Combined Arms Battalion Single Battalion Totals 
3 Battalions  
per Unit of Action 
Grand Totals 
Personnel 623 1,869 
Vehicle Type     
C2V 10 30 
ICV 33 99 
HMMWV (C2) 9 27 
HMMWV (Support) 3 9 
HEMMT-LHS 18 54 
PLS Trailer 10 30 
MV-E 5 15 
MV-T 2 6 
Mounted Combat System (MCS) 20 60 
ARV-RSTA 9 27 
MULE 18 54 
MULE/GSTAMIDS 10 30 
ARV-A (L) 6 18 
ARV-A 6 18 
Small UGV 27 81 
UAV CL 1 L/C 15 45 
UAV CL 1 Vehicle 30 90 
UAV CL 2 L/C 12 36 
UAV CL 2 Vehicle 12 36 
UAV CL 3 L/C 3 9 
UAV CL 3 Vehicle 12 36 
NLOS Mortar 8 24 
81MM Mortar 4 12 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (R&SV) 10 30 
Camel (Water) 2 6 
Tank Rack (POL) 2 6 
HEMMT Fueler 4 12 
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ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (CONTINUED) 
 
AAFARS Advanced Aviation Forward Area Refueling System 
ARV Armed Robotic Vehicle 
ARV-A Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault 
ARV-A (L) Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault (Light) 
ARV-RSTA ARV-Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
C2 Command and Control  
C2V Command and Control Vehicle 
CIC Command Integration Cell 
CL Class 
FCS Future Combat System 
GSTAMIDS Ground Standoff Minefield Detection System 
HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 
HEMTT-LHS HEMTT-Load Handling System 
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle  
HTARS HEMMT Tanker Aviation Refueling System 
ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle 
L/C Launcher/Control 
LHS Load Handling System 
Mtd Mounted 
MULE Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equipment 
MV-E Medical Vehicle-Evacuation 
MV-T Medical Vehicle-Treatment 
NETOPS Network Operations 
NLOS Non-line of Sight 
NLOS LS Non-line of Sight, Launch System 
PLS Palletized Loading System 
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging 
RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
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Enclosure 3: Transit Time Analysis 
Transit Analysis - San Diego to Diego Garcia 




















MV-22 48 0.8 9.6 10 1 Day San Diego Hawaii 2,195 200 10:58 RON* 10:58 + 12:00
Hawaii Johnson Atoll 815 200 4:04 2 hr fuel 2
Johnson Atoll Wake Island 1,370 200 6:51 RON 10:55 + 12:00
Wake Island Guam 1,306 200 6:32 RON 6:32 + 12:00
Guam Philippines 1,388 200 6:56 RON 14:28 +12:00
Philippines Singapore 1,281 200 6:24 RON 6:24 + 12:00
Singapore Diego Garcia 1,963 200 9:49 Complete
10,318 51:35:00 113:35:00
4 days + 18 hrs 
+ 35 min.
5 days + 18 hrs 
+ 35 min.
JSF 36 0.85 5.4 6 1 Day San Diego Hawaii 2,195 450 4:53
Hawaii Wake Island 2,130 450 4:44 RON 9:34 + 12:00
Wake Island Philippines 2,633 450 5:51 2 hr fuel 2
Philippines Singapore 1,281 450 2:51 RON 8:31 + 12:00
Singapore Diego Garcia 1,963 450 4:22 Complete
10,202 22:41  44:03:00
1 day + 20 hrs + 
03 min.
2 day + 20 hrs 
+ 03 min.
C-5 10 0.8 2 2 96 Hours 1 Day San Diego Guam 5,200 450 11:56 RON 11:56 + 12:00
20 CH-53s 2 per C-5 Guam Diego Garcia 4,494 450 10:00 Complete
1 per C-17 9,694 21:56 33:56:00
1 day + 15 hrs + 
56 min.
 +96 Hours
5 day + 15 hrs 
+ 56 min.
C-17 10 0.85 1.5 2 96 Hours 1 Day San Diego Guam 5,200 450 11:56 RON 11:56 + 12:00
9 UH-1Ys
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5 Guam Diego Garcia 4,494 450 10:00 Complete
18AH-1Zs
4 per C-17 
8 per C-5 9,694 21:56 33:56:00




4 per C-17 
6 per C-5
5 day + 15 hrs 
+ 56 min.
MV-22 to Diego Garcia JSF to Diego Garcia
Aircraft dimensions for loading transport aircraft come from www.fas.org and www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet
* RON:  Remain Over Night
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Transit Analysis - Okinawa to Diego Garcia 





















MV-22 48 0.8 9.6 10 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 200 6:09 RON* 6:09 + 12:00
Guam Philippines 1,388 200 6:56 RON 6:56 + 12:00
Philippines Singapore 1,281 200 6:24 RON 6:24 + 12:00
Singapore Diego Garcia 1,963 200 9:49 Complete
5,862 29:18:00 65:18:00
2 days + 17 hrs 
+ 18 min.
3 days + 17 hrs 
+ 18 min.
JSF 36 0.85 5.4 6 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 2 hr fuel 2
Guam Philippines 1,388 450 3:05 2 hr fuel 2
Philippines Singapore 1,281 450 2:51 RON 8:40 + 12:00
Singapore Diego Garcia 1,963 450 4:22 Complete
5,862 13:02  29:02:00
1 day + 5 hrs + 
02 min.
2 day + 5 hrs + 
02 min.
C-5 10 0.8 2 2 96 Hours 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 2 hr fuel 2
20 CH-53s 2 per C-5 Guam Diego Garcia 4,494 450 10:00 Complete
1 per C-17 5,724 12:44 14:44:00 1 day + 96 hrs 
5 day + 14 hrs + 
44 min.
C-17 10 0.85 1.5 2 96 Hours 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 2 hr fuel 2
9 UH-1Ys 6 per C-5 Guam Diego Garcia 4,494 450 10:00 Complete
18 AH-1Zs
4 per C-17 
8 per C-5 5,724 12:44 14:44:00 1 day + 96 hrs 
5 day + 14 hrs + 
44 min.
10 SH-60s
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5
4 day + 15hrs + 
56 min.
MV-22 to Diego Garcia JSF to Diego Garcia
Aircraft dimensions for loading transport aircraft come from www.fas.org and www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet
* RON:  Remain Over Night  
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KC-10A 342,000 JSF 6,000 4 36 864,000 2.526315789 3 0.85 3.529411765 4
KC-135R 120,000 JSF 6,000 4 36 864,000 7.2 8 0.85 9.411764706 10
KC-130 66,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 19.63636364 20 0.8 25 25
KC-10A 342,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 3.789473684 4 0.85 4.705882353 5
KC-135R 120,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 10.8 11 0.85 12.94117647 13
Tanker flight times will be equal to the aircraft they are refueling
Fuel loads for tankers come from www.fas.org
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Transit Analysis - San Diego to Guam 






















MV-22 48 0.8 9.6 10 1 Day San Diego Hawaii 2,195 200 10:58 RON* 10:58 + 12:00
Hawaii Johnson Atoll 815 200 4:04 2 hr fuel 2
Johnson Atoll Wake Island 1,370 200 6:51 RON 10:55 + 12:00
Wake Island Guam 1,306 200 6:32 Complete
5,686 28:25:00 54:25:00
2 days + 6hrs 
+ 25 min.
3 days + 6 hrs + 
25 min.
JSF 36 0.85 5.4 6 1 Day San Diego Hawaii 2,195 450 4:53 2 hr fuel 2
Hawaii Wake Island 2,130 450 4:44 2 hr fuel 2
Wake Island Guam 1,306 450 2:54 Complete
5,631 12:31 16:31:00 1 day
1 day + 16 hrs 
+ 31 min.
C-5 10 0.8 2 2 96 Hours 1 Day San Diego Guam 5,200 450 11:56
20 CH-53s 2 per C-5 11:56 Complete 11:56:00
1 day + 96 
hours
5 day + 11 hrs 
+ 56 min.
1 per C-17
C-17 10 0.85 1.5 2 96 Hours 1 Day San Diego Guam 5,200 450 11:56
9 UH-1Ys
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5 11:56 Complete 11:56
1 day + 96 
hours
5 day + 11 hrs 
+ 56 min.
18 AH-1Zs
4 per C-17 
8 per C-5
10 SH-60s
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5
JSF to Guam MV-22 to Guam
Aircraft dimensions for loading transport aircraft come from www.fas.org and www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet
* RON:  Remain Over Night  
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Transit Analysis - Okinawa to Guam 
 





















MV-22 48 0.8 9.6 10 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 200 6:09 Complete
6:09 6:09 1 day 
1 days + 6 hrs 
+ 09 min.
JSF 36 0.85 5.4 6 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 Complete
2:44  2:44 1 day 
1 day + 2 hrs 
+ 44 min.
C-5 10 0.8 2 2 96 Hours 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 Complete
20 CH-53
2 per C-5 
1 per C-17 2:44 2:44
1 day + 96 
hours
5 day + 2 hrs 
+ 44 min.
C-17 10 0.85 1.5 2 96 Hours 1 Day Okinawa Guam 1,230 450 2:44 Complete
9 UH-1Ys
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5 2:44 2:44
1 day + 96 
hours
5 day + 2 hrs 
+ 44 min.
18 AH-1Zs
4 per C-17 
8 per C-5
10 SH-60s
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5
0 0 1 Day
MV-22 to Guam JSF to Guam
Aircraft dimensions for loading transport aircraft come from www.fas.org and www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet
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KC-10A 342,000 JSF 6,000 3 36 648,000 1.894736842 2 0.85 2.352941176 3
KC-135R 120,000 JSF 6,000 3 36 648,000 5.4 6 0.85 7.058823529 8
KC-130 66,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 19.63636364 20 0.8 25 25
KC-10A 342,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 3.789473684 4 0.85 4.705882353 5
KC-135R 120,000 MV-22 3,000 9 48 1,296,000 10.8 11 0.85 12.94117647 13
Tanker flight times will be equal to the aircraft they are refueling
Fuel loads for tankers come from www.fas.org
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Transit Analysis - Cherry Point to Sigonella 























MV-22 48 0.8 9.6 10 1 Day Cherry Point Brunswick 628 200 3:08 2 hr fuel 2
Brunswick Saint. John's 754 200 3:46 2 hr fuel 2
Saint John's Greenland 798 200 4:00 RON* 12:54 + 12:00
Greenland Keflavic 674 200 3:22 2 hr fuel 2
 Keflavic Scottland 743 200 3:43 2 hr fuel 2
Scottland Rota 896 200 4:29 RON 13:34 + 12:00
Rota Sigonella 624 200 3:07 Complete
5,117 25:35:00 57:35:00
2 days + 
9hrs + 35 
min.
3 days + 9 hrs + 
35 min.
JSF 36 0.85 5.4 6 1 Day Cherry Point Azores 2,380 450 5:17 2 hr fuel 2
Azores Rota 1,376 450 3:03 2 hr fuel 2
Rota Sigonella 624 450 1:23 Complete
4,380 9:44 13:56:00 1 day
1 days + 13 hrs + 
56 min.
C-5 10 0.8 2 2 96 Hours 1 Day Cherry Point Sigonella 4,267 450 9:29 Complete 9:29
1 day + 96 
hours
5 days + 9 hrs + 
29 min.
20 CH-53s 2 per C-5
1 per C-17
C-17 10 0.85 1.5 2 96 Hours 1 Day Cherry Point Sigonella 4,267 450 9:29 Complete 9:29
1 day + 96 
hours
5 days + 9 hrs + 
29 min.
9 UH-1Ys
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5 9:29
18AH-1Zs
4 per C-17 
8 per C-5
10 SH-60s
4 per C-17 
6 per C-5
MV-22 to Sigonella JSF to Sigonella
Aircraft dimensions for loading transport aircraft come from www.fas.org and www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet
*RON:  Remain Over Night
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KC-10A 342,000 JSF 6,000 4 36 864,000 2.526315789 3 0.85 3.529411765 4
KC-135R 120,000 JSF 6,000 4 36 864,000 7.2 8 0.85 9.411764706 10
KC-130 66,000 MV-22 3,000 3 48 432,000 6.545454545 7 0.8 8.75 9
KC-10A 342,000 MV-22 3,000 3 48 432,000 1.263157895 2 0.85 2.352941176 3
KC-135R 120,000 MV-22 3,000 3 48 432,000 3.6 4 0.85 4.705882353 5
Tanker flight times will be equal to the aircraft they are refueling
Fuel loads for tankers come from www.fas.org
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Enclosure 4: OV-2 JELo Operational Node Connectivity 
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6. 2015 BASELINE ARCHITECTURE RELIABILITY, 
AVAILABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
6.1 Overview 
This analysis evaluates the reliability of the 2015 Baseline Architecture  
(2015 BLA) as defined by SEA-6.  It also provides insight into the architecture by 
identifying the major functional subsystems that would most benefit from  
improved reliability. 
This analysis is performed on the 2015 BLA during the sustainment phase.  The 
2015 BLA constitutes a system of systems.  Where available, SEA-6 uses system 
component reliability, availability, or maintainability data.  Where not available, system 
characteristics are assumed based on estimates made by analogy with existing systems or 
operational experience to determine system distribution and parameters.  These 
simplifying assumptions may not hold true when actual system-level data becomes 
available.  However, these assumptions allow back of the envelope calculations that 
provide useful insight to system requirements and performance.  Additionally, the 
Systems Engineering Analysis Baseline Architecture System Evaluator Six  
(SEABASE-6) model, described in Chapter 8, serves as a tool to perform follow-on 
reliability analysis.  Architecture components can be analyzed based on a user-defined 
distribution and parameters.  A reliability analysis was performed using SEABASE-6 for 
the reliability of the LCAC as a surface assault connector.  The result of this analysis is 
presented in Chapter 11. 
SEA-6 uses the reliability, availability, and maintainability analysis techniques 
taught at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Drenick’s Theorem is used to model the 
systems and subsystems with an exponential distribution of failure times.  This theorem 
states that the distribution of times between failures for a complex, repairable system that 
has already been repaired several times is well modeled by the exponential distribution.  
Therefore, Eqn 6-1 can be used to estimate individual system reliability. 
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[Eqn 6-1] ( )
m ission tim e
M T B FR t e
⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= . 
 
Where MTBF is the Mean Time Between Failure and mission time is set for  
30 days.  R(t) is the reliability of the system where t corresponds to the desired  
mission time. 
All systems, subsystems, and components are assumed to be independent of each 
other.  Using this assumption, the reliability of series systems is calculated by taking the 
product of the individual reliabilities.  Parallel system reliabilities are calculated by: 
[Eqn 6-2]  1 2 3( ) 1 (1 ( ) )(1 ( ) )(1 ( ) )...(1 ( ) )S S S S KR t R t R t R t R t= − − − − − . 
R(t)S is the overall system reliability.  R(t)S1, R(t)S2, R(t)S3 … R(t)K is the reliability 
of the individual subsystems numbered 1 through k over a specified length of time. 
Systems that only require a portion of the total numbers available are k-of-n 
systems.  The reliability of these systems if identically distributed and of same age is 
calculated by use of the binomial distribution shown as Eqn 6-3. 
[Eqn 6-3] 
 










⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , 
where k is the number of items required, n is the total number of items, and R is 
the individual reliability of each item (calculated with Eqn 6-1). 
Since some of the 2015 BLA systems are conceptual, actual availability data is 
obtainable for only those systems in existence today.  Availabilities are estimated by 
analogy with existing systems tempered with fleet experience.  For simplicity of 





= + + . 
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MTTR is the Mean Time To Repair and MLOG is the Mean Logistics delay.   












6.2 Sustainment Phase System Definition 
The 2015 BLA is described in detail in Chapter 5.  The portion of the architecture 
used for analysis is the combined set of functional systems and processes that combine to 
build the systems of systems used during the Sustainment phase of Joint Expeditionary 
Operations.  During sustainment operations, a resupply item flows through the functional 
systems of the 2015 BLA following the series path shown in Figure 6-1.  The  
command and control (C2) system senses the need for a particular supply.  The  
Inventory and Storage (I & S) system finds and makes available the supply item.  The 
transfer system (XFER) represents the systems that interface between platforms and 
connectors.  The first XFER block represents the transfer system that transfers the supply 
item to an available logistic connector.  The logistic connector (TOR) block represents 
systems that carry the supply items to the objective.  The second XFER block represents 
the transfer systems that remove the supply items from the connector at the objective. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: 2015 Baseline Architecture Sustainment Phase Block Diagram. 
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The logistics system’s performance during the Sustainment phase is measured in 
Days of Supply (DOS).  A failure of this system is defined by the inventory ashore of any 
class of supply (food, water, fuel, or ammunition) falling below 1 DOS. 
 6.2.1 Sustainment Phase System Model 
The 2015 BLA Sustainment phase system is modeled as an Economic Order 
Quantity (EOQ) Inventory system with periodic review.  The periodic review relies on a 
known supply quantity on hand (OH) at a fixed review interval, T.  An order-up-to-level, 
defined as R, is set to reflect the maximum amount of supplies maintainable at the 
objective.  Figure 6-2 shows a graphical representation of this model type.  The 
difference between R and OH determines the amount of supplies needed; Q, for the next 
time interval.  The 2015 BLA must perform within this logistics policy. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: EOQ Model with Periodic Review.189 
6.3 Sustainment System Requirement Analysis 
The logistics system fails if supplies get too low or too high.  Operational pauses 
for logistics and “Iron Mountains” of supplies at the objective are both critical 
vulnerabilities.  Maintaining less than three days’ supply level at the objective enables 
force mobility and agility without excessive inventory.  However, shortages at the 
                                                 
189 Schrady, David, OS 4580 Course Notes, p. 5-3. 
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objective cannot be tolerated as well.  This high-level system requirement can be 
quantified in the following inventory policy. 
The Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) deploys to the objective with three DOS, 
so the “initial inventory” is three DOS (R = 3).  To maintain the inventory at the objective 
and to handle the occasional high demand situation, the 2015 BLA has the capacity to 
provide a minimum of 1 1/2 DOS to the objective per day.  Based on USMC planning 
factors,190 1 DOS of food, water, ammunition, and fuel totals 767 short tons, which yields 
1,151 short tons for the 1 1/2 DOS.  Thirty days of continuous sustainment at the 
objective for the 3 Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) equates to 23,010 short tons. 
To achieve 30 days of sustainment at a maximum delivery rate of 1 1/2 DOS per 
day requires the 2015 BLA to supply for a minimum of 20 out of 30 days.  While the goal 
is to deliver 1 DOS per day, a surge capability of 50% is added to account for increased 
combat operations.  This equates to an operational availability of 67% during the  
30-day sustainment phase.  Additionally, the 2015 BLA sustainment system cannot be 
down for more than 2 1/2 consecutive days without creating shortages at the objective.  
Therefore, the combined MTTR + MLOG of the system cannot exceed 2 1/2 days. 
To quantify the relationship between MTTR and MLOG, assume that the 
summation of MTTR and MLOG also follows an exponential distribution.191  This 
assumption is used to simplify the calculations required to perform this back of the 
envelope calculation and quantify the overall system of systems performance.  Further, 
assume that the system satisfies the requirement greater than 90% of the time.  The 
expected value of the sum of MTTR and MLOG is estimated. 
Let s = (MTTR + MLOG) follow an exponential distribution with mean = 1/λS. 
 
Find the MTBF that makes s less than 2 1/2 days 90% of the time, 
P(s ≤ 2.5) ≥ 0.90. 
                                                 
190 MCCDC, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual, Part IV. 
191 Blanchard, Benjamin S. and Fabrycky, Wolter J., Systems Engineering and Analysis, Third Edition.  
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 408. 
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This is found by taking 1- (probability that s is greater than 2 1/2 days): 
1 – e- λS (2.5) ≥ 0.90. 
Solving for λS:  λS ≥ 0.92 
Therefore, the desired expected value of (MTTR + MLOG) is  
1/ λS = 1.1 days ≈ 26 hrs. 
Based on a 30-day mission time, the sustainment system MTBF must be greater 
than 30 days (720 hrs) 90% of the time.  Using the same steps as above, the expected 
value of the 2015 BLA MTBF is estimated. 
P(MTBF ≤ 720) ≤ 0.10 
1 – e- λM (720) ≤ 0.10 
λM ≥ 0.00015 
Therefore, the expected value of MTBF = 1 6,834
Mλ =  hrs ≈ 285 days. 
In other words, the logistics system must have an average MTBF of at least  
285 days to maintain the desired inventory policy.  Because there is no actual data for the 
2015 BLA, its availability is estimated using Eqn 6-4 and the MTBF, MTTR, and MLOG 
estimates above:  A∞ = 0.996. 
Since 0.996 is greater than the requirement threshold of 0.67, the 2015 BLA is 
expected to be available more than the minimum time required to deliver the minimum 
amount of logistics to the objective. 
6.4 Command and Control System Analysis 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CAN) Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) 
(MPF(F) Analysis of Alternative (AoA) suggests that 2 MPF(F) ships in a squadron will 
have the major C2 system components.192  Figure 6-3 shows a generic composition of the 
C2 system for these 2 MPF(Fs). 
                                                 
192 Souders et al., pp.22-23. 















Figure 6-3: Example Command and Control System. 
 
As described in Chapter 5, the system consists of many (*) transmitters, receivers, 
users, and software applications (* listed by these items in Figure 6-3).  Each ship has its 
own Global Command Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) network.  These networks are tied 
together via the Global Information Grid (GIG)).  The network’s reliability is estimated 
based on the functional relationships shown in Figure 6-4. 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Generic Network Architecture Diagram.193 
                                                 
193 Sample, Char and Sample, Keith, Network Reliability and Availability Issues, Charmark, Inc., 1998. 
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 6.4.1 Command and Control Reliability Estimate 
The reliability of this system is calculated using reliability estimates for each of 
the subsystems.  MTBFs194 for the major subsystems are estimated from current 
commercial systems: 
 External Router MTBF = 47,600 hrs 
 Firewall MTBF = 50,000 hrs 
 Gateway MTBF = Web MTBF = 26,000 hrs 
 MTBF (Internal Router) = 52,000 hrs 
Using these MTBFs, the Sustainment mission time of 30 days (720 hrs), and  
Eqn 6-1, the estimated subsystem reliabilities are: 
 R(t)ext router = 0.985 
 R(t)firewall = 0.986 
 R(t)gateway = R(t)web = 0.973 
 R(t)int router = 0.986 
Because all of these components have to work for the system to work, the system 
in Figure 6-4 is modeled as a series system.  Using this model, the overall reliability is 
the product of the subsystem reliabilities: 
 R(t) = R(t)ext router * R(t)firewall * R(t)gateway * R(t)web * R(t)int router 
 R(t) = 0.985 * 0.986 * 0.973 * 0.973 * 0.986 = 0.907 
This is the reliability of a single ship C2 system.  Using the two-ship 
model, the C2 reliability becomes: 
 R(t)C2 = 0.907 * 0.907 = 0.823. 
                                                 
194 Ibid. 
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This is less than the 0.9 reliability threshold desired.  However, if the network is 
set up with two parallel loops, system reliability becomes: 
 R(t)C2 = 1 – (1-R(t)1)*(1-R(t)2) = 1 – (0.093)*(0.093) = 0.991. 
Based on this assumed configuration, to achieve network reliability > 0.9, at least 
two independent network paths are required on each MPF(F). 
 6.4.2 Command and Control Maintainability 
From Section 6.3, MTTR + MLOG for the C2 system needs to be less than  
60 hrs.  This MTTR requirement assumes that the technician, parts, publications, 
documentation, tools, etc. are all available at the time of repair. 
 6.4.3 Command and Control Availability 
Also from Section 6.3, the logistic system must have an operational availability 
(Ao) greater than 0.67.  Using Eqn 6-4, the MTBF values from Section 6.5.1, and the 
MTTR+MLOG value of 60 hrs from Section 6.3, the overall C2 availability is estimated 
to be Ao = 0.998. 
6.5 Inventory and Storage System Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the I & S System of each MPF(F) ship consists of  
three subsystems: three elevators, various Material Handling Equipment (MHE), and the 
Inventory Management System (IMS).  Figure 6-5 depicts the overall I & S system. 
 
Figure 6-5: I & S System Illustration Across One Squadron of MPF(F). 
*Note: Operator reliability is not estimated.  
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 6.5.1 Inventory and Storage Reliability Estimate 
Each MPF(F) ship has three elevators.  The three elevators are modeled as a 
parallel system because all elevators have access to all storerooms.  At least one elevator 
per ship has to work to perform strike up/down.  A system failure is defined as an 
elevator not being able to lift cargo/stores. 
Elevator MTBF is estimated from the elevator availability.  From fleet 
experience, a given elevator is down approximately 1 out of 30 days; an availability  
of 0.967. 
Also from fleet experience, a failed elevator takes, on average, one day to repair: 
MTTR + MLOG ≈ 24 hrs.  Using these values in Eqn 6-5 gives an MTBF for a single 
elevator of ~ 703 hrs.  Substituting this MTBF value and the mission time of 720 hrs into 
Eqn 6-1 gives an individual elevator reliability: 
R(t)elevator = e -(720/703) = 0.36. 
Using this value in Eqn 6-2 for parallel systems: 
(1 – (1-.36)*(1-.36)*(1-.36)) = 0.737. 
Therefore, an MPF(F) equipped with three elevators has an estimated elevator 
reliability of 0.74. 
The MHE subsystem is modeled as a k-of-n system, based on at least 4 working 
forklifts/pallet jacks from a pool of at least 8 forklifts and 12 pallet jacks per MPF(F).  A 
failure is defined as a forklift or pallet jack that is not able to move cargo/stores. 
From fleet experience, a forklift is down, on average, 1 out of 60 days and takes 
half a day to repair; an approximate availability of 0.983 and MTTR + MLOG of  
12 hrs.  From Eqn 6-5, the MTBF for a single forklift is estimated to be ~ 588 hrs.  
Additionally, a pallet jack fails on average 1 out of 180 days and takes half a day to 
repair; an approximate availability of 0.994 and MTTR + MLOG of 12 hrs.  Again, from 
Eqn 6-5, the MTBF for a single pallet jack is estimated to be ~ 2,154 hrs. 
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Using Eqn 6-1 with these values gives an individual item reliability of 0.29 for the 
forklift and 0.72 for the pallet jack.  On average, four MHE items are needed to pull items 
from inventory.  The MHE is a k of n system where any combination of k = 4 will suffice.  
Using Eqn 6-3, the MHE reliability becomes 0.99. 
Because the Inventory Management System (IMS) uses much of the infrastructure 
of the C2 system in Section 6.5, it is assumed to have the same reliability:  R(t) Inventory 
sys = 0.99. 
This system’s reliability is estimated using estimates for the reliability of the 
subsystems and components.  The three subsystems are modeled in series because they 
must work together to accomplish I & S mission.  The overall reliability is the product of 
the subsystem reliabilities: 
R(t) = R(t)elevator * R(t)MHE * R(t) Inventory sys  
R(t) = 0.74 * 0.99* 0.99 = 0.73 
This is the reliability of each ship’s system.  The overall architecture of 8 ships is 
a k-of-n system, where at least 4 of the 8 MPF(F) ships are required to move stores.  
Using Eqn 6-3 with k = 4, n = 8, and R(t) = 0.73, the I & S reliability is then 0.86. 
 6.5.2 Inventory and Storage Maintainability 
Again, by analogy with the C2 system, the maintainability (MTTR + MLOG) is 
estimated to be 60 hrs. 
 6.5.3 Inventory and Storage Availability 
Also from Section 6.3, the logistic system must have an operational availability 
(Ao) greater than 0.67.  Using Eqn 6-4, the MTBF values from Section 6.6.1, and the 
MTTR+MLOG value of 60 hrs from Section 6.3, the overall I & S availability is 
estimated to be Ao = 0.988. 
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6.6 Transfer System Analysis 
Three subsystems comprise the 2015 BLA transfer system: air transfers,  
surface STREAM transfers, and surface crane transfers.  Each of these three subsystems 
has two components: the sending component and the receiving component.  To simplify 
the analysis, both components are assumed identically distributed.  This assumption is 
reasonable for the air transfers since the helicopters are using a sling to pick up and drop 
off pallet loads.  Because any two ships use the same STREAM system, the identical 
assumption holds there too.  The assumption is questionable for the cranes and for 
LCACs loading at an Integrated Landing Platform (ILP).  It is also questionable  
for unloading. 
 6.6.1 Transfer System Reliability 
The transfer system reliability is estimated by applying a complexity factor195 to 
the overall 2015 BLA.  Based on the relative simplicity of the transfer mechanisms 
(pallet jacks, ramps, forklifts, STREAM underway replenishment, etc.) the transfer 
system represents an estimated 15% of the overall complexity of the 2015 BLA.  This 
complexity factor is applied to the overall architecture failure rate to calculate the transfer 
system failure rate: 
 
1 / 1 / 30 .0333








= = =  
1 /
1 / 1 / .0 0 5 2 0 0 2 4 0 0
X fe r
X fe r
M T B F




= = = =  
 
Using this MTBF value and Eqn 6-1 for a mission time of 720 hrs, transfer system 
reliability is 0.78. 
The same reliability allocation approach is used to estimate the reliability of each 
transfer subsystem where weighted complexity factors (CF) are assigned to the 
                                                 
195 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and Management (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1998), p. 140. 
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subsystems.  Air transfers (Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) slings), very mature and 
simple systems, are assigned a CF of 0.05.  The standard STREAM underway 
replenishment system, also mature and slightly more complex, is assigned 0.15.  
However, the MPF(F) sea-state-compensating crane subsystems, both technologically 
risky and highly complex, are assigned a CF of 0.80. 
For the Air Transfers, the reliability of each end of the system is estimated by 
multiplying the overall transfer failure rate (λ) by the CF to get the Air Transfer failure 
rate.  The reciprocal of this value is the MTBF, used in Eqn 6-1 to estimate  
Air Transfer reliability. 
λAirXfer = λXfer * 0.05 = .005 * 0.05 = .00025 
MTBFAirXfer = 1/ λAirXfer = 1/(.00025) = 4,000 days = 96,000 hrs 
Substituting a mission time of 720 hrs and the MTBF of 96,000 hrs into Eqn 6-1 
gives an estimated Air Transfer reliability of 0.99.  Using the same approach for the 
STREAM system: 
λAirXfer = λXfer * 0.15 = .005 * 0.15 = .0075 
MTBFSTREAM = 1/ λSTREAM = 1/(.0075) = 133 days = 3,200 hrs 
Substituting a mission time of 720 hrs and the MTBF of 3,200 hrs into Eqn 6-1 
gives an estimated STREAM reliability of 0.80.  Likewise for the Surface Crane System: 
λCrane= λCrane * 0.8 = .005 * 0.8 = .004 
MTBFCrane = 1/ λCrane = 1/(.004) = 250 days = 6,000 hrs 
Substituting a mission time of 720 hrs and the MTBF of 6,000 hrs into Eqn 6-1 
gives an estimated Surface Crane System reliability of 0.89.  The series combination of 
these subsystems is slightly less than the overall approximation of 0.78 above: 
R(t)Xfer = 0.99 * 0.80 * 0.89 = 0.70. 
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 6.6.2 Transfer System Maintainability 
As discussed in Section 6.3, the maintainability of the sustainment system must be 
less than 2.5 days (MTTR + MLOG). 
 6.6.3 Transfer System Availability  
Using Eqn 6-4 with an MTBF of 200 days and maintainability (MTTR + MLOG) 
of 2 1/2 days, the estimated availability of the transfer system equates to 0.988. 
6.7 Connector System Analysis 
This section estimates the logistics system’s air connector reliability.  Only the  
air connectors are used for sustainment, thus this analysis only considers those 









Figure 6-6: Air Connector Reliability Block Diagram. 
 
The 2015 BLA is designed such that the Air Connector System  
(the MV-22 squadrons and the CH-53X squadrons) sustains the JEB ashore.  The mission 
is to deliver one DOS per day with a surge capability of up to 1 1/2 DOS to the JEB 
ashore in any 24-hr day.  The analysis will look at the 1 1/2 DOS delivery rate to obtain 
the maximum system performance.  Therefore, a “failure” of the logistic system occurs 
when less than 1 1/2 DOS are provided to the JEB ashore in a given 24-hr period.  The 
2015 BLA consists of eight MPF(F) that operate on two 12-hr shifts.  For a given  
12-hr shift, 4 MPF(Fs), with one 10-plane CH-53X squadron and  
two 12-plane MV-22s, must provide half of 1 1/2 DOS or three-quarters DOS.  Using the 
BLA planning factors [Chapter 5], three-quarters DOS for the 3 BLTs is as follows: 
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1 DOS food = 27,113 lbs 
1 DOS fuel = 134,000 gals x (6.8 lbs/gal) = 911,200 lbs 
1 DOS water = 34,013 gals x (8.3 lbs/gal) = 282,308 lbs 
1 DOS ammo = 312,000 lbs 
Aggregate DOS = 1,532,621 lbs ≈ 1,533,000 lbs 
1.5 DOS ≈ 2,300,000 lbs 
¾ Aggregate DOS = (0.75)*(1,533,000 lbs) = 1,150,000 lbs 
This quantity is converted into CH-53X payloads: number of CH-53X payloads = 
(¾ DOS lbs)/(CH-53X capacity lbs) where CH-53X external capacity is 25,500 lbs at  
100 nm = (1,150,000 lbs)/( 25,500 lbs) ≈ 46 payloads.  Each payload represents a  
round-trip from the Sea Base to the objective and back.  To calculate the time required 
for an individual trip: 
Time per trip = ((2*Radius)/(Average trip speed)) + Load-unload delay. 
If each aircraft spends 6-12 minutes on each end of the trip picking up and 
dropping off its load, on average 12-24 minutes for each trip is spent loading and 
unloading palletized loads. 
An MV-22 flies 100 kts to the objective with an external load and 240 kts back 
from the objective, for an average trip speed of approximately 170 kts. 
A CH-53X flies 100 kts to the objective with an external load and 150 kts back 
from the objective, for an average trip speed of approximately 125 kts.  For a  
Sea Base-to-objective radius of 100 nm: 
MV-22 time per trip  = ((2*100 nm)/(170 kts)) + 0.3 hr = 1.5 hr 
CH-53X time per trip  = ((2*100 nm)/(125kts)) + 0.3 hr = 1.9 ≈ 2.0 hr 
In a single 12-hr period, each MV-22 could fly a maximum of 8 trips.  Assume a 
1 1/2-hr delay for refuel/crew switch/deck delays, the maximum number of MV-22 trips 
per 12-hr shift is reduced to 7. 
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In a single 12-hr period, each CH-53X could fly a maximum of 6 trips.  Assume a 
2-hr delay for refuel/crew switch/deck delays, the maximum number of  
CH-53X trips per 12-hr shift is reduced to 5. 
Based strictly on external payload capacity, and given that the CH-53X carries 
nearly three times the external payload of the MV-22 at a 100 NM range, Figure 6-7 
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Figure 6-7: Air Connector Combinations for Sustainment. 
6.7.1 Connector System Reliability Estimate 
Based on the requirements analysis above, the air connector system is modeled as 
ten parallel paths as shown in Figure 6-8. 
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Figure 6-8: Air Assault Connector Reliability Block Diagram (one 12-hr day). 
 
Each subsystem’s reliability block is calculated as a k-of-n system using Eqn 6-3.  
The reliability of each individual path is calculated by multiplying the probability of k1 
CH-53s with the probability of having at least k2 MV-22s.  k1 corresponds to the  
CH-53 value in Figure 6-8 and k2 corresponds to the MV-22 value.  The total reliability 
becomes the sum of the 11 paths, which equals 0.99. 
 6.7.2 Connector System Maintainability 
The MTBF value is estimated using Eqn 6-5.  For the purposes of this analysis, a 
failure means anything that renders an aircraft nonmission capable (“down”). 
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For the CH-53X, assume the following expected values:196 
MTTR = 16 hrs MLOG = 1 hr. 
Inserting these values into Eqn 6-5 yields an MTBF = 40 hrs.  Using Eqn 6-1, 
with a mission time of 12 hrs and an MTBF of 40 hrs, the individual CH-53X reliability 
is estimated to be 0.74.  Thus, there is approximately a 74% chance of a single CH-53X 
not failing in a 12-hr fly day. 
For the MV-22, assume the following expected values:197 
 MTTR = 12 hrs  MLOG = 1 hr. 
Inserting these values into Eqn 6-5 yields MTBF = 52 hrs.  Using Eqn 6-1, with a 
mission time of 12 hrs and an MTBF of 52 hrs, the individual MV-22 reliability is 
estimated to be 0.80.  Thus, there is approximately an 80% chance of a single MV-22 not 
failing in a 12-hr fly day. 
 6.7.3 Connector System Availability 
A prototype CH-53X is not yet fielded, thus no actual data is available.  Assume 
the CH-53X is a CH-53E Super Stallion basic airframe with new 6150 shaft horse-power 
engines (like the Rolls-Royce AE-1170C), the higher-rated transmissions, and the 
associated airframe modifications, including the improved 3-point lift system.198  This 
analysis assumes that the CH-53X availability in 2015 will be similar to that of the  
CH-53X today.  A Marine Corps Concept Development Command (MCCDC) slide that 
depicts assault aircraft for the future MEB199 indicates that 6 of 20 will be unavailable: 
unavailability = 6/20 = 0.3 
availability = 1-(unavailability) = 1 - 0.3 = 0.7 
                                                 
196 A “reasonable estimate” based on the expert opinion of three field-grade Naval Aviators and two 
Aviation Limited Duty Officers. 
197 A “reasonable estimate” based on the expert opinion of three field-grade Naval Aviators and two 
Aviation Limited Duty Officers. 
198  Helms, Douglas W., “A Bigger, Better Giant,” Rotor & Wing (http://defensedaily.com),  
26 September 2004. 
199 MCCDC, “Marine Experimental Brigade,” briefing slide, 2004. 
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As of this writing, actual MV-22 availability/reliability data is not publicly 
available.  A MCCDC slide depicting the assault aircraft for the future MEB indicates  
9 of 47 MV-22s unavailable.200 
unavailability = 9/47 = 0.2 
availability = 1-(unavailability) = 1 - 0.2 = 0.8 
6.8 Sustainment Phase System Reliability Estimate 
The sustainment phase system reliability estimate is computed from the estimated 
reliability of the blocks in Figure 6-1.  The SEA-6 functional teams generate the 
estimates for the system reliability of their respective boxes in Figure 6-1.  Because all of 
the blocks are required to function together, the overall system is a series system whose 
reliability is calculated in Eqn 6-6 for a mission time of 720 hrs (30 days). 
[Eqn 6-6] R(t)BLA = R(t)C2 * R(t)I&S * R(t)XFER1 * R(t)TOR * R(t)XFER2 
 R(t)BLA = 0.99 * 0.86 * 0.78 * 0.99 * 0.78 ≈ 0.5 
 6.8.1 2015 Baseline Reliability Importance 
Reliability importance analysis identifies where in Figure 6-1 a small change in 
subsystem reliability will have the greatest effect on total system reliability.  From  
Eqn 6-6, take the partial derivative of RBLA and the reliability of the 2015 BLA 
sustainment system, with respect to each of the five functional blocks, to determine 
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Based on these calculations, the sustainment phase system reliability will improve 
the most by improving the reliability of the transfer system (the block with the highest 
partial derivative value). 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
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6.9 Summary 
The reliability analysis tells us that the 2015 BLA should be able to perform the 
required logistics policy of carrying 1 1/2 days’ worth of supplies to the objective per 
day.  Additionally, the increase in reliability of the transfer system (loading between 
platforms) will yield the greatest increase in total system reliability.  This translates to 
better performance and greater dependability of the system.  However, the relatively low 
overall system reliability estimate (0.5) does not mean that you cannot perform within the 
desired logistics policy.  The current assumed system of systems configuration achieves 
the desired system availability (0.67). 
When more system data is available, the SEABASE-6 model provides a useful 
tool to reevaluate system performance.  Each assumed distribution for system modeling 
could be verified or changed as user-defined inputs that can generate system performance 
at both the Sea Base and the objective.  A more detailed reliability analysis for the 
Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) is presented in Chapter 11, Section 7.  SEA-6 
recommends this analysis continue for other system components. 
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7. 2015 BASELINE ARCHITECTURE COST  
ESTIMATION ANALYSIS 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter documents the various steps taken to provide cost estimates of the 
2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA), to include: 
• Defining Cost Estimation and Analysis. 
• SEA-6 cost estimation goals. 
• Constraints and assumptions. 
• Cost estimation methodology. 
• The 2015 BLA cost estimation. 
• Cost estimation of each baseline architecture component. 
Performing Cost Estimation and Analysis is intended to provide insight to the 
decision-maker regarding the expected costs associated with the logistical component of 
the Sea Base concept.  In addition to decision-maker insights, the cost estimation of the 
2015 BLA is used to perform comparative studies against project alternatives. 
For the cost estimating process, several assumptions that apply to the overall 
estimation are necessary.  Each 2015 BLA element requires specific assumptions.   
High-level assumptions include: 
• Open source costing data is assumed to be complete and accurate. 
• Open source per unit cost data is assumed to include all program 
acquisition costs and are average procurement unit costs (APUC). 
• Disposal costs are minimal and do not adversely impact cost estimates. 
• Cost data in high-level governmental budgetary documentation is assumed 
to be highly accurate and includes all costs. 
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7.2 Cost Estimating and Analysis 
The Defense Acquisition University defines Cost Estimating and Analysis as a 
formal discipline for predicting the future cost of systems, subsystems, and components 
based on historical data201 and considers it a vital aspect of the  
Defense Acquisition System. 
The DoD Directive 5000 series governs the Defense Acquisition System.  One 
directive, DoD Directive 5000.1, states the primary objective of Defense Acquisition is to 
acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvement to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and  
reasonable price.202 
Performing Cost Estimating and Analysis serves two purposes in meeting its 
objective of ensuring proper pricing.  The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) uses cost 
estimates during the acquisition phase at each acquisition program milestone and decision 
review to assess whether the future system cost is affordable and consistent with the 
DoD’s overall long-range investment and force structure plans.203  Cost estimates are also 
used by each service component to form the annual budget requests to Congress.  
Without performing cost estimates, the ability to meet the objective of ensuring fair and 
reasonable pricing of future systems and ensuring budgetary requests are approved 
becomes constricted. 
When performing cost estimates, DoD Directive 5000.1 states costing data should 
include all the costs associated with ownership, referred to as total ownership cost 
                                                 
201Defense Acquisition University, “Cost Estimating,” para. 1 [data online] (17 February 2004 [cited  
15 September 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev.php?ID=1437_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
202 Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.1 – The Defense Acquisition System, para. 4.2 [instruction 
online] (12 May 2003 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Wed @ 
http://akss.dau.mil/darc/darc.html. 
203 Department of Defense, DoD Direective 5000.2 – Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,  
para. 3.1 [instruction online] (12 May 2003 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://akss.dau.mil/darc/darc.html. 
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(TOC).204  A defense system’s total ownership cost (TOC) is equal to the system’s  
life cycle cost (LCC).205  For purposes of cost estimating, the LCC includes four primary 
cost categories (research and development (R & D), procurement, operating and support 
costs (O & S) and disposal) and seven cost elements,206 shown in Figure 7-1.  Definitions 
for each cost element include:207 
 
Figure 7-1: Life Cycle Cost Composition.208 
 
• Development Costs – The costs primarily associated with  R & D efforts 
including the development of a new or improved capability to the point 
where it is appropriate for operational use.  Development costs are those 
incurred from program initiation at the conceptual phase through the end 
                                                 
204 Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.1 – The Defense Acquisition System, para. E1.4 
[instruction  online] (12 May 2003 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://akss.dau.mil/darc/darc.html. 
205Defense Acquisition University, Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, p. B-144 
[instruction online] (September 2003 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/glossary/preface.asp. 
206 Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.4M – Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures,  
para. 3.3.3.1 [instruction online] (December 1992 [cited 30 September 2004]); available from World Wide 
Web @ http://www.ncca.navy.mil/resources/guidance.cfm. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Jim Gates, “Introduction to Cost Analysis,” p. 4 [teaching notes online] (April 2004 [cited  
01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev.php?ID=19844_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
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of engineering and manufacturing development.  Examples include the 
cost of prime mission equipment, program management, training, 
specialized equipment, instrumentation, testing, feasibility studies, 
modeling, tradeoff analyses, engineering designs, prototype assembly, and 
facilities required to support R & D. 
• Procurement Costs – The sum of all the associated procurement costs for 
prime mission equipment, weapon system costs, support items, initial 
spare parts, repair parts, engineering changes, preplanned product 
improvement, transportation costs, and outfitting/post delivery costs  
(for Navy shipbuilding programs). 
• O & S Costs– All direct and indirect costs incurred in using the delivered 
system that includes the cost of personnel, equipment, maintenance, 
supplies, software, and services (including contract support) associated 
with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and 
supporting the defense system. 
• Disposal Costs – The costs associated with deactivating or disposing of a 
materiel system at the end of its useful life.  Disposing of a materiel 
system can result in additional costs or a salvage value depending on the 
disposition.  Disposal costs are normally insignificant compared to the 
total life cycle cost. 
Figure 7-2 is a graphical representation of the four primary cost categories.  
Throughout the life cycle, cost is historically incurred at various percentages.  For 
development costs (R & D), the average total cost is approximately 5%-15% of the total 
life cycle cost.  The total associated procurement costs comprise approximately 10%-20% 
of the total.  The most prominent cost incurred during the life cycle is the O & S cost, 
which constitutes 55%-80%.  This cost is directly proportional to the operational life of a 
given system.  The least significant cost incurred during the life cycle is the disposal cost, 
which generally equals approximately less than 5% of the total life cycle cost.  Disposal 
costs are often considered minimal and are included in the O & S cost category by 
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military components’ cost analysis agencies.209  There are cases where disposal costs 
have a greater cost value, such as with the disposal of nuclear waste (or other hazardous 








Figure 7-2: Life Cycle Cost Categories.210 
 
7.3 Cost Estimating Methodology 
DoD Directive 5000.4-M “Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures” and  
Chapter 12 of the Acquisition Logistics Guide (ALG) provides a standard cost estimating 
process that is the basis for the cost estimate of the SEA-6 2015 BLA.  Figure 7-3 is a 
graphical representation of the process. 
                                                 
209 Defense Systems Management College, Acquisition Logistics Guide, para. 12.2.1.1 [instruction online] 
(December 1997 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/gdbks/acqulogguide.asp. 
210 Ibid. 














Figure 7-3: Cost Estimating Process.211 
 7.3.1 Definition and Planning 
The definition and planning phase contains several key aspects that are addressed 
throughout the SEA-6 2015 BLA cost estimate to include: 
• Knowing the purpose of the estimate. 
• Defining the system requiring cost estimation. 
• Establishing ground rules, constraints, and assumptions. 
• Selecting the estimating approach. 
Cost Estimation and Analysis has two primary purposes:  to ensure affordability 
and for budget formulation.  Two additional purposes are generated to fully capitalize on 
the usefulness of cost estimation.  The first of these additional purposes is to provide 
insights for decision makers regarding the costs associated with the 2015 BLA.  The 
second is to use the quantitative data derived from the 2015 BLA in comparative studies 
against alternative architectures during the FSA phase. 
A generic, indirect Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD)212 of the 
2015 BLA is used to determine what systems require cost estimates.  Prior to 
                                                 
211 Mislick, Gregory, LtCol, USMC, “Chapter 1: Cost Estimation Introduction and Overview,” slides 1-12 
[online brief] (August 2004 [cited 01 September 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/~gkmislic/oa4702. 
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commencing the cost estimation, abstract ground rules, identifiable constraints and 
applicable assumptions are required.  The high-level constraints and assumptions 
identified previously are used, along with the following ground rules. 
• All costs are generated using Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 as the base year. 
• All costs are normalized to FY15. 
• All cost data are compared between two sources, when available,  
for verification. 
• Excel Spreadsheets are the primary modeling tool. 
A key component of the definition and planning phase of the cost estimating 
process is the selection of the estimating approach.  DoD cost agencies primarily use four 
specific cost estimating approaches:213 
• Analogy Method. 
• Parametric Method. 
• Engineering Method. 
• Extrapolation from Actual Costs Method. 
The analogy and extrapolation from actual costs methods are the two methods 
used to estimate the cost for the 2015 BLA.  Brief descriptions are provided for 
understanding of each method.214 
                                                                                                                                                 
212 Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.4M – Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures,  
para. 3.3.3.1 [instruction online] (December 1992 [cited 30 September 2004]); available from  
World Wide Web @ http://www.ncca.navy.mil/resources/guidance.cfm. 
213 Defense Systems Management College, Acquisition Logistics Guide, para. 12.4 [instruction online] 
(December 1997 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/gdbks/acqulogguide.asp. and Jim Gates, “Introduction to Cost Analysis,” pp. 3-5 
[teaching notes online] (April 2004 [cited 01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev.php?ID=19844_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
214 Jim Gates, “Introduction to Cost Analysis,” pp. 3-5 [teaching notes online] (April 2004 [cited  
01 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev.php?ID=19844_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. 
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 7.3.2 Analogy Method 
The analogy method compares a new or future system with one or more similar 
existing systems by conducting subjective evaluations between the historical data and the 
anticipated future system.  To compare the two systems, a variety of factors are 
developed to assist in the estimation to include cost, complexity, miniaturization, 
production improvement or other useful injects. 
 7.3.3 Extrapolation from Actual Costs Method 
The extrapolation from actual costs method uses actual cost experience on 
prototype units, early engineering development hardware and early production hardware 
for the system production to predict future costs.  When available, the use of actual costs 
is the preferred method and is used to the maximum extent possible.  This method is 
conducted in conjunction with the analogy approach when actual costs are available for a 
similar system or variant. 
 7.3.4 Data Collection 
The next step in the cost estimating process is the data collection.  For the SEA-6 
project, a variety of open source references are used to perform the 2015 BLA cost 
estimates.  To ensure the validity of unit costs, two references are used if available.  If the 
two references are inconsistent, subjective evaluations are conducted to decide which 
reference to use.  When feasible, cost data is taken from actual contract costs that include 
all costs for R & D and procurement.  Since one of the primary functions of a cost 
estimate is to provide input for budget formulations, the FY05 Presidential Budget215 is 
utilized for cost data based on the assumption that highly accurate cost estimates are used 
to generate the Presidential Budget.  The majority of the cost data is from the following 
organizations or reports. 
                                                 
215 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html.  
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• FY05 Budget of the Department of the Navy/Army/Air Force. 
• Jane’s Information Group. 
• U.S. Air Force Fact Sheets. 
• Global Security. 
• Department of Defense. 
• Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 
• Naval Air Warfare Center (NAVAIR). 
• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 
• U.S. Navy Fact Files. 
• United States Marine Corps (USMC) Fact Files. 
• Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). 
• Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). 
• Maritime Business Strategies. 
For O & S costs, the primary data source is the Navy Visibility and Management 
of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) management information system,216 which 
is maintained by the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD).  The VAMOSC management 
information system collects and reports U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps historical 
weapon system O & S costs.  It provides the direct O & S costs of weapon systems, some 
linked indirect costs, such as ship depot overhead, and related noncost information such 
as flying hour metrics, steaming hrs, age of aircraft, and more.  The program recently 
added the Personnel database, which contains all Active Duty Navy and USMC 
personnel costs and attribute data.  In addition to the VAMOSC database, NCAD 
                                                 
216 VAMOSC is a restricted access system.  Access permission must to granted by the NCAD.  The 
VAMOSC system is located at http://www.navyvamosc.com/. 
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provides the current inflation rates and indices that are used in the normalization of cost 
data to FY04 and FY15.217 
 7.3.5 Estimate Formulation 
With historical cost data in hand, the formulation of the 2015 BLA can begin.  For 
each baseline component, an estimating approach is selected and applied.  The costing 
base year, the reference period that determines a fixed price level for comparison in 
economic escalation calculation and cost estimations, is set for the FY04.  All costs are 
normalized to FY04 to provide consistent cost data.  From the normalized cost data, costs 
are projected to FY15 to establish the cost of the future baseline component. 
For the cost estimate, the APUC is calculated for each asset of the  
2015 BLA.  The APUC is calculated by dividing the total procurement cost by the 
number of assets that were procured or planned for procurement. 
For the complete development of the LCC, O & S costs are retrieved from the 
VAMOSC database.  The historical O & S costs are used to estimate future cost for 
current and future systems.  For future O & S cost predictions, an average annual increase 
is calculated from the available historic O & S cost data.  The average annual increase is 
applied to the years FY04 to FY15.  For future systems, an analogy approach utilizing a 
cost factor is applied to calculate O & S costs. 
 7.3.6 Review and Presentation 
Throughout the course of the cost estimation, periodic reviews are conducted to 
ensure accuracy and completeness.  All cost estimating data is presented to the team’s 
NPS faculty cost advisor, LtCol Gregory Mislick (USMC),218 for review  
and clarification. 
                                                 
217 Inflation indices can be obtained from the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) at 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm. 
218 LtCol Mislick is the Associate Dean for the Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences at 
the Naval Postgraduate School and is an instructor for the course OA4702: Cost Estimation of DoD 
Weapons Systems. 
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7.4 2015 Baseline Architecture 
The 2015 BLA for a single Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)) 
squadron [Chapter 5] consists of 8 ships, 1 Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship,  
26 surface connectors, 79 assault air connectors, and 70 nonconnector air assets.  Specific 
platforms and quantities include: 
• 8 Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future (MPF(F)) (unconstrained-size, 
Full ACE, distributed-capability variant) ships;219 
• 1 Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE); 
• 48 MV-22 Ospreys; 
• 20 CH-53X Super Stallions; 
• 12 SH-60R Seahawks; 
• 18 AH-1Z Super Cobras; 
• 36 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs); 
• 6 Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAVs); 
• 9 UH-1Y Iroquois; 
• 24 Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCACs); and 
• 2 Landing Craft Utility, Replacement (LCU(Rs)). 
7.5 Cost Estimation 
Table 7-1 is a summary of the cost estimate for the 2015 BLA.  The calculations 
used to determine the cost estimation are located in Appendix C.  Dollar figures are 
shown in FY04 to indicate the cost value in today’s dollars.  The FY2004 dollar values 
are normalized using the inflation indices provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division 
(NCAD) to account for inflation and the time value of money in order to show the 
anticipated cost of the 2015 BLA. 
                                                 
219 Souders et al., p. 33. 
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Platform Quantity Life Cycle Cost (BY04$) 
Life Cycle Cost 
(FY15$) 
MPF(F) 8 $16,004,120,970 $19,588,611,469 
T-AOE 1 $1,552,400,599 $1,900,128,650 
MV-22 48 $7,741,104,368 $9,475,009,238 
CH-53X 20 $2,825,866,361 $3,458,830,717 
SH-60R 12 $1,095,440,391 $1,340,807,207 
AH-1Z 18 $1,083,348,674 $1,326,008,973 
JSF (F-35) 36 $5,397,219,681 $6,606,115,954 
UAV 6 $18,784,685 $22,991,946 
UH-1Y 9 $495,033,217 $605,913,963 
LCAC 24 $1,078,807,272 $1,320,430,940 
LCU(X) 2 $34,305,263 $41,988,715 
Baseline Total Cost   $37,326,431,481 $45,686,837,773 
 
Table 7-1: 2015 Baseline Architecture Cost Summary. 
 
As indicated in Table 7-1, if the 2015 BLA were assembled in 2004, it would cost 
approximately $37.3 billion.  When inflation indices are applied, the cost for the  
2015 BLA grows to approximately $45.7 billion. 
The measures taken to calculate the 2015 BLA component’s cost follows.  Each 
section addresses the cost data reference, methodologies, the cost estimating approach 
used, specific assumptions for each particular component, and O & S costs.  Section 7.3.5 
describes the process for normalizing all cost data to the appropriate years. 
 7.5.1 Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future 
All MPF(F) cost data is from the MPF(F) study220 conducted by the CNA.  CNA, 
with the assistance of NAVSEA and Military Sealift Command (MSC), developed a total 
ownership cost/life cycle cost for each of the MPF(F) alternatives addressed in the study.  
All costs are calculated based on a squadron size.  Since the SEA-6 2015 BLA includes a 
larger MPF(F) squadron size (8 versus 6 vessels), extrapolation of the CNA cost data is 
necessary.  For the 2015 BLA, the cost data from CNA is for the unconstrained, full  
Air Combat Element (ACE), distributed Sea Base variant as described in Chapter 5.  Both 
CNA and the SEA-6 Cost Estimation Team make the following assumptions. 
                                                 
220 Ibid., pp. 48-55. 
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• NAVSEA costs are accurate and appropriate (CNA, SEA-6). 
• All follow-on ships maintain the same acquisition cost with no learning 
curve improvements (CNA). 
• MPF(F) vessels will have a 40-year life (CNA, SEA-6). 
• Additional manning for Sea Base support would be approximately  
2,118 personnel (CNA). 
• The lead ship and first follow-on ship are equipped with the  
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) C2 suite (SEA-6). 
• All MPF(F) ships are JSF capable (SEA-6). 
• O & S costs include the cost of the Naval Support Element for the  
Sea Base (SEA-6). 
• The cost of additional ships maintain the same cost as outlined in the CNA 
study (SEA-6). 
• O & S costs are the same for each MPF(F) (SEA-6). 
• All R&D and production costs are included in the APUC (SEA-6). 
• Production of the MPF(F) ships (8) will be completed by 2012, with a 
production schedule of 1 each in 2008 and 2009, 2 each in 2010 and 2011, 
and 2 in 2012 (SEA-6). 
• The CNA/NAVSEA cost estimation is preformed using a analogy and 
parametric cost estimating approach (SEA-6). 
• CNA cost data include annual inflation increases (SEA-6). 
Figure 7-4 displays the cost data used to determine the acquisition cost of the 
eight unconstrained, full ACE, distributed Sea Base MPF(F) ships in the 2015 BLA. 
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Figure 7-4: CNA Ship and Squadron Acquisition Costs.221 
 
From Figure 7-4, CNA is estimating the acquisition cost for the lead ship to be 
$2,300 million (FY08$) with all follow-on ships maintaining a fixed cost of  
$1,730 million (FY$).  For the SEA-6 cost estimate, an additional cost for the  
MEB Command and Control (C2) suite ($40 million) is included for the lead and first 
follow-on ship.  In addition, another cost is included to provide each MPF(F) with JSF 
handling capability ($95 million).  From the total acquisition cost per ship, the cost data 
is normalized, based on the assumed production schedule. 
Figure 7-5 displays O &S cost data from the CNA study that is the basis for the  
O & S costs in the 2015 BLA cost estimation.  Per the CNA study, O & S costs for a  
6-ship MPF(F) squadron operating at a Sea Base increases the TOC/LCC cost  
by $14.4 billion. 
                                                 
221 Ibid., p. 49. 




Figure 7-5: CNA Total Ownership Cost Data.222 
 
To calculate the O & S costs for the 2015 BLA, the CAN-estimated O & S costs 
are assumed to be equally distributed between the 6 ships within the squadron and then 
distributed on a per year basis, which results in allocating $60 million per year to each 
ship.  To calculate the total O & S cost up to 2015 for each of the 8 MPF(F) ships in the 
2015 BLA, all costs are normalized for each year up to 2015, based on the assumed 
production schedule for each ship.  For the SEA-6 MPF(F) squadron of 8 ships, it is 
assumed each additional ship will require the same level of O & S costs as provided by 
the CNA study. 
                                                 
222 Ibid., p. 54. 
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 7.5.2 Fast Combat Support Ship 
To support the MPF(F) ships, one Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE) is included 
in the 2015 BLA.  The current U.S. inventory contains four T-AOE ships that are 
expected to continue service beyond 2015.  The cost estimate for the T-AOE uses the 
extrapolation from actual cost estimating approach for each component of the LCC. 
Acquisition costing data for each T-AOE is from the Maritime Business 
Strategies,223 a strategic management-consulting firm for the maritime industry.  Since it 
is unknown which T-AOE will be assigned to support the MPF(F) in 2015, an APUC, 
based on the procurement cost of each ship, is used.  To calculate the APUC, the 
procurement cost of each ship is normalized to the base year (2004) from which the 
APUC is determined to establish the procurement cost of the T-AOE used in the  
LCC estimate. 
O & S costs are from the VAMOSC database.  For continuity, the average O & S 
cost for the T-AOE-6 class is used.  To obtain average ship class data, the VAMOSC 
“Ship Class Average Query – All Elements (FY04$)” option for data results is utilized to 
capture all O & S costs across all ships within the class.  O & S costs are available for the 
past nine years.  To calculate future year O & S costs, the percentage change between 
each year is calculated and is averaged.  This averaged annual percentage increase is 
applied to the average annual O & S cost to calculate expected future O & S costs.  The 
actual historic and expected O & S costs are summed to determine the O & S component 
of the life cycle cost. 
 7.5.3 MV-22 Osprey 
For the 2015 BLA, 48 MV-22s are included.  For the SEA-6 cost estimation, the 
APUC is from the Department of the Navy’s FY05 President’s Budget.224  The budgetary 
                                                 
223 Tim Colton, “U.S. Government Shipbuilding – Auxiliary Ships,” [online database] (29 October 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/ussbldrs/postwwii/government/auxiliaries. 
224 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html. 
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cost data are a function of the total program cost and the number of  
expected procurements. 
For the O & S cost component of the life cycle cost, data is from the VAMOSC 
database.  The database contains four years of O & S costs for the MV-22.  However, 
with the operational problems and mishaps, the historical O & S costs do not appear to be 
a true representation of the future costs.  There is a 43% average annual increase in  
O & S costs over the 4 years of data.  Yet, the cost data is based only on 7 aircraft.  To 
predict a more reasonable estimate of the future O & S cost for each MV-22, an analogy 
cost estimating approach with a cost factor is utilized.  Using only 3 of the 4 years of  
O & S cost data, an average per unit O & S cost is calculated.  Instead of applying a 43% 
annual increase, the annual percentage increase of 4 other aircraft (AV-8B, EA-6B,  
F-14D, and F/A-18E) is applied.  On average, each of the 4 aircraft types demonstrated 
an annual increase of 12% per year.  This factor is applied to the MV-22’s average O & S 
cost to predict future O & S costs out to 2015. 
 7.5.4 CH-53X Super Stallion 
There are 20 CH-53Xs in the 2015 BLA.  The CH-53X is a future upgrade of the 
existing CH-53E.  For the cost estimation, the CH-53X cost is based on the cost of the 
CH-53E.  The acquisition and procurement cost for the aircraft is from  
Jane’s Information Group.225  This CH-53E cost data is assumed to be an APUC. 
To determine the O & S cost component for the life cycle cost, seven years of  
O & S cost data are available from the VAMOSC database.  The average annual O & S 
cost increase percentage is calculated from the historical data and applied to future years.  
For the LCC, O & S cost data was included from 1997 to 2015.  Since the CH-53X is an 
upgraded CH-53E, the cost of the upgrade per aircraft is classified as O & S.  The 
upgrade’s cost is included in the O & S for FY11.  Along with improving the capability 
of the current CH-53E, the CH-53X is expected to require 25% less O & S costs.  A 25% 
decrease is included in the annual O&S costs per aircraft for the years FY12 to FY15. 
                                                 
225 Jane’s Information Group, “Sikorsky CH-53X” [database online] (21 October 2002 [cited  
18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://www4.janes.com/. 
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 7.5.5 SH-60R Seahawk 
The SH-60R is the scheduled replacement for the SH-60B and SH-60F.  The  
SH-60R has recently entered the production phase and cost data are available in the  
FY05 President’s Budget.226 
To determine the O & S cost of the SH-60R, an analogy cost estimating approach 
with a cost factor is utilized.  Since the SH-60R is a planned replacement for the SH-60B, 
historical O & S costs for the SH-60B are used to predict the future costs.  The VAMOSC 
database contains seven years’ worth of SH-60B O & S cost data.  To calculate future 
year O & S costs, the percentage change between each historic year is calculated and 
averaged.  This averaged annual percentage change is applied to the average annual  
SH-60B O & S cost to calculate the expected O & S costs for the SH-60R. 
 7.5.6 AH-1Z Super Cobra 
The AH-1Z is a planned upgrade to the AH-1W.  The program for the AH-1Z 
includes upgrading certain AH-1Ws to AH-1Zs with new production comprising the 
majority of the program.  Cost estimation data for the AH-1Z is located in the  
FY05 President’s Budget.227  For the cost estimation, it is assumed all baseline AH-1Zs 
were the newly manufactured airframes. 
Since the AH-1Z includes upgraded AH-1Ws, an analogy cost estimating 
approach is used to compute the cost estimation for the AH-1Z based on historical  
AH-1W O & S cost data.  The VAMOSC database contains seven years of historical data 
that is used to determine the future O & S costs of the AH-1Z. 
                                                 
226 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html. 
227 Ibid. 
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 7.5.7 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
The 2015 BLA includes 36 JSFs.  Costing data for future capabilities can be 
located in a Department of Defense SAR.228  The costing data are provided as a total 
program cost with the number of expected procurements.  An APUC is calculated to 
determine the cost of each unit. 
The JSF is currently in the development phase and no actual O & S costs are 
available in the VAMOSC database.  To determine the future O & S costs of the JSF, an 
analogy cost estimating approach is implemented with a cost factor that uses the F/A-18F 
as the similar aircraft.  The average annual O & S costs for the F/A-18F is calculated 
from historical data.  It is assumed the JSF will require 5% more O & S cost per year than 
the F/A-18E.  Based on this assumption, a .05 cost factor is applied to the F/A-18F 
annual O & S cost.  The annual increase for the F/A-18F is calculated and applied to each  
future year. 
 7.5.8 Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Per the CNA MPF(F) study, it is expected that the MPF(F) squadron will operate 
with six VTUAVs when operating in a Sea Base environment.229  To determine VTUAV 
cost during the 2015 time frame, the SEA-6 cost estimate is accomplished utilizing the 
RQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV that is currently under development as an analogous system for 
the procurement costs. 
Limited cost data is available for VTUAV’s.  For the Fire Scout, cost data being 
used is from the Under Secretary of Defense’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Planning Task Force report.230 
                                                 
228 Department of Defense, SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary [report online] (30 September 2003 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2003/d20031118sar. 
229 Souders et al., p. 21. 
230 Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Planning Task Force: The UAV Roadmap 2002 
[report online] (25 October 2001 [cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/docs/exec_sum.pdf. 
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To determine the future O & S costs for the VTUAV, an analogy cost estimating 
approach using the United States Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator UAV as an analogous 
system is performed.  It is assumed that the RQ-8 will exhibit operating and support cost 
requirements similar to the RQ-1.  To determine the O & S costs for the RQ-1, cost data 
from the FY05 President’s Budget231 for the RQ-8 is used. 
 7.5.9 UH-1Y Iroquois 
The UH-1Y is a future capability that is intended to replace the UH-1N.  The 
program is intended to convert selective UH-1Ns into UH-1Ys and to manufacture new 
airframes.  For the SEA-6 cost estimation, it is assumed all aircraft included in the  
2015 BLA are of the newly constructed variant. 
Cost estimating data for the acquisition and procurement costs are located in the 
FY05 President’s Budget.232  The budget contains the total program cost, along with the 
APUC for the future UH-1Y. 
Since the UH-1Y is the planned replacement for the UH-1N, the O & S cost data 
for the UH-1N is used to conduct an analogy cost estimating approach.  The average 
annual O & S cost is calculated using data obtained from the VAMOSC database.  A cost 
factor of .05 is applied to the annual O & S cost to predict future UH-1Y O & S costs.  In 
addition to a 5% greater annual expected cost, the historic annual cost increase is 
determined for the UH-1N and applied to all future years. 
 7.5.10 Landing Craft, Air Cushion 
As Chapter 5 outlines, SEA-6 assumes 24 LCACs are required in the 2015 BLA.  
Acquisition and procurement cost data is obtained from the Maritime Business 
                                                 
231 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html. 
232 Ibid., para. 5. 
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Strategies.233  From this open-source cost data, an extrapolation from actual costs  
is applied. 
There are currently 91 LCACs in the U.S. Navy’s inventory.  Since it is unknown 
which of those 91 LCACs might be utilized in the 2015 BLA, an average unit cost is 
calculated for the cost estimation.  Though it is uncertain if all acquisition and 
procurement costs are included in the open source data, it is assumed that all costs are 
captured in the data, based on the learning curve apparent in the cost data.  To determine 
the average unit cost, the cost of each unit is normalized to the base year and  
then averaged. 
LCAC O & S costs are not maintained separately by the VAMOSC database.  
Instead, O & S costs for the LCAC are included in O & S cost data for the platforms that 
operate them.  The cost to operate or support the LCAC, however, is not distinguished.  
The LCAC inventory is currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).  
SLEP costs are categorized as O & S costs and are the only O & S costs that can be 
included.  For the SLEP, cost data is located in the FY05 President’s Budget.234  The 
budget reports the total program cost, as well as the per unit cost for the upgrades.  The 
SLEP cost data are normalized and is included in the O & S costs for each LCAC. 
 7.5.11 Landing Craft Utility, Replacement 
The LCU(R) is the intended replacement craft for the aging LCU.  It is currently 
in the low rate initial production (LRIP) phase with 19 units planned for procurement.  
Cost data are found in the FY05 President’s Budget.235Budget documentation contains all 
acquisition and procurement costs for each of the 19 future crafts. 
                                                 
233 Tim Colton, “U.S. Government Shipbuilding – Auxiliary Ships” [online database] (29 October 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/ussbldrs/postwwii/government/lcac.htm. 
234 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 18 October 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html. 
235 Ibid., para. 1. 
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Since the LCU(R) is currently in the LRIP phase of production, no O & S cost 
data are available.  It is not expected that the VAMOSC database will contain future  
O & S costs once the craft is implemented into the fleet. 
7.6 Summary 
As Table 7-1 indicates, the SEA-6 baseline architecture has an estimated total cost 
of $45.6 billion (FY15).  Figure 7-6 is a graphical depiction of the percentage that each 
component contributes to the total cost.  The data generated during the cost estimation of 
the 2015 BLA will be used during the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) to compare the 
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Figure 7-6: 2015 Baseline Architecture Cost Distribution. 
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8. Modeling and Simulation 
8.1 Overview 
A model is a simplified representation of a system intended to support 
understanding of the real system.  Simulation is a model embedded in a computer 
program that moves defined entities from place to place, in time and space, according to 
rules that may be deterministic or stochastic.  Modeling and simulation can be used 
collectively for developing a level of understanding of the interaction of the individual 
parts of a system, and of the system as a whole. 
In order to gain insight and analyze the complex problem presented by the 
dynamic variables involved with Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo), the 
Systems Engineering Analysis Baseline Architecture System Evaluator Six  
(SEABASE-6) model is built using “Image That, Inc.’s” modeling and simulation tool 
Extend™.  The main goal of the model is to facilitate the analysis of multiple  
Seabasing JELo architectures in order to compare their performance.  The model is built 
to describe the JELo architecture via a parameterized set of input variables that map to 
different functional areas of the system.  For instance, the time that it takes to load a 
platform at sea as a function of sea state is modeled simply as a time delay.  This time 
delay can then represent any multitude of diverse loading systems (i.e., well deck, 
integrated launching platform, etc.) by simply modifying the associated time delay 
variable.  Extend™ also allows analytical flexibility by permitting either a deterministic 
or a stochastic variable input.  The model can run deterministically utilizing constant 
value input variables or stochastically by using distributions.  Model inputs are contained 
within one central database and can be modified directly through the program or through 
an Excel™ spreadsheet interface.  This feature makes changing input variables extremely 
rapid and efficient.  Enclosure 1 lists the model inputs in detail.  Model outputs are 
exported to a workbook in Excel™ format, which allows follow-on analysis of data from 
each model run in a format that is universal among many other software packages. 
 
  186
8.2 Extend™ Simulation Software 
Extend™ is a powerful, leading edge, discrete simulation tool.  One of 
Extend™’s principle benefits is that system architectures may be modeled at a high level 
of abstraction to gain rough insight into system behavior.  Specific system elements can 
then be targeted for higher resolution modeling as needed, based on system requirements.  
This stepwise refinement enables very complex problems to be broken down more 
quickly with varying levels of complexity.  Extend™ utilizes a customizable graphical 
interface, which displays the various relationships within the system.  Extend™’s 
graphical animation allows for a greater understanding of simulation flows during model 
development and serves as an excellent debugging tool.  Unlimited hierarchical 
decomposition of various model components allows multiple system views with varying 
degrees of complexity.  This hierarchical decomposition property facilitates the use of 
multiple modules and promotes object reusability throughout the model development  
life cycle. 
8.3 Initial Procedures 
The SEABASE-6 model uses proven software development practices and 
methodologies.  Prior to actual code generation, a series of top-level abstract system 
overviews are developed to establish system boundaries and interfaces.  These overviews 
are developed using the information provided in the JELo Operating Concept  
[Chapter 2].  Figure 8-1 shows the initial top-level system view produced by the 
modeling team to understand the major components of the logistics flow throughout the 
system, without placing any focus on inputs or outputs. 
CONUS FLS SEABASE BEACH OBJECTIVE
 
 
Figure 8-1: Initial Modeling Concept.  The Continental United States (CONUS) is the default origin.  The 
Forward Logistics Site (FLS) is the base for prepositioned assets. 
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8.4 Model Modularity 
A great advantage of utilizing Extend™ for this object-oriented discrete 
simulation is that it facilitates rapid reuse of both predefined objects from the Extend™ 
library, as well as model-specific, user-designed modules.  Hierarchical decomposition 
also allows the model to be subdivided into logical components or submodules, 
represented by a single descriptive icon.  Double-clicking on the hierarchical block opens 
a new window displaying the submodel, which greatly simplifies the representation of the 
model and allows the user to hide and show model details as desired.  Figure 8-2 shows 
the initial JELo architecture screen developed using Extend™.  Each block represents a 
single module and contains numerous, more detailed modules.  The top-level modules 
include: CONUS, Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)),  
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)-1 and ESG-2, FLS, Combat Logistics Force (CLF), 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Sea Base, Beach, and Objective.  The process lines represent 
the flows between each module.  Specific explanation of each module’s various inputs 
and outputs and their interactions are explained in detail later in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 8-2: JELo Top-Level Overview.  This represents the main modules defined by the simulation. 
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8.5 Model Database 
To create uncomplicated user-modified inputs, a relational database is integrated 
into the model.  By separating the data from the model, the database offers fast scenario 
implementation, flexible analysis, and improved data management.  The database serves 
as a list of input tables that the model draws during simulation.  This database has the 
unique ability to import and export data via an add-in interface with Microsoft Excel™.  
The add-in enables the creation of database workbooks, which serve as the Excel™ data 
interface.  When a model input is changed in the database table, the input value is 
modified everywhere in the model that references the database input variable.  This 
feature allows for rapid, convenient, and efficient change management of model variables 
in a central location without having to change various values that are distributed/hidden 
throughout the model.  In addition, this feature reduces the chance that there is a different 
parameter value in place when that parameter is used in more than one location 
throughout the model. 
8.6 Sea State Module 
Two of the dominate performance drivers of the Seabased JELo system are the  
at-sea transfer/loading delay and connector speed of advance.  Both the loading delays 
and connector speeds are a function of, and highly dependent on, sea state.  To make this 
analysis possible, a sea state module is created and utilized in multiple modules 
throughout the model.  All input variables whose performance is affected by sea state are 
entered into the model as a function of sea state condition.  SEABASE-6 models three 
separate and distinct sea state conditions (sea states 2, 3, and 4).  These three sea states 
are chosen as they represent the greatest change in performance across the entire system 
based on historical research.  Component performance values used as input for sea state 2 
are also assumed to represent sea states 0 and 1.  This assumption is made to simplify the 
model and to gain insight into the three sea states that are most predominant around the 
globe on a basis of probability.  Sea states greater than 4 are not modeled.  The user can 
modify all system component values that are a function of sea state, so that any 
geographical area of the world may be modeled if supporting sea state data is available. 
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Sea state is modeled using Markovian stationary transition probabilities with  
three possible states (sea state 2, 3, and 4) on a 6-hr cycle.  This means that the  
sea state can at most, change every 6 hrs.  All delays or activities in the model that are a 
function of sea state will utilize the same sea state during that 6-hr period.  This method 
more accurately models the historical weather patterns of the simulated geographical 
area.  It also prevents the sea state from jumping directly from 2 to 4 without first passing 
through sea state 3. 
8.7 Units of Measure 
Supply commodity units of measure are standardized with Marine Corps planning 
factors to reduce the amount of unit conversions within the model.  English standard units 
for area and volume are utilized to match the preponderance of the literature describing 
Seabasing and JELo systems.  Distance is modeled in nautical miles, and times and rates 
are input in terms of hours.  Table 8-1 reflects the standard units of measure for the 





Distance Nautical Miles 
Time Hours 
Speed Nautical Miles per hr (kts) 
Area Square Feet 
Volume Cubic Feet 
Table 8-1: SEABASE-6 Standard Units of Measure. 
8.8 Model Module Description 
The logistics processes are grouped into modules.  These modules follow three 
distinct phases: closure, employment, and sustainment.  The Assembly Phase takes place 
during the Closure Phase.  Some modules overlap and play a part in more than one phase.  
The functions of each module are explained in the following sections. 
  190
8.9 Closure 
The model’s Closure Phase tracks the progress of troops, their equipment and  
Sea Base components from their point of origin up until they converge at the  
Joint Operations Area (JOA) to form the Sea Base. 
8.10 CONUS 
The simulation begins in the CONUS module shown in Figure 8-2.  Troops and 
the various air assets are generated here and transit to the FLS.  Although the term 
CONUS is used, it merely reflects a point of origin for the forces and may, in fact, 
represent a forward base in some architectures and scenarios.  Distances from CONUS to 
the FLS and the Sea Base are user-input and easily changed. 
 8.10.1 Combat Force Transit 
At the start of the simulation, the model generates the combat force troops and 
they enter a user-specified readiness delay that simulates the alert posture of the forces.  
After this delay, the troops transit to the airport and are loaded onto each aircraft.  The 
number of aircraft required is dependent on the input value for aircraft capacity.  This 
logic allows for flexibility in capacities among current and future platforms.  Each 
aircraft experiences a user-defined loading delay.  Departures are modeled as a single 
runway, therefore aircraft are sequenced and scheduled to take off at a user-specified time 
interval.  These user-defined delays enable the model to evaluate numerous scenarios 
dealing with transport aircraft availability and response times.  The troop transport 
aircraft then transit to the FLS.  The SEABASE-6 model calculates the transit delay 
based on a user-specified speed and distance.  In-flight winds and delays are not modeled. 
 8.10.2 Self-Deploying Aircraft Transit 
SEABASE-6 also models the transit of self-deployable aircraft.  Self-deployable 
aircraft are those platforms that fly under their own power from their point of origin to 
the FLS or Sea Base.  In the 2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA), the MV-22 aircraft 
demonstrates this capability.  At the start of the simulation, the MV-22s deploy from 
CONUS and transit to the FLS.  In actuality, this flight path is nothing more than a 
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distance and can resemble a flight between any points on the globe.  The user specifies 
the number of self-deploying aircraft and their corresponding readiness delay.  This 
readiness delay accounts for the time between the actual deployment order and the time 
that each aircraft gets airborne (i.e., squadron readiness delay, time required to set-up  
in-flight refueling assets, etc.).  Once airborne, the SEABASE-6 model calculates the 
transit delay for the self-deployed aircraft based on a user-specified speed and distance.   
In-flight winds and delays are not modeled.  Aircraft reliability is modeled by a user-
specified value.  The product of the reliability and the initial quantity of aircraft 
represents the total quantity of aircraft that arrive at the FLS or the Sea Base. 
 8.10.3 Non-Self-Deploying Aircraft Transit 
SEABASE-6 also models the non-self-deploying aircraft.  Non-self-deploying 
aircraft are those platforms that must be transported by another connector to arrive at the 
FLS or the Sea Base.  In the 2015 BLA, these aircraft are the CH-53, UH-1, AH-1, and 
SH-60.  At simulation start, a user-specified squadron readiness delay is applied to  
non-self-deploying aircraft to simulate alert posture.  A user-specified maintenance delay 
is also set for each aircraft to simulate the amount of time that it takes to disassemble 
and/or prepare the aircraft for transfer.  This delay may also be used to model the time 
required for the Air Mobility Command (AMC) to establish the air bridge.  Additionally, 
a user-specified quantity of transport aircraft, as well as their corresponding sequence 
delays, may be entered.  A user-specified loading delay is applied to the transport aircraft 
to simulate loading times.  Each transport aircraft carries a single non-self-deploying 
aircraft.  To simulate transport aircraft that are capable of carrying multiple  
non-self-deploying aircraft, the user may adjust the loading delays and the sequencing 
delays for departing aircraft.  The model calculates the actual transit delay based on  
user-specified speed-of-advance and distance to travel.  In-flight winds and en route 
delays are not modeled. 
8.11 Forward Logistics Site 
As the troops and aircraft transit to the FLS, the MPF(F)s also transit to the FLS.  
The distance between the MPF(F)s and the FLS is user-specified.  The number of 
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MPF(F) ships is also a user-specified value.  Before an MPF(F) can be loaded, its  
non-self-deploying aircraft inventory must first be reassembled.  This process is modeled 
by a user-specified aircraft assembly delay at the FLS.  It is assumed that the combat gear 
is already prepositioned on the MPF(F) ships.  MPF(F) ship loading is simulated when 
the user-specified inventory of combat troops and mission ready aircraft are assembled at 
the FLS.  The user can input the number of piers available at the FLS to reflect any port 
facility.  A user-specified MPF(F) transfer delay is modeled to account for the time delay 
required to load the MPF(F) ship.  Loading delays can also be user-input to vary with  
sea states to allow modeling of at-sea transfers. 
8.12 Forward Deployed Units 
This module accounts for the forward deployed units.  These include the CLF, 
ESG 1 and 2, MPF(F), and CSG. 
 8.12.1 Combat Logistics Force 
SEABASE-6 can model multiple CLF ships.  The actual quantity of CLF ship(s) 
is a user-input and the CLF originates at a user-specified distance from the Sea Base.  
This allows various CLF assumptions to be modeled.  A CLF ship that originates at sea 
can be used to model a predeployed or CSG CLF asset, while one that originates at the 
same distance as the FLS to Sea Base can model an attached CLF that supports only the 
MPF(F) squadron.  A user-input CLF readiness delay acts at the start of the simulation to 
model any initial delays.  The CLF ship then proceeds to the Sea Base with a  
user-specified quantity of supplies (food, fuel, water, and ammunition).  SEABASE-6 
calculates the transit delay based on user-inputs for distance and speed-of-advance as a 
function of sea state. 
 8.12.2 Expeditionary Strike Group 
SEABASE-6 models up to two ESGs.  A user-defined range from the Sea Base 
models their point of origin.  The ESGs are used to model the ESGs’ synchronization 
with the Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG) to form the Sea Base.  Their 
corresponding logistical footprints are not modeled (outside the scope of this project).  
Their functionality in the model is simply to transit to the Sea Base when the simulation 
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starts.  The Sea Base is not considered to be formed and ready to employ troops until the 
two ESG units arrive.  The start of the simulation encounters a user-specified readiness 
delay to model ESG force alert posture.  If alternative architectures do not require any 
ESG synchronization, the model user may specify the readiness delay and distance to 
travel as a 0 value.  SEABASE-6 calculates the transit delay based on user-inputs for 
distance and speed-of-advance as a function of sea state. 
 8.12.3 Carrier Strike Group 
SEABASE-6 models a single CSG.  Its purpose is to represent synchronization 
between Sea Shield and Sea Strike of CSG aircraft and the MPG/Sea Base.  The logistical 
footprint of the CSG is not modeled (outside the scope of this project).  The CSG’s 
functionality in the model is to transit to the Sea Base at simulation start.  The Sea Base is 
not considered to be formed and ready to employ troops until the CSG arrives at the  
Sea Base.  A user-specified readiness delay represents CSG force alert posture and acts at 
simulation start.  The distance for the CSG to travel to the Sea Base is user-specified to 
permit modeling numerous CSG assumptions.  If alternative architectures do not require 
any CSG support, the model user may specify the readiness delay and distance to travel 
as a zero value.  SEABASE-6 calculates the transit delay based on user-inputs for 
distance and speed-of-advance as a function of sea state. 
8.13 Sea Base Formation 
Convergence at the Joint Operations Area by the two ESGs, CSG, and MPF(F) 
constitutes the formation of the Sea Base.  At this time, the ESGs and the CSG modules 
are disabled.  The commodities from each individual MPF(F) ship are combined into a 
common inventory pool that represents the Sea Base inventory. 
Once the ESGs, CSG, and MPF(Fs) arrive at the operating area position, 
SEABASE-6 considers the Sea Base formed.  The employment phase starts only after the 
Sea Base forms.  Within this module, an EXTENDTM holding tank accumulates the 
specified number of ships from each variety to arrive.  The ESG ships are batched into a 
single unit, while the MPF(F) ships are all counted individually.  These items are released 
simultaneously once the last one arrives, marking the Sea Base formation time. 
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 8.13.1 MPF(F) Commodity Visibility 
Upon arrival at the Sea Base, the MPF(F) ships enter the commodity visibility 
module.  Here, the commodities (troops, equipment, food, fuel, water, and ammunition) 
carried by the MPF(F)s are made visible to the modules utilized for the employment and 
sustainment phases of the model.  The model can now use these commodities for 
inventory and consumption calculations.  This portion of the model extracts the 
individual MPF(F) commodity quantities and sends them to the Sea Base commodity 
inventory storage module. 
 8.13.2 MPF(F) Commodity Storage 
Once the commodities carried by the MPF(F) ships are made visible in the model, 
the commodity storage module receives and stores the commodities via a commodity 
queue.  When a connector is loaded with items at the Sea Base, the items decrement from 
the commodity queue and reduce the Sea Base inventory.  As items arrive on resupply or 
CLF ships, the transferred commodities are added to the Sea Base inventory.  The 
consumption module also decrements the commodity queue as a function of the Sea Base 
consumption rate for those items used by the Sea Base (food, fuel, and ammunition).  The 
Sea Base utilizes a consumption rate for food based on the number of personnel at the 
Sea Base.  The ammunition consumption rate for the Sea Base is user-specified and 
includes ordnance delivered by the strike support aircraft embarked on the MPF(F) ships.  
MPF(F) own-ship fuel is not modeled.  However, cargo fuel for use by embarked 
platforms and ground forces ashore is modeled.  The consumption of fuel at the Sea Base 
is a user-specified rate.  For the 2015 BLA, this rate includes daily fuel consumption by 
generic aircraft not individually modeled such as the JSF, AH-1, and SH-60 aircraft. 
8.14 Employment 
The employment phase of the model starts once the Sea Base is formed.  Recall 
that it is assumed that Assembly took place as the MPF(F) that loaded troops and  
non-self-deployed aircraft at the FLS transited to the Sea Base.  Employment is the 
insertion of three battalion landing teams (BLTs) from the Sea Base to their objectives 
ashore.  During employment, two surface BLTs are sent to the shore objective via surface 
  195
assault connectors, while a single vertical BLT is sent to the inland objective via  
air connectors.  Arrival at the objective (inland or beach) of the last connector 
transporting any part of the BLTs marks the end of the employment phase. 
 8.14.1 MPF(F) to Connectors 
As each MPF(F) ship arrives at the Sea Base, the embarked surface assault 
connectors are offloaded and ready to transfer troops and equipment to the objective.  For 
the 2015 BLA, these connectors are LCACs, LCU(R)s, CH-53s, MV-22s, and UH-1s.  
Each MPF(F) transports a user-specified quantity of each connector.  The model allows 
the user to utilize two surface assault connector types and up to three types of air 
connector types.  Once the embarked connectors offload at the Sea Base, they are 
considered operational. 
 8.14.2 Connector Transit 
All connectors may be used for both logistical resupply between the Sea Base and 
the objective, as well as for medical evacuation of wounded personnel.  The only 
exception to this policy is the connector identified in the 2015 BLA as the UH-1.  The 
UH-1 connector is modeled to serve only in a medical evacuation transport role and 
cannot carry other types of supplies. 
 8.14.3 Parallel Loading Logic 
The SEABASE-6 model allows the user to input the quantity of surface craft 
loading points (i.e., Integrated Landing Platforms) and operational air deck spots 
dedicated to logistics per MPF(F).  The user specifies the number of operational loading 
platforms available to each connector on a per MPF(F) ship basis.  Once an operational 
deck spot is available to a connector for loading, delays for strike up, assembly, and 
transfer are encountered prior to actual connector departure.  All three of these delays are 
user-input as a function of sea state.  These delays provide the flexibility to model diverse 
transfer mechanisms, means of assembly, and inventory and storage systems.  
SEABASE-6 also allows the user to specify if the first wave of connectors can bypass the 
strike up delay to simulate that the connector is pre-loaded prior to initial operations. 
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 8.14.4 Number of Trips Required 
The number of trips required for each connector during the employment phase is 
user-specified, based on connector payload capacity and payload requirements.  The user 
must specify exact payloads for each connector trip in the load plan database.  The 
connectors must complete the specified number of trips prior to entering the sustainment 
phase.  When a connector returns to the Sea Base during the employment phase  
(scripted trip), a logic block determines whether the specified number of trips have been 
completed.  If the specified number is not complete, the connector continues in the 
employment phase and loads the next user-specified scripted payload.  When the 
specified number of trips is complete, the employment phase is complete and the 
sustainment phase commences. 
 8.14.5 Load Out 
Each connector is loaded with a user-defined amount of food, fuel, water, 
ammunition, troops, and vehicles to reflect its actual payload.  During the employment 
phase, the load-out for each connector is predetermined from a user-defined script in the 
database.  In this phase, each connector is capable of carrying more than one type of 
supply.  When loaded connectors depart the Sea Base, logic signals decrement the 
inventory of commodities at the Sea Base.  Air connectors proceed to the in-land 
objective and surface connectors to the beach.  A transit delay is calculated based on 
user-input distance and speed-of-advance.  Specific wind and current effects are  
not modeled. 
 8.14.6 Connector Attrition 
SEABASE-6 models connector attrition.  The user-specified probability of kill for 
each connector is per half trip.  The connector is subjected to this probability of kill 
during both the ingress and the egress portions of the trip.  This half-trip attrition logic 
provides the opportunity for supplies to arrive at the objective prior to connector attrition 
approximately 50% of the time.  If attrition occurs during ingress, the equipment is lost.  
Once a connector attrites, it exits the simulation and is not regenerated. 
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 8.14.7 Connector Fuel Consumption 
While connectors transit to the objective or the beach, their fuel consumption is 
calculated based on user-specified consumption rates and decremented from the Sea Base 
fuel inventory.  Air connector fuel consumption rates are based on the average weight 
and drag for a full external payload on the ingress leg and half-mission fuel weight with 
base external drag on egress.  Surface connector fuel consumption rates are based on  
full payload weight during the ingress and empty weight on the egress leg. 
 8.14.8 Connector Off-Load 
A user-specified transfer delay is applied to connectors unloading assets at the 
beach and the objective.  This delay can be a function of combat level if desired. 
 8.14.9 Air Connector Commodity Visibility 
When an air connector arrives at the objective to deliver its payload, it 
experiences a user-defined transfer delay based on the current level of combat.  The 
connector’s commodities are made visible to the objective module, which deposits them 
into the objective’s commodity storage.  After delivery, air connectors transit back to the 
Sea Base, with a calculated transit delay based on user-input for speed-of-advance  
and distance. 
 8.14.10 Connector Return to Sea Base 
Once a connector unloads its payload at the beach or the objective it returns to the 
Sea Base to pick up its next pre-determined load.  The return transit delay is calculated 
based on user-input distance and speed-of-advance. 
Before the empty air connector returns to the Sea Base, the model first checks to 
see if there is a wounded soldier waiting at the objective.  If there is, the air connector is 
diverted to pick-up the wounded (medical evacuation module).  The assumption is that all 
air connectors are configurable to carry wounded troops.  If there are no wounded 
soldiers, the air connector transits back to the Sea Base.  This calculated transit delay is a 
function of user-input for speed-of-advance and return distance. 
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 8.14.11 Nondedicated Medical Evacuation Air Connectors 
As an air connector enters the medical evacuation module, it loads the lesser of 
either the user-specified maximum litter capacity or the current number of wounded 
troops.  The air connector does not wait for the maximum value of troops it can carry if 
the number of wounded troops is less than its carriage capacity.  The delay associated 
with loading wounded soldiers is a user-input. 
 8.14.12 Dedicated Medical Evacuation Air Connector 
SEABASE-6 models one air connector that is dedicated to the medical evacuation 
mission.  In the 2015 BLA, this air connector is the UH-1Y.  The loading logic and 
delays are identical to those for the nondedicated medical evacuation air connectors. 
 8.14.13 Ground Vehicle Transit 
Once a surface connector delivers a vehicle ashore, the vehicle begins its transit to 
the inland objective.  Vehicle transit delay is calculated based on a user-defined vehicle 
speed and distance.  SEABASE-6 calculates vehicle transit fuel consumption based on a 
user-defined rate and decrements the on-hand fuel inventory at the objective. 
 8.14.14 Objective Commodity Storage 
The commodity storage module at the objective stores the delivered commodities.  
This module represents on-hand inventory of supplies at the objective.  When a connector 
deposits commodities at the objective, they are added to the on-hand inventory.  The 
consumption module decrements the commodity storage at a user-specified consumption 
rate per unit time. 
 8.14.15 Ground Vehicle Commodity Visibility 
As each ground vehicle arrives at the objective, its commodity payload (troops, 
food, fuel, water, and ammunition) becomes visible to the objective module.  This 
module extracts the commodities and deposits them into the commodity storage at  
the objective. 
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 8.14.16 Ground Vehicle Attrition 
SEABASE-6 models vehicle attrition based on user-input rates.  This module 
simulates a reduction in fuel consumption due to vehicle losses over time (both combat 
and/or maintenance losses).  The vehicle attrition module is deterministic and relies on a 
user specified vehicle loss quantity per unit time.  For example, if the user chooses to 
attrite 1 M1A1 tank every 36 hrs, the model will decrement the objective’s on-hand 
inventory of M1A1 tanks by a quantity of 1 every 36 hrs. 
 8.14.17 Troop Attrition Module 
Wounded troops in need of a medical evacuation are generated from a  
user-specified distribution that is a function of the current level of combat 
(assault/sustain).  Wounded troop quantity is drawn from their distribution each hour.  
Wounded troops are placed into a holding queue at the objective and are picked-up by 
medical evacuation connectors to transport them to the Sea Base.  When wounded troops 
depart the objective, on-hand inventory decrements. 
8.15 Consumption Module 
Every hour inside the simulation, a combat level is selected based on a  
user-specified probability distribution.  From this combat level, the model applies a  
user-input consumption rate to the supply commodities of food, water, and ammunition 
by multiplying the specific commodity consumption rate by the number of troops at the 
objective.  The troops in the wounded commodity queue are not taken into account for 
this calculation.  An increase in combat level results in an increase in the quantity of 
troops in the wounded queue.  The resultant quantities are decremented from the 
objective’s on-hand inventory. 
Combat level also drives the fuel consumption rate; however, fuel demand is a 
function of vehicle type and quantity vice troop levels.  For vehicles at the objective, the 
model calculates fuel consumption hourly.  To account for the fact that vehicles are not in 
use 24 hrs a day, a user-defined “usage” percentage is modeled, which reflects the 
percentage per 24-hr period that vehicles are in use.  This “usage” percentage facilitates 
modification of fuel consumption rates for fuel efficiency analysis and their impact on 
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logistics.  Vehicle fuel consumption is calculated hourly by multiplying together the user-
inputs for “usage” percentage and consumption rate.  The consumption module 
decrements the objective’s on-hand fuel inventory by the amount of  
fuel consumed. 
8.16 Sustainment 
The sustainment phase begins once the employment phase ends.  The sustainment 
phase consists of keeping both the Sea Base and the forces ashore supplied with an 
adequate amount of commodities (food, fuel, water, and ammunition). 
 8.16.1 Asset Visibility 
SEABASE-6 models actual commodity inventories at both the objective and the 
Sea Base to simulate real time, 100% asset visibility.  This simulates that the Sea Base 
logisticians have real-time, accurate information of on-hand inventory at both the  
Sea Base and the objective.  The model uses 100% asset visibility to simulate an adaptive 
Sense and Respond logistics system. 
 8.16.2 Sense and Respond 
SEABASE-6 models a Sense and Respond logistics system with 100% asset 
visibility of inventory levels at the objective and Sea Base, supplies in transit, and 
supplies ordered, but not filled.  The model calculates priorities based on actual real-time 
inventory levels at the objective.  The reorder point for each commodity at the objective 
is a user-input value representing an inventory level measured in days-of-supply.  This 
modifiable reorder point facilitates the evaluation of different safety-stock levels at the 
objective.  The commodity that is below its user-defined reorder point, and has the lowest 
on-hand days-of-supply inventory, becomes the highest priority.  The highest priority 
commodity then departs the Sea Base as the payload on the next available connector.  
Each connector can only carry one type of supply per trip.  Connector payload capacities 
are user-input as a function of range to allow for decreasing payload capacities at  
longer ranges. 
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The model verifies that the requested commodity is in the Sea Base inventory.  If 
the Sea Base can fill the order, the connector loads the commodity quantity determined 
by the range from the Sea Base to the objective based on user-defined connector  
range-payload characteristics.  If the Sea Base cannot fill the highest priority commodity 
order due to low inventory, the second highest priority commodity is loaded. 
 8.16.3 Scheduled Replenishment 
SEABASE-6 models FLS resupply from either CONUS or an advanced base.  
Although not used in our project due to scope limitations, it is included for model future 
use.  Once the Sea Base has been formed, a user-specified timing trigger is passed to the 
scheduled replenishment module to initiate the generation of resupply ships.  The 
resupply ship receives a user-specified payload of food, fuel, water, and ammunition.  
Each resupply ship goes through a user-specified loading delay.  Once the first resupply 
ship is generated, a new one is generated at a user-specified time interval. 
 8.16.4 Resupply Platform to Forward Logistic Site Storage Location 
The resupply ship transits from CONUS/Advanced Base to the FLS over a  
user-specified distance and speed-of-advance.  Upon entering the FLS, its payload of 
food, fuel, water, and ammunition is unloaded to a storage location.  When a CLF arrives 
at the FLS, it receives a load-out from the FLS storage location.  This module is not 
active in this study, based on the assumption that the logistics flow from CONUS to FLS 
is adequate to meet the Sea Base demand. 
 8.16.5 Combat Logistics Force Return 
In this module, the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) has restocked at the FLS and 
returns to the Sea Base.  SEABASE-6 calculates the en route transit delay dependent on 
the user-specified distance and CLF speed-of-advance.  Once the CLF arrives at the  
Sea Base, it enters a holding status until the Sea Base is able to accept its commodities.  
Once the Sea Base sends a demand signal to the CLF for underway replenishment, the 
CLF transfers its commodities to the Sea Base and returns to the FLS. 
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 8.16.6 Combat Logistics Force Unload/Delays 
The CLF remains on-station until the Sea Base inventory can accept the entire 
CLF off-load for the commodity in highest demand.  At this time, the CLF ship transfers 
its entire off-load of the highest demand commodity to the Sea Base.  The CLF also 
transfers the remaining classes of supplies in sufficient quantities to top-off the Sea Base 
without exceeding the user-specified Sea Base maximum per commodity.  The CLF ship 
then returns to the FLS to reload.  The CLF returns to the FLS empty of the most 
demanded supply and partially loaded with the supplies that were not fully utilized.  This 
logic allows the CLF ship to minimize its return time to the Sea Base for the most heavily 
demanded class of supply. 
The transfer of commodities between the CLF and the Sea Base is modeled as a 
user-input time delay.  This transfer delay can be a function of sea state.  In addition to 
the transfer delay, the MPF(F) experiences a user-specified delay as a function of  
sea state for commodities strike down (storage).  Different inventory and storage systems 
can be modeled via this user-input delay.  Commodities are not visible for use in the 
simulation until the commodities have gone through the strike down delay. 
 8.16.7 Connector Availability 
SEABASE-6 models connector availability.  Availability is modeled by “failing” 
a connector after reaching a user-specified Time-Between-Failure (TBF).  The user can 
input either a constant TBF or a distribution for failure times. 
Each connector arrives at the Sea Base in an “up” operational status and is 
assigned a TBF time drawn from the user-input.  Prior to each trip, the model queries the 
failure time of the connector.  If the failure time is exceeded, the connector is considered 
“down” for maintenance and enters the “awaiting maintenance” queue.  If the assigned 
“failure” time is not exceeded, it is assigned a trip.  If the time of failure for a connector 
is reached while on a trip, the connector is allowed to complete the trip without any 
penalty, but is “down” once it arrives back at the Sea Base. 
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Failed aircraft are sent to the “awaiting maintenance” queue.  Here they wait until 
a maintenance spot is open so that they may be repaired.  Time-to-Repair (TTR) times are 
user-specified and may either be a constant or drawn from a distribution.  Once the 
repairs are made to the connector, it is assigned a new future failure time and returned  
to service. 
 8.16.8 Connector Cycling 
SEABASE-6 permits the user to define an operational tempo for the Sea Base 
during the sustainment phase by cycling connectors on and off.  During the employment 
phase, all assets of the Sea Base are operating to employ forces in the shortest amount of 
time.  However, the sustainment phase lasts much longer and operational tempo must be 
considered.  SEABASE-6 allows user-input to turn on/off MPF(F) ships and their 
respective connectors to simulate crew rest cycles and underway replenishment windows.  
The user specifies a percentage of Sea Base assets that are “first up” during the 
sustainment phase and their time duration to remain operational (cycle time).  At the end 
of that cycle time, the remaining Sea Base assets become operational for the next cycle 
(same duration) while the “first-up” Sea Base assets are turned-off.  This cycle then 
repeats itself for the duration of the sustainment period.  For example, if the user inputs a 
Sea Base percentage of 50% and a cycle time of 12 hrs, half of the MPF(F) ships and 
connectors will be operational at any one time.  The first 50% of the Sea Base assets are 
operational during the first 12 hrs and the remaining 50% of the assets are operational 
during the second 12 hrs, in a repeating fashion.  Various operational tempo assumptions 
can be evaluated using this input parameter. 
8.17 MPF(F) Attrition 
SEABASE-6 models MPF(F) attrition.  MPF(F) attrition is based on a one-time 
user-specified  probability of kill as a MPF(F) enters the Joint Operating Area (JOA) to 
form the Sea Base.  If the MPF(F) is killed, it exits the simulation and none of the 
commodities or connectors embarked on the platform are available for future operations 
or regenerated. 
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8.18 Model Validation and Verification 
Model validation is the process of ensuring that the model represents the actual 
system.  Since the SEABASE-6 model is a tool to simulate future Seabasing and JELo 
architectures, the model cannot truly be validated, as there is no real system for 
comparison.  Although the model can predict future performance of the system, these 
predictions cannot be validated with any certainty.  Even though the model cannot be 
validated, it can accrue validity over time.  Comparing SEABASE-6 simulation results to 
those of other similar models developed by partnership teams/agencies is an on-going 
effort and one method in which validity may be accrued.  Comparison of the  
SEABASE-6 model with the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) model used in their 
MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives study yields very positive results.  The CNA study 
simulated landing a single BLT from four unconstrained, distributed ships, from 25 NM 
at sea in approximately 14.8 hrs.236  Utilizing the same deterministic assumptions, LCAC 
speeds of advance and transfer delays as the CNA study, the SEABASE-6 model returned 
an output of 14.3 hrs (a difference of less than 5%). 
Model verification is the process of ensuring that a model works as expected.  
Verification of the SEABASE-6 model is an on-going and iterative effort utilizing 
multiple means to meet the objective.  The SEABASE-6 model is built in stages 
(modules).  Each stage is coded, debugged, and run to ensure that the results seem 
reasonable and that they match expected results obtained from side-study analysis or 
simple back-of-the-envelope calculations.  This type of testing is very similar to the 
software test methodology known as CABTAB (Code-a-Bit and Test-a-Bit). 
SEABASE-6 model stress testing is also a part of the verification process.  A  
full factorial controlled test permits evaluation of overall system behavior and exposes 
any unpredicted factor interactions.  Sea state, rate of consumption, ranges from Sea Base 
to shore and range from shore to objective stress the SEABASE-6 model.  The  
full 54-trial factorial test looks at three sea states (2, 3, and 4), two levels of consumption 
                                                 
236 Robert M. Souders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Summary Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D0009814.A2/Final, 
April 2004), p. 74. 
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(assault and sustain), three ranges between the Sea Base and shore (25, 40, and 100 NM), 
and three ranges between the shore and the objective (10, 50, and 100 NM).  The full 
factorial test also serves as a litmus test for model stability, with the model accruing over  
6,500 minutes of run time, while exploring the boundaries of the system and covering the 
entire planned factor space. 
Sensitivity analysis provides yet another form of verification for the SEABASE-6 
model.  A series of controlled experiments determines the system response due to a 
change of just one input parameter value.  Sensitivity studies look at all phases of the 
model to include closure, employment, and sustainment.  Sensitivity analysis not only 
provides valuable insight into the impact of each variable on overall system response, but 
also verifies that system response is logical and of the proper magnitude with respect to 
the modified variable and value. 
8.19 Model Limitations 
As with any model, SEABASE-6 has numerous constraints and limitations 
imposed on it in order to simplify the complex Seabasing and JELo problem.  These 
constraints and limitations permit the system to be modeled at the correct level of 
abstraction to ensure that key insights are drawn from the resulting data the  
model generates. 
 8.19.1 CONUS Logistics 
SEABASE-6 does not model the logistics infrastructure within CONUS or an 
Advanced Base.  Logistic flows within CONUS or the Advanced Base are modeled as a 
simple user-input delay. 
 8.19.2 Sea State 
Sea state is modeled identically throughout the model.  The sea state at the beach 
objective is the same sea state that is seen at the FLS, as well as the open ocean.   
See Section 8.6 for more detailed discussion on the sea state module. 
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 8.19.3 Combat Logistics Force Return Logic 
The CLF ship does not replenish the MPF(F) ships one at time, but treats them as 
one entity (Sea Base).  The actual flow of supplies between platforms during underway 
replenishment is not modeled.  A user-input CLF transfer delay models the underway 
replenishment process.  This delay is also a function of sea state. 
 8.19.4 Assembly at Sea 
Assembly at sea is modeled only as a user-specified delay as a function of  
sea state.  To simulate that assembly takes place on board the MPF(F) ships en route to 
the JOA, the delay can be set to 0. 
 8.19.5 Multiple Objectives 
SEABASE-6 models only a single land objective.  The complexities and network 
interactions of employing and sustaining forces at multiple objectives simultaneously are 
not modeled. 
 8.19.6 Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group Logistics 
The logistical footprints of both the CSG and ESG are not modeled.  However, 
the CSG and ESG are required members of the Sea Base.  In order for the Sea Base to be 
considered formed and operational, the CSG and ESG must be present. 
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Enclosure 1:  Model Inputs Glossary 
 
Aircraft from CONUS: Inputs include the amount and type of aircraft available for 
transporting troops from CONUS. 
 
Asset Visibility: Includes sense and respond asset visibility delay times, in hours, for 
both the employment and sustainment phases.  This visibility delay is the time required 
for the associated command and control system to provide information concerning 
logistics assets. 
 
Availabilities: Each connector has an associated mean time between failure (MTBF) and 
mean time to repair (MTTR), which is in units of hours.  MTBF is the average time 
between platform breakdowns.  MTTR is the average time required to perform corrective 
maintenance on a particular piece of equipment or platform.  The number of maintenance 
spots refers to the number of locations available to perform corrective maintenance  
and repair. 
 
Combat Level Priority: Assault 1 refers to the first 10 days of the model-simulated 
time.  Assault 2 refers to the days 11-20 of simulated time in the model.  Assault 3 refers 
to the last 30 days of simulated time in the model.  Each input is associated with a table to 
determine the probability of being in an assault condition or a sustained condition. 
 
Connector Cycling: “First up ratio” refers to the ratio of the first number of MPF(F)s 
available for sustainment.  Cycle time is the amount of time between one group of 
MPF(F)s switching to begin sustainment operations, while the other MPF(F)s enters  
crew rest. 
 
Consumption Rates: Allows the input of consumption rates for both the employment 
and sustainment phases of operations.  The connectors have inputs for fuel consumption 
rates, in gallons per mile, for both a fully loaded vehicle and empty vehicle.  Fuel 
(gallons per mile) full refers to the amount of fuel consumed by a particular vehicle when 
a full load of cargo is present.  Fuel (gallon per mile) empty refers to the amount of fuel 
consumed by a particular vehicle when empty of cargo. 
 
Current Sea State: This is a constant that reflects the current sea state used for 
calculations throughout the model.  This number is not a user-defined input. 
 
Delays-Combat Level: These delays include transfer delays for the various connectors, 
on land, for both the employment and sustainment phases.  Input time is in hours.  For the 
connectors, the measurement used is a full load.  A medical evacuation considers transfer 
time for only one soldier.  This is the loading of the wounded soldier at the objective.  
The model uses this value and multiplies by the number of soldiers being evacuated. 
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Delays-CONUS: 
 
• Troop Readiness: Amount of time it takes the troops to assemble and 
prepare for transit. 
 
• Airport Transit: Amount of time is takes for troops to get to the aircraft. 
 
• Troop Aircraft (A/C) Sequencing: Refers to how often aircraft can take-off 
from a runway. 
 
• Troop A/C Loading: Amount of time required to load the specified 
number of troops into the aircraft. 
 
• Resupply Platform Sequencing: Refers to how often the resupply platform 
leaves CONUS to fly to the FLS. 
 
• MV-22 Squadron Readiness: The level to which the squadron is prepared 
to perform operations prior to transit from CONUS. 
 
• MV-22 Transit (NM/hr): The normal air speed for the MV-22 is  
180 kts.  It is assumed that the MV-22 will do 180 kts for 12 hrs and then 
rest for 12 hrs.  Therefore, to simplify modeling calculations, the speed is 
given as 90 kts for 24 hrs. 
 
• Helicopter A/C Readiness/Disassembly: The amount of time required to 
disassemble the helicopters (CH-53s and UH-1s). 
 
• Helicopter A/C Loading: The amount of time required to load associated 




• Helicopter Reassembly and functional check flight (FCF): The amount of 




• CSG Readiness: The amount of time required for the CSG to reach a state 
of readiness prior to transit. 
 
• ESG Readiness: The amount of time required for the ESG to reach a state 
of readiness prior to transit. 
 
• CLF Readiness: The amount of time required for the CLF to reach a state 
of readiness prior to transit. 
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• MPF(F) Readiness: The amount of time required for the MPF(F) to reach 




• CH-53 Sequencing: Refers to how often the associated aircraft is sent 
from the sea base to the objective.  This delay is used for planning factors 
only and is not taken into account when using sense and respond logic. 
 
• MV-22 Sequencing: Refers to how often the associated aircraft is sent 
from the sea base to the objective.  This delay is used for planning factors 
only and is not taken into account when using sense and respond logic. 
 
• Medical Evacuation Readiness: Amount of time required to reconfigure 
the primary medical evacuation aircraft, following the transportation of 
supplies, for troop evacuation. 
 
• A/C Redistribution: The various aircraft types are not distributed among 
the MPF(F)s during the initial transit from the FLS.  This input refers to 
the amount of time required to redistribute aircraft amongst the MPF(F)s 




• CLF Initial Transit (kts): The speed of the CLF ship, originating in the 
ocean, transiting to the Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• CLF to Sea Base (kts): The speed of the CLF ship, originating at the FLS, 
transiting to the Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• CLF to FLS (kts): The speed of the CLF ship, originating at the Sea Base, 
transiting to the FLS expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• CLF Transfer (hrs): The amount of time required to transfer items both at 
the Sea Base and FLS expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• MPF(F) Transit (kts): The speed of the MPF(F) ship expressed as a 
function of sea state. 
 
• MPF(F) Transfer (hrs): The amount of time required to transfer items at 
the FLS expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• ESG Transit (kts): The speed of the ESG expressed as a function of  
sea state. 
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• CSG Transit (kts): The speed of the CSG expressed as a function of  
sea state. 
 
• LCAC Initial Transit (kts): The speed of the LCAC from the Sea Base to 
the beach expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• LCAC Return Transit (kts): The speed of the LCAC from the beach to the 
Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• LCAC Transfer (hrs): The amount of time required to transfer items at the 
Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• CH-53 Transfer (hrs): The amount of time required to transfer items at the 
Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• Medical Evacuation Transfer (per soldier in hrs): The transfer delay 
associated with loading and unloading wounded troops at the Sea Base. 
 
• Resupply Ship Transit (kts): The speed of the resupply ship from CONUS 
to the FLS expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• Resupply Ship Transfer (hrs): The amount of time required to transfer 
items at CONUS and the Sea Base expressed as a function of sea state. 
 
• Strike Up (hrs): The amount of time required to transport equipment from 
below deck of the MPF(F) ship to the main deck of the ship, expressed as 
a function of sea state.  This is the equipment that the MPF(F) will transfer 
to the connectors. 
 
• Strike Down (hrs): The amount of time required to transport equipment 
from the main deck of the MPF(F) ship to below deck, expressed as a 
function of sea state.  This is the equipment received from the CLF. 
 
• Assembly (per vehicles in hrs): The amount of time required to assemble 
the associated vehicle. 
 
Distances: (all in Nautical Miles (NM)) 
  
• Sea Base to Beach Head: Not considered an input.  It is a block used in the 
model to write the current distances.  This value is used in calculations 
throughout the model. 
 
• CSG to Sea Base: Distance from the CSG to the Sea Base in NM. 
 
• ESG 1 to Sea Base: Distance from ESG 1 to the Sea Base in NM. 
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• ESG 2 to Sea Base: Distance from ESG 2 to the Sea Base in NM. 
 
• CONUS to FLS: Distance from CONUS to the FLS in NM. 
 
• FLS to Sea Base: Distance from the CSG to the Sea Base in NM. 
 
• Sea Base to Objective: Not considered an input.  It is rather a block used 
for the model to write the current distance.  This value is used in 
calculations throughout the model. 
 
• Beach Head to Objective: Not considered an input.  It is rather a block 
used for the model to write the current distance.  This value is used in 
calculations throughout the model. 
 
• MPF(F) to FLS: Distance from the MPF(F) to the FLS in NM. 
 
• CLF to Sea Base: Distance from the CLF to the Sea Base in NM. 
 
• Initial Sea Base to Beach Head: Distance used for LCAC and LCU(R) 
runs.  Once these runs are complete, the distance moves back to the  
final distances. 
 
• Initial Beach Head to Objective: Distance used for LCAC and LCU(R) 
runs.  Once these runs are complete, the distance moves back to the  
final distances. 
 
• Initial Sea Base to Objective: Distance used for LCAC and LCU(R) runs.  
Once these runs are complete, the distance moves back to the  
final distances. 
 
• Final Sea Base to Beach Head: Final distance used for calculation once 
LCAC and LCU(R) runs are complete. 
 
• Final Beach Head to Objective: Final distance used for calculation once 
LCAC and LCU(R) runs are complete. 
 
• Final Sea Base to Objective: Final distance used for calculation once 
LCAC and LCU(R) runs are complete. 
 
First Connector Wave Strike up in Transit: The input is either 1 or 0, which 
corresponds to yes and no, respectively.  If yes, the strike up on the MPF(F) for the  
first wave of connectors is performed while in transit to the Sea Base.  If no, the strike up 
on the MPF(F) is not performed until reaching the Sea Base. 
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Ground Vehicle Attrition Rates: 
  
• Vehicle: The ground vehicle associated with the attrition. 
 
• Assault Time (hours): The mean time between the next vehicle failure for 
the Employment phase. 
 
• Sustain Time (hours): The mean time between the next vehicle failure for 
the sustainment phase. 
 
Ground Vehicle Operation: Percentage of ON Time: Amount of time, expressed as a 
percent, that a vehicle is considered to be running and/or operating.  This is used as an 
input for fuel consumption calculations. 
 
Initial Load-out Configuration CH-53: Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one CH-53. 
 
Initial Load-out Configuration LCAC: Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one LCAC. 
 
Initial Load-out Configuration LCU(R): Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one LCU(R). 
 
Initial Load-out Configuration MV-22: Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one MV-22. 
 
Load-out Configuration CLF: Initial items with their associated amounts considered in 
the load-out configuration of one CLF. 
 
Load-out Configuration Helicopter A/C: Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one Helicopter. 
 
Load-out Configuration MPF(F): Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one MPF(F). 
 
Load-out Configuration Resupply Ship: Initial items with their associated amounts 
considered in the load-out configuration of one Resupply ship. 
 
Maximum Resupply Range: The maximum range, in nautical miles, at which the 
connector can perform a resupply mission. 
 
MPF(F)/Connector Attrition Probabilities: 
 
• Type: Type of connector used in the calculation. 
 
• Assault: Attrition probability during employment phase of operations. 
 
    213
• Sustain: Attrition probability during the sustainment phase of operations. 
 
 
Number of connectors loaded in parallel (per MPF(F)): The number of  
Integrated Loading Platforms (ILPs) available. 
 
Number of Helicopter A/C loaded in parallel: The number of aircraft, at CONUS, that 
can be loaded at the same time. 
 
Number of MPF(F)s loaded in parallel: The number of MPF(F)s, at the FLS, that can 
be loaded at the same time. 
 
Number of Trips Required for Insertion: 
 
• Initial: Amount of trips required to deliver troops and equipment to their 
final destination during the initial 10 hrs of employment phase. 
 
• Follow on: Amount of trips required to deliver troops and equipment 
following the employment phase.  These items are not required for the  
10-hr employment phase. 
 
Planning Factor Probabilities: Planning factors will be used only if the asset visibility 
system fails.  If using planning factors, the probabilities will be based on an  
empirical table. 
 
Reliability Rates from CONUS: Refers to the number of MV-22s available to perform 
operations from CONUS, expressed as a fraction of one. 
 
Reorder Levels: Level at which a particular item will be reordered to maintain two days  
of supply. 
 
Resupply Holding Capacities CH-53: Amount of cargo the CH-53 can hold, as a 
function of associated range. 
 
Resupply Holding Capacities MV-22: Amount of cargo the MV-22 can hold, as a 




• Surface Connector: Type of connector used for resupply. 
 
• Number of Load-outs before resupply: The number of LCAC and LCU(R) 
runs completed prior to the beginning of air resupply runs. 
 
S&R Logistics Critical Levels: This number corresponds to the amount of items 
considered to be one day of supply. 
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Sea Base Maximum Capacities: Maximum capacities, in associated units, that can be 
held within the Sea Base. 
 
Sea State Distribution: Distribution of sea state based on an empirical table  
of probability. 
 
Ships: The amount and type of ships used throughout the model. 
 
SOA: The speed of a platform in kts. 
 
Troop Attrition Rates: 
 
• Wounded: Rate at which troops attrite. 
 
• Killed: Refers to the fatality rate of troops. 
 
Troop Carrying Capacities: 
 
• Aircraft: Maximum number of troops that can be carried by the  
associated platform. 
 
• UH-1: Maximum number of troops that can be carried by the associated 
platform.  For medical evacuation only. 
 
• CH-53: Maximum number of troops that can be carried by the associated 
platform.  For medical evacuation only. 
 
• MV-22: Maximum number of troops that can be carried by the associated 




• To Sea Base: Number of troops delivered to the Sea Base. 
 
• To Objective: Number of troops delivered to the objective. 
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9. THE BURMA SCENARIO 
9.1 Overview 
Currently, the Pentagon uses numbered Major Combat Operation (MCO) 
scenarios and a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) scenario for budgetary analysis and 
force planning.  The MCO scenarios are large force employments supported by years of 
deliberate, joint planning.  Additionally, much of today’s forward presence policy/posture 
addresses these scenarios.  However, the true test of the Sea Base capability, indeed of 
expeditionary forces in general, comes in the form of a smaller-scale crisis response 
where the U.S. has little warning and has done little deliberate planning prior to the 
deployment of forces.  Areas of the world that are not near major U.S. logistics centers 
and/or have constrained or restricted lines of communication also challenge the Sea Base 
concept.  For these reasons, Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) Cohort 6 (SEA-6) 
choose a crisis response in Burma as an analytical scenario over the MCOs. 
NPS Joint Campaign Analysis courses have analyzed two “crisis” scenarios that 
challenge the Sea Base concept.  In one scenario, the U.S. responds to a near-peer 
competitor’s aggressive invasion of the island of Palawan in the South China Sea.  In the 
other, the U.S. and its allies support a democratic revolution in Burma (Myanmar).   
Systems Engineering and Integration Cohort 3 (SEI-3) used a Burma scenario in their 
study of Expeditionary Warfare.237  Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohorts 4 and 5 
(SEA-4 and SEA-5) used a near-peer scenario in their studies of protecting the Sea Base 
with Sea Shield and of Maritime Dominance in the Littorals.  SEA-6 chooses the  
Burma Scenario because this study also focuses on expeditionary warfare, and because 
SEA-6 has previously performed extensive analysis of it. 
Burma is a good test of the Sea Base concept for many reasons: the geography 
presents physical and political challenges, the air and sea lines of communication are long 
and constrained, the enemy force is credible, and the shortage of well-developed ports 
and airfields make access a problem.  Figure 9-1 shows the constrained geography. 
                                                 
237 SEI-3 2002 Integrated Project, “Expeditionary Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
    216
9.2 2015 Scenario Background 
 
 
Figure 9-1: Burma and Surrounding Area.238 
With the Taliban’s demise in 2002, Burma (Myanmar) is the world’s leading 
illicit opium producer.  In the subsequent years, Burma’s military government has 
expanded its power using increased revenue from drug activity. 239  Southeast Asian 
factions of the Al Qaeda terror network use the shared isthmus region for training, opium 
distribution, and as a launching point for piracy missions.  The Burmese military regime 
continues to turn a blind eye toward the terrorists in return for their distribution services.  
Neighboring countries, Europe, and North America fear that the military regime poses a 
threat to the Straits of Malacca. 
                                                 
238 Note the shared borders with both India and China; also note the long coastline and proximity to the 
Straits of Malacca. 
239 A majority of the background for this scenario was taken from the Burma Scenario write up  
(Chapter VI) in the SEI-3 2002 Integrated Project Report “Expeditionary Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2002. 
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China is concerned with the Burmese drug trade on its own borders.  However, 
China takes a proactive approach, supporting the Burmese military in an attempt to gain 
the regime’s help in controlling the drug flow and to check what it perceives as India’s 
expansion.  Since 1990, China has sold military equipment to Burma and provided 
military and technical advisors.  In addition to arms sales, the Chinese assisted Burma in 
building and improving naval facilities at the port city of Myeik, the port city of Akyab 
along the Burmese coast of the northern Bay of Bengal, and the port city of Moulmein 
due east of Rangoon.  To further strengthen its power, the military regime used their 
improved military capability against members of the old People’s Assembly and the  
Shan rebels, both pro-democracy movements. 
In 2015, a popular pro-democracy uprising occurs in Bhamo (north-central part of 
the country).  The freedom fighters establish a stronghold and ask the remaining members 
of the old People’s Assembly to establish a new, democratic Burmese government in 
Bhamo.  In response, the Burmese people south of Rangoon along the Malay Peninsula 
take up an armed resistance against the military regime’s forces.  With covert  
Thai support (arms shipments, training, etc.) the southern freedom fighters take control of 
the country south of Ye and establish headquarters in Tavoy.  With tenuous strongholds 
in the north and south, the fledgling democratic movement calls for assistance from the 
international community. 
The military regime responds by threatening to close all Southeast Asian 
waterways if any country intervenes on behalf of the “insurgents.”  In addition to 
mobilizing forces, the military regime activates the air defenses around Rangoon; deploys 
mobile anti-ship missile systems; deploys their Naval Special Forces; and establishes 
regular maritime patrols with their ships. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states, the  
United States and the European Union (E.U.) recognize the pro-democracy forces as the 
legitimate government of Burma.  ASEAN and the United States calls for an immediate 
cease-fire and demand that the military government relinquish power to a transitional 
government, headed by the Shan rebel faction, with popular elections soon to follow.  
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China and India support the cease-fire, but China independently warns the United States 
that they will not tolerate any U.S. military “adventurism.”  China promises a  
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council veto if the U.S. tries to organize a military 
coalition against Burma under U.N. auspices. 
In response to the situation, the U.S. National Command Authority, after 
conferring with its ASEAN allies, tasks the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) to provide military support to the democratic movement in order to bring freedom 
to the Burmese people.  The desired end state is a freely elected, pro-democracy Burmese 
government that increases security of the Malaccan Strait, combats terrorism, and stems 
the flow of opium. 
9.3 Mission 
Based on this guidance, the U.S. CJCS directed Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) to: 
1. Form a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to: 
a. Keep the Straits of Malacca open to the free movement of 
commercial shipping by neutralizing the Burmese naval activity in 
and around the straits. 
b. Protect and support the pro-democracy forces in Bhamo  
and Tavoy. 
2. Prepare plans for a large-scale operation to defeat the Burmese  
military regime. 
3. Prepare proposed response options and/or contingency plans needed to 
deter Chinese and/or Indian intervention. 
4. Monitor Chinese and Indian force locations and behavior. 
The commander of the new CJTF 140, Vice Admiral Hues, has issued the 
following guidance: 
The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC),  
Army Brigadier General Allwell, is responsible for supporting the rebels in Bhamo.  His 
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concept of operations involves inserting at least one airborne division directly into the 
Bhamo region.  Due to the political sensitivities of having US forces in close proximity of 
China and India, the U.S. is conducting diplomatic discussions with those countries.  The 
Bhamo operations and associated forces are on alert, pending resolution of the diplomatic 
efforts.  Despite Thailand’s support as an ASEAN member, they have been reluctant to 
grant basing and overflight rights to the U.S. forces.  This reluctance stems from their 
increased ties with the Chinese economy and a desire to keep the conflict from spilling 
into their country.  Once basing is granted, a U.S. Army combat aviation brigade and an 
airborne division will be deployed to Bhamo and sustained by the Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) from the Thai airbase at Chiang Mai. 
The Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC),  
Rear Admiral Sheradie, is responsible for keeping the Straits open and supporting the 
forces in Tavoy.  Operation Piranha Treasure (OPT) will keep the Straits open.   
Operation Burmese Sanctuary (OBS) will support the rebel forces in the south by rapidly 
deploying 2 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and 2 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) to 
the northern Andaman Sea.  These forces will establish air and sea dominance, providing 
a Sea Shield for the operations south of Moulmein.  The special operations elements of 
the 2 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) in the ESGs 
will interdict lines of communication south of Moulmein to slow Burmese deployment 
south.  If the Burmese give indications of launching an offensive to the south, both full 
MEUs will deploy in and around Moulmein as a blocking force.  In the Tavoy area, the 
JFMCC will conduct Forcible Entry Operations to take control of the Tavoy airfield and 
Tavoy port facility.  Brigadier General Allwell provides 2 support battalions for the 
operation.  Marine Brigadier General Mizlic, the Marine Component Commander, 
provides 3 Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) and the supporting forces at the Sea Base.  
This Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) is to secure Tavoy.  Once the JEB secures Tavoy, 
it will support rebel actions to establish control south of Moulmein. 
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9.4 Current Situation 
It has been two days since the freedom fighters have captured Bhamo and Tavoy.  
The military regime’s forces are mobilizing for larger actions and are expected to launch 
an offensive south toward Tavoy within the next 7 to 10 days.  Time is critical. 
9.5 Geography 
Burma, shown in Figure 9-2, is a vast country with poorly developed 
transportation infrastructure.  The tropical low lands near the coast transition quickly into 
rugged foothills and mountains.  Numerous waterways cross the lowlands, making 
bridges critical infrastructure.  The long coastline includes large river deltas, countless 
small bays and inlets, coastal islands, and long, sandy beaches.  See Enclosure 1 for more 
information on Burma. 
 
 
Figure 9-2: Map of Burma with Coalition, Rebel, and Key Enemy Positions 
(Burma Star Association, 1991). 
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9.6 Enemy Order of Battle 
The Burmese National military has a large army.  However, 20% of the  
400,000-man army is comprised of children under the age of 17.  Much of the army is 
poorly trained, widely dispersed, and has little experience in coordinated warfare.  The 
Burmese Air Forces, including missile forces, exist to defend Rangoon.  Their  
Naval Forces focus on regional defense and coastal patrol. 
 9.6.1 Enemy Land Forces 
The Burmese National Land Forces include infantry units, armor units, and 
Special Forces units as described below: 
• 12 Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs): There are 12,000 troops per division.  
The LIDs comprise the majority of Burmese units.  The weapons and 
equipment include multiple launch rocket system (MLRS),  
122mm howitzers, trucks, SA-18s, and RPG-12s.  These troops are 
motivated by pay and pride. 
• 13 State Infantry Divisions (State IDs): There are 12,000 troops per  
State ID.  The weapons and equipment order consists of 122mm mortars.  
The State IDs have moderate offensive capability, and most of the units 
are made up of conscripts.  Troops in the State IDs are motivated by the 
right to plunder rebel territories. 
• 12 Regional Infantry Divisions (Regional IDs): There are 9,000 troops per 
division.  The weapons and equipment order consists of 122mm mortars.  
The Regional IDs have little offensive capability and are made up of 
mostly local conscripts and children.  The troops of the Regional IDs are 
under local command. 
• 3 Armored Divisions: These are equipped with 400 Chinese-built armored 
personnel carriers (APCs), 80 Chinese tanks, MLRS, and  
122mm howitzers. 
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• 4 Special Forces Bureaus: These SOF units conduct intelligence gathering 
and strategic strike operations.  The troops are highly motivated.  These 
SOF units more closely resemble the Nazi Gestapo than the  
U.S. Delta Force. 
These Burmese Army units are deployed as follows (see Figure 9-2): 
• Four elite Light Infantry Divisions and 5 State Infantry Divisions stationed 
in and around Rangoon. 
• Two Armored Divisions, 2 Light Infantry Divisions, and 3 State Infantry 
Divisions based in Kyunchaung near the Three Pagodas Pass on the 
Isthmian border with Thailand. 
• One Special Forces Bureau and a Light Infantry Division based near the 
Amya Pass on the Isthmian border with Thailand. 
• Three Light Infantry Divisions, 3 State Infantry Divisions, and 1 Armored 
Division based in Ngape in western Burma. 
• A strategic task force of 2 Light Infantry Divisions, 2 State Infantry 
Divisions, and 2 Special Forces Bureaus headquartered in Mandalay. 
• Eight Regional Divisions are scattered along Burma’s eastern border  
with Thailand. 
• Four Regional Divisions are scattered along Burma’s northwestern border 
with India. 
 9.6.2 Enemy Air Forces 
The military regime centers its Air Forces on Rangoon.  Airfields outside 
Rangoon base only transport and patrol aircraft.  This Air Force includes: 
• 1 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Wing: This unit consists of modern, 
Chinese-made, medium-altitude missile systems, numerous SA-18s, and 
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numerous antiquated cannons integrated with radar and  
communication systems. 
• 1 Fixed Air Wing: This unit consists of 3 intercept aircraft,  
6 attack aircraft, 1 troop transport plane, and 2 surveillance squadrons.  
The attack aircraft are capable of carrying anti-ship missiles. 
• 1 Rotary Air Wing: This unit consists of 3 observation/utility helicopter 
squadrons and 3 modern (Bell) attack helicopter squadrons with  
Israeli anti-tank guided munitions (ATGMs). 
 9.6.3 Enemy Naval Forces 
The Burmese National Naval Forces include destroyers, frigates, missile patrol 
boats, coastal patrol boats, and riverine craft.  The Navy also maintains and deploys 
mobile anti-ship missile batteries.  A Naval Special Forces Bureau is used to interdict  
sea-borne traffic flow through the waterways of Southeast Asia.  These  
Naval Special Forces have been posing as pirates in small, fast patrol craft armed with 
hand-launched and base-mounted missile systems.  Intelligence suggests that these forces 
established headquarters in the port city of Myeik; the actual vessels are scattered around 
the islands of the Merguis Archipelago close to the western entrance of the  
Straits of Malacca.  Despite international protests, they have conducted exercises within 
Indonesian, Thai and Malaysian territorial seas.  These forces number approximately  
200-300 specially trained personnel operating 30-50 watercraft.  According to some 
sources, the watercraft may also have limited mine deployment capability.  In addition to 
these forces, the Burmese West Coast Fleet, based in Akyab (Sittwe), is comprised of  
1 Luhai DDG, 2 Jiangwei FFGs, 5 Hainan-class coastal patrol craft, and 5 Houxin-class 
missile boats.  The rest of the fleet deploys from Moulmein (Mawlamyine).  The 
Burmese use these more conventional forces to protect their territorial seas and support 
the so-called pirates of the Naval Special Forces.  The Naval order of battle includes: 
• 1 LUHAI DDG 
• 2 JIANGWEI FFGs 
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• 5 HAINAN-Class Coastal Patrol Craft 
• 5 HOUXIN-Class Missile Boats 
• 20-30 Coastal Patrol Boats: These patrol boats are capable of mine laying, 
seizure of merchant vessels, and employing hand-held SAMs. 
• 90 Riverine Craft: Small arms capable. 
• 5 Coastal Batteries: One fixed site south of Rangoon and four mobile 
batteries.  Each battery carries 12 missiles.  Each missile has an effective 
range of over 200 NM.  Two mobile batteries of 320mm rocket cannons  
(6 cannons per battery).  Each rocket has an effective range of over  
120 NM.  All of these systems need external, over-the-horizon targeting 
from either ships or aircraft. 
 9.6.4 Enemy Early Warning Forces 
Intelligence also reports possible electronic stations manned by the Chinese in 
facilities along the Bay of Bengal coastline, the Cocos Islands near the  
Preparis South Channel, and Lord Loughborough Island and Great Western Torres Island 
in the Mergui Archipelago in the Andaman Sea (Cole, 2001). 
9.7 Burma Scenario Threat Analysis 
This section analyzes the threat to the Sea Base.  Pertinent threats are  
converted into a probability of kill (Pk) used to model the threat.  Per the JELo Operating 
Concept [Chapter 2], SEA-6 assumes that the Sea Shield is established in the  
Andaman Sea prior to the Sea Base closing for the assault.  This threat analysis focuses 
on the Burmese subsurface, surface, air, and land threats to a Sea Base, specifically to the 
Maritime Pre-positioning Group (MPG) of the Sea Base. 
 9.7.1 Mines 
Burma has not employed free-floating mines in deep water because of the threat 
posed to their own naval vessels and the extreme negative publicity. 
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 9.7.2 Torpedoes 
Burma has not yet acquired their desired submarine capability.  The torpedo threat 
to the MPF(F) comes from the Burmese combatants and from small commercial boats.  
Burma practices to employ swarm tactics.  The Sea Shield assets are able to keep the 
Burmese combatants and commercial small boats out of torpedo range of the MPF(F).  
Pk for torpedo threat to MPF(F) is assumed to be 0. 
 9.7.3 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) 
Burmese anti-ship cruise missiles threaten the Sea Base.  With a 1,000-ft length, 
200-ft beam, and 50-ft freeboard, the MPF(F) unconstrained ship [Chapter 5] is a large 
target.  The MPF(F) does not have missile-defense systems.  Built to commercial cargo 
ship standards, its limited damage control capability make it unlikely that the MPF(F) 
will survive even a single ASCM hit. 
 9.7.4 Air-Launched ASCM 
With Sea Shield in place, the airspace is secure from manned aircraft threat.  The 
air-launched ASCM threat is assumed to be 0. 
 9.7.5 Shore-Launched ASCM 
Three mobile SSM batteries are deployed and unlocated, each with 12 missiles 
per battery.  Each missile has a 200 NM effective range.  One mobile battery of 320mm 
rocket cannons is deployed and unlocated.  Six cannons, each with a range of 120 NM, 
comprise the battery.  The ASCM risk increases as the MPF(F) gets closer to the shore; 
however, it is still acceptable because the Burmese have only limited  
over-the-horizon-targeting capability. 
 9.7.6 Ship-launched Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 
The Sea Shield combatant ships maintain a maritime keep out zone and a 
defensive perimeter around the MPG. 
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 9.7.7 Air-Delivered Weapons 
Sea Shield establishes air superiority prior to Sea Base establishment.  The  
air defense portion of Sea Shield detects and engages incoming threats out beyond  
200 NM from the Sea Base. 
9.8 Threats to Surface Assault Connectors 
The threat window period exists from when the surface assault connectors are in 
transit between the Sea Base, the beach, and back.  The following sections address the 
threats in this window. 
 9.8.1 Mines 
The long Burmese coastline precludes them from effectively mining everywhere.  
However, the military regime does have enough mines and mine-capable vessels to 
effectively mine a small passage, an inlet, or a single beach.  The Burmese have only 
bottom and moored mines, which are most effective in straits, inlets, or on anticipated 
landing beaches.  JFMCC assumes that the Burmese have mined the assault beach at 
Tavoy and the inlet to the Tavoy River. 
 9.8.2 Torpedoes 
Torpedoes pose little threat to the hovercraft assault connectors because of their 
high speed and shallow draft.  Although torpedoes do pose a threat to displacement 
surface-assault connectors (LCU(Rs), etc.), their high speed and maneuverability make 
them a difficult torpedo target.  Therefore, the probability of kill (Pk) for torpedoes 
against the surface assault connectors is assumed to be 0. 
 9.8.3 Beach Obstacles 
Burma’s long coastline and the CSG activity to the North make it difficult for the 
Burmese to decide which beach to defend.  By the time the Burmese obtain actionable 
intelligence on the proximity of the MPG, (1-2 days out when the MPG is detected by the 
Coco Island listening station), they will have insufficient time to deploy obstacles to the 
likely landing sites. 
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 9.8.4 Surface Threats 
Once the MPG closes to 25 NM to initiate the assault, the attack helicopters from 
the JEB Air Combat Element (ACE) will provide defense to the surface assault 
connectors from patrol boat-like combatants and or civilian craft. 
 9.8.5 Air Threat 
Both the CSG regional air superiority and the MPG’s ACE reduce the air threat to 
the assault connectors to near 0. 
 9.8.6 Surface Assault Threat Model Inputs 
SEABASE-6 models the Burmese threat using the analysis from the SEI-3 Final 
report.240  The 2015 BLA brings some organic Mine Counter Measure (MCM) capability 
in the SH-60 and CH-53X (if configurable as MH-53s).  These measures and the mine 
warfare capabilities of the ESG and CSG (LCS with a MIW mission module) reduce the 
SEI-3 Pk value from 0.07 to 0.03.  The full mission probability of kill for a surface assault 
connector is calculated using the circulation model in Figure 9-2. 
B e a c h  
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Figure 9-2: SEI-3 Surface Assault Connector Circulation Model.241 
 
                                                 
240 SEI-3 Final Report, Chapter VI, pp. 47-54. 
241 Operations Research Department, “Joint Campaign Analysis Book 1 – Student Text,” unpublished 
student text, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1999. 
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q1 = q4 = Probability of Survival for a surface connector hitting a mine 
Probability of Kill for an assault connector hitting a mine 
Pk1 = 0.03242 
q1 = 1 – Pk1 = 1 – 0.03 = 0.97 
q2 = q3 = Probability that a surface connector survives an anti-ship  
missile attack 
q2 = 0.99243 
Half-Mission Survivability: 
q = q1 * q2 = 0.97 * 0.99 = 0.96 
Half-mission Probability of Kill: 
Pk = 1 – q = 1 – 0.96 = 0.04 
Full-Mission Survivability: 
q * q = q2 = (0.96)2 = 0.92; therefore, 
Full-Mission Probability of Kill: 
Pk = 1 – q2 = 1 – 0.92 = 0.08 
9.9 Threats to Air Assault Connectors 
Despite the best work of Sea Shield, the mobile SAM, AAA, and MANPADS 
systems will still pose a threat to the air assault connectors.  As the operation proceeds, 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) assets target and destroy threat sites.  
However, air connectors’ routes will become more predictable, causing the risk to 
increase.  These two effects offset each other.  Therefore, the Pk against the  
                                                 
242 This value calculated from a Burma analysis done for the Spring Joint Campaign Analysis class. 
243 Ibid. 
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air assault connectors is a constant value.  The Pk value is the same that SEA-6 uses in 
their 2004 Joint Campaign Analysis Mini Study of Burma.  In both that study and this 
one, the overall Pk is calculated using the circulation Model244 in Figure 9-3. 
T a v o y   
A i r f i e l d  
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Figure 9-3: Air Connector Circulation Model. 
q1 = q4 = Probability air connector survives Surface-to-Air Missile Attack 
q2 = q3 = Probability air connector survives AAA Attack 
Half-Trip Survivability: 
q = q1 * q2 where q1 = q2 = 0.99245 
q = 0.99 * 0.99 = 0.98 
Half-Trip Probability of Kill: 
Pk = 1-q 
Pk = 1 – 0.98 = 0.02 
Roundtrip Survivability and Probability of Kill: 
q * q = q2 = (0.98)2 = 0.96 therefore; 
Pk = 1 – q2 = 1 – 0.96 = 0.04 
That is, an air assault connector will be shot down on average 4 out of 100 trips to 
the beach. 
                                                 
244 Ibid. 
245 SEI-3 Final Report, Chapter VI, p. 35. 
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9.10 Threats to Land Forces 
Another threat window to the land forces starts when they disembark from their 
assault connectors.  For air-delivered troops, the Pk estimate averages across all casualty 
mechanisms (mines, artillery, hostile fire, etc.).  Surface-delivered troops move by 
vehicle to the objective area.  Once the surface assault connectors are ashore, the Pk for 
the delivered troops switches to a value based on vehicle losses.  Once at the objective 
area, the troops “dismount” their vehicles.  A similar, but slightly different, Pk is used for 
the dismounted troops. 
 9.10.1 Attrition of Dismounted Troops 
The combined effects of enemy fires (direct and indirect), land mines, and  
booby-traps wound dismounted troops.  The rate of attrition is highly dependent on the 
relative number of friendly and enemy troops.  Wounded-in-Action casualties drive the 
number of medical evacuation missions required.  Based on the MAGTF Planner’s Guide 
Casualty Rates,246 the casualty rates vary with the level of combat and numbers of troops 
ashore.  To decrease complexity, an average rate is used with values of –three wounded 
per hr during employment and –one wounded per hr during sustainment.  Enclosure 2 
shows an off-line troop casualty estimate performed using the MAGTF Planner’s Guide.  
The SEABASE-6 simulation results agree within 5%-10%. 
 9.10.2 Attrition of Ground Vehicles 
Ground vehicles attrite from the combined effects of Burmese fires (direct and 
indirect), mines, Improvised Explosive Devices, vehicle accidents, and malfunctions.  
Ground vehicle attrition is estimated from the number of vehicles lost per day during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom from May-September 2003247 [Enclosure 3].  Vehicle attrition 
rate uses both combat losses and vehicle accidents.  This data gives an average of  
0.5 vehicles per day or 0.02 vehicles per hr. 
                                                 
246 MAGTF Planner’s Reference Guide, p. 73. 
247 www.militarycity.com, November 2004. 
    231
9.11 Combat Level 
At each time step, the model stochastically assigns the combat intensity level to 
the operation ashore (high or low).  The level chosen determines which consumption 
rates the model uses during that time step.  The USMC defines their consumption rates as 
Assault for high intensity combat and Sustain for low intensity combat248 and this section 
repeats that naming convention.  Enclosure 4 describes the process and calculation that 
produces the following distributions. 
JEB employs before day 10: 
 
Probability of Assault Combat Level =       0 for           0 ≤ time ≤ 10 days 
      0.42 for 10 days ≤ time ≤ 20 days 
      0.37 for 20 days ≤ time ≤ 30 days 
JEB employs after day 10: 
 
Probability of Assault Combat Level =       0 for           0 ≤ time ≤ 10 days 
      0.95 for 10 days ≤ time ≤ 20 days 
      0.05 for 20 days ≤ time ≤ 30 days 
9.12 CONUS Readiness Delay 
The troop’s mobilization delay is modeled as a uniform distribution from  
24 hrs to 96 hrs. 
9.13 Forward Deployed Forces Delays 
Forward deployed forces (ESG, CSG, MPF(F)) are assumed to be at a higher state 
of readiness than those in CONUS.  A uniform distribution models this 24- to 48-hr 
mobilization delay.  The response delay of the forward-deployed forces is modeled as a 
uniform distribution from 24 hrs to 48 hrs.  The smaller time interval reflects the 
increased readiness of deployed forces.  The forward deployed forces are assumed to be 
operating in the Indian Ocean.  The time distance calculations from the Indian Ocean to 
the AO have the arrival of the ESG and CSG in five to six days.  Their early arrival 
allows them to employ their organic mine countermeasure assets to clear lanes for the 
beach assault. 
                                                 
248 MAGTF Planner’s Reference Guide, Part V, p. 73. 
    232
9.14 Distances 
Enclosure 5 shows the closure times for forces transiting from appropriate ports to 
Burma Joint Operating Area (JOA).  The pertinent distances from the scenario are: 
From Okinawa to Burma = 5,800 NM 
Sea Base Position to Chaungwabyin Beach = 110 NM 
Chaungwabyin Beach to Tavoy = 40 NM by road 
Sea Base Position to Tavoy = 150 NM 
Diego Garcia to Sea Base Position = 2,000 NM 
9.15 Ground Vehicle Utilization Rates 
Given the small overland ranges of the scenario, ground vehicle usage is 50%.  
Each ground vehicle is on and running 12 out of every 24 hrs of the operation. 
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Enclosure 1: CIA World Fact Book summary of Burma 
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Geographical Statistics for Burma (Source: CIA, 2001).249 
                                                 
249 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html, December 2004. 
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Enclosure 2: Troop CASUALTY Estimates 
Troop Attrition Rates if JEB employs before 10 days 
The values in the table come from MAGTF Planner’s Guide for a moderate 
ground campaign and a light air campaign.  The units for the values in the table are  
(per thousands per day); the values that have parentheses around them have the units of 
(total force per day). 
 Blue Blue and Rebels Red 
Killed in Action 4 5 20 
Wounded in Action 16 21 36 
Died of Wounds 1 1 5 
Disease Casualties 7 7 9 
Non-battle Injuries 1 2 3 
Battle Fatigue 1 2 5 
Missing in Action 1 1 1 
Captured 1 1 1 
Admin Losses 0 0 0 
Total 32 (156) 40 (275) 80 (572) 
 
Troop Attrition Rates if JEB employs after 10 days 
The values in the table come from MAGTF Planner’s Guide for a heavy ground 
campaign and a heavy air campaign.  The units for the values in the table are  
(per thousands per day); the values that have parenthesis around them have the units of 
(total force per day). 
 Blue Blue and Rebels Red 
Killed in Action 16 20 40 
Wounded in Action 62 79 74 
Died of Wounds 2 2 10 
Disease Casualties 8 12 10 
Non-battle Injuries 2 3 3 
Battle Fatigue 4 5 7 
Missing in Action 1 1 1 
Captured 1 1 1 
Admin Losses 0 0 0 
Total 96 (467) 123 (844) 146 (1044) 
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Enclosure 3: Ground Vehicle losses during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
February-September 2003250 
Month Vehicles Lost Combat 
Vehicle Accident
Casualties 
Total Vehicles Lost 
Combat + Accidents 
Total Vehicle-related 
Casualties 
May 4 6 10 12 
June 1 4 5 5 
July 14 3 17 19 
Aug 11 4 15 14 
Sep 5 3 8 8 
Oct 15 2 17 17 
Nov 18 3 21 24 
Dec 12 5 17 20 
Jan 6 1 7 13 
Feb 3 2 5 8 
Mar 7 4 11 18 
Apr 15 1 16 20 
May 16 6 22 20 
June 4 1 5 10 
July 10 7 17 16 
Aug 7 2 9 9 
Sep 8 4 12 11 
      
Total 156 58 214 244 
Mean 9 3 13 14 
Std Dev 5 2 6 5 
Per Day 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 
                                                 
250 www.militarycity.com/valor/honor, 27 November 2004. 
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Enclosure 4: Combat Level Calculations 
This calculation assumes that troop levels determine combat intensity; the more 
troops at the objective, the higher the probability of being in high intensity combat.  
SEABASE-6 assigns a simulation combat level from a probability distribution.  This 
distribution is determined using the following steps: 
1. Determine the per thousand troops per day losses for the Blue and Red 
forces using the MAGTF Planner’s guide method. 
2. Determine force losses for all Blue and Red forces per day. 
3. Determine the losses for Blue and Red forces over 30 days. 
4. Perform a linear regression on the data points determined in Step 3.  
Where the independent variable is the day of the operation and the 
dependent variable is the surviving troops. 
5. To determine the combat intensity, the area under the curve was 
calculated.  This was done by dividing the time into wedges (JEB arriving 
< 9 days: 0-9, 9-28, 28-39, 39-49 days and JEB ≥ 10 days: 0-10, 10-20, 
20-30 days) and then dividing the area under the wedge by the entire area 
under the curve.  All negative are ignored since you cannot attrite more 
than you have. 
Repeating this process twice reflects the change in force accumulation with time.  
The first calculation is for the JEB arriving at the objective in less than 9 days.  In less 
than 9 days, the opposing Burmese force in Tavoy is smaller and less effective.  The 
process is repeated to reflect the JEB arriving after 10 days.  After 10 days, the opposing 
Burmese force is massed and prepared for the attack. 
The equation, derived from the MAGTF Planner’s Guide, that appears in the first 
row of the two following tables estimates wounded soldiers as a function of soldiers 
present.  The remaining rows show the probability estimate from the process  
described above. 
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 Blue Blue and Rebels Red 
Equation # of Blue Forces 
Remaining = 
–155 (day) + 6,258 
# of Blue and Rebel Forces 
Remaining = 
–254 (day) + 9,143 
# of Red Forces  
Remaining = 
–63 (day) + 12,182 
Day 0-9 0 0 0 
Day 9-28 .4241 .4500 .7746 
Day 28-39 .3739 .3754 .2254 
Day 39-49 .2020 .1746 0 
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Combat-level probabilities if JEB arrives in less than 9 days. 
 
 Blue Blue and Rebels Red 
Equation # of Blue Forces  
Remaining = 
–466 (day) + 9,524 
# of Blue and Rebel Forces 
Remaining = 
–816 (day) + 15,021 
# of Red Forces  
Remaining = 
–030 (day) + 
17,417 
Day 0-10 0 0 0 
Day 10-20 .9463 1.000 1.000 
Day 20-30 .0537 0 0 
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Combat-level probabilities if JEB arrives in 10 days or more. 
 
• Day 0 is defined as the day that the Deployment Order is released. 
• From Day 0-9 troops are in transit and are not in contact with hostile 
forces; therefore, the probability that they engage hostile forces is 0. 
¾ This is 0 because all of the enemy attacking forces are dead.  
Therefore, the 7,144 men assigned to red forces cannot attack.  
(The other values in the row are not 0 because of leftover 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mines, etc.) 
• From Day 0-10 troops are in transit and are not in contact with hostile 
forces; therefore, the probability that they engage hostile forces is 0. 
¾ This is 0 because all of the enemy attacking forces are dead.  
Therefore, the 6,859 men assigned to red forces cannot attack.  
(The other values in the row are not 0 because of left over IEDs, 
mines, etc.) 
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Enclosure 5: Closure Times for the Burma Scenario 
Tavoy 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
KTS KTS KTS KTS KTS KTS KTS KTS 
  NM HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS HRS 
Singapore 1,117 223.4 111.7 74.5 55.9 44.7 37.2 31.9 27.9 
Diego Garcia 2,052 410.4 205.2 136.8 102.6 82.1 68.4 58.6 51.3 
Indian Ocean 3,000 600.0 300.0 200.0 150.0 120.0 100.0 85.7 75.0 
Sasabo, Japan 3,545 709.0 354.5 236.3 177.3 141.8 118.2 101.3 88.6 
Guam  3,698 739.6 369.8 246.5 184.9 147.9 123.3 105.7 92.5 
Yokosuka 3,999 799.8 399.9 266.6 200.0 156.0 133.3 114.3 100.0 
Honolulu 6,994 1398.8 699.4 466.3 349.7 279.8 233.1 199.8 174.9 
San Diego 8,858 1771.6 885.8 590.5 442.9 354.3 295.3 253.1 221.5 
Indian Ocean 3,000 600.0 300.0 200.0 150.0 120.0 100.0 85.7 75.0 
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10. 2015 BASELINE ARCHITECTURE CAPABILITY GAPS 
10.1 Overview 
The culminating product of the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), as discussed in 
the Methodology section of Chapter 1, is a description of the capability gaps between the 
requirements identified in the Functional Area Analysis (FAA) [Chapter 3] and the 
performance of the 2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA).  This chapter analyzes the 
2015 BLA capability gaps.  Previous studies identify many of the gaps in Sea Base 
Logistics (e.g., the need for heavy vertical lift capacity), but do not always quantify these 
gaps.  The extent of these gaps depends heavily on the assumed architecture and 
operating conditions.  The gaps this analysis identifies are specific to the chosen scenario, 
architecture, and assumptions made in this study.  However, the insights into system 
behavior may be more general. 
The purpose of the 2015 BLA analysis is to identify and quantify capability gaps, 
and to document the architecture’s behavior.  Although this chapter addresses the  
2015 BLA, the same analysis is applied to the 2025 Alternative Architectures described 
in Chapter 12.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study covers the Closure, Assembly, 
Employment, and Sustainment Phases of operations. 
The Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) requirements of Chapter 3, when stated 
as questions, become the 2015 BLA’s Critical Operational Issues (COIs).251  Appropriate 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) provide a 
means to answer these questions.  The SEABASE-6 model, described in Chapter 8, 
models the scenario variables to obtain the data described here. 
                                                 
251 Hoivik, Thomas H., OA-4603 Test and Evaluation Lecture Notes, Version 6.0, (Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2004). 
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10.2 Measures of Effectiveness and Performance 
The JELo MOEs and MOPs listed in Enclosure 1 are used because they are:252 
• quantitative; 
• measurable or estimable; 
• directly related to the objective; and 
• reflective of the benefit/penalty of an alternative. 
Enclosure 1 lists all of the COIs, MOEs, and MOPs developed for this analysis.  
This discussion contains only those COIs that provide high-level insights into system 
performance, although multiple measures provide insight into specific processes and  
subsystems within the architecture. 
10.3 Modeling the 2015 Baseline Architecture 
SEA-6 created a model using ExtendTM software that simulates the 2015 BLA’s 
performance and behavior.  The SEABASE-6 model is described in detail in Chapter 8.  
The model initial conditions, internal characteristics, and external factors influence the 
architecture performance, and hence the experiment’s outcome. 
 10.3.1 Model Initial Conditions 
These variables define the starting simulation conditions.  They include the ranges 
from the United States to the Forward Logistics Site (FLS), the FLS to the Sea Base, and 
the starting position of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)), 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  For the simulation, 
the prepositioning site for the MPF(F) is the FLS.  Appendix B contains the complete 
description and listing of these variables. 
                                                 
252 Kline, Jeff E., “Measures of Effectiveness,” unpublished lecture notes for the NPS OS3680  
Naval Tactical Analysis Course, 30 September 2003. 
  
   242
 10.3.2 Architecture Internal Variables 
The internal variables (e.g., speed, capacity, transfer time, etc.) describe the  
subsystems, components, interfaces, and relationships that make up the architecture.  The 
collection of these variables defines the architecture in the model.  SEA-6 functional 
subsystem teams perform research and off-line analysis to generate the values of these 
variables.  Appendix B lists these internal variables for the 2015 BLA. 
 10.3.3 External Factor Variables 
These external variables represent the primary factors external to the architecture 
that act on the entire system and significantly influence its overall performance.  The 
external factors evaluated in this experiment are sea state, level of combat (consumption 
rates), range (Sea Base to shore), and range (shore to objective).  These four factors 
reflect significant operational concerns of a Joint Task Force Commander and are 
important design drivers for multiple Sea Base logistics architecture components.   
Table 10-1 lists the external factors and their corresponding levels evaluated. 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Sea State Level of Combat Range, Sea Base-to-Shore 
(NM) 
Range, Shore-to-Objective  
(NM) 
2 Sustain 25 10 
3 Assault 40 50 
4 — 100 100 
 
Table 10-1: Simulation Experiment External Factors and Levels. 
Sea state values of 2, 3, and 4 represent the most common ocean conditions.  The 
level of combat values, assault and sustained, are how the USMC represents sustainment 
planning factors for food, water, fuel, and ammunition.253  The SEABASE-6 model uses 
these published USMC planning factors for consumption rates and casualty rates.  
Ranges are the distances (in NM) between the Sea Base, shore, and objective.  The two 
different range variables affect different parts of the architecture.  The range from  
Sea Base to shore directly impacts the performance of the surface assault connectors and 
determines the threat posed to the MPF(F).  The range from shore to objective impacts 
                                                 
253 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001,  
(U.S. Marine Corps MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 20 April 2001), Part IV. 
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the performance of the ground distribution system (trucks, Humvees, etc.) and vertical 
sustainment.  The sum of the two ranges is the one-way distance (radius) that the  
air assault connectors travel.  The range values in Table 10-1 are used because they cover 
most of the total range envelope (25 NM to 200 NM) prescribed in the FAA [Chapter 3].  
Figure 10-1 shows the coverage that the nine unique combinations of Range 1 and  
Range 2 give of the total range envelope. 
 
Figure 10-1: Sea Base to Objective Ranges Resulting from Range Combinations. 
Enclosure 2 lists the full factorial trial matrix.  For example, Run #1 is for  
sea state 2, sustaining level of combat, 25 NM from Sea Base to shore, and 10 NM from 
shore to Sea Base (total range of 35 NM Sea Base to Objective). 
10.4 Simulation Experiment 
The Burma Scenario simulation in Chapter 9 generates the architecture 
performance data.  Additionally, a full-factorial simulation experiment generates insight 
into architecture behavior and assesses external factor interactions.  Both the scenario 
simulation and the factorial experiment use 30 replications per run to produce a robust 
data sample.  Using both Microsoft Excel™ and MINITAB 14™ software, the model 
output data is analyzed to determine if the architecture’s performance meets the 
requirements specified in the FAA [Chapter 3].  Where the architecture does not meet the 
requirement, further analysis quantifies the capability gap and assesses the likely causes 
of the capability gap. 
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 10.4.1 Scenario Simulation 
SEA-6 measures the architecture’s performance by simulating a  
Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) deployment to Burma.  The scenario variables reflect 
the variability of real-world operations.  For example, the level of combat varies 
randomly based on a time-phased distribution and the sea state values vary randomly 
based on real oceanographic data for the Andaman Sea. 
 10.4.2 Full Factorial (Factor Effects and Interactions) 
The full factorial experiment design determines the external factor effects and the 
interactions among the external effects.  Each observation estimates an effect from each 
primary factor listed in Table 10-1.  Limiting the experiment to only 2-3 levels per factor 
reduces the overall number of experiment trials, a necessary trade-off between simulation 
run time (approximately 2-3 minutes per replication) and the amount of insight gained. 
 10.4.3 Capability Gap Analysis 
As mentioned, the 2015 BLA’s capability gaps are identified based on 
performance during the Burma Scenario simulation.  The ratio of the number of runs that 
meet the requirements over the total number of runs (30) represents the probability of 
meeting the requirement.  A one-sided t-test (at a 10% significance level) determines if 
the mean value of each MOP meets its associated requirement.  C-day, the day the 
deployment order says to move out, and L-hour, the hour that deployment begins, are 
used to express the performance requirements.254  Enclosure 3 shows the calculation of 
the critical times that must be achieved to meet the timeline requirements.  Further 
analysis determines the cause(s) of any statistically significant gaps.  Full factorial data 
and queuing data from the SEABASE-6 model aid this analysis. 
 10.4.4 External Factor Effects and Factor Interaction Analysis 
The full factorial data, reduced via MINITAB 14™, highlights external factor 
effects and factor interaction effects.  Summary statistics, histograms, dot plots, and box 
plots describe the MOP data.  Fisher Least Squares Difference at a 90% confidence level 
                                                 
254 Naval War College, “Joint Military Operations” course notes, (Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 
2002), pp. 36-37. 
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identifies primary factor effects.  A General Linear Model ANOVA with interaction plots 
also identifies main factor effects and the following two-factor interactions: 
• Sea state and combat level (SS*CL); 
• Sea state and Sea Base-to-shore range (SS*R1); 
• Sea state and shore-to-objective range (SS*R2); 
• Combat level and Sea Base-to-shore range (CL*R1); 
• Combat level and shore-to-objective range (CL*R2); and 
• Sea Base-to-shore range and shore-to-objective range (R1*R2). 
Any factor or interaction with a p-value less than 10% identifies a statistically 
significant interaction.  Hypothesis tests, using pair-wise comparisons of the significant 
factors or factor interactions, further clarify the significance of the effects.  For example, 
if sea state returns a p-value of 0.087, then sea state is considered to have a significant 
impact on the performance.  A pair-wise t-test between MOPs at sea state 2 and at  
sea state 3 tests the hypothesis that sea state does not have a significant effect. 
 10.4.5 Data Management 
The data output from the simulation automatically populates a collection of 
Excel™ spreadsheets.  These spreadsheets reduce the data and provide values for each 
MOE and MOP.  Data from these spreadsheets are also imported into MINITAB 14™ for 
additional analysis.  The Meyer Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School retains all of 
the model output data for archival purposes. 
10.5 Modeling Results and Evaluation 
The scenario models the 2015 BLA with respect to 9 identified COIs.   
Table 10-2 shows the complete list of COIs.  Enclosure 1 contains the MOE and MOP 
relationship to their respective COIs.  In the modeled scenario, the 2015 BLA meets only 
2 of the 9 COIs. 
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MEASURE DESCRIPTION 
 Closure Phase 
COI 1 Can the architecture deliver the Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME) and the Sea Base 
Support Element (SBSE) to the Forward Logistics Site (FLS) in time to meet the  
10-day requirement? 
COI 2 Can the architecture load SBME and the SBSE aboard the Maritime Propositioning Force, 
Future (MPF(F)) in time to meet the 10-day requirement? 
COI 3 Can the MPF(F) get underway in time to meet the 10-day requirement? 
COI 4 Can the forces and equipment meet the MPF(F) in transit to the Sea Base location? 
 Employment phase 
COI 5 Can the architecture employ the SBME to an objective in one period of darkness (10 hrs)? 
 Seize the Initiative 
COI 6 Can the architecture deliver a JEB to the objective in 10 days? 
 Sustainment Phase 
COI 7 Can the architecture sustain the JEB from the sea for a minimum of 30 days (720 hrs)? 
COI 8 Can the architecture sustain the JEB by vertical lift only? 
COI 9 Can the architecture evacuate the wounded troops (MEDEVAC) within the Golden Hour? 
 
Table 10-2: COI Summary. 
10.6 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase involves the deployment, transit, assembly of troops and 
equipment, and the formation of the Sea Base in the Area of Operation (AO). 
 10.6.1 Deployment and Transit 
COI 1 deals with the capability of the 2015 BLA to transport all SBME and SBSE 
personnel to the FLS for further transfer to the MPF(F) ships.  Additionally, the  
non-prepositioned aircraft must also transit to the FLS and load onto the MPF(F).  The 
MV-22 are self-deploying aircraft that fly to the FLS.  The CH-53s, UH-1s, and SH-60s 
are non-self-deploying aircraft brought to the FLS via strategic airlift.  As shown in 
Figure 10-2, neither the self-deploying nor the non-self-deploying aircraft arrive within 
sufficient time to load aboard the MPF(F).  Not shown in this calculation is the additional 
time required for the Air Mobility Command (AMC) to plan, coordinate, and establish an 
air bridge to transport the non-self-deploying aircraft and all non-prepositioned 
equipment.  In addition to the time displayed in Figure 10-2, the air bridge requires 
another four days to establish. 
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Figure 10-2: Aircraft arrival at FLS.  The red line marks the requirement and the green line marks the 
modeled performance.  A capability gap exists. 
Note: Add 96 hrs to establish the air bridge. 
 
Figure 10-3 shows that, on average, the arrival of the SBME and SBSE personnel 
(≈ 8,000) to the FLS falls within the required time of 127 hrs.  TCRIT1.1 shown in 




Figure 10-3: Personnel arrival at FLS.  No capability gap exists. 
 10.6.2 Assembly 
Each MPF(F) ship is already loaded with the prepositioned equipment, minus 
aircraft and LCACs.  The LCACs are located at the FLS and are craned onboard the 
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MPF(F) ships while the troops are loading.  Helicopters arrive at the FLS as discussed in 
the previous sections and are flown aboard the MPF(F) ships once maintenance 
preparations are complete.  MV-22 and F-35 aircraft rendezvous with their MPF(F) ship 
if at sea or at the FLS if their ship is in port. 
Upon arrival at the FLS, personnel debark the airlifts and are transported to the 
pier where two MPF(F) ships are docked.  Personnel distribution and load out plans are 
prearranged so all personnel are located on the same MPF(F) ship as their equipment.  
Once personnel boarding is complete, each ship transits to the anchorage area to await the 
arrival of its designated aircraft.  After the first MPF(F) ship boards all personnel and 
clears the pier, the next MPF(F) ship will take its place.  This process will continue until 
all MPF(F) ships are loaded. 
COI 2 involves calculating the time the additional equipment arrives to the FLS.  
The values of TCRIT 1.2, TCRIT 1.3, and TCRIT 2.1 are shown in detail in Enclosure 3.  As seen 
in Figure 10-4, on average, the non-prepositioned personnel and equipment cannot arrive 
within the required time. 
 
 
Figure 10-4: Equipment loaded on MPF(F) ships.  Capability gap exists for the in port portion  
of assembly. 
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 10.6.3 Sea Base Formation 
COI 3 deals with forming the Sea Base with enough time to employ the three 
Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) to the objective within the 10 days required by 
10/30/30.  In order to arrive at the AO with enough time to employ the BLTs, the MPF(F) 
must depart 110 hrs from the deployment order.  Enclosure 3 shows the calculation 
performed to arrive at this time critical value.  On average, the MPF(F) ships miss the 
required departure time by 50 hrs, as shown in Figure 10-5.  This is mainly due to the 
delay in aircraft arrival at the FLS. 
 
 
Figure 10-5: MPF(F) Underway Times from FLS.  Capability gap exists due to loading effects. 
10.7 Employment Phase 
The Employment Phase involves delivering the 3 BLTs to the objective within 
one period of darkness.  Air assault connectors deliver 1 BLT, while surface assault 
connectors deliver the remaining 2 BLTs. 
COI 5 involves employing the 3 BLTs that comprise the SBME from the  
Sea Base to the objective in one period of darkness (10 hrs).  Tracking the elapsed time of 
the employment and calculating the percent of the 3 BLTs that have completely 
employed yields the resulting performance.  Figure 10-6 indicates that, on average, the 
three BLTs require 30 hrs to complete their employment to the objective.  This 20-hr gap 
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Figure 10-6: SBME Insertion Time to Objective.  Capability gap of 20 hrs exists. 
10.8 Seize the Initiative 
In accordance with the Operating Concept [Chapter 2], the force has 10 days to 
seize the initiative.  In order to seize the initiative, the 2015 BLA must complete the 
Closure, Assembly, and Employment Phases of operations.  COI 6 provides insight into 
this system requirement. 
On average, the 2015 BLA seizes the initiative in 12 + 4 days, or 16 days.  The 
12-day result is optimistic since it is based on the immediate availability of all assets, 
including the required strategic airlift assets.  The four additional days reflect the time 
required to establish the air bridge.  While this result is a major advantage over today’s 
capability, it still falls short of the desired goal for future combat operations to seize the 
initiative within 10 days. 
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10.9 Sustainment Phase 
The Sustainment Phase involves delivering supplies from the Sea Base to the 
objective for a mission time of 30 days.  The air assault connectors only sustain the JEB 
at the objective to avoid having a beach and landlines of communication.  Additionally, 
during the 30-day mission time, a resupply ship from the FLS must also sustain the  
Sea Base.  COI 7 provides the information needed to evaluate this system requirement. 
 10.9.1 Sea Base Sustainment 
The requirement states that the Sea Base must perform sustainment functions for 
30 continuous days of operation [Chapter 3].  The amount of supplies stored at the  
Sea Base (food, water, ammunition, and fuel) is a function of the available storage on the 
MPF(F) ship.  Chapter 5 lists the storage capacity for the MPF(F) ship in the 2015 BLA.  
The amount of supplies calculated includes pallets of MREs, pallets of bottled water, 
pallets of ammunition, and gallons of fuel. 
As shown in the graphs of Enclosure 4, the Sea Base storage level of these 
supplies is adequate to sustain the three BLTs at the objective for 30 days.  However, the 
Sea Base does require a resupply of fuel, on average, twice during the 30-day mission 
time.  Extra pallets of food, bottled water, or ammunition may also be brought by the 
resupply vessel as required. 
 10.9.2 Objective Sustainment 
The air assault connectors of the 2015 BLA must sustain the three BLTs at the 
objective for 30 days.  Both air assault connector quantity and range from Sea Base to the 
objective factor into these results.  From the graphs in Enclosure 4, the 2015 BLA  
air assault connectors, on average, sustain the objective at the desired level of two days of 
supply.  This shows that the quantity of air assault connectors is adequate for the range 
specified in the scenario.  Additional insight can be gained by determining the maximum 
range that the three BLTs can be sustained from the Sea Base. 
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 10.9.3 Vertical Sustainment 
COI 8 involves determining the maximum vertical sustainment range from the 
Sea Base.  The 2015 BLA identified the CH-53X and the MV-22 as the  
two air connectors capable of performing vertical sustainment.  Figure 10-7 shows that 
beyond 165 NM, sustainment by the air connectors cannot be achieved.  This decline in 
capability stems from the published maximum external payload endurance of the  




Figure 10-7: Vertical Sustainment Performance.  Beyond 165 NM, only the CH-53X can sustain at  
the objective. 
 10.9.4 Medical Evacuation 
COI 9 deals with the capability to perform medical evacuation of wounded 
personnel from the objective to the Sea Base within 1 hr [Chapter 2].  The scenario range 
from Sea Base to objective is 150 NM.  As shown in Figure 10-8, on average, the medical 
evacuation requires 1.3 hrs to complete.  The principle reason for this gap revolves 
around the operational range of the UH-1. 
                                                 
255 Naval Air Systems Command, NATOPS Flight Manual, Navy Model MV-22B Tiltrotor, Preliminary 
with Change 3, 01 June 2000. 
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Figure 10-8: Medical Evacuation Times.  The operational range of the UH-1 causes this capability gap. 
10.10 Summary 
Analysis of the SEABASE-6 simulation data indicates that while the 2015 BLA 
goes a long way toward closing the 2004 capability gaps, it still does not meet the 
operational goals of 10/30/30 [Chapter 3].  Specifically, it seizes the initiative 
approximately 6 days past the 10-day requirement.  Solutions that transport the  
non-self-deploying aircraft without the disassembly and reassembly should reduce the 
closure phase gap.  Reducing the time to move the JEB from the Sea Base to the 
objective or reducing the amount of equipment carried should reduce the employment 
phase gap.  Overall, the 2015 BLA sustains the JEB ashore for 30 days.  Evacuation of 
wounded personnel to the Sea Base takes approximately 20 minutes longer than the  
1-hr requirement. 
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Enclosure 1: Measures 
MEASURE DESCRIPTION 
 Closure Phase 
COI 1 Can the architecture deliver the SBME and the SBSE to the FLS in time to meet the  
10-day requirement? 
MOE 1.1 The probability that all of the SBME and SBSE troops arrive at the FLS by TCRIT 1.1. 
MOP 1.1.1 Elapsed time until all SBME and SBSE troops arrive at the FLS. 
MOP 1.1.2 Percent of SBME and SBSE troops at the FLS at TCRIT 1.1. 
MOE 1.2 The probability that all of the SBME and SBSE equipment256 arrives at the FLS by TCRIT 1.1. 
MOP 1.2.1 Elapsed time until all SBME and SBSE equipment arrives at the FLS. 
MOP 1.2.2 Percent of SBME and SBSE equipment at the FLS by TCRIT1.1. 
COI 2 Can the architecture load the SBME and the SBSE aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the  
10-day requirement? 
MOE 2.1 The probability that the SBME and SBSE troops are loaded by TCRIT 2.1. 
MOP 2.1.1 Elapsed time until SBME and SBSE troops are loaded. 
MOP 2.1.2 Percent of  required personnel loaded by TCRIT 2.1. 
MOE 2.2 Probability that all of the SBME and SBSE equipment257 is loaded by TCRIT 2.1. 
MOP 2.2.1 Elapsed time until all SBME and SBSE equipment is loaded aboard MPF(F). 
MOP 2.2.2 Percent of SBME and SBSE equipment loaded aboard by TCRIT. 
COI 3 Can the MPF(F) get underway in time to meet the 10-day requirement? 
MOE 3.1 The probability of the MPF(F) departing by TCRIT 3.1. 
MOP 3.1.1 Elapsed time at which all MPF(F) are underway. 
MOP 3.1.2 Percent of MPF(F) departed by TCRIT 3.1. 
COI 4 Can the forces and equipment meet the MPF(F) in transit to the Sea Base location? 
MOE 4.1 The probability that the forces and equipment arrive in transit. 
MOP 4.1.1 Percent of forces and equipment onboard at a given time.  This COI is answered by COI 2.  The 
capability to meet the MPF(F) in transit is reflected in the elapsed time until SBME and SBSE are 
loaded onto MPF(F). 
 Employment Phase 
COI 5 Can the architecture deploy the SBME to an objective in one period of darkness (10 hrs)? 
MOE 5.1 The probability that the SBME can be inserted in one period of darkness (POD) (10 hrs). 
MOP 5.1.1 Elapsed time that the SBME is inserted. 
MOP 5.1.2 Percent of forces at objective at the completion of one POD. 
 Seize the Initiative 
COI 6 Can the architecture deliver a JEB to the Objective in 10 days? 
MOE 0.1 The probability that the JEB is delivered to the Objective within 240 hrs. 
MOP 0.1.1 Elapsed time until JEB at the Objective. 
MOP 0.1.2 Percent of JEB at the Objective in 240 hrs. 
MEASURE DESCRIPTION 
 Sustainment Phase 
COI 7 Can the architecture sustain the JEB from the sea for a minimum of 30 days (720 hrs)? 
MOE 7.1 The probability that the JEB personnel at the Sea Base are sustained for 720 hrs (30 days). 
MOP 7.1.1 Elapsed time that food is fully depleted at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.2 Elapsed time that fuel is fully depleted at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.3 Elapsed time that water is fully depleted at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.4 Elapsed time that ammunition is fully depleted at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.5 Elapsed time that the troops are fully depleted at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.6 Percent of time that food falls below the reserve level258 at Sea Base. 
                                                 
256 For 2015 Baseline Architecture, this means the nondeployable aircraft. 
257 For 2015 Baseline Architecture, this means the nondeployable aircraft. 
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MEASURE DESCRIPTION 
MOP 7.1.7 Percent of time that fuel falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.8 Percent of time that water falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.9 Percent of time that ammunition falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.10 Percent of the time that troops fall below the reserve level at the Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.11 Number of times that food falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.12 Number of times that fuel falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.13 Number of times that water falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOP 7.1.14 Number of times that ammunition falls below the reserve level at Sea Base. 
MOE 7.2 The probability that the JEB personnel ashore are sustained for 720 hrs (30 days). 
MOP 7.2.1 Elapsed time that food is fully depleted ashore. 
MOP 7.2.2 Elapsed time that fuel is fully depleted ashore. 
MOP 7.2.3 Elapsed time that water is fully depleted ashore. 
MOP 7.2.4 Elapsed time that ammunition is fully depleted ashore. 
MOP 7.2.5 Elapsed time that the troops are fully depleted ashore. 
MOP 7.2.6 Percent of time that food falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.7 Percent of time that fuel falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.8 Percent of time that water falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.9 Percent of time that ammunition falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.10 Percent of time that the troop level falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.11 Number of times that food falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.12 Number of times that fuel falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.13 Number of times that water falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.14 Number of times that ammunition falls below the reserve level ashore. 
MOP 7.2.15 Number of times that troop levels fall below the reserve level ashore. 
MOE 7.3 Probability that the JEB ashore is not burdened by excessive supplies. 
MOP 7.3.1 Percent of time that food quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.2 Percent of time that fuel quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.3 Percent of time that water quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.4 Percent of time that ammunition quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.5 Percent of time that troops quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.6 Number of times that food quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.7 Number of times that fuel quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.8 Number of times that water quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.9 Number of times that ammunition quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.3.10 Number of times that troops quantity ashore is above distribution capacity. 
MOE 7.4 Efficiency of the architecture during the Sustainment Phase. 
MOP 7.4.1 Percent of time that food quantity is above the reserve level and below the maximum distribution 
capacity. 
MOP 7.4.2 Percent of time that fuel quantity is above the reserve level and below the maximum  
distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.4.3 Percent of time that water quantity is above the reserve level and below the maximum  
distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.4.4 Percent of time that ammunition quantity is above the reserve level and below the maximum 
distribution capacity. 
MOP 7.4.5 Percent of time that troops quantity is above the reserve level and below the maximum  
distribution capacity. 
COI 8 Can the architecture sustain the JEB by vertical lift only? 
MOE 8.1 Probability that SBME can be sustained via vertical lift only. 
MOP 8.1.1 Percent of required supplies that can be airlifted to designated location. 
                                                                                                                                                 
258 “Reserve levels” are a matter of policy.  As set forth in the FAA [Chapter 3] and the 2015 Baseline 
Architecture description [Chapter 5], the MPF(F) reserve level is 50% of capacity for each class of supply. 
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MEASURE DESCRIPTION 
COI 9 Can the architecture evacuate the wounded troops (MEDEVAC) within the  
Golden Hour? 
MOE 9.1 Probability that wounded patients are evacuated to the Sea Base within evacuation policy time limit.
MOP 9.1.1 Mean Time to evacuate a wounded soldier from the objective to the Sea Base. 
MOP 9.1.2 Percent of wounded evacuated within the evacuation policy time limit. 
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Enclosure 2: Full Factorial Run Matrix 
Run # Sea State Level of Combat Range (SB-Shore) Range (Shore-OBJ) 
1 2 Sustain 25 10 
2 2 Sustain 25 50 
3 2 Sustain 25 100 
4 2 Sustain 40 10 
5 2 Sustain 40 50 
6 2 Sustain 40 100 
7 2 Sustain 100 10 
8 2 Sustain 100 50 
9 2 Sustain 100 100 
10 2 Assault 25 10 
11 2 Assault 25 50 
12 2 Assault 25 100 
13 2 Assault 40 10 
14 2 Assault 40 50 
15 2 Assault 40 100 
16 2 Assault 100 10 
17 2 Assault 100 50 
18 2 Assault 100 100 
19 3 Sustain 25 10 
20 3 Sustain 25 50 
21 3 Sustain 25 100 
22 3 Sustain 40 10 
23 3 Sustain 40 50 
24 3 Sustain 40 100 
25 3 Sustain 100 10 
26 3 Sustain 100 50 
27 3 Sustain 100 100 
28 3 Assault 25 10 
29 3 Assault 25 50 
30 3 Assault 25 100 
31 3 Assault 40 10 
32 3 Assault 40 50 
33 3 Assault 40 100 
34 3 Assault 100 10 
35 3 Assault 100 50 
36 3 Assault 100 100 
37 4 Sustain 25 10 
38 4 Sustain 25 50 
39 4 Sustain 25 100 
40 4 Sustain 40 10 
41 4 Sustain 40 50 
42 4 Sustain 40 100 
43 4 Sustain 100 10 
44 4 Sustain 100 50 
45 4 Sustain 100 100 
46 4 Assault 25 10 
47 4 Assault 25 50 
48 4 Assault 25 100 
49 4 Assault 40 10 
50 4 Assault 40 50 
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Run # Sea State Level of Combat Range (SB-Shore) Range (Shore-OBJ) 
51 4 Assault 40 100 
52 4 Assault 100 10 
53 4 Assault 100 50 
54 4 Assault 100 100 
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Enclosure 3: Timeline Analysis for 2015 Baseline Architecture 
From Chapter 3, the requirement is to have three BLTs at the objective in 10 days 
(240 hrs).  The 240 hrs breaks down as follows: 
240 hrs = TCONUS_FLS + TXIT + TUW +TLOAD + TDEPLOY. 
TCONUS_FLS = Time (hours) for the troops and nondeployable aircraft to transit 
from the Continental United States (CONUS) to the FLS. 
TXIT = Time (hours) to transit from the FLS to the Sea Base = distance/speed,  
where distance is from the FLS to the Sea Base and speed is an input variable of the  
FLS-to-Sea Base connector (MPF(F)). 
TUW = Time (hours) for MPF(F) to get underway (input based on  
outside analysis). 
TLOAD = Time (hours) for MPF(F) to load (input based on outside analysis). 
TDEPLOY = Time (hours) for the three BLTs of the SBME to get from the Sea Base 
to the objective. 
Burma Scenario Values 
Distance FLS to Sea Base is an input from the scenario = 2,000 NM 
MPF(F) speed = 20 kts 
TCRIT 1.1 
TCRIT 1.1 is the latest time that the JEB can arrive at the FLS and still make it to the 
objective by hour 240 (day 10).  TCRIT depends on the scenario for distance to travel and 
the architecture for speed of advance of connector. 
TCRIT 1.1 = 240 hrs – TXIT – TUW –TLOAD - TDEPLOY 
TXIT = (2,000 NM)/(20 kts) = 100 hrs 
TUW = 3 hrs  TLOAD = included in TUW TDEPLOY = 10 hrs 
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TCRIT 1.1 = 240 – 100 – 3 - 10  = 127 hrs 
TCRIT 1.2 
TCRIT 1.2 is the latest time that the non-self deploying aircraft can arrive at the FLS 
and still make it to the objective by hour 240 (day 10).  It is calculated in the same 
manner as TCRIT 1.1. 
TCRIT 1.2 = 230 hrs – TXIT – (TUW + TLOAD) 
TXIT = 100 hrs TUW = 3 hrs      TLOAD = E(uniform 60;84) = 72 hrs 
TCRIT 1.2 = 55 hrs 
TCRIT 1.3 
TCRIT 1.3 is the latest time that the non-self-deploying aircraft can arrive at the FLS 
and still make it to the objective by hour 240 (day 10).  It is calculated in the same 
manner as TCRIT 1.1. 
TCRIT 1.3 = 230 hrs – TUW – TXIT 
TXIT = 65 hrs TUW = E(uniform 24;48) = 36 hrs 
TCRIT 1.2 = 129 hrs 
TCRIT 2.1 
TCRIT 2.1 is the latest time the force can be loaded aboard and still make it to the 
objective by hour 240 (day 10).  It is a calculated in the same way as TCRIT 1.1. 
TCRIT 2.1 = 240 hrs – TXIT – TUW  - TDEPLOY 
TXIT, TUW, AND TDEPLOY are the same as above. 
TCRIT 2.1 = 127 hrs 
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Tcrit 3.1 
TCRIT 3.1 is the latest time the last MPF(F)can get underway and still make it to the 
objective by hour 240 (day 10).  It is a calculated in the same way as TCRIT 2.1. 
TCRIT 3.1 = 240 hrs – TXIT - TDEPLOY  where…. 
TXIT and TDEPLOY are the same as for MOE 1.1 above 
TCRIT 3.1 = 240 – 100 – 10 = 130 hrs 
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Enclosure 4: Supporting Data 




2015 BLA Food Inventory at the Sea Base (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 




2015 BLA Fuel Inventory at the Sea Base (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 
onboard the MPF(F). 
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2015 BLA Water Inventory at the Sea Base (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 




2015 BLA Ammunition Inventory at the Sea Base (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve 
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2015 BLA Food Inventory at the Objective (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 
onboard the MPF(F). 
 



























2015 BLA Fuel Inventory at the Objective (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 
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2015 BLA Water Inventory at the Objective (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve level 




2015 BLA Ammunition Inventory at the Objective (Burma Scenario).  The green line represents the reserve 
level onboard the MPF(F). 
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11. Sensitivity Analysis 
11.1 Overview 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to determine how much impact a specific 
parameter or group of parameters has on overall model performance.  The sensitivity 
analysis of the SEABASE-6 simulation model aids in the Functional Solutions Analysis 
(FSA) phase by providing focused insight into the complex Seabasing and  
Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) system to identify system behaviors, interactions, 
performance drivers, and coupling effects within the system.  Its results, when combined 
with the system capability gaps identified in the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), 
enable alternative solution design teams to focus efficiently toward high-impact doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities 
(DOTMLPF) changes. 
SEABASE-6 model’s sensitivity analysis is conducted using the  
2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA). Unless otherwise specified, the architecture 
parameter values listed in Appendix B are germane for each of the sensitivity analysis 
simulations described in this chapter.  Variables that are key design drivers within the 
Seabasing System’s four functional areas (connectors, transfers, inventory and storage, 
command and control) are varied across a range of operationally significant values to 
determine their impact on overall system performance as defined by  
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs).  With the 
exception of the variable under evaluation, all other parameters in the model are frozen to 
their baseline values as defined in Appendix B.  The springtime Andaman Sea module  
(Burma Scenario) is the sea state module used for all simulations.  A 30-trial Monte Carlo 
simulation for each parameter value under test produces raw data model outputs in 
Microsoft™ Excel format.  Calculations are then conducted on the raw data in  
Excel spreadsheets and then fed into the MINITAB 14 statistical software package for 
more detailed analytical review. 
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11.2 Parameters Analyzed 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the key Seabasing and JELo architecture 
parameters listed in Table 11-1.  Also listed in Table 11-1 are the associated values for 
which each parameter is varied.  Both Employment and Sustainment tasks are examined. 
 Sensitivity Analysis Parameter Specific Parameter 
Values 
Quantity of operational at-sea surface assault 
vehicle (i.e., LCAC) loading platforms for the 
MPF(F) element of the Sea Base. 
1, 2, and 3 interfaces per 
MPF(F) vessel 
Mean Time Between Failure for the surface 
assault connector. 
20, 30, 40, and 50 hrs 
Connector load time associated with the at-sea 
transfer of equipment between the MPF(F) vessel 
and the surface assault connector (i.e., LCAC). 
0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 hrs 
On-deck connector load time of an air connector 12, 18, 24, and 30 minutes
Time to complete a specified number of surface 
assault connector trips between the Sea Base and 
the shore objective. 
25, 50, 75, and 100 trips 
Employment Phase 
Speed of surface assault connector. 25, 35, 45, and 55 kts 
Quantity of CH-53 equivalent aircraft to sustain 
operations ashore from the Sea Base at a distance 
of 200 NM. 
20, 30, 40, and 50 aircraft 
Sustainment Phase Quantity of dedicated logistics vertical 
replenishment deck spots for the MPF(F) element 
of the Sea Base. 
2, 4, 6, and 8 deck spots 
for the Sea Base per 
MPF(F) squadron 
 
Table 11-1: List of Variables and Associated Values for Sensitivity Analysis. 
11.3 Measures of Performance 
Employment times measure performance for sensitivity study parameters 
affecting the Employment phase.  Employment time is the time required to employ two 
surface battalion landing teams (BLT) and one vertical BLT from the  
Sea Base to the shore objective.  The operational requirement is to complete the 
employment in less than 10 hrs (one period of darkness). 
The measure of performance for sensitivity study parameters affecting the 
Sustainment Phase is on-hand fuel inventory at the objective, measured in days-of-supply 
(DOS).  The goal is to maintain the fuel on-hand inventory at the reorder point of  
2 DOS to provide an acceptable safety stock.  If fuel drops below the critical level of  
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1 DOS, sustainment fails.  Fuel is the commodity tracked for performance analysis as it 
comprises over 50% of the daily lift requirements by weight. 
11.4 Results 
The following sections describe each individual sensitivity test in more detail.  
The assumptions, external factor settings, as well as any specific parameter changes to 
frozen baseline variable values are discussed.  Graphs and statistical analysis of the 
sensitivity data are also presented.  Finally, key insights into the performance of the 
Seabasing and JELo system are presented based on data analysis.  Figure 11-1 shows a 
generic box plot with definitions for the symbology. 
Outlier - an unusually large or 
small observation. Values 
beyond the whiskers are 
outliers.
By default, the top of the 
box is the third quartile 
(Q3) - 75% of the data 
values are less than or 
equal to this value.
By default, the bottom of 
the box is the first quartile 
(Q1) - 25% of the data 
values are less than or 
equal to this value. 
By default, the upper whisker 
extends to this adjacent value -
the highest data value within the 
upper limit. 
Upper limit = Q3 + 1.5 (Q3 - Q1)
Median - the middle of the data. 
Half of the observations are less 
than or equal to it indicated by 
the line across the box and an 
encircled ‘x’.
By default, the lower whisker 
extends to this adjacent value -
the lowest value within the 
lower limit.
Lower limit = Q1- 1.5 (Q3 - Q1)
Mean - the arithmetic mean of all 
the values in a sample indicated 
by an encircled ‘+’.
 
 
Figure 11-1: Generic Box Plot Showing Standard Symbology. 
11.5 Surface Interfaces 
Varying the quantity of surface interfaces on each MPF(F) ship determines if 
multiple surface interface points enhance overall system performance during the 
Employment Phase.  The quantity of interfaces per MPF(F) ship varies from  
1 to 3 interfaces in single increments.  The distance from the Sea Base to the beach 
objective during the employment phase is 25 NM. 
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 11.5.1 Data 
The box plot of employment time as a function of surface craft loading interface 
quantity is depicted in Figure 11-2.  A pairwise comparison between a single interface 
configuration and a dual interface configuration is depicted in Figure 11-3 to show the 
statistically significant difference. 





























10Requirement < 10 hours
N = 30
Employment Time vs. Number of Surface Interfaces
Range = 25 nm
 
 
Figure 11-2: Box Plot of Employment Time as a Function of Surface Interface Quantity. 
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Figure 11-3: Pairwise Comparison Between One and Two Surface Interfaces per MPF(F) Ship. 
 11.5.2 Insights 
The data suggests that additional surface interfaces produce minimal performance 
gains during the Employment Phase.  A statistically significant system performance gain 
of approximately 3 hrs is evident for the Employment Phase utilizing two surface 
interfaces vice a single interface.  Adding more than two interfaces provides no further 
benefit in system performance. 
Analysis suggests that the 3-hr performance gain for the two-interface 
configuration is primarily a result of two effects.  Approximately 1 to 2 hrs of the  
3-hr performance gain can be attributed to loading the first wave of assault vehicles 
simultaneously.  The remainder of the performance gain is attributed to the elimination of 
queuing delays at the Sea Base during assault connector reloading.  The average queuing 
delay at the Sea Base when utilizing a single interface is approximately 1 minute, with a 
maximum waiting time of 2 1/2 minutes.  The two-interface configuration eliminates the 
queuing delay at the Sea Base. 




























Pairwise Comparision Between One and Two Surface Interfaces
Interfaces   N   Mean  StDev   
1                 30   28.83   7.13     
2                 30   25.09   6.21      
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =) 
T-Value = 2.17  P-Value = 0.035 
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The low rate of utilization is a possible reason for the minimal performance gain 
in multiple platform configurations.  Analysis suggests that the low reliability of the 
LCAC in the 2015 BLA may be a confounding variable.  A future sensitivity analysis on 
multiple surface interface configurations incorporating a more reliable surface connector 
is recommended. 
11.6 Dedicated Logistics Aircraft Deck Spots 
Varying the quantity of available operational aircraft deck spots dedicated to 
logistics at the Sea Base determines the minimum quantity needed to conduct sustainment 
operations.  Fuel inventory at the objective, maintained at 2 DOS, is the MOE.  The 
quantity of aircraft deck spots dedicated to logistics is varied between 2 and 8, in 
multiples of 2.  In this sensitivity study, the quantity of deck spots is associated with the 
Sea Base vice individual ships so that the data is extensible to any MPF(F) ship 
architectural combination.  The distance from the Sea Base to the objective is 150 NM. 
 11.6.1 Data 
Figure 11-4 depicts Seabasing and JELo system sustainment performance as a 
function of dedicated logistics operational Sea Base aircraft deck spots. 
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Number of Operational Deck Spots Dedicated to Logistics (150 nm)
Critical Level
Assumes continuous 24/7 operations
 
 
Figure 11-4: Box Plot of Operational Deck Spots Dedicated to Logistics to Sustain a JEB Force Ashore 
from a Distance of 150 NM. 
 11.6.2 Insights 
The data suggests that a minimum of 6 dedicated logistics aircraft deck spots are 
required to be in operation over a 24-hr period in order to sustain the objective from a 
range of 150 NM.  There is no performance gain if the number of deck spots is increased 
from 6 to 8. Four dedicated logistics deck spots is enough to maintain the objective 
inventory above the critical level, but with an unacceptable safety stock of less than  
one-third DOS.  A dedicated logistics deck spot is, by definition, one that is only used for 
logistics purposes to support forces ashore.  It is operational 24-hrs a day,  
seven days a week.  Any competing resources for aircraft deck spots such as nonlogistics 
missions or nonlogistics aircraft (i.e., Joint Strike Fighter, AH-1 Cobra, etc.) increase the 
required number of operational deck spots for the Sea Base. 
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11.7 Mean Time between Failure of the Surface Assault Connector 
Varying the surface assault connector mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) 
determines its impact on system performance during the Employment Phase.  Surface 
assault connector MTBF times are varied between operationally significant values of  
20 to 50 hrs in 10-hr increments.  These values equate to approximate operational 
availabilities of 52%, 62%, 68%, and 73% based on assumed Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) of 16 hrs and logistics delays of 2 1/2 hrs.  The distance between the  
Sea Base and the beach objective during the Employment Phase is 25 NM. 
 11.7.1 Data 
Figure 11-5 depicts the box plot of employment time as a function of surface 
assault vehicle MTBF.  Figure 11-6 illustrates the statistically significant difference 
between an MTBF of 20 hrs and 30 hrs. 































Impact of Surface Assault Vehicle MTBF on Employment Time
N=30
Requirement < 10 hours
Range = 25 nm
 
 
Figure 11-5: Box Plot of Employment Time as a Function of Assault Vehicle MTBF. 
 





























Assault Vehicle Pairwise Comparison for MTBF of 20 hrs and 30 hrs
P-Value = 0.005
Difference is Statistically Significant
 
 
Figure 11-6: Pairwise Comparison Between an MTBF of 20 Hrs and 30 Hrs. 
 11.7.2 Insights 
The data suggests that MTBF is a primary performance driver during the 
Employment Phase.  Problems arise when the MTBF is equal to or less than the time 
necessary to complete the Employment Phase.  A statistically significant performance 
gain is evident when increasing the MTBF from 20 hrs to 30 hrs.  This  
10-hr MTBF increase equates to a roughly 9-hr reduction in employment time, yielding a 
27% performance gain.  The data also suggests that as long as the MTBF of the surface 
assault connector is greater than the elapsed time necessary to employ forces, it will not 
have a statistical impact on performance. 
During the simulation runs when MTBF is set at 20 hrs, maintenance queue 
length for average surface assault connector awaiting maintenance is 1.06 +/– 0.06 with 
an average waiting time of 15.5 +/– 0.5 hrs.  This is significant since, on average, of the  
3 surface assault connectors assigned to each MPF(F) ship, 1 is operational, 1 is being 
repaired, and 1 is awaiting maintenance.  By contrast, during the 30-hr MTBF simulation, 
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the average queue length for awaiting maintenance is reduced to  
0.54 +/– 0.15 and the average maintenance waiting time is reduced to 10.3 +/– 2.8 hrs.  
The data suggests that significant performance gains may be achieved through a  
50% improvement in reliability. 
The data also suggests that MTBF is a key contributor to variance within the 
system.  This variance is most pronounced when the MTBF value is equal to or less than 
mission duration.  An increase in variance makes it difficult to predict system 
performance.  As MTBF values are increased to levels greater than the mission duration, 
variance in system performance is dramatically reduced. 
11.8 Surface Assault Connector Loading Time 
Varying the loading time of the surface assault connector at the Sea Base 
determines if the loading time is a primary system driver during the Employment Phase.  
Loading times are varied in 30-minute increments between 30 minutes and 2 hrs.  During 
this sensitivity test, transfer times are input to the model as constants that do not fluctuate 
with sea state so that the overall effect of the transfer delay is not confounded by  
sea state.  It is assumed that increasing sea state will increase the time needed to load a 
surface assault connector  The distance between the Sea Base and the beach objective 
during the Employment Phase is 25 NM. 
 11.8.1 Data 
Figure 11-7 depicts the box plot for surface battalion employment time as a 
function of the surface assault connector at-sea loading time at the Sea Base. 
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Impact of At-Sea Transfer Delays on Employment Time
Requirement < 10 hours
N = 30
Range = 25 nm
(Independent of Sea State)
 
Figure 11-7: Employment Time as a Function of Surface Assault Connector Transfer/Loading Delay at the 
Sea Base. 
 11.8.2 Insights 
Reduction of the transfer time at the Sea Base is essential.  The data suggests that 
the loading time for the surface assault connector at the Sea Base is a primary system 
performance driver.  It is important to note that even with a very short loading time of  
30 minutes (very difficult to achieve in reality with current or planned systems), the 
employment time is 20 hrs, twice the 10-hr operational requirement.  Therefore, 
minimizing the loading time by itself will not close the Employment Phase capability 
gap.  Consideration should be given to eliminating transfer operations if possible. 
Increasing the loading time 30 minutes has an almost linear effect on system 
performance for delays between 30 minutes and 1 1/2 hrs.  For each 30-minute delay 
increment, the employment time increases by approximately 5 hrs.  However, the 
performance decrement between the 1 1/2-hr and the 2-hr delay is significantly greater, 
with an increase in employment time of 9 hrs (31 hrs to 40 hrs).  At first glance, the 
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larger performance decrement is due to queuing delays, however, even with a  
2-hr loading time, surface assault connector queuing delays at the Sea Base are 
negligible.  The root cause of the larger performance decrement at 2 hrs appears to be an 
interaction effect with the surface assault connector MTBF and overall surface assault 
connector availability. 
11.9 Air Connector Loading Time 
Varying the loading time between the MPF(F) and the air connector determines 
the impact it has on overall system performance during the Sustainment Phase.  This 
sensitivity study combines into a single delay, the multiple individual delays within the 
model.  This single delay represents the summation of commodity strike-up, staging, 
loading, and aircraft refueling times while an aircraft occupies an operational deck spot.  
For this analysis, the distance from the Sea Base to the objective during the  
Sustainment Phase is 150 NM. 
 11.9.1 Data 
Figure 11-8 depicts vertical sustainment capability from the Sea Base as a 
function of the loading time for air connector operations from MPF(F) ships. 
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Impact of On-Deck Delay Time on Sustainment from 150 nm
On-Deck Delay = f(strike-up, staging, assembly, loading, re-fueling, etc.)
8 Operational Deck Spots Dedicated to Logistics
 
Figure 11-8: Impact of On-Deck Delay Time on Sustainment Operations from the Sea Base at 150 NM. 
 11.9.2 Insight 
The data suggests that there is a significant difference in system performance with 
transfer times between 18 and 30 minutes.  Transfer times of less than 18 minutes are 
sufficient to sustain the objective with an adequate amount of fuel.  System performance 
declines as transfer time increases above 18 minutes.  A transfer time of 24 minutes only 
allows fuel sustainment at the objective to be maintained at the critical level.  Transfer 
times greater than 24 minutes provide insufficient sustainment. 
At long ranges, such as the 300 NM round-trip evaluated, this 18-minute on-deck 
loading time would include the time permitted to hot-pump refuel the air connectors.  In 
addition, it drives the response time of the inventory and storage system to ensure that 
ordered commodities are ready for transfer to the air connector within 18 minutes. 
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11.10 Surface Assault Connector Trips 
Varying the number of surface assault connector trips between the MPF(F) and 
the beach objective highlights how the number of trips affect the time required to employ 
2 surface BLTs.  The 2015 BLA required 127 surface connector trips to employ the  
2 surface BLTs.  Surface assault connector trips are varied between 25 and 100, in 
increments of 25 trips.  Employment range is 25 NM and the total number of surface 
assault connectors at the Sea Base is 24, with 8 operational surface interface spots.  The 
MTBF for the surface assault connector is 26 hrs and drawn from an exponential 
distribution yielding an approximate operational availability of 58%. 
 11.10.1 Data 
Figure 11-9 depicts the impact of surface assault connector trips on the time to 
employ 2 surface BLTs ashore from the Sea Base. 
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Impact of Surface Assault Connector Trips on Employment Time
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Figure 11-9: Impact of Surface Assault Connector Trips on Employment Time. 
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 11.10.2 Insight 
The data suggests that in order to meet the Employment Phase operational time 
requirement of less than 10 hrs, the total number of trips from the Sea Base must be 
limited to approximately 50.  The number of trips between the Sea Base and beach 
objective is a key design driver for the Employment Phase.  Of all the parameters studied 
in the sensitivity analysis, only a variation in the quantity of surface assault connector 
trips allows this operational time requirement to be met.  This provides insight into the 
design of surface connector payload characteristics and the quantity of connectors 
required.  Some possible options to lower the number of trips required include increasing 
surface connector payload or decreasing the amount (size, weight, area, volume) of 
equipment required in the surface BLTs. 
At greater trip counts (75 and 100), employment time is very unpredictable.  
There is no significant difference between 75 and 100 trips, with respect to employment 
time, since the variance for each is so large.  This unpredictable performance is a result of 
the longer employment times interacting with MTBF effects. 
11.11 Surface Assault Connector Speed 
Surface assault connector speed is varied to determine if speed is a key 
performance driver during the Employment Phase of operations.  Surface assault 
connector speed is varied between 25 and 55 kts, in increments of 10.  Employment range 
from the Sea Base is 25 NM. 
 11.11.1 Data 
Figure 11-10 depicts the impact of assault connector speed on the time it takes to 
employ 2 surface BLTs. 
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Figure 11-10: Impact of Assault Connector Speed on Employment Time. 
 11.11.2 Insights 
Increasing surface assault connector speed produces minimal performance gains 
during the Employment Phase from short ranges (25 NM).  The largest performance 
increase occurs between 25 and 35 kts with a 20% reduction in employment time.  The 
performance gains due to speeds between 35 and 45 kts and from 45 to 55 kts are not 
statistically significant.  The data suggests that a marginal, statistically significant (10%) 
reduction in employment time occurs when speed is increased from 35 to 55 kts.  
Recommend further sensitivity analysis on the effects of speed on employment time from 
longer ranges (50 NM to 200 NM) and the interactions between speed, loading times, and 
the number of ILPs. 
11.12 Vertical Sustainment 
The quantity of vertical replenishment (VERTREP) aircraft are varied to 
determine the number of aircraft required to sustain forces ashore from the Sea Base from 
a distance of 200 NM.  The model parameter varied is the number of CH-53X aircraft.  
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The number of MV-22 aircraft modeled is set to zero since they are unable to provide 
sustainment in excess of approximately 165 NM (see Chapter 10).  CH-53X aircraft 
operational availability is modeled at approximately 68%, with an MTBF of 40 hrs. 
 11.12.1 Data 
Figure 11-11 depicts the number of CH-53X equivalent aircraft to sustain a 
brigade-size force ashore from the Sea Base at a distance of 200 NM. 
































Figure 11-11: Number of CH-53X Equivalent Aircraft to Sustain a JEB-sized Force Ashore from the  
Sea Base at a Distance of 200 NM. 
 11.12.2 Insights 
The data suggests that, given sufficient heavy-lift aircraft, it is feasible to sustain a 
Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) from the Sea Base at a distance of 200 NM.  
Sustainment from a distance of 200 NM requires approximately 50 CH-53X equivalent 
aircraft that are dedicated to nothing but logistics missions.  Additionally, the Sea Base 
requires less deck space and fewer operational spots to store and operate the 50 CH-53X 
aircraft in comparison to the 2015 BLA of 20 CH-53X and 48 MV-22 aircraft. 
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11.13 Summary 
Insight into system performance and tendencies gives direction to design 
alternative architechures to close or eliminate the capability gaps identified in the FNA.  
The SEABASE-6 model shows what impact surface interfaces, aviation deck spots, 
connector MTBF, transfer delays at the Sea Base, surface connector speed and  
cargo capacity, and vertical sustainment at the objective have on the system of systems 
that comprise the 2015 BLA.  The SEABASE-6 model is a product of this study that 
allows explorations such as these.  A fractional factorial designed experiment to fully 
explore interactions was beyond the scope of this study, but could be conducted as further 
research using the tools and examples provided here. 
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12. DESCRIPTIONS, ANALYSIS, AND COST ESTIMATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
12.1 Overview 
The Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) is the third and final phase of the SEA-6 
systems engineering project.  The FSA helps answer the question, “How can we close or 
reduce the capability gaps?”  The Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
Operations (JELo) system capability gaps identified in the Functional Needs Analysis 
(FNA) are the inputs used for the design of alternative architectures.  The output of this 
phase includes designs of alternative architectures intended to close or reduce the 
capability gaps previously identified in the FNA.  Additionally, the cost estimate for each 
alternative architecture is used for comparative analysis touching the  
2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA). 
12.2 Methodology 
The FSA process begins with a sensitivity analysis of the SEABASE-6 simulation 
model.  Design teams then create alternative architectures to close the capability gaps 
identified during the FNA by exploiting sensitivity analysis insights.  Design teams 
utilize the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) framework to 
create a balanced and cost effective alternative solution providing synergism across the 
entire Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, 
and Facilities (DOTMLPF) trade space.  The Burma Scenario then stresses the alternative 
architectures against the same threat and environmental conditions as the 2015 BLA 
facilitating a side-by-side comparison.  A pair-wise comparison follows for identification 
of any statistical or militarily significant performance gains and/or reductions in 
capability gaps.  The modeling results and evaluation follow the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 10, 2015 Baseline Architecture Capability Gaps.  The performance of each 
alternative solution design is then associated with its cost estimate to permit a  
cost-benefit comparative analysis for the entire solution set to provide conclusions 
[Chapter 13]. 
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 12.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
It is necessary to perform a sensitivity analysis in order to determine how much of 
an impact a parameter or group of parameters has on model results.  A sensitivity analysis 
using the SEABASE-6 simulation model provides insight into the Seabasing and JELo 
system sensitivities, enabling design teams to focus toward specific high impact 
DOTMLPF changes.  For specific sensitivity analysis information and results, refer to 
Chapter 11. 
 12.2.2 Design Teams 
For the FSA, a format of three competing design teams capitalizes on the 
competitive nature of the SEA-6 Integrated Project Team.  The concept of three 
competing design teams is used to simulate the current Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy procedure on the solicitation of Request for Proposals (RFP) for future 
systems.  In this case, the RFP is for 2025 Seabasing JELo architecture to support the 
Operating Concept in Chapter 2. 
 12.2.3 2025 Alternative Architecture Design Process 
The JCIDS DOTMLPF trade-space establishes the framework from which the 
three competing design teams formulate their solution sets.  The JCIDS framework also 
specifies a priority of solutions.  Alternative architecture designs first focus on 
nonmateriel solutions to narrow or close capability gaps to prevent unneeded and costly 
new materiel (M) starts.  Existing product improvements are the next priority with 
expensive and time-consuming new materiel (M) acquisition programs as a final option.  
Table 12-1 describes the attributes that comprise the DOTMLPF trade-space. 
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DOTMLPF Attribute 
Doctrine The doctrine effects or influences on the activities and operations. 
Organization The organization(s) that is responsible for the activities and operations. 
Training The training is what is required to gain the skill-set required to conduct the activities and 
operations. 
Materiel The materiel is the physical objects required to perform the activities and operations. 
Leadership  The leadership is the association with the organizational hierarchy controlling or 
influencing the activities and operations. 
Personnel The personnel are the actual humans conducting the activities and operations. 
Facilities The facilities are the operational threads that describe the capabilities necessary to 
perform the activities and operations. 
 
Table 12-1: DOTMLPF Trade-space Attributes.259 
Due to the large number of conceptual designs under consideration for the  
2025 time frame, it is necessary to constrain the set of materiel solutions available to the 
competing designs teams.  A restrictive materiel solution set, known as the M-Pool, 
contains only materiel solutions that pass at least one of three SEA-6 constraining 
requirements.  For consideration, the materiel solution must be a current Program of 
Record (PR), an Advanced Concept Demonstrator (ACD), or an Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD).  The rationale behind this constraint is to prevent 
inclusion of programs with high technology risk.  The premise is that 
programs/technologies currently funded in 2004 meet the minimum requirements 
established by Department of Defense science organizations such as the Office of Naval 
Research and Defense Science Board for feasibility in the 2025 time frame.   
Table 12-2 lists the materiel solutions that comprise the SEA-6 M-Pool. 
                                                 
259 Department of Defense Architecture Framework Working Group, DoD Architecture Framework 
(Version 1.0): Volume I: Definitions and Guidelines, p. 3-17 [instruction online] (30 August 2003) [cited 
17 November 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.teao.saic.com/jfcom/ier/documents/dod_framework_vol_1.pdf. 
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Materiel Solution Description 
V-44 Future Transport 
Rotorcraft (FTR) 
The V-44 is a future conceptual transport that uses the V-22 tilt rotor concept.  Designs 
envision it to be the size of a C-130 with a quad tilt rotor system that is capable of delivering a 
payload in excess of 20 tons (internal or external),  The design specifications call for a speed 
capability of over 300 kts and an endurance of over 1,000 NM. 
Heavy Landing Craft  
Air Cushioned (HLCAC) 
The HLCAC is set to replace the current LCAC with the first procurement occurring in 2009.  
The HLCAC will be one-third longer than the LCAC, with twice the payload. 
Theater Support 
Vessel/High Speed 
Vessel (TSV/HSV)  
The TSV/HSV is a high-speed theater transport vessel.  Each Service is currently exploring the 
use of high-speed crafts for use in the littorals.  The Navy is also looking at the prospect of 
using the TSV/HSV to support the Seabasing concept. 
Rapid Strategic Lift Ship 
(RSLS)  
The RSLS is a high-speed, strategic lift ship capable of transporting non-self-deploying aircraft 
and equipment to the Sea Base.  
T-AOE(X) The T-AOE(X) is the future replacement for the current T-AOE.  It will exhibit similar resupply 
capabilities with a slight speed increase. 
Advance Theater 
Transport (ATT) 
The ATT is a future technology that incorporates a tilt wing design.  It is under review as a 
future replacement for the C-130 fleet.  The design calls for a greater payload than the C-130 
with the ability to land on runways less than 500 ft long, including Naval flight decks. 
SkyCatTM 1000 The SkyCatTM 1000 is a lighter-than-air technology under consideration by the Department of 
Defense.  Designs include a maximum payload of over 1,100 tons, a maximum speed of  
99 kts, and an endurance of 5,000 NM. 
Maritime Preposition 
Force (Future) MPF(F) 
The MPF(F) is the future replacement of the current MPF.  There are multiple variants under 
review as potential replacements.  For the SEA-6 project, the variants from the CNA MPF(F) 
study260 are the primary focus. 
Integrated Landing 
Platform (ILP) 
The ILP is envisioned to be the primary surface craft interface point for the MPF(F) and will 
handle both air cushioned and displacement lighterage for the offloading of various equipment, 




The AUTOLOG/Extra Heavy Lift transfer system of systems is composed of two separate 
subsystems: the Autolog intra-ship transfer system and the Extra Heavy Lift inter-ship transfer 
system.  The Autolog intra-ship transfer system locates, connects, lifts, and transports cargo 
containers from their storage position on the container vessel to the Extra Heavy Lift Connected 
Replenishment (CONREP) transfer station.  The Extra Heavy Lift Transfer System then 
connects to the cargo container and transfers it by tensioned high wire to the receiving ship. 
Affordable Guided Air 
Drop System (AGAS) 
AGAS is a program that enables supplies delivery via parachutes from Air Force aircraft such 
as C-130s and C-17s.  Current prototypes can handle weights up to 2,100 lbs, but future designs 





PACSCAT vessel is a fast, freight-carrying, slender-hulled catamaran.  It is designed to operate 
on inland waterways and on short-sea routes.  Current designs of the vessel have an overall 
length of 135 m and a beam of 22.8 m.  They can provide deadweight transport of up to 2,200 T 
with a cargo capacity of up to 240 TEU.  LO/LO and RO/RO configurations are both under 
development. 
LHA(R) The LHA Replacement (LHA(R)) Program is the functional replacement for USS TARAWA 
(LHA 1) Class ships.  It is planned as an affordable and sustainable Amphibious Ship 
development program in support of the Navy and Marine Corps Global Concept of Operations. 
Navy Storage and 
Retrieval System 
(NAVSTORS) 
NAVSTORS is a fully automated shipboard stowage and retrieval system designed to perform 
cargo and weapons handling operations in the holds and magazines in NIMITZ-class and 
CVN(X) aircraft carriers, with possible future applications in DD(X), CG(X), and LCS. 
 
Table 12-2: List of Available Materiel Solutions for 2025 Alternative Architecture Designs (M-Pool). 
                                                 
260 Robert M. Sounders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D00009814.A2/Final  
April 2002), pp. 29-48. 
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In addition to the materiel options in the M-Pool, an additional academic materiel 
technology inject is evaluated.  The academic technology inject is imposed to facilitate 
cross-campus interdisciplinary participation by the Total Ship Systems Engineering 
(TSSE) group.  The TSSE materiel solution consists of a Joint Amphibious Combat 
Cargo Expeditionary Support Ship design (Joint ACCESS).  Appendix E contains 
detailed information regarding the Joint ACCESS.  To ensure the use of the  
Joint ACCESS, Design Team I incorporates the Joint ACCESS for evaluation in their 
2025 Alternative Architecture I.  Additionally, the Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS) is 
currently a high interest materiel solution being evaluated by OPNAV and NAVSEA.  To 
evaluate the potential of the RSLS, Design Team II incorporates the RSLS into their  
2025 Alternative Architecture II.  The unrestricted use of nonmateriel trade space 
solutions is available to all designs teams.  For design solutions, each team assumes a 
2025 JEB is equivalent to the 2015 JEB outlined in Chapter 5. 
 12.2.4 2025 Alternative Architecture Performance 
The evaluation process to determine the 2025 Alternative Architectures system 
performance is identical to that of the 2015 BLA.  The SEABASE-6 simulation model is 
used to evaluate each alternative architecture.  The Burma Scenario, outlined in  
Chapter 9, provides the operational and environmental context for the evaluation.  Thirty 
simulation runs for each alternative architecture provides data for follow-on  
statistical analysis. 
The SEABASE-6 Extend™ model provides the means to assess the three  
2025 Alternative Architectures using the methodology detailed in Chapter 10.  
Comparisons of the simulation results are performed against the Critical Operational 
Issues (COIs) to determine whether the COI is met, or whether there is performance 
shortfalls identifying a capability gap. 
    289
 12.2.5 Comparative Analysis 
The comparative analysis overall goal  is to determine if the performance of each 
2025 Alternative Architecture is successful in closing the gaps identified in the  
2015 BLA. 
The first step compares the MOE/MOP results of the 2025 Alternative 
Architectures with those of the 2015 BLA.  A 2025 Alternative Architecture gap analysis 
is necessary to determine if there is a reduction in the existing baseline capability gaps 
and to identify any new emerging gaps.  Comparative analysis between each alternative 
design and the 2015 BLA provides insight as to whether the 2025 Alternative 
Architecture demonstrates a statistically significant improvement.  MOE/MOP 
comparisons for each operational phase (closure, employment, and sustainment) are also 
necessary in evaluating the overall Seabasing and JELo system performance for each 
2025 Alternative Architecture design. 
12.3 2025 Alternative Architecture I 
Alternative Architecture I utilizes the design of the Total Ships Systems 
Engineering (TSSE) Joint Amphibious Combat Cargo Expeditionary Support Ship  
(Joint ACCESS) High Speed Assault Connector (HSAC) as the primary materiel solution 
design for changes to the 2015 BLA.  The Joint ACCESS is a self-deployable ship 
primarily employed to deliver the two surface Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) directly 
from the Forward Logistics Site (FLS) to the beach.  Appendix F contains a more detailed 
description of the Joint ACCESS design.  Joint ACCESS, shown in Figure 12-1, 
incorporates the following attributes: 
• Over 500 ft in length 
• 43 kts cruise speed 
• 2,000-NM range 
• 800-ton payload capability 
• 260-troop berthing 
• Manning of 60 to 70 personnel 
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• Two cargo decks 
• Hanger for a single SH-60 
• One helicopter operational spot for SH-60, CH-53X, or MV-22 
• Elevator from cargo deck to hanger 
• 20-day self-sustainment 
• Capable of at-sea replenishment 
• Gas turbine engines with water jets 
• Beachable with a 120-ft bow ramp 




Figure 12-1: TSSE Joint ACCESS Design. 
Table 12-3 summarizes Design Team I’s Alternative Architecture to include  
Sea Base operational roles and changes from the 2015 BLA. 
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Platform Number Joint Expeditionary Logistics Operation (JELo) Phase Changes from the 2015 BLA 
MPF(F) Unconstrained-size, 
distributed-capability ships261 2 Closure/Employment/Sustainment Eliminated 6 ships 
Afloat Forward Staging Base 
(AFSB) MPF(F) variant ship262 2 Closure/Employment/Sustainment Addition 
Joint ACCESS 12 Employment/Sustainment Addition 
MV-22 48 Employment/Sustainment None 
CH-53X 20 Employment/Sustainment None 
SH-60R 12 Sustainment None 
AH-1Z 18 Sea Strike None 
VTUAV 6 Sea Strike None 
JSF 36 Sea Strike None 
CLF Tanker 1 Sustainment None 
UH-1Y 0 MEDEVAC Eliminated 
LCAC 0 Employment Eliminated 
LCU(R) 0 Employment Eliminated 
Table 12-3: 2025 Alternative Architecture I Composition. 
 12.3.1 2025 Alternative Architecture I Nonmateriel Design Changes 
Table 12-4 describes the nonmateriel changes made to 2025 Alternative 
Architecture I compared to the 2015 BLA. 




1. Assemble CH-53Xs in-transit from FLS to objective onboard MPF(F) vessels.  This is 
accomplished by loading the aircraft on the MPF(F) as they arrive at the FLS: 
a) In the 2015 Baseline model, the aircraft arrive at the FLS by C-17, reassemble, 
and then fly onto the MPF(F).  This creates a time delay of 3+ days, 
contributing to the closure gap described in Chapter 10. 
b) This change addresses the closure gap. 
c) The change is made with time/space analysis and expert opinion considering the 
ability of the CH-53X aircraft to be reassembled and to conduct a functional 
check flight at sea. 
2. Use only MV-22s for MEDEVAC: 
a)     In the baseline model, all aircraft are used for MEDEVAC with the UH-1Y 
designated as the primary MEDEVAC aircraft. 
b)    The UH-1Y does not have the range and speed to meet the SEA-6 established 
requirement, which results in the change.  The MV-22 has a longer range and 
greater speed than the UH-1Y.  In addition, the MV-22 can also transport more 
litters and injured patients than the UH-1Y.  Since the MV-22 is a supply 
transport during the Sustainment Phase, it can divert quickly to a MEDEVAC 
mission prior to returning to the Sea Base. 
Organization None 
Training None 
                                                 
261 Robert M. Sounders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D00009814.A2/Final  
April 2002), p. 33. 
262 Ibid., p. 46. 
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1.    MPF(F) storage area: 2025 Alternative Architecture I increases the available MPF(F) 
storage utilization  from 48% to 60%.  With the use of selective offloading, the  
2015 BLA only utilizes 48% of the available cargo space.  Since the Joint ACCESS 
transports the two surface BLTs, the remaining equipment and vehicles carried onboard 
the MPF(F) ships does not require selective off-load, resulting in an increase of  
storage utilization. 
2.    Forward deployment of the Joint ACCESS squadron to the FLS requires infrastructure to 
be in place to support the squadron. 
 
Table 12-4: 2025 Alternative Architecture I Non-Materiel Changes. 
 12.3.2 2025 Alternative Architecture I Materiel Design Changes  
The first part of the Closure Phase is the movement of assets from the  
Advance Base, defined as Okinawa in the Burma Scenario, to the FLS.  The only change 
to this part of the Closure Phase is the elimination of the UH-1Y Iroquois.  The UH-1Y is 
eliminated due to its insufficient range and speed in support of the MEDEVAC mission.  
The MV-22 replaces the UH-1Y as the primary MEDEVAC platform. 
The second part of the Closure phase is the movement of the Sea Base assets from 
the FLS to the Sea Base.  Design Team I, with the addition of 12 Joint ACCESS ships, 
made significant changes to the 2015 BLA.  Twelve Joint ACCESS platforms are capable 
of transporting the two surface Sea Base Maneuver Elements (SBME) BLTs [Chapter 5] 
to the beach in a single trip.  This materiel solution eliminates the difficulties with  
at-sea transfers and dramatically reduces the number of trips required to employ the 
forces.  The result of embarking the two surface BLT’s equipment in the Joint ACCESS 
platforms results in a requirements change for the number of  MPF(F).  Analysis 
indicates the requirement for the number of MPF(F) unconstrained-size,  
distributed-capability ships is reduced from 8 down to 2, with the addition of  
2 Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships. 
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Figure 12-2: AFSB MPF(F) Ship.263 
 
Figure 12-2 shows the AFSB MPF(F) ship and Tables 12-5 and 12-6 show the 
AFSB characteristics.  The AFSB has 11 operational spots for normal air operations; 
however, only 7 are used.  The other 4 operational spots are required as additional aircraft 
parking spots. 
Characteristic Dimension 
Length overall 949 ft 
Maximum beam 126 ft 
Full load draft 31.5 ft 
Lightship tonnage 40,319 MT 
Full-load tonnage TBD 
Full time MSC crew 45 personnel 
USMC accommodations 2,000 personnel 
Cargo fuel 33,000 bbls 
Cargo square 33,000 sq ft 
Cargo area 30,000 sq ft 
# of containers N/A 
Aviation stowage and maintenance space 173,000 sq ft 
CH-46 equivalent parking spots 80 
CH-53X operational spots 11 
LCAC stows 0 
Craft interface 0 
 
Table 12-5: AFSB MPF(F) Ship Characteristics.264 
                                                 
263 Ibid., p. 47. 
264 Ibid., p. 48. 
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AFSB Ship Characteristics 
Personnel berthing space 2,000 people 
Vehicle cargo space 33,000 sq ft 
Combat gear space (nonvehicle) 30,000 sq ft 
Aircraft storage space 108,700 sq ft 
Surface craft storage space 0 
Medical space 5,000 sq ft 
Maintenance space 50,000 sq ft 
Assembly space 7,000 sq ft 
Fuel space 33,000 bbls 
Interface (Surface) 0 
Interface (Vertical) 11 
Water production 500,000 gal/day 
Additional Squadron Requirements 
Non-Prepositioned cargo 3,000 tons 
JTFC Staff Personnel 500 people 
JTFC Staff space 30,000 sq ft 
MEB C2 space 30,000 sq ft (split across 2 ships) 
 
Table 12-6: AFSB MPF(F) Ship Characteristics.265 
 
The two AFSB ships provide the required area, volume, and weight capability to 
supplement the 2 unconstrained-size, distributed-capability ships, while providing the 
additional aircraft operational and parking spots needed to fill the gap caused by reducing 
the number of MPF(F) ships from 8 to 2.  Table 12-7 is a summary of  
Design Team I’s MPF(F) load-out distribution. 
                                                 
265 Ibid., p. 48. 
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 UNITS UNCON-1 UNCON-2 AFSB-1 AFSB-2 TOTALS 
FOOD Area (sq ft) 2,464 2,464 2,463 2,463 9,854 
  Weight (stons) 102 102 102 102 408 
WATER Area (sq ft) 15,800 15,800 7,914 7,914 47,428 
  Weight (stons) 1,411 1,411 707 707 4,236 
  Volume (gal) 340,083 340,083 170,328 170,328 1,020,822 
AMMO Area (sq ft) 18,554 18,554 6,650 6,650 50,408 
  Weight (stons) 2,485 2,485 890 890 6,750 
FUEL Volume (gal) 1,873,200 1,873,200 1,386,000 1,386,000 6,518,400 
SBSE Area (sq ft) 115,402 115,402 50,000 50,000 330,804 
  Weight (stons) 3,195 3,195 1,384 1,384 9,158 
FIE Area (sq ft) 30,644 30,664 10,010 10,010 81,328 
  Weight (stons) 666 666 218 218 1,768 
AIRCRAFT Operational spots 2 2 7 7 18 
  Parking spots 47 47 84 84 262 
  Maintenance spots Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
         
TOTALS Area (sq ft) 182,864 182,884 77,037 77,037 519,822 
  Weight (stons) 7,859 7,859 3,301 3,301 22,320 
         
AIRCRAFT MV-22 12(27) 12(27) 12(27) 12(27) 48(108) 
  CH-53X   10(27) 10(27) 20(54) 
  AH-1 10(10)  4(4) 4(4) 18(18) 
  SH-60 10(9)    10(9) 
  JSF  10(21) 13(27) 13(27) 36(75) 
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are required aircraft parking spots.  
 
Table 12-7: 2025 Alternative Architecture I MPF(F) Load-out Distribution. 
 
In the Sea Base operation’s Employment Phase, the use of the 12 Joint ACCESSs 
eliminates the need for LCAC and LCU(R) assault surface connectors.  The  
12 Joint ACCESS platforms are capable of completing the employment and 
disembarkation of the two surface BLTs within the established 10-hr requirement. 
For the ashore Sustainment phase, Design Team I made no materiel changes from 
the 2015 BLA.  The team continued to employ the CH-53X and MV-22 as the transport 
systems for delivering provisions, fuel, and ammunition to the objective. 
For the Sea Base Sustainment phase, the design team employs the Joint ACCESS 
as a high-speed shuttle ship between the FLS and the Sea Base and a T-AOE for  
Sea Base refueling.  The Joint ACCESS, after completing the Employment Phase, 
resupplies the Sea Base with ammunition and provisions.  Six Joint ACCESS vessels can 
transport sufficient amounts of these supplies to keep the Sea Base inventory above 
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reserve requirements.  The actual amounts carried are 80,000 lbs of provisions,  
84,939 gallons of bottled water, and 715,000 lbs of ammunition.  The Joint ACCESS 
transfers supplies to the MPF(F) ships via vertical and connected replenishment.  
Utilizing both of these methods of transfer, the at-sea replenishment lasts approximately 
4 hrs.  The vertical replenishment employs the SH-60R helicopters at an assumed transfer 
rate of 60,000 lbs/hr.  The assumed connected replenishment transfer rate is  
26,000 lbs/hr. 
The only requirement not met in resupplying the Sea Base with the use of the 
Joint ACCESS is the fuel criteria.  To sustain fueling requirements, the use of a  
fuel tanker is incorporated. 
12.4 2025 Alternative Architecture I Concept of Operations 
Utilizing the 2025 Alternative Architecture I composition to generate an 
operational view, the following Concept of Operation emerges.  Figure 12-2 depicts the 
JELo Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1).  The Advance Base (Okinawa), not shown in 
Figure 12-2, is the initial starting point of the operation.  From the Advance Base,  
non-self-deploying aircraft and JEB personnel depart for transit to the FLS.  The FLS, 
shown in the distance, represents the starting point for the Maritime Prepositioning Group 
(MPG).  The MPG consists of 4 MPF(F)s, a CLF, and 12 Joint ACCESS ships.  The 
MPF(F)s carry the vertical BLT personnel and equipment from the FLS to the Sea Base.  
Joint ACCESS is the assault connector that transports the 2 surface BLTs to the beach 
and then acts as a high-speed shuttle ship to resupply the Sea Base.  The CLF tanker is 
the refueling asset for the Sea Base.  The aircraft represent the connectors that provide 
vertical BLT insertion and logistical support between the MPG and objective.  The 
lightening bolts represent the C2 system linking all assets together.  The single CSG/ESG 
represents the inclusion of CSGs and ESGs within the Sea Base. 
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Figure 12-3: 2025 Alternative Architecture I Operational View (OV-1). 
 12.4.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase consists of deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
equipment, and the Sea Base formation.  The Closure Phase begins with the movement of 
personnel and non-self-deploying aircraft to the FLS.  The Joint ACCESS and MPF(F) 
ships are assumed to be prepositioned at the FLS. 
For personnel movement, 2025 Alternative Architecture I relies on the use of 
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to transport the JEB personnel from point of origin to the 
designated FLS.  The same assumptions for the 2015 BLA apply to the  
2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
For the movement of non-self-deploying aircraft, 2025 Alternative Architecture I 
also uses the same 2015 BLA assumptions for the movement and transportation of both 
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self-deploying aircraft and non-self-deploying aircraft.  Non-self-deploying aircraft rely 
on the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) for transportation. 
Assembly occurs similar to the 2015 BLA, with one major difference.   
2025 Alternative Architecture I changes the reassembly location of the CH-53X aircraft 
from the FLS to the MPF(F).  Following their delivery to the FLS, the CH-53Xs are 
craned onboard the MPF(F) without assembly.  While in-transit to the Sea Base, the  
CH-53Xs are reassembled and all check flights are performed prior to arrival at the  
Sea Base. 
 12.4.2 Employment Phase 
The movement of equipment designated for air transport is similar to the  
2015 BLA and as specified in Chapter 5 [Enclosure 1B] landing priorities 1-8.  The  
Joint ACCESS transports the equipment designated for movement via surface transport in 
a single wave and as specified in Chapter 5 [Enclosure 1A], landing priorities 1-19. 
The remaining equipment is detailed in Chapter 5 [Enclosure 1A], landing 
priorities 20-28 is delivered by Joint ACCESS platforms from the MPF(F) and landing 
priorities 9 and 10 by vertical means.  The transport of the remaining priorities occurs 
immediately following the initial equipment movement. 
 12.4.3 Sustainment Phase 
Resupply at the objective occurs in the same manner as the 2015 BLA.  Sea Base 
resupply occurs using the Joint ACCESS.  Joint ACCESS has one operational helicopter 
spot that will support the use of the SH-60R to transfer supplies via vertical 
replenishment.  Joint ACCESS is also equipped with connected replenishment equipment 
to supplement the SH-60R during at-sea replenishment of the Sea Base.  A cargo fuel 
delivery ship is still required in this architecture since the Joint ACCESS cannot support 
that role. 
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 12.4.4 Medical Evacuation 
The MV-22 is the sole asset used to conduct the MEDEVAC mission.  In addition 
to delivering supplies to the objective, the MV-22, after delivery of its cargo, checks for 
casualties prior to returning to the Sea Base. 
 12.4.5 Cost Estimation of 2025 Alternative Architecture I 
Table 12-8 is a cost estimate summary for the 2025 Alternative Architecture I.  
The cost estimate contains acquisition cost data and ten years of operating and support  
(O & S) cost data.  Calculations to determine the cost estimate are similar to those from 
Chapter 7, Baseline Architecture Cost Estimation Analysis.  Example cost estimate 
calculations are in Appendix C.  Cost data are normalized using the inflation indices 
provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) to account for inflation and the 
time value of money266 and is provided in FY04$. 
Platform Quantity Acquisition Cost (FY04$) 
10 Years of O&S Costs 
(FY04$)  Total Cost (FY04$) 
MPF(F) - Baseline variant 2 $4,001,185,185 $1,126,187,290 $5,127,372,475 
MPF(F) - AFSB variant 2 $2,769,095,806 $1,126,187,290 $3,895,283,096 
ACCESS 12 $5,703,571,968 $55,479,072 $5,759,051,040 
T-AOE 1 $739,106,413 $868,543,070 $1,607,649,483 
MV-22 48 $3,792,336,000 $2,578,714,848 $6,371,050,848 
CH-53X 20 $1,099,073,220 $440,754,300 $1,539,827,520 
SH-60R 14 $510,666,167 $639,456,300 $1,150,122,467 
AH-1Z 18 $362,701,736 $600,539,040 $963,240,776 
JSF (F-35) 36 $2,994,231,545 $2,002,489,920 $4,996,721,465 
VTUAV 6 $11,049,804 $77,348,820 $88,398,624 
Total Cost   $21,983,017,844 $9,515,699,950 $31,498,717,794 
 
Table 12-8: 2025 Alternative Architecture I Cost Estimation. 
 
Cost estimation data for each MPF(F) is from the Center for Naval Analysis 
MPF(F) study.267  The acquisition cost data for the Joint ACCESS is from the  
                                                 
266 Inflation indices are from the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) and are located at 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm. 
267 Robert M. Souders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Summary Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D0009814.A2/Final 
April 2004), pp. 48-54. 
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TSSE design team cost estimation.  For Joint ACCESS O & S cost calculations, an 
analogy approach using a frigate (FFG) based on vessel size is performed.268 
12.5 2025 Alternative Architecture I Modeling Results and Evaluation 
Of the eight Critical Operational Issues (COIs) addressed, 2025 Alternative 
Architecture I successfully meets the requirements of four.  The specific answers to each 
COI, as evaluated from the scenario simulation, follow in the details below. 
 12.5.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase involves the deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
aircraft, and the Sea Base formation.  There are three COIs that address the  
Closure Phase.  COI 1 addresses the delivery of the Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME) 
and the Sea Base Support Element (SBSE) to the Forward Logistics Site (FLS) in time to 
meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 2 involves the loading of the SBME and the SBSE 
aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 3 addresses the MPF(F) 
vessels ability to get underway from the FLS in time to meet the 10-day requirement. 
For the Closure Phase, 2025 Alternative Architecture I does not meet the 
requirement.  Analysis reveals the alternative architecture does reduce the capability gap 
from the 2015 BLA by 3 days, but a 3-day capability gap still exists.  The reduction is 
attributed to the nonmateriel change of reassembling the CH-53Xs while in-transit to the 
Sea Base vice at the FLS.  However, the reassembly of CH-53X change cannot overcome 
the 96-hr delay caused by the formation of the air bridge.  The 96-hr air bridge delay 
adversely affects the ability to meet the requirements for COIs 1, 2, and 3.  Figure 12-4 
depicts the 2025 Alternative Architecture I performance during the Closure Phase. 
                                                 
268 All O & S cost data is from the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) management information system.  VAMOSC is a restricted access system.  To access, 
permission must be granted by the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD).  The VAMOSC system is 
located at http://www.navyvamosc.com/. 
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Figure 12-4: Time to Complete Closure Phase for 2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
 12.5.2 Employment Phase 
The Employment Phase involves delivering 2 surface BLTs and 1 vertical BLT 
within a 10-hr period.  Air assault connectors deliver the 1 vertical BLT, while surface 
assault connectors (Joint ACCESS) deliver the remaining 2 surface BLTs. 
COI 5 involves the employment of the SBME to an objective.  The goal for 
accomplishing this operation is a 10-hr period.  2025 Alternative Architecture I deploys 
the SMBE to the objective in 10.1 hrs.  Joint ACCESS completes the employment of the 
2 surface BLTs in 6.7 hrs.  The insertion of the vertical BLT prevents a quicker 
Employment Phase.  On average, the CH-53X completes the Vertical Employment Phase 
in 10.1 hrs.  From the 30 simulation runs, Figure 12-5 indicates 2025 Alternative 
Architecture I successfully delivers the SBME to the objective 77% of the time (23 out of 
30 runs). 
Two factors affect the ability to achieve 100% employment success.  The first 
factor is a model artifact regarding attrition.  In the SEABASE-6 model, 12 deliveries to 
the objective are required for the model to recognize the completion of the surface 
component of the Employment Phase.  If one Joint ACCESS is lost due to enemy 
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intervention, the model assumes one of the empty Joint ACCESSs will return to the  
Sea Base for reloading.  Once it loads, the Joint ACCESS returns to the objective for  
off-load.  This return trip accounts for the variation in the 10-hr requirement.  The second 
factor pertains to the maintenance of the CH-53X.  During the SEABASE-6 simulation, 
the average time a CH-53X spends in a queuing status while waiting for maintenance is 
1.3 hrs.  This equates to at least six CH-53Xs requiring maintenance during the 
Employment Phase.  This maintenance queue results in fewer CH-53Xs available to 












Requirement < 10 hours  
 
Figure 12-5: Employment of the SBME at the Objective for 2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
 12.5.3 Seize the Initiative 
In accordance with the Operating Concept [Chapter 2], the force has 10 days to 
seize the initiative.  In order to seize the initiative, the 2025 Alternative Architecture I 
must complete the Closure, Assembly, and Employment Phases of operations within  
10 days.  COI 6 provides insight into this system requirement. 
COI 6 involves the delivery of a JEB from the Advance Base (Okinawa) to the 
FLS and then to the Sea Base to include employing 2 surface BLTs to the beach and  
1 vertical BLT at the objective with a goal of 10 days (240 hrs).  2025 Alternative 
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Architecture I fails to meet the requirements of 10 days, with an average time of 13 days.  
The inability to meet COI 6 is attributed to the inability to meet the  
Closure Phase requirement. 
 12.5.4 Sustainment Phase 
The Sustainment Phase involves delivering supplies vertically from the Sea Base 
to the objective for a mission time of 30 days.  Additionally, during the 30-day mission 
time, a resupply shuttle ship must also sustain the Sea Base.  COIs 7 and 8 provide the 
sustainment information needed for both the Sea Base and objective to evaluate this 
system requirement. 
COI 7 first addresses sustainment of the Sea Base for a minimum of 30 days  
(720 hrs).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture I, no class of supply reaches exhaustion.  
With Joint ACCESS in its resupply shuttle role, the Sea Base is able to maintain supplies 
above the reserve level.  There are instances when the reserve level for supplies at the  
Sea Base for provisions and fuel falls below the requirement, as shown in Figures 12-6 




Figure 12-6: Sea Base Provisions Sustainment for 2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
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Figure 12-7: Sea Base Fuel Sustainment for 2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
 
COI 7 also addresses the objective sustainment.  Objective sustainment involves 
sustaining the JEB from the sea for a minimum of 30 days (720 hrs).  In  
2025 Alternative Architecture I, no class of supply is ever fully exhausted or falls below 
the critical reserve level during the Sustainment Phase.  COI 7 also permits an evaluation 
of the maximum distribution capacity of the SBME.  Analysis reveals that an 
overabundant amount of provisions is sent to the objective from the Sea Base.   
Figure 12-8 indicates that during the initial start of the Sustainment Phase, an oversupply 
of provisions occurs.  This occurs due to a model artificiality, in which air connectors 
begin delivering supplies prior to the exhaustion of the initial supplies delivered during 
the Employment Phase. 
Reserve Level 
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Figure 12-8: Provisions Inventory at the Objective during the Sustainment Phase for  
2025 Alternative Architecture I. 
 
COI 8 addresses the sustainment of the JEB by vertical lift only.  The total range 
from Sea Base to objective for the scenario is 150 NM, which is just under the 165 NM 
maximum range of the MV-22 with external cargo loads.  If the 165 NM range of the 
MV-22 is exceeded, the 20 CH-53Xs are not capable of meeting the sustainment 
demands of the ashore forces by themselves.  Sensitivity analysis indicates that to provide 
vertical sustainment between 165 and 200 NM, approximately 50 CH-53Xs are required. 
 12.5.5 Medical Evacuation 
COI 9 involves the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of wounded personnel 
within the Golden Hour (defined in Chapter 2).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture I, the 
doctrine change from using the UH-1Y as the primary MEDEVAC platform to assigning 
only the MV-22 MEDEVAC results in meeting this requirement.  On average,  
2025 Alternative Architecture I can perform MEDEVAC operations from the objective to 
the Sea Base within 30 minutes. 
 12.5.6 Summary 
Though the 2025 Alternative Architecture I fails to meet the requirements for 
each COI, it does provide valuable insights.  The nonmateriel trade space change to the 
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savings.  However, this time savings is not enough to overcome the 96-hr air bridge 
formation delay.  The Joint ACCESS provides the capability to land all necessary 
personnel and equipment for two surface BLTs, eliminating at-sea personnel and 
equipment transfers and the need for multiple trips.  In addition to providing rapid assault 
capabilities, the Joint ACCESS also provides a means to ensure the resupply of the  
Sea Base during the Sustainment Phase. 
12.6 2025 Alternative Architecture I Potential New Issues Created 
Joint ACCESS platforms are all loaded with the critical vehicles and equipment of 
the JEB requiring that Joint ACCESS has the same reliability, availability, and 
maintainability requirements as the MPF(F) ships.  These requirements mean that the 
architecture cannot have any of these systems fail during the Closure and Employment 
Phases of the operation.  Joint ACCESS is also more susceptible to attack due to the time 
it must stay close to the beach disembarking.  However, this susceptibility is mitigated 
since Joint ACCESS is more survivable than a LCAC or LCU(R).  In addition, the single 
trip by the Joint ACCESS squadron provides fewer exposures to the enemy than the 
multiple trips required by the LCACs and LCU(R)s.  Joint ACCESS has its own  
self-defense weapon systems to counter enemy threats while offloading personnel  
and equipment. 
Following the initial employment, Joint ACCESS returns to the MPF(F) to load 
and transport the remaining nonpriority vehicles and equipment to the objective via an 
ILP.  If the sea conditions exceed sea state 3, ILP transfer operations cannot proceed, 
restricting the delivery of vehicles and equipment to the objective.  The time requirement 
to load the Joint ACCESS via ILP is much greater than loading an LCAC, and with only 
2 of these ships available, there are only 2 transfer spots for this equipment.  However, 
only 1 trip with 5 Joint ACCESS ships can accomplish the transfer due to the larger 
payload capacity. 
The 2025 Alternative Architecture I composition, as a result of downsizing to  
4 MPF(F) ships, reduces the total amount of storage space available for the different 
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supply classes.  There is virtually no affect on the total storage amounts of bottled water, 
provisions, and ammunition, but there is a reduction in Sea Base fuel capacity from 
approximately 15 million to 6.5 million gallons.  This requires resupplying the Sea Base 
with fuel at more frequent intervals than the 2015 BLA.  The Sea Base fuel resupply 
occurs an average of 7 times versus 4 times in the 2015 BLA. 
12.7 2025 Alternative Architecture II 
The 2025 Alternative Architecture II design utilizes the Rapid Strategic Lift Ship 
(RSLS)269 and Landing Craft Utility, Replacement (LCU(R)) as the primary materiel 
solution design for changes to the 2015 BLA.  Additionally, the 2025 Alternative 
Architecture II incorporates a different mix of aircraft from the 2015 BLA that includes 
more CH-53Xs and less MV-22s. 
The RSLS, shown in Figure 12-9, is a conceptual family of ships, which provides 
a potential answer to the problem of transporting non-self-deploying aircraft such as the 
CH-53X, from CONUS or an Advance Base to the FLS by eliminating the reliance on 
strategic air lift.  For the 2025 Alternative Architecture II, the RSLS transports the  
CH-53X, AH-1Z, SH-60R, and MV-22 air assets from the Advance Base (Okinawa) to 
the FLS.  RSLS primary attributes include: 
• a stern ramp for the RO/RO loading and unloading of cargo and helos; 
• projected cruising range of 8,000 NM; 
• 36 kts cruise speed; 
• payload capacity of 3,000 tons; 
• accommodations for 1,000-3,000 personnel; and 
• 175,000 sq ft of cargo space. 
                                                 
269 Jonathan Kaskin, Director Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics Division/N42, “Rapid Strategic Lift 
Ship (RSLS)” (family of ships) brief, 08 March 2004. 
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Figure 12-9: Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS).270 
 
Table 12-9 summarizes Design Team II’s Alternative Architecture, which 
evaluates the capabilities of the RSLS during each phase of Sea Base operations along 
with the individual platform roles and changes to the 2015 BLA. 
 
Platform Number Joint Expeditionary Logistics Operations (JELo) Phase Changes from 2015 BLA 
RSLS 1 Closure/Sustainment Addition 
MPF(F) Vessels 8 All None 
LCU(R) 16 Assault Addition of 14; replaces LCACs
MV-22 15 Assault/Sustainment Eliminated 33 MV-22s 
CH-53X 35 Assault/Sustainment Added 15 CH-53Xs 
SH-60R 12 Sustainment None 
AH-1Z 18 Sea Strike None 
F-35 JSF 36 Sea Strike None 
V-TUAV 6 Sea Strike None 
T-AOE  0 Sustainment (FLS to Sea Base) Eliminated 
LCAC 0 Assault Eliminated 
UH-1Y 0 MEDEVAC Eliminated 
Table 12-9: 2025 Alternative Architecture II Composition. 
 12.7.1 2025 Alternative Architecture II Nonmateriel Design Changes 
Table 12-10 describes the nonmateriel changes made to the  
2025 Alternative Architecture II compared to the 2015 BLA. 
                                                 
270 Steven Wynn, Jeff Hough, and Howard Fireman, “Rapid Strategic Lift Ship: Feasibility Study Report,” 
(Washington Navy Yard, DC: Naval Sea System Command, Ser 05D/097, 29 September 2004), p. 7. 
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1) Load non-self-deploying aircraft (CH-53X, SH-60R, AH-1Z) and MV-22s directly 
onto the RSLS at the Advance Base (no CH-53X disassembly/assembly) for transport 
to the Sea Base for rendezvous with the MPF(F). 
a.   In the baseline model, the aircraft were disassembled at the Advance Base, 
loaded onto the C-5s and C-17s, then transported to the FLS where they were 
reassembled and then flown onto the MPF(F).  This created a delay of  
3+ days, which contributes to the closure gap in the 2015 BLA. 
b.   This change addresses the Closure Phase gaps. 
2) Use only MV-22s for MEDEVAC: 
a.   In the 2015 BLA, all aircraft are used for MEDEVAC, with the UH-1Y 
designated as the primary MEDEVAC aircraft. 
b.   The UH-1Y does not have the range and speed to meet the established 
requirement, which results in the change.  The MV-22 has a longer range and 
greater speed than the UH-1Y.  In addition, the MV-22 can also transport 
more litters and injured patients than the UH-1Y.  Since the MV-22 fills a 
supply transport role during the Sustainment Phase, it can divert quickly to a 





Facilities Forward deployment of the RSLS at the Advance Base. 
Table 12-10: 2025 Alternative Architecture II Nonmateriel Changes. 
 12.7.2 2025 Alternative Architecture II Materiel Design Changes 
The first part of the Closure Phase is the movement of assets from the  
Advance Base, defined as Okinawa in the Burma Scenario, to the FLS.  For  
2025 Alternative Architecture II, the RSLS transports the CH-53X, MV-22, AH-1Z, and 
SH-60R air assets from the Advance Base to the Sea Base to rendezvous with the 
MPF(F).  The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) RSLS Feasibility Study271 
provides data on two RSLS variants.  The first variant has a flight deck, hanger, and 
aircraft elevator.  The second variant is similar in size, but does not have the flight deck 
or aircraft elevator.  For 2025 Alternative Architecture II, Design Team II evaluates the 
flight deck variant.  Table 12-11 displays the characteristics of the flight deck RSLS 
variant as described by the NAVSEA study.272 
                                                 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid., p. 6. 
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RSLS Characteristic Specification 




Container Cargo Weight 3 000+ short tons 
Container Capacity 250+ TEUs 
Total Cargo Deadweight 5 000+ short tons 
Crew 40 (MSC civilians) 
Passenger Capacity 1,650 
Crew Sustainment Capacity 30 days 
Passenger Sustainment Capacity 20 days 
Stern Ramp RO/RO for vehicles and cargo 
RO/RO Ramp Capacity 35 metric tons 
Survivability No signature reduction.  Only light force 
protection/antiterrorism weapons.  Designed to 
commercial standards. 
Navigation System Commercial navigation and electronic systems 
C4I Commercial with military GPS 
 
Table 12-11: RSLS Characteristics. 
 
RSLS was chosen as the primary focal point for the 2025 Alternative  
Architecture II design to address the issue of transporting non-self-deploying aircraft that 
require time consuming disassembly and reassembly, specifically the CH-53X. 
In the second part of the Closure Phase, FLS to the Sea Base, the 2025 Alternative 
Architecture II requires eight MPF(F) ships for use as the primary transport for the  
2025 JEB forces and equipment to the Sea Base. 
In the Employment Phase, the LCU(R), shown in Figure 12-10, replaces the 
LCAC as the primary surface transport of equipment to the beach.  This change occurs to 
address the 20-hr employment gap from the 2015 BLA.  In 2025 Alternative Architecture 
II, troop transport to the beach occurs via LCU(R) and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
(EFV) to the beach. 
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Figure 12-10: Landing Craft Utility, Replacement (LCU(R)).273 
 
Additionally, the 2025 Alternative Architecture II uses 15 MV-22s  
(33 less than the 2015 BLA) and 35 CH-53Xs (15 more than the 2015 BLA) for the 
Employment and Sustainment phases to conduct JEB replenishment at the objective.  The 
number of aircraft changes because the CH-53X has approximately three times the 
payload capacity and twice the range as the MV-22. 
In the Sustainment Phase, the RSLS replaces the T-AOE as the CLF ship for  
Sea Base resupply.  With a larger cargo capacity and faster speed than the T-AOE, the 
RSLS is capable of providing the transport of necessary supplies from the FLS to the  
Sea Base.  The RSLS also has the capability to include a fuel cargo configuration that 
provides the necessary fuel requirement that the T-AOE offers the 2015 BLA.  To 
replenish the Sea Base, the RSLS is equipped with standard STREAM equipment.  As in 
the 2015 BLA, the MV-22 and CH-53X vertically replenish the personnel at the 
objective.  However, the 2025 Alternative Architecture II contains more CH-53Xs and 
less MV-22s. 
12.8 2025 Alternative Architecture II Concept of Operations 
Utilizing the 2025 Alternative Architecture II composition to generate an 
operational view, the following Concept of Operation emerges.  Figure 12-11 depicts the 
JELo Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1).  The Advance Base (Okinawa), not shown in 
                                                 
273 Ken Maloney, “LCU(R) Landing Craft,” [database online] ([cited 19 November 2004]); available from 
World Wide Web @ http:// www.systems.textron.com/pdf/products/lcur_datasheet.pdf. 
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Figure 12-11, is the initial starting point of operations.  From the Advance Base, the 
RSLS departs with the non-self-deploying and MV-22 aircraft for direct transit to the  
Sea Base.  Additionally, JEB personnel depart for transit from the Advance Base to the 
FLS.  The FLS, shown in the distance, represents the starting point for the MPG.  The 
MPG is depicted as 8 MPF(F) ships, which carry the JEB personnel and equipment from 
the FLS to the Sea Base; the RSLS, which also serves as a CLF ship to resupply the  
Sea Base; and 16 LCU(R)s, which perform the employment of the 2 surface BLTs to the 
beach.  The aircraft represent the connectors that provide vertical BLT insertion and 
logistical support between the Sea Base and the objective.  The lightening bolts represent 
the C2 system linking all assets together.  The single CSG/ESG represents the inclusion 
of CSGs and ESGs in the Sea Base. 
 
Figure 12-11: 2025 Alternative Architecture II Operational View (OV-1). 
 12.8.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase consists of the deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
equipment, and the Sea Base Formation.  Closure begins with the movement of personnel 
RSLS 
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and JSFs to the FLS and the RSLS transit to the Sea Base.  The MPF(F) ships and 
LCU(R) are assumed to be prepositioned at the FLS.  The RSLS is assumed to be 
forward deployed at the Forward Base (Okinawa). 
For personnel movement, 2025 Alternative Architecture II relies on the  
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to transport the JEB personnel from point of origin to the 
designated FLS.  As personnel arrive at the FLS, they embark the MPF(F) pier side.  The 
MPF(F)s perform a rotation from the FLS anchorage to the pier for personnel 
embarkation.  The same assumptions for the 2015 BLA apply to the 2025 Alternative 
Architecture II. 
For aircraft movement, the RSLS loads all non-self-deploying aircraft at the 
Advance Base (Okinawa) with the exception of the JSF aircraft.  The JSFs self-deploy 
and can fly directly to the FLS or meet the MPF(F) ships while en route to the Sea Base.  
Once loaded, the RSLS departs for direct transit to the Sea Base to rendezvous with the 
MPF(F)s.  Figure 12-12 indicates the required travel distance and time of the RSLS 
transit from the Advance Base (Okinawa) to the Sea Base.  Since the aircraft transported 
via the RSLS do not require disassembly, a savings of three days is realized over the  
2015 BLA.  Additionally, another savings of four days occurs since the need for 
reassembly and functional check flights for the aircraft is eliminated at the FLS. 
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Figure 12-12: RSLS Transit from Advance Base (Okinawa) to Sea Base. 
 
For assembly at the Sea Base, the actions occur similarly as in the 2015 BLA.  For 
loading purposes, the LCU(R)s become the primary surface assault equipment transport. 
For the Sea Base formation, the MPF(F) ship movement of equipment and 
personnel from the FLS to the Sea Base is similar to the steps taken for the 2015 BLA.  
Once the RSLS rendezvous with the MPF(F), aircraft redistribution occurs in the same 
manner as the 2015 BLA. 
 12.8.2 Employment Phase 
The manner of movement for the vertical BLT from the Sea Base to the Objective 
is similar to the 2015 BLA.  For the employment of the 2 surface BLTs, operations begin 
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the Sea Base to the beach.  The 16 LCU(R)s require approximately 60 trips to complete 
the employment of the 2 surface BLTs. 
12.8.3 Sustainment Phase 
Objective resupply occurs in the same manner as the 2015 BLA, with the 
exception of the number of MV-22 and CH-53X connectors. 
The RSLS replaces the T-AOE as the CLF ship for resupply of the Sea Base.  The 
RSLS, once it offloads aircraft at the Sea Base, assumes the resupply for operations 
between the FLS and the Sea Base.  At the Sea Base, the MPF(F)s are resupplied via 
connected and vertical replenishment. 
 12.8.4 Medical Evacuation 
The MV-22 is the sole asset used to conduct the MEDEVAC mission.  In addition 
to delivering supplies to the objective, the MV-22, after delivery of its cargo, checks for 
casualties prior to returning to the Sea Base. 
 12.8.5 Cost Estimation of 2025 Alternative Architecture II 
Table 12-12 is a cost estimate summary for the 2025 Alternative Architecture II.  
The cost estimate contains acquisition cost data and ten years of operating and support  
(O & S) cost data.  Calculations to determine the cost estimate are similar to those from 
Chapter 7, Baseline Architecture Cost Estimation Analysis.  Example cost estimate 
calculations are in Appendix C.  Cost data is normalized using the inflation indices 
provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) to account for inflation and the 
time value of money274 and is provided in FY04$. 
                                                 
274 Inflation indices are from the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) and are located at 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm. 
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Platform Quantity Acquisition Cost (FY04$) 10 Years of O&S Costs (FY04$) Total Cost (FY04$)
MPF(F) 8 $13,686,187,886 $4,504,749,160 $18,190,937,046 
RSLS 1 $1,332,654,959 $363,824,743 $1,696,479,703 
MV-22 15 $1,185,105,000 $805,848,390 $1,990,953,390 
CH-53X 35 $1,923,378,135 $771,320,025 $2,694,698,160 
SH-60R 10 $364,761,548 $456,754,500 $821,516,048 
AH-1Z 18 $362,701,736 $600,539,040 $963,240,776 
JSF (F-35) 36 $2,994,231,545 $2,002,489,920 $4,996,721,465 
UAV 6 $11,049,804 $77,348,820 $88,398,624 
LCU(R) 16 $274,442,105 $165,254,880 $439,696,985 
Total Cost   $22,134,512,717 $9,748,129,478 $31,882,642,196 
 
Table 12-12: 2025 Alternative Architecture II Cost Estimation. 
 
To conduct a cost estimate for the RSLS, cost data from the CNA MPF(F) 
study275 for the “family, specialized constrained logistics and RO/RO ship” variant is 
used.  This variant’s cost is comparable to the cost estimate from the NAVSEA study.276  
The CNA cost data is the preferred costing source since the NAVSEA cost data is 
proprietary data and considered business sensitive.277  The LCU(R) is a current funded 
program that has extensive cost data located in the FY05 President’s Budget.278 
12.9 2025 Alternative Architecture II Modeling Results and Evaluation 
Of the eight COIs addressed, the 2025 Alternative Architecture II successfully 
meets the requirements of seven.  The only COI that the 2025 Alternative Architecture II 
fails to meet is COI 5 regarding employment of the Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME) 
ashore in 10 hrs.  The specific answers to each COI, as evaluated from the scenario 
simulation, follow in the details below. 
                                                 
275 Robert M. Souders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Summary Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D0009814.A2/Final 
April 2004), pp. 48-54. 
276 Steven Wynn, Jeff Hough, and Howard Fireman, “Rapid Strategic Lift Ship: Feasibility Study Report,” 
(Washington Navy Yard, DC: Naval Sea System Command, Ser 05D/097, 29 September 2004). 
277 Steven Wynn, [WynnSB@NAVSEA.NAVY.MIL], “RSLS Questions,” 05 November 2004,  
Office Communication, (08 November 2004). 
278 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials: FY2005 Budget, [database online] (10 March 2004 
[cited 01 November 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/index.html. 
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 12.9.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase involves the deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
aircraft, and the Sea Base formation.  There are three COIs that address the  
Closure phase.  COI 1 addresses the delivery of the SBME and the SBSE to the FLS in 
time to meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 2 involves the loading of the SBME and the 
SBSE aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 3 addresses the 
MPF(F) vessels ability to get underway from the FLS in time to meet the  
10-day requirement. 
For the deployment and transit aspect of the Closure Phase, COI 1 involves the 
delivery of the SBME and the SBSE to the FLS in time to meet the 10-day requirement.  
In the 2025 Alternative Architecture II, the SBME and SBSE personnel arrive at the FLS 
in 121 hrs, meeting the 127-hr requirement. 
COI 2 addresses the assembly requirement for the Closure Phase and involves the 
loading of the SBME and SBSE aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the  
10-day requirement.  Analysis of the 2025 Alternative Architecture II indicates that the 
time to load the SBME and SBSE aboard the MPF(F) for personnel is 62 hrs, well below 
the 127-hr requirement. 
COI 3 involves the ability of the MPF(F) vessels to get underway from the FLS in 
time to meet the 10-day requirement.  There are no departure delays in the  
2025 Alternative Architecture II.  MPF(F) ships are underway in 92 hrs.  This is a result 
of all aircraft (except the JSF) being transported onboard the RSLS and the elimination of 
assembly and reassembly time delays associated with the CH-53X helicopter. 
 12.9.2 Employment Phase 
The Employment Phase involves delivering the 2 surface BLTs and 1 vertical 
BLT to the objective within a 10-hr period.  Air assault connectors deliver 1 vertical 
BLT, while surface assault connectors deliver the remaining 2 surface BLTs. 
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COI 5 involves the employment of the SBME to an objective in a 10-hr period.  
In the 2015 BLA, there was a capability gap of 20 hrs.  The 2025 Alternative 
Architecture II delivers the SBME from the Sea Base to the Objective in 12 hrs.  This 
exceeds the 10-hr requirement, producing a 2-hr gap as shown in Figure 12-13.  
However, this alternative architecture produces an 18-hr capability gap reduction over the 
2015 BLA.  The 2-hr capability gap for the 2025 Alternative Architecture II is due to the 
employment of the 2 surface BLTs.  To employ the 2 surface BLTs, multiple trips are 
required by the LCU(R)s.  The time delay to load each LCU(R) via ILP at the Sea Base 
and the subsequent transit time contributes to the 2-hr capability gap.  The employment 
of the vertical BLT is accomplished under the 10-hr requirement. 
 
 
Figure 12-13: Employment of SBME at the Objective for 2025 Alternative Architecture II. 
 12.9.3 Seize the Initiative 
In accordance with the Operating Concept [Chapter 2], the force has 10 days to 
seize the initiative.  In order to seize the initiative, the 2025 Alternative Architecture II 
must complete the Closure, Assembly, and Employment Phases of operations.  COI 6 
provides insight into this requirement. 
COI 6 involves the delivery of a JEB from the Advance Base (Okinawa) to the 
FLS and then to the Sea Base, to include employing 2 surface BLTs and 1 vertical BLT at 
the objective ashore with a goal of 10 days (240 hrs).  The 2025 Alternative Architecture 
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II meets this requirement by delivering the combat element of the JEB to the objective in 
approximately 230 hrs. 
 12.9.4 Sustainment Phase 
The Sustainment Phase involves delivering supplies from the Sea Base to the 
objective for a mission time of 30 days.  The air assault connectors sustain the JEB at the 
objective.  Additionally, during the 30-day mission time, a resupply ship must also 
sustain the Sea Base.  COIs 7 and 8 provides the sustainment information needed for both 
Sea Base and objective to evaluate this system requirement. 
COI 7 first addresses the sustainment of the Sea Base for a minimum of 30 days 
(720 hrs).  In the 2025 Alternative Architecture II, at no point do any classes of supply 
reach exhaustion.  With the materiel change of the RSLS in its role of performing  
resupply after the Employment Phase, the Sea Base is able to maintain supplies above the 
reserve level.  There are no instances when the reserve level for supplies at the  
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Figure 12-15: Sea Base Fuel Sustainment for the 2025 Alternative Architecture II. 
 
COI 7 also addresses the sustainment of the objective from the Sea Base for a 
minimum of 30 days (720 hrs).  In the 2025 Alternative Architecture II, no class of 
supply is ever fully exhausted or falls below the critical reserve level during the 
Sustainment Phase.  COI 7 also permits an evaluation of the maximum distribution 
capacity of the SBME.  Figure 12-16 indicates that during the initial start of the 
Sustainment Phase, an oversupply of provisions occurs.  This occurs due to a model 
artificiality in which air connectors begin delivering supplies prior to the exhaustion of 
the initial supplies delivered during the Employment Phase. 
 
 
Figure 12-16: Provisions Inventory at the Objective during the Sustainment Phase for  






    321
COI 8 addresses the sustainment of the objective by vertical lift only.  The total 
range from Sea Base to objective for the scenario is 150 NM, which is just under the  
165-NM maximum range of the MV-22 with external cargo loads.  If the 165-NM range 
of the MV-22 is exceeded, the 35 CH-53Xs are not capable, themselves, of meeting the 
sustainment demands of the ashore forces.  Sensitivity analysis reveals approximately  
50 CH-53Xs would be required to sustain the objective between 165 and 200 NM. 
 12.9.5 Medical Evacuation 
COI 9 involves the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of the wounded personnel 
within the Golden Hour (defined in Chapter 2).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture II, the 
doctrine change from using the UH-1Y as the primary MEDEVAC platform to assigning 
only the MV-22 MEDEVAC results in meeting this requirement.  On average,  
the 2025 Alternative Architecture II can perform all MEDEVAC operations from the 
objective to the Sea Base within 30 minutes. 
 12.9.6 Summary 
The 2025 Alternative Architecture II utilizes a RSLS to deliver the  
non-self-deploying aircraft to the Sea Base.  Additionally, the RSLS serves as the  
CLF ship during the Sustainment Phase.  This eliminates the need for disassembly and 
reassembly of the CH-53X.  Additionally, LCU(R)s replace the LCACs in the 
Employment Phase.  The use of the HLCAC vice the LCAC was explored.  However, use 
of HLCACs is not effective.  Use of the HLCAC as the primary surface assault connector 
resulted in a capability gap of 18 hrs.  Additionally, Design Team I moved the MPF(F) 
from 25 NM to 10 NM off the beach to further test the close-in effects of using the 
HLCAC.  This closer range still resulted in a capability gap of 13 hrs and drastically 
increased the risk of enemy intervention. 
Implementing the LCU(R) vice the LCAC or HLCAC reduces the number of trips 
required to employ the forces ashore.  Use of the LCU(R) reduces the Employment Phase 
gap to only 2 hrs, an 18-hr improvement over the 2015 BLA. 
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Alternative Architecture II employs 33 less MV-22s and 15 more  
CH-53Xs for the employment of the vertical BLT and sustainment of the JEB ashore.  
This mix of aircraft produces favorable results for both vertical BLT employment  
and sustainment. 
12.10 2025 Alternative Architecture II Potential New Issues Created 
The use of the RSLS creates a single point of failure.  Instead of having the  
non-self-deploying aircraft transported via multiple platforms, they are all located on a 
single platform.  If the RSLS experiences mechanical problems or other delays, all the 
required assault air connectors arrive at the Sea Base late.  Additionally, survivability is 
an issue.  If the enemy realizes the RSLS is a center of gravity, there are several 
opportunities during the transit to the Sea Base from the Advance Base (Okinawa) for 
enemy intervention. 
12.11 2025 Alternative Architecture III 
The 2025 Alternative Architecture III utilizes airships, Advanced Theater 
Transports (ATT), and the MPF(F) aviation variant as the primary changes to the  
2015 BLA.  This alternative architecture also explores the feasibility of transporting  
non-self-deploying aircraft from CONUS vice an Advance Base (Okinawa) to the FLS.  
An MPF(F) aviation variant is a flat deck MPF(F) ship, approximately 1,000 ft long, with 
no island structure.  This MPF(F) aviation ship is designed to operate the ATT, a  
C-130-type aircraft with a tilt wing design.  Designs for the ATT call for an extremely 
short take off and landing (STOL) capability.  Additionally, this alternative architecture 
increases the number of MV-22s and eliminates CH-53Xs. 
An airship, using lighter-than-air technology, presents a solution to the movement 
of non-self-deploying aircraft to the FLS.  Airship technology is undergoing changes with 
the use of modern, lightweight, high-strength materials and the use of vectored thrust.  
Several programs under study include the Heavy Lift Air Vehicle (Walrus) and the 
Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft (HULA).  Figure 12-17 is a graphic representation of this 
emerging technology. 
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Figure 12-17: Graphic Representation of Ligher-than-air Heavy Lift Airship.279 
 
The proposed heavy lift airship SkyCatTM 1000280 is a representative of the  
lighter-than-air technology for use in the 2025 Alternative Architecture III.  SEA-6 
makes no claims that this is the best airship or that this particular airship is the optimal 
platform, only that it is representative of airships in general.  The SkyCatTM 1000 
transports non-self-deploying aircraft and MV-22s from CONUS to the FLS in the  
2025 Alternative Architecture III.  Table 12-13 summarizes 2025 Alternative 
Architecture III’s design. 
                                                 
279Globalsecurity.org, “SkyCat 1000,” [database online] (30 September 2004 [cited 17 November 2004]) 
available from World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/skycat.htm. 
280 Advanced Technologies Group, “SkyCat Hybid Air Vehicle, United Kingdom” [database online]  
(22 March 2004 [cited 22 October 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ http://www.aerospace-
technology.com/projects/skycat/). 
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Platform Number Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) Phase Change from 2015 BLA 
MPF(F) Unconstrained-size, 
distributed-capability ships281 
4 Closure/Employment/Sustainment Eliminated 4 ships; change to add 
an additional ILP to each ship 
MPF(F) Aviation ship282 1 Closure/Employment/Sustainment Addition 
T-AOE 1 Sustainment None 
MV-22 65 Employment/Sustainment Addition of 17 MV-22s 
ATT 8 Employment/Sustainment Addition of 8 ATTs 
SH-60R 10 Sustainment None 
AH-1Z 18 Sea Strike None 
F-35 (JSF) 36 Sea Strike None 
VTUAV 6 Sea Strike None 
LCU(R) 12 Employment Addition of 10 
SkyCatTM 1000 6 Closure/Sustainment Addition 
LCAC 0 Employment Eliminated 
UH-1Y 0 MEDEVAC Eliminated 
CH-53X 0 Employment/Sustainment Eliminated 
Table 12-13: 2025 Alternative Architecture III Composition. 
 12.11.1 2025 Alternative Architecture III Nonmateriel Design Changes 
Table 12-14 describes the nonmateriel changes made to Alternative  
Architecture III from the 2015 BLA. 




1) Non-self-deploying aircraft and MV-22s transported from CONUS to the FLS by loading the 
aircraft onto the SkyCatTM 1000. 
a) In the 2015 BLA, the MV-22s self-deploy to the FLS and the CH-53Xs are 
disassembled and transported to the FLS, assembled and then flown to the MPF(F), 
creating a time delay of 3+ days. 
b) SkyCatTM 1000 addresses the CH-53X time delay. 
2) Use MV-22s and ATTs for MEDEVAC 
a) In the 2015 BLA, the UH-1Y is designated as the primary MEDEVAC aircraft.  The 
UH-1Y does not have the range and speed to meet the SEA 6 established requirement. 
The MV-22 has a longer range and greater speed than the UH-1Y.  In addition, the 
MV-22 can also transport more litters and injured patients than the UH-1Y.  Since the 
MV-22 is a supply transport during the Sustainment Phase, it can divert quickly to a 
MEDEVAC mission prior to returning to the Sea Base. 
b) ATT supplements the MV-22 and can carry 96 litters. 







Table 12-14: 2025 Alternative Architecture III Nonmateriel Changes. 
                                                 
281 Robert M. Souders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Summary Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D0009814.A2/Final, 
April 2004), p. 33. 
282 Ibid., p. 46. 
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 12.11.2 2025 Alternative Architecture III Materiel Design Changes 
For the Closure Phase, Design Team III uses six airships for the transportation of 
non-self-deploying aircraft to the FLS to address the 2015 BLA capability gaps.  CRAF 
aircraft provide transportation for personnel by the same means detailed in the 2015 BLA 
[Chapter 5]. 
The SkyCatTM 1000 vehicle combines lighter-than-air airship technology and  
air-cushioned hovercraft technology, allowing landings on flat land, grass, swamp, water 
(including the open ocean), and snow.283  Utilizing reverse thrust on the hovercraft 
engines (suck-down mode) will allow it to remain stationary.284  The airship has a 
projected cruising range of 6,000+ NM empty and can carry a maximum payload of  
1,100 tons.285  A reduced payload of 750 tons allows for a range of 5,500+ NM.286  Each 
airship is capable of transporting the weight of 66 MV-22 aircraft; however, cargo area 
limits this to 13 MV-22s—approximately 20% of the airship’s weight-carrying capacity.  
This decreased payload permits the SkyCatTM 1000 to operate with the  
5,500 NM endurance range.  The airship also resupplies provisions, bottled water, and 
ammunition to the Sea Base from the FLS.  Figure 12-18 shows a SkyCatTM 
demonstration model. 
                                                 
283  Advanced Technologies Group, “SkyCat Hybid Air Vehicle, United Kingdom,” [database online] 
(22 March 2004 [cited 22 October 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ http://www.aerospace-
technology.com/projects/skycat/). 
284 Paul Macey, [P.Macey@ConnectFree.co.uk], “SkyCat,” 28 October 2004, Office Communication, 
(29 October 2004). 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
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Figure 12-18: SkyCatTM 1000 Demonstration Model.287 
In the Closure Phase, eight ATTs self-deploy to the FLS from CONUS.  The 
ATT, shown in Figure 12-19, is a C-130 type airframe with a four turbo prop engine/ 
tilt wing design.  ATTs have an extreme STOL capability and can land at unprepared 
landing sites.  The ATT has a cruising speed of 300 kts, a range of 2,100 NM, and a  
fuel capacity of 60,000 lbs.288 
 
 
Figure 12-19: Advance Theater Transport.289 
 
In 2025 Alternative Architecture III, the number of MPF(F) ships is reduced from 
8 to 5.  The new MPG configuration consists of 4 unconstrained-size, distributed 
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
288 Globalsecurity.org, “Advanced Theater Transport,” [database online] (01 December 2002  
[cited 23 November 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/att.htm. 
289Globalsecurity.org, “Advanced Theater Transport,” [database online] (01 December 2002  
[cited 16 November 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/att-pics.htm, (16 November 2004). 
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capability variants and 1 modified aviation variant, shown in Figure 12-20.  The MPF(F) 
load-out plan for the 2025 Alternative Architecture III is shown in Table 12-15. 











Food 104,394 104,394 104,394 104,394 104,394 521,970 
Fuel 1,848,000 1,848,000 1,848,000 1,848,000 1,848,000 9,240,000
Water 127,549 127,549 127,549 127,549 127,549 637,745 
Ammo 1,687,500 1,687,500 1,687,500 1,687,500 1,687,500 8,437,500
LCAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ATT 0 0 0 0 8 8 
MV-22 16 16 16 17 0 65 
LCU(R) 3 3 3 3 0 12 
AH-1Z 5 5 4 4 0 18 
Troops 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 8,100 
M1A1 7 7 7 7 0 28 
EFV 27 27 26 26 0 106 
ABV 1 1 1 1 0 4 
AVLB 1 1 1 1 0 4 
M88A2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
M9 ACE 2 2 2 2 0 8 
HMMWV 81 81 81 81 101 425 
ITV 4 4 4 4 0 16 
LAV 14 14 14 14 28 84 
MTVR 22 22 23 23 0 90 
4K Forklift 2 2 2 2 0 8 
Contact Truck 4 4 5 5 0 18 
EFSS 0 0 0 0 8 8 
HIMARS 7 7 8 8 0 30 
LVS 9 9 9 9 0 36 
 




Figure 12-20: 2025 Alternative Architecture III MPF(F) Aviation Variant. 
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In the Employment Phase, Design Team III uses the LCU(R) and the ATT to 
address the 20-hr Employment Phase gap from the 2015 BLA.  Twelve LCU(R)s replace 
the 24 LCACs and 8 ATTs replace the 20 CH-53Xs from the 2015 BLA.  The LCU(R) 
has a cargo area of approximately 2,800 sq ft and a payload capacity of  
495,000 lbs.  This translates into a 55% increase in cargo area and a 313% increase in 
payload capacity over the LCAC.  Additionally, the LCU(R) can carry 3 M1A1 tanks and 
has a full payload speed of 30 kts.  The ATT can carry an internal cargo load of  
60,000 lbs, while still maintaining STOL capability and has a cargo area of 
approximately 500 sq ft.  This translates to an approximate 122% increase in cargo area 
and a 100% increase in payload capacity over the CH-53X. 
For the Sustainment Phase, Design Team III uses 65 MV-22s and 8 ATTs to 
conduct all sustainment operations for the JEB at the objective.  The 2015 BLA details 
the capacities and characteristics of the MV-22 aircraft. 
For Sea Base resupply, Design Team III uses the SkyCatTM 1000 to augment the 
T-AOE.  The limited storage capacity of 5 vice 8 MPF(F) ships results in an additional 
resupply requirement.  Using the SkyCatTM 1000 to augment the T-AOE in the 
Sustainment Phase meets the Sea Base resupply needs.  Since no current literature 
supports the use of an airship to transport fuel, Design Team III did not examine the 
possibility of the SkyCatTM 1000 replacing the T-AOE completely. 
12.12 2025 Alternative Architecture III Concept of Operations 
Utilizing the 2025 Alternative Architecture III composition to generate an 
operational view, the following Concept of Operations emerges.  Figure 12-21 depicts the 
JELo Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1).  CONUS (not shown) in Figure 12-21, is the 
initial starting point of the operation for this alternative architecture.  From CONUS, the 
SkyCatTM 1000 transports non-self-deploying aircraft and MV-22s to the FLS.  The FLS 
shown in the distance represents the starting point for the MPG.  The MPG is depicted as 
MPF(F) ships, which carry the JEB personnel and equipment from the FLS to the  
Sea Base; a T-AOE which resupplies the MPF(F) ships with fuel; and LCU(R) vessels 
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which deliver the two surface BLTs to the beach.   The SkyCatTM 1000 also serves as a 
high-speed resupply asset for provisions and ammunition to the Sea Base.  The ATT and 
other aircraft represent the connectors that provided vertical BLT insertion and logistical 
support between the MPG and objective.  The lightening bolts represent the C2 system 
linking all assets together.  The single CSG/ESG represents the inclusion of CSGs and 
ESGs in the Sea Base. 
 
Figure 12-21: Alternative Architecture III Operational View (OV-1). 
 12.12.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase consists of the deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
equipment, and the Sea Base formation.  Closure begins with the movement of personnel 
and aircraft to the FLS.  The starting point is CONUS vice an Advance Base (Okinawa).  
The 12 LCU(R)s are assumed to be forward deployed at the FLS. 
    330
For personnel movement, the 2025 Alternative Architecture III relies on the  
CRAF to transport the JEB from point of origin to the designated FLS.  The same 
assumptions for the 2015 BLA apply to the 2025 Alternative Architecture III. 
For aircraft movement, non-self-deploying aircraft and MV-22s fly to CONUS 
SkyCatTM 1000 locations to load onto six airships for transport to the FLS.  The ATTs 
will self-deploy to the FLS similar to the JSFs as outlined in Chapter 5. 
The starting point time and distance calculations for movement of the aircraft are 
based on a SkyCatTM 1000 speed of advance (SOA) of 100 kts from CONUS to the FLS 
as shown in Figure 12-22.  These calculations result in a transit time of approximately 
four days with the addition of stops for refueling.  The SkyCatTM1000 experiences no 
crew rest delays and does not require the use of in-flight refueling assets. 
 




    331
The movement of the MPF(F) ships from the FLS to the Sea Base is 
accomplished as in the 2015 BLA.  The 5 MPF(F) ships will transit with and support the 
12 LCU(R)s to the Sea Base.  Aircraft redistribution occurs in the same manner as the 
2015 BLA. 
For assembly at the Sea Base, the actions occur similarly as in the 2015 BLA.  For 
loading purposes, the LCU(R)s become the primary surface assault equipment transport. 
 12.12.2 Employment Phase 
Equipment and troop movement is similar to the 2015 BLA.  The main difference 
from the 2015 BLA is the utilization of 12 LCU(R)s and 8 ATTs.  The LCU(R)s will be 
operated in the same manner as the 2015 BLA except that 2 LCU(R)s are loaded 
simultaneously from each of the 4 2015 BLA MPF(F) ships.  Each MPF(F) ship has  
2 ILPs positioned on the same side of the ship, 1 forward and 1 aft. 
The ATT replaces the CH-53X and operates exclusively from the aviation-type 
MPF(F) ship.  ATTs launch fully loaded to the objective where one of two cargo delivery 
methods is used.  The first method is for the ATT to utilize extremely short field landing 
capabilities to land at an unprepared landing site where supplies are off-loaded.  The 
second method is to employ a Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) as 
shown in Figure 12-23.   LAPES is a low-level, self-contained system capable of 
delivering heavy loads into an area where air landing is not feasible.290 
                                                 
290 Defense Technical Information Center, “LAPES” [database online] (01 October 2004 [cited  
09 December 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/l/03127.html. 
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Figure 12-23: C-130 Employing LAPES.291 
 12.12.3 Sustainment Phase 
Sustainment of the forces at the objective is similar to the 2015 BLA.  Eight ATTs 
replace all the CH-53Xs and 18 additional MV-22s are added to meet the vertical lift 
needs of the Sea Base. 
The Sea Base is resupplied using the T-AOE capabilities described in the  
2015 BLA.  One SkyCatTM 1000 augments the T-AOE to meet the Sea Base resupply.  
The re-supply of the Sea Base is accomplished by the airship landing on the MPF(F) 
aviation ship, where it will off-load provisions and ammunition.  Figure 12-24 depicts an 
example of this concept.  This photograph, taken on June 26, 1950, shows the  
ZP2K-80 (blimp), piloted by Lt. John Fahey, taking off from the U.S.S. Midway (CV-41) 
after a demonstration of an airship landing for the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, who were aboard Midway.  Design Team III 
did not explore the possibility of all six airships replacing the T-AOE as the primary 
resupply source for the Sea Base due to fuel cargo issues with airships. 
                                                 
291 Globalsecurity.org, “C-130 Hercules” [database online] (12 October 2004 [cited 17 November 2004]) 
available from World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-130-
pics.htm. 
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Figure 12-24: Demonstration of an Airship Carrier Landing.292 
 12.12.4 Medical Evacuation 
In the 2025 Alternative Architecture III, the MV-22 and the ATT conduct the 
MEDEVAC mission.  In addition to delivering supplies to the objective, MV-22s and 
ATTs, after delivery of their shipment, check for casualties prior to returning to the  
Sea Base. 
 12.12.5 Cost Estimation of 2025 Alternative Architecture III 
Table 12-16 is a cost estimate summary for the 2025 Alternative Architecture III.  
The cost estimate contains acquisition cost data and 10 years of operating and support  
(O & S) cost data.  Calculations to determine the cost estimate are similar to those from 
Chapter 7, Baseline Architecture Cost Estimation Analysis.  Example cost estimate 
calculations are in Appendix C.  Cost data is normalized using the inflation indices 
provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) to account for inflation and the 
time value of money293 and is provided in FY04$. 
                                                 
292 Unknown, “Naval Airship Carrier Operations,” [database online] (25 May 2001  
[cited 23 November 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ http://www.naval-airships.org/carrier.html. 
293 Inflation indices are from the Navy Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) and are located at 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm. 
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Platform Quantity Acquisition Cost (FY04$) 
10 Years of O&S Costs 
(FY04$)  
Total Cost  
(FY04$) 
MPF(F) - Baseline variant 4 $7,293,655,715 $2,252,374,580 $9,546,030,295 
MPF(F) - Aviation/C2 variant 1 $1,828,684,151 $440,332,519 $2,269,016,670 
T-AOE 1 $739,106,413 $868,543,070 $1,607,649,483 
MV-22 65 $5,135,455,000 $3,492,009,690 $8,627,464,690 
SkyCat 1000 6 $1,200,000,000 $34,985,313 $1,234,985,313 
ATT 8 $932,132,706 $59,475,033 $991,607,739 
SH-60R 12 $437,713,857 $548,105,400 $985,819,257 
AH-1Z 18 $362,701,736 $600,539,040 $963,240,776 
JSF (F-35) 36 $2,994,231,545 $2,002,489,920 $4,996,721,465 
UAV 6 $11,049,804 $77,348,820 $88,398,624 
LCU(R) 12 $205,831,579 $123,941,160 $329,772,739 
Total Cost   $21,140,562,506 $10,500,144,545 $31,640,707,052 
 
Table 12-16: 2025 Alternative Architecture III Cost Estimation. 
 
Cost data for the modified aviation/C2 MPF(F) variant is from the CNA MPF(F) 
study.294  This modified variant has a different flight deck than the one proposed by 
CNA.  A cost factor based on the CNA reported cost increase for major reconfigurations 
is used to estimate the cost of this MPF(F) variant.  The SkyCatTM 1000 is a  
lighter-than-air technology that is being explored by the Department of Defense.295  
Acquisition costing data is from one of the current designers.296  Since no current system 
resembles the ATT, the O & S cost data for the C-130 is the analogous system used to 
develop future O & S costs on the basis that the ATT will serve as a transport craft.  The 
ATT is a potential future replacement for the current C-130 transport aircraft.297  Since it 
is a potential replacement for the C-130, the C-130 costing data is used to develop the 
ATT cost.  A cost factor based on the potential cargo payload is used to calculate the 
acquisition and O & S costs for the ATT. 
                                                 
294 Souders et al., pp. 48-54. 
295GlobalSecurity.org, “SkyCat 1000,” [data online] (30 September 2004 [cited 03 November 2004]); 
available from World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/skycat.htm. 
296 Paul Macey, [P.Macey@ConnectFree.co.uk], “SkyCat,” 28 October 2004, Office Communication,  
(29 October 2004). 
297 Military Analysis Network, “Advanced Theater Transport,” [data online] (02 January 1999  
[cited 03 November 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ac/att.htm. 
    335
12.13 2025 Alternative Architecture III Modeling Results and Evaluation 
2025 Alternative Architecture III successfully meets the requirements of the eight 
COIs addressed.  The specific answers to each COI, as evaluated from the scenario 
simulation, follow in the details below. 
 12.13.1 Closure Phase 
The Closure Phase involves the deployment, transit, assembly of personnel and 
aircraft, and the Sea Base formation.  There are three COIs that address the  
Closure Phase.  COI 1 addresses the delivery of the SBME and the SBSE to the FLS in 
time to meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 2 involves the loading of the SBME and the 
SBSE aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the 10-day requirement.  COI 3 addresses the 
MPF(F) vessels’ ability to get underway from the FLS in time to meet the  
10-day requirement. 
For the deployment and transit aspect of the Closure Phase, COI 1 involves the 
delivery of the SBME and the SBSE to the FLS in time to meet the 10-day requirement.  
Aircraft arriving at the FLS cannot exceed 55 hrs to allow loading of the MPF(F) ships so 
they can deploy with sufficient time to meet this COI.  In the 2025 Alternative 
Architecture III, aircraft transported by the SkyCat TM1000 arrive in 96 hrs.  This creates 
a 41-hr gap.  However, the elimination of CH-53Xs from this alternative architecture also 
eliminates the reassembly delay the CH-53Xs require that offsets the  
41-hr gap.  In order to meet the overall 10-day requirement, the MPG must deploy within 
140 hrs.  As shown in Figure 12-25, the MPG is able to deploy within the  
140-hr requirement. 
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Figure 12-25: Number of MPF(F) ships deployed in time to meet 10-day objective. 
 
COI 2 addresses the assembly requirement for the Closure Phase and involves the 
loading of the SBME and SBSE  aboard the MPF(F) in time to meet the  
10-day requirement.  A requirement of 127 hrs is necessary for the loading of all 
personnel and aircraft onto the MPF(F).  For personnel, the 2025 Alternative  
Architecture III completes the loading in approximately 35 hrs, with aircraft on-load 
lasting 95 hrs. 
COI 3 involves the ability of the MPF(F) vessels to get underway from the FLS in 
time to meet the 10-day requirement.  There are no departure delays in the  
2025 Alternative Architecture III.  MPF(F) ships are underway in 105-hrs.  This is a 
result of all non-self-deploying and MV-22 aircraft being transported onboard the 
SkyCatTM 1000 and the elimination of CH-53s from the architecture.  The CH-53X 
elimination also eliminates the delay caused by the disassembly and reassembly of these 
aircraft if transported by strategic airlift. 
 12.13.2 Employment Phase 
The Employment Phase involves delivering 2 surface BLTs and 1 vertical BLT to 
the objective within a 10-hr period.  Air assault connectors deliver 1 vertical BLT, while 
surface assault connectors deliver the remaining 2 surface BLTs. 
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COI 5 involves the employment of the SBME to an objective in a 10-hr period.  
The 2025 Alternative Architecture III delivers the SBME from the Sea Base to the 
objective, on average, in 8.6 hrs, as seen in Figure 12-26. 
 
 
Figure 12-26: Employment of SBME at the Objective for the 2025 Alternative Architecture III. 
 
 12.13.3 Seize the Initiative 
In accordance with the Operating Concept [Chapter 2], the force has 10 days to 
seize the initiative.  In order to seize the initiative, the 2025 Alternative Architecture III 
must complete the Closure, Assembly, and Employment Phases of operations.  COI 6 
provides insight into this system requirement. 
COI 6 involves the delivery of a JEB from CONUS/Advance Base to the FLS and 
then to the Sea Base, to include employing 2 surface BLTs and 1 vertical BLT at the 
objective ashore with a goal of 10 days (240 hrs).  The 2025 Alternative Architecture III 
delivers the combat element of the JEB to the objective in 231 hrs, meeting the  
240-hr requirement. 
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 12.13.4 Sustainment Phase 
The Sustainment Phase involves delivering supplies from the Sea Base to the 
objective for a mission time of 30 days.  Air assault connectors  sustain the JEB at the 
objective.  Additionally, during the 30-day mission time, a resupply ship must also 
sustain the Sea Base.  COIs 7 and 8 provide the sustainment information needed for both 
the Sea Base and objective to evaluate this system requirement. 
COI 7 first addresses the sustainment of the Sea Base for a minimum of 30 days 
(720 hrs).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture III, at no time does any class of supply reach 
exhaustion.  With the addition of the SkyCatTM1000 and its role of performing resupply 
during the Sustainment Phase, the Sea Base is able to maintain supplies above the reserve 
level.  There are no instances when the reserve level for supplies at the Sea Base for 
provisions and fuel fall below the requirement, as shown in Figures 12-27 and 12-28. 
 
 
Figure 12-27: Sea Base Provisions Sustainment for the 2025 Alternative Architecture III. 
Reserve Level 
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Figure 12-28: Sea Base Fuel Sustainment for the 2025 Alternative Architecture III. 
 12.13.5 Objective Sustainment 
COI 7 also addresses the objective sustainment from the sea for a minimum of  
30 days (720 hrs).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture III, no class of supply is ever fully 
exhausted or falls below the critical reserve level during the Sustainment Phase.  Another 
function of COI 7 is the maximum distribution capacity of the SBME.   
Figure 12-29 indicates that during the initial start of the Sustainment Phase, an 
oversupply of provisions occurs.  This occurs due to model artificiality, in which air 
connectors begin delivering supplies prior to the exhaustion of the initial supplies 
delivered during the Employment Phase. 
 
 
Figure 12-29: Provisions Inventory at the Objective during the Sustainment Phase for  






    340
COI 8 addresses sustainment of the objective vertical lift only.  The total range 
from the Sea Base to the objective for the scenario is 150 NM, which is just under the 
165 NM maximum range of the MV-22 with external cargo loads.  If the range of the 
objective exceeds the 165 NM range of the MV-22, the ability for vertical sustainment 
becomes strained.  The ATTs have a longer range, but with the limited number of ATTs, 
the ability to maintain adequate resupply begins to decline. 
 12.13.6 Medical Evacuation 
COI 9 involves the MEDEVAC of the wounded personnel within the  
Golden Hour (defined in Chapter 2).  In 2025 Alternative Architecture III, the doctrine 
change from using UH-1Y as the primary MEDEVAC platform to assigning the MV-22 
and ATT MEDEVAC results in meeting this requirement.  On average, 2025 Alternative 
Architecture III can perform MEDEVAC operations from the objective to the Sea Base 
within 30 minutes. 
 12.13.7 Summary 
The 2025 Alternative Architecture III uses new concepts that pose potential 
technology risks.  With this unproven technology, 2025 Alternative Architecture III 
meets the employment of the SBME movement to an objective ashore in a  
10-hr period.  This is a result of the ATTs augmenting the LCU(R)s and reducing the 
number of trips and associated transfers with ILP loading.  Design Team III was able to 
meet the closure and sustainment requirements with the additions of the SkyCatTM1000 
and ATT.  ATT operations from an aviation variant MPF(F) allows for the elimination of 
the CH-53Xs and removes the reliance on strategic airlift and its associated 96-hr time 
delay.  The use of SkyCatTM1000 in transporting the MV-22 squadrons eliminates the 
added maintenance and wear on the aircraft during self-deployment. 
12.14 2025 Alternative Architecture III Potential New Issues Created 
The use of airships to transport aircraft from CONUS to the FLS has the potential 
to pose a high technology risk.  The emerging lighter-than-air technology being used for 
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airships has not been tested to military standards nor does it have the ability to land on 
deployed ships. 
The use of ATTs could pose a high technology risk due to the new untested 
design of the tilt-wing.  Landing the ATTs at an unprepared landing site and the stability 
of the landing surface could pose problems, due to the weight of a fully loaded aircraft.  
Operationally, the landing of a C-130-sized aircraft in a hot landing zone is an  
increased risk. 
The alongside transfer of materiel from the MPF(F) to the LCU(R) is dependant 
on sea state.  Additionally, 2 ILPs could mean less storage capacity and selective offload 
must account for 2 debarkation points.  The reduced fuel storage capability resulting from 
the elimination 3 MPF(F) vessels and the increased fuel consumption of fixed wing 
aircraft will increase the Sea Base refueling requirement. 
12.15 Nonmateriel and Materiel Trade Space 
During the course of the designing alternative architectures, several nonmateriel 
and materiel solutions were considered, but ultimately eliminated, for various reasons.  
Table 12-17 lists the nonmateriel solutions considered and the reason for elimination.  
Table 12-18 lists the materiel solutions that were eliminated. 
Nonmateriel Concepts Eliminated 
Doctrine Fly all MV-22s to the FLS from the Advance Base vice transporting to FLS. 
a)    Con: Requires additional fuel and manning to support the MV-22. 
b)    Con: Does not optimize the RSLS load capabilities; the RSLS is currently able to 
carry all MV-22s, CH-53Xs, and other helicopter assets. 
Rotate aircraft squadrons to the FLS. 
a) Pro: Eliminates the problem of moving/transporting the aircraft from point of 
origin to the FLS.  This would save valuable time and remove the dependence on 
strategic airlift assets. 
b) Con: This will require the establishment of facilities. 
c) Con: Squadron rotation would be difficult to manage as well as equipment 
maintenance. 
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Forward-deploy the CH-53X squadrons at or near the FLS locations. 
a) Pro: Eliminates the problem of moving/transporting the helicopter from point 
of origin to the FLS.  This would save transit time and remove dependence on 
strategic airlift assets. 
b) Con: This will require the establishment of facilities for the equipment and 
personnel to operate and support the installation, squadrons, and increased 
OPTEMPO. 
c) Con: The costs of building and operating a CH-53X Advance Base may not 
prove to be feasible or cost efficient. 
 
Table 12-17: Nonmateriel Solutions Eliminated from Considerations. 
 





The TSV is a high-speed, theater transport vessel.  Design Team I’s analysis of the 
Army’s version of the TSV shows that it has potential to resupply the Sea Base.  The 
TSV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) indicates that this vessel will have 
greater speed, range and cargo capacity than currently fielded HSV.  The analysis used 
the ORD published numbers for speed, range, and cargo capacity to compare the TSV 
to the T-AOE in the baseline composition.  The TSV has a speed of 40 kts, a range of 
8,700 NM at 24 kts and 4,726 NM at 40 kts, and a cargo capacity of  
1,500 short tons.  It is clear that the TSV offers a greater speed capability, but can it 
carry enough cargo to take advantage of that speed?  Comparing the cargo capacities 
of both vessels in the three classes of supply results in the following: 
 
• Fuel: Approximately 15 TSVs required to hold equivalent weight of barrels 
of one T-AOE.  Additionally, there exists a problem of fuel storage with  
the TSV. 
• Ammunition: Approximately 1.2 TSVs required to carry equivalent tons of 
one T-AOE. 
• Stores: 0.5 TSV required to carry equivalent tons of one T-AOE. 
• One T-AOE is equivalent to approximately 17 TSVs in supply capacity. 
 
The TSV was eliminated only because 2025 Alternative Architecture I already 
includes a similar vessel in speed, range, and capacity.  The Joint ACCESS has a lesser 
range and cargo capacity than the TSV, but meets the requirements of the  
Sea Base described by SEA 6.  The analysis of the TSV indicates that continued 
research in this type of technology can meet capability gaps of logistics. 
 
The TSV does not provide adequate air asset transport capability (insufficient height 
specifically for CH-53X stowage and insufficient area for air wing transport in 
general).  Additionally, this vessel does not possess an adequate beaching capability 
for use in the Employment Phase. 
                                                 
298 Tom Worthington, “USAV Spearhead (TSV-1X): High Speed U.S. Army Transport Ship,” [database 
online] (15 October 2003 [cited 14 November 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.tomw.net.au/2002/tsv1x. 
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MPF(F) Aviation/ 
C2 Variant  
This variant of the MPF(F) is considered since the Joint ACCESS will be transporting 
the majority of the JEB going ashore, resulting in the MPF(F) requiring more aviation 
support for resupply of the objective.  Using the analysis of the CNA MPF(F) AoA the 
design team compares the two aviation variant MPF(F), the Aviation/C2 and the 
Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB).  The Aviation/C2 variant has slightly greater 
aviation parking spots, but fewer operational spots.  The aviation capabilities of both 
ships are similar; therefore, the decision on which variant to select is made in the cargo 
and fuel carrying capabilities of the ships.  The Aviation/C2 is eliminated because the 
AFSB has greater cargo capacity and fuel storage capabilities. 
LHA(R)299 The LHA(R) is the replacement for the LHA-1 Wasp class amphibious big deck ships.  
The first ship in the LHA(R) Program (a modified “Plug Plus” LHD-8300) is used for 
consideration in this alternative architecture.  The LHA(R) provides sufficient aviation 
capability for the MEB ACE.  The well deck provides for lower loading times of the 
LCAC and LCU(R) in the Employment Phase of Sea Base operations.  The 
survivability of the LHA(R) exceeds that any of the other MPF(F) variants because of 
its self-defense weapons.  Elimination of the platform occurs because, compared to the 
AFSB, the LHA(R) has much less cargo and fuel carrying capacities.  In addition, the 
use of the Joint ACCESS removes the need for a well deck. 
AUTOLOG/Extra 
Heavy Lift UNREP 
System 
The use of Joint ACCESS as a re-supply shuttle ship eliminates the need to transfer 
bulk material in TEUs from commercial container ships to Sea Base assets.  This also 
eliminates the issue of performing skin-to-skin transfers in high sea states since the 
Joint ACCESS can conduct UNREPs up to sea state 5+. 
Partial Air Cushion 
Support Catamaran 
(PACSCAT) 
The PACSCAT does not possess a beaching capability for use in the Employment 




The AGAS system current payload capability is insufficient.  If, in the future, it can 
accommodate large payloads such as vehicles, it may have potential for use in the 
Employment Phase from large cargo aircraft. 
Heavy Landing 
Craft Air Cushioned 
(HLCAC) 
The HLCAC is used in the initial modeling of Alternative Architecture II and fails to 
meet the 10-hr requirement during employment.  The HLCAC still requires  
28 hrs to complete the initial employment.  The HLCAC continues to fail the 
requirement, even with the movement of the departure point for employment from  
25 NM to 10 NM.  At the 10 NM distance, the total time for employment is still  
23 hrs; only a 5-hr time savings. 
V-44 Considered, but eliminated due to the high technology risk, based on the MV-22 initial 
production difficulties. 
NAVSTORS Considered, but not used due to modeling limitations; potentially valuable. 
 
Table 12-18: Materiel Solutions Eliminated from Consideration. 
                                                 
299 Joint Staff Joint Requirements Oversight Council, “Mission Need Statement for Amphibious Assault 
Ship (LHA(R),” (Washington, DC: JROCM, 045-01, 05 March 2001). 
300 GlobalSecurity.org, “LHX / LHA (R)” [database online] (18 August 2004 [cited 15 November 2004]); 
available from World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lhx.htm. 
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13. Conclusions and Recommendations 
13.1 Overview 
In order to bring the many pieces of the Joint Expeditionary Logistic Operation 
(JELo) together, a final link in comparing the different architectures presented so far is 
needed.  A comparison of the architectures with each other, and the criteria associated 
with each phase, will bring insight in determining which systems are worth consideration 
for the 2025 notional Sea Base.  This chapter analyzes all of the architectures with respect 
to different performance measures. 
Time is the performance metric used to determine success with respect to the 
system performance standards stated in Chapter 2.  The 2015 Baseline Architecture  
(2015 BLA) and Alternative Architectures are compared against each other to determine 
which of the four meets the criteria given for each of the different phases of Closure, 
Employment, Seizing the Initiative, Sustainment, and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). 
Analyzing time alone does not give the complete picture.  Cost is chosen as a 
secondary measure to determine if future systems warrant future acquisition 
expenditures.  Cost variability in predicting future complex systems is historically high.  
The intent of using costing is to establish a means of comparison between architectures as 
well as aid a decision maker in determining which systems are promising. 
The dollar amounts represent the procurement and 10-year operating cost of the 
specific systems.  Complete architecture costing is found in Chapters 7 and 12.  The 
costing represented in this chapter is not the combined cost of all of the architecture’s 
systems.  It is, however, an itemized summation of the major contributing systems 
associated with a given phase.  Closure systems such as the Rapid Strategic Lift Ship 
(RSLS) and Marine Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)) are examples of specific 
closure platforms.  Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility 
Replacement (LCU(R)) are specific employment systems.  Only the high speed assault 
connector (HSAC) Joint ACCESS has a dual role during the Closure and Employment 
Phases since it is a major cargo carrier from the Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) to the  
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Sea Base, as well as a direct Sea Base to Employment platform.  This study is to provide 
insight on the cost and performance of specific systems during each phase, not to 
determine which of the architectures perform better at a lower cost.  Consideration is 
given to the major contributing systems of the Closure and Employment Phases and these 
costs are compared against each other using time as the performance metric for  
each phase. 
Technical risk can be used as another metric available in evaluating and 
comparing different systems.  Due to time constraints and resource availability, technical 
risk is not estimated during this study; however, it was bounded by the use of  
Advanced Concept Demonstrators (ACDs) and Advanced Concept Technology 
Demmonstrators (ACTDs) in the alternative architectures. 
13.2 General Alternative Architecture Comparison 
An architecture overview is provided to give a side by side comparison of the 
architectures with respect to phase performance. 
From Table 13-1, it is apparent all alternative architectures outperform the  
2015 BLA at a relatively lower cost.  A further analysis of time and cost for each of the 
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Baseline 16 30 17 $34-$42
Alternative 1 13 10 13 $28-$35
Alternative 2 9 12 10 $29-$36
Alternative 3 9 9 10 $28-$35  
 
Table 13-1: Architecture Summary of Phases and Total Architecture Cost (FY04$B). 
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13.3 Closure Phase Comparison 
The Closure Phase is defined as the elapsed time to form the Sea Base where the 
requirement of 9.6 days determines success.  This criterion is derived from the total time 
to seize the initiative (10 days) and subtracts the 10-hr goal of employment yielding  
9.6 days.  The major Closure platforms and systems are various MPF(F) ships,  
High Speed Assault Connector (HSAC), combat logistic force (CLF) ships, RSLS, 
strategic airlift (C-5 and C-17), and lighter-than-air heavy lift transports.  The most 
important conclusion from the comparative analysis is a need for a dedicated strategic lift 
asset.  Reliance on nonorganic strategic lift results in a gap of at least 6 days from the 
criteria goal of 9.6 days. 
 13.3.1 Closure Phase Performance Comparison 
As shown in Figure 13-1, it is clear 2 of the 4 architectures meet the criteria and  





























Closure Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison
n=30
Requirement < 9.6 Days
 
 
Figure 13-2: Closure Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison.301 
                                                 
301 Refer to the glossary for an explanation of box-plot symbols. 
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Alternative Architecture I shows a 3-day improvement over the 2015 BLA by 
utilizing a nonmateriel change of assembling the CH-53X on the MPF(F) while in transit 
to form the Sea Base vice at the FLS.  Both the 2015 BLA and Alternative Architecture I 
depend on joint strategic airlift to get nondeploying aircraft to the FLS.  Preparation of 
the joint strategic airlift (or establishing an “air bridge”) is assumed to take 4 days.  
Without this 4-day air bridge penalty, Alternative Architecture I succeeds during the 
Closure Phase by meeting the 9.6 day criteria. 
Alternative Architecture II utilizes an RSLS to deliver the non-self-deploying 
aircraft (NSDA) to the MPF(F) while transiting to/from the Sea Base.  The RSLS allows 
Alternative Architecture II to skip the assembly and reassembly of nondeploying aircraft 
and avoids the reliance on joint strategic airlift.  The use of the RSLS creates a single 
point of failure.  Instead of having the non-self-deploying aircraft transported via multiple 
platforms, they are all located on a single platform.  If the RSLS experiences mechanical 
problems or other delays, all the required assault air connectors arrive at the Sea Base 
late.  Additionally, if the enemy realizes the RSLS is a center of gravity, there are several 
instances during the transit that offer opportunities for enemy intervention.  Survivability 
analysis of the RSLS is not published and is recommended for further study. 
Alternative Architecture III uses six lighter-than-air vehicles, SkyCats, in 
transporting the NSDA and eliminates the time-consuming efforts of assembly and  
reassembly of the aircraft, as well as avoiding the reliance on joint strategic airlift.  The 
utilization of six Skycats reduces the single point of failure associated with the RSLS; 
however, no real survivability study has been conducted on this type of aircraft.  Further 
survivability and availability studies are needed. 
 13.3.2 Closure Phase Cost Comparison 
The itemized calculations for the major contributing systems of the Closure Phase 
are presented in Table 13-2.  A detailed list of the architecture’s systems is found in 
Chapter 12. 
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Architecture Platform QTY QTY Cost (FY04$) Total Cost (FY04$)
MPF(F) Total 4 $6,770,280,991
TSSE HSAC 12 $5,759,051,040
MPF(F) Totals 8 $18,190,937,046
RSLS 1 $1,696,479,703
MPF(F) Totals 4 $9,546,030,295
MPFF A/C 1 $2,269,016,670
Skycat 1000 6 $1,234,985,313





Cost of Architecture's Major Contributing Systems for Closure Phase
 
 
Table 13-2: Cost of Architecture’s Major Contributing Systems for Closure Phase. 
 
The costs of the contributing closure systems are compared to the elapsed time to 
close.  A comparative chart expressing cost versus performance is given in Figure 13-2. 
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Figure 13-2: Closure Phase Cost Comparison for All Architectures. 
 
It is apparent the 2015 BLA is nearly the most expensive as well as the worst 
performer.  Alternative Architecture I is about the same cost as  
Alternative Architecture III, but underperforms Alternative Architecture III due to the  
4-day penalty for its reliance of the joint strategic airlift.  Of the two architectures 
succeeding in the given Closure criteria of 9.6 days, Alternative Architecture III utilizing 
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SkyCat is cheaper than Alternative Architecture II RSLS.  Again, this cost does not 
incorporate technical risk or survivability.  In order to address these two facets, a 
complexity factor accounting for risk and survivability is recommended for further study. 
13.4 Employment Phase Comparison 
The Employment Phase is defined as the elapsed time to complete the initial 
insertion of three battalion landing teams (BLT) of a Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB).  
Two BLTs are inserted via surface connectors and one BLT by air connector with success 
measured against the 10-hr criteria to complete insertion.  The major Employment 
platforms are the MV-22, CH-53X, HSAC Joint ACCESS, LCU(R), LCAC, and 
Advanced Theater Transporter (ATT).  The main conclusion from the Employment Phase 
is that large payload assault connectors improve performance as they reduce the number 
and/or the requirement for at-sea transfers.  The cost associated with this phase favors 
LCU(R)s over Joint ACCESS and the ATTs. 
 13.4.1 Employment Phase Performance 
All three alternative architectures almost completely close the Employment gap 
from the 2015 BLA as illustrated in Figure 13.3.  The three architectures are nearly 
equivalent with respect to this metric.  One conclusion remains clear: all three 
alternatives outperform the 2015 BLA and reduce the employment gap to near 0. 



























Employment Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison
n=30
Requirement < 10 Hours
 
 
Figure 13-3: Employment Phase All Architectures. 
 
The driving factor during employment is the time spent conducting at-sea 
transfers.  The 2015 BLA uses LCAC as its primary assault connector, which requires 
127 total trips and transfers (loading and unloading operations).   
Alternative Architecture II and Alternative Architecture III use the larger LCU(R) and 
average between 50 and 60 trips to insert 2 BLTs.  Alternative Architecture I utilizes  
12 preloaded Joint ACCESS vessels, which are able to off-load 2 BLTs with no 
additional at-sea transfer.  The larger payload of the Joint ACCESS and the LCU(R) 
yields fewer trips, which reduce the at-sea transfer accompanying each trip. 
This insight is further reenforced from the sensitivity study on the impact of  
at-sea transfer delay during the Employment Phase found in Chapter 11.  Starting with an 
optimistic 30-minute loading delay for each platform, the criterion of 10 hrs is exceeded 
by 9 hrs.  The introduction of a higher payload capacity in the LCU(R) or HLCAC does 
show some benefit, but this is due to the larger initial equipment load out during the first 
wave.  Increasing payload capacity does not remove the need for at-sea transfer.  In fact, 
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larger payloads require a longer delay in order to load the platform.  The transfer system 
must have the capability to move high volumes of materiel in a short time in varying sea 
states.  A practical operational study is recommended to determine if a transfer system of 
this capacity is possible. 
 13.4.2 Employment Phase Cost Comparison 
The itemized calculations for the contributing systems of the Employment Phase 
are given in Table 13-3. 
Architecture Platform QTY QTY Cost (FY04$) Total Cost (FY04$)
























Table 13-3: Cost of Architecture’s Major Contributing Systems for Employment Phase. 
 
Taking the cost of the major contributing systems, an analysis is conducted to 
determine which of these architectures performs better in the given employment criteria.  
The costs of the contributing employment systems are compared to the elapsed time to 
insert 3 BLTs.  A comparative chart expressing performance versus cost is given in 
Figure 13-4. 
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Figure 13-4: Employment Phase Cost Comparison for All Architectures. 
 
Though the 2015 BLA is not the most expensive, its performance gap of  
20+ hrs excludes it from further analysis.  The remaining architectures have large payload 
capacity, which reduces the number of at-sea transfer needed.  Further insight to  
Figure 13-4 suggests that the increase in dollar cost is a trade off to reduce  
at-sea transfers.  As mentioned before, Alternative Architecture II and  
Alternative Architecture III utilize 50-60 at-sea transfers, while Joint ACCESS removes 
all at-sea transfers during the Employment Phase. 
Another explanation to the difference in cost is the level of survivability 
associated with the platforms.  LCU(R) and ATT have limited self-defense capability, 
while Joint ACCESS provides a full complement of self-defense capability as well as 
augmenting Sea Shield.  Further study on the viability and cost associated with the 
integrated landing platform (ILP) for at-sea transfer is recommended, as well as the 
additional cost to harden the LCU(R) and ATT to an acceptable survivability level. 
    353
 13.4.3 LCU(R) and HLCAC Side Study 
In a side study, the LCU(R) is compared to the HLCAC.  The LCU(R) 


































Comparison of HLCAC and LCU(R) Performance
n=30
Requirement < 10 Hours
 
 
Figure 13-5: Performance Comparison of the HLCAC and LCU(R). 
 
In order to conduct this analysis, a separate model simulation is run keeping all 
conditions and number of units the same except for the HLCAC and LCU(R) variables 
and parameters associated with each one.  The total acquisition and 10-year operating 
cost for 16 HLCACs is $1.01 billion (FY04$B) and the cost for 16 LCU(Rs) is  
$0.27 billion (FY04$B).  A trade study is recommended, taking into account the beach 
accessibility an HLCAC provides over an LCU(R).  Only 15%-17% of the world’s 
coastline is compatible for LCU(R), while 70%-80% is compatible for an HLCAC.302 
                                                 
302 U.S. Navy Fact File:  Landing Craft, Air Cushioned, [online] (30 December 2003  
[cited 09 November 2004]), available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-lcac.html. 
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13.5 Seize the Initiative Comparison 
The Seize the Initiative Phase is a combination of the Closure and  
Employment Phases.  It is used to measure the overall effectiveness of seizing an 
initiative within 10 days after the execute order.  This measure demonstrates an overview 
of the combination of materiel and nonmateriel made in each architecture to insert a JEB 
at an objective.  The criterion of 10 days determines success.  The main conclusion from 
the Seize the Initiative Phase repeats the importance of organic strategic lift, as well as 
reducing at-sea transfer by utilizing high payload capacity assault connectors. 
 13.5.1 Seize the Initiative Phase Performance 
As shown in Figure 13-6, it is clear that 2 of the 4 architectures meet the criteria 


























Seize the Initiative Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison
n=30
Requirement < 10 Days
 
 
Figure 13-6: Seize the Initiative Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison. 
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 13.5.2 Seize the Initiative Phase Cost Comparison 
The itemized calculations for the contributing systems used to seize the initiative 
are given in Table 13-4. 
Architecture Platform QTY QTY Cost (FY04$) Total Cost (FY04$)
MPF(F) Total: 4 $6,770,280,991









MPF(F) Totals: 4 $9,546,030,295
MPFF A/C 1 $2,269,016,670
T-AOE 1 $1,607,649,483





















Table 13-4: Cost of Architecture’s Major Contributing Systems for Seize the Initiative Phase. 
 
The costs of the major contributing systems are compared to the elapsed time to 
complete closure.  A comparative chart expressing cost versus performance is given in 
Figure 13-7. 
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Figure 13-7: Seize the Initiative Phase Cost Comparison for All Architectures. 
 
The Seize the Initiative Phase allows for the full story to be told.  Reliance on 
joint strategic airlift will not allow success in reaching the objecting within 10 days, 
while the only architectures with organic strategic lift succeed.  Again, the  
2015 Baseline Architecture is the least capable and most expensive. 
13.6 Sustainment Phase 
No problems in sustaining the Sea Base or forces at the objective are noted during 
this analysis.  Figures 13-8 and 13-9 show all alternative architectures meet and exceed 
the goal of maintaining at least 30 days of food, fuel, water, and ammunition at both the 
Sea Base and objective. 
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Figure 13-8: Time to Exhaust Stores at Sea Base. 
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Figure 13-9: Time to Exhaust Stores Ashore. 
 
Additional insights on the number of deck spots needed and delay time associated 
with loading and refueling sustainment platforms are found during the sensitivity analysis 
in Chapter 11.  The data from the study suggests that a minimum of six dedicated logistic 
aircraft deck spots are required amongst the MPF(F) to be in operation over a  
24-hr period, for 30 days, to sustain the objective from 150 NM from the Sea Base.  
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These dedicated logistic deck spots will be in competition for availability with 
nonlogistical operational service aircraft and a study is recommended to determine the 
total number of deck spots needed to support logistical and nonlogistical operations from 
the Sea Base. 
In keeping with Marine Corps operating objectives, sustainment must be 
accomplished up to 200 NM from the objective.  The MV-22 aircraft does not possess the 
heavy lift capability at ranges greater than 150 NM.  The sensitivity analysis suggests that 
50 CH-53X-equivalent aircraft, dedicated specifically for logistic operations, are required 
to sustain at least one day of supplies from 200 NM to the objective. 
13.7 MEDEVAC Phase Performance Comparison 
All three alternative architectures utilized the MV-22 as the primary MEDEVAC 
transporter and all three exceeded the criteria of 1 hr.  There is no statistical difference 
between the architectures.  It is recommended the MV-22 aircraft assume the role as 






































MEDEVAC Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison
n=30
Requirement < 1 Hour
 
 
Figure 13-10: MEDEVAC Phase Alternative Architecture Comparison. 
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13.8 Recommendation Summary 
Finally, the following is a summary of the recommendations for further study 
SEA-6 suggests from the results experienced during this project. 
• Explore a Unified Expeditionary Command concept.  An additional 
component command, comprised of the required dedicated strategic and 
assault assets, is recommended to be able to react and respond to the 
envisioned expeditionary war in 2025, such as U.S. Special Operations 
Command’s (USSOCOM) ownership of their dedicated assets in 
supporting geographic commands, ambassadors, and their country teams. 
• Conduct a trade study on alternative command structures to share 
resources if the above is not realistic. 
• Consider SkyCat and other airship concepts.  Though these airships have 
shown some promise in our study, a survivability and reliability analysis is 
recommended to determine if they can be applied in a military context. 
• Further analyze the survivability of the MPF(F), RSLS, and other 
dedicated sealift concepts to determine the magnitude of specific  
self-defense and damage control capability needed to meet military 
survivability criteria or if these vessels could be escorted with nonorganic 
self-defense assets. 
• Consider alternative vertical lift compositions in order to utilize  
high-speed troop transporters (MV-22) during employment, then 
reallocate where they are needed, as they are not suitable for the heavy lift 
requirements (specifically external bulk payload) during sustainment. 
• Conduct a trade study of MPF(F) selective off-load technology versus 
manning, overall cargo capacity, and survivability.  Selective off-load 
needs to stay in step with the future manning force to operate and support.  
Selective off-load requires large storage compartments to compensate its 
poor space utilization, which implies damage control and  
survivability complexity. 
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• Develop a conceptual design for a Sea Base Common Logistics Picture 
(CLP) architecture needed for real time data flow for sense and respond 
logistic operations to avoid “Iron Mountains.” 
• Conduct at-sea experimentation to measure transfer performance with 
varying sea state to determine operation practicability and affordability for 
tactical at-sea transfer (specifically the ILPs). 
• Conduct SEABASE-6 model fractional factorial experiment to determine 
interaction of key design features to provide further insight on the degree 
of impact a certain platform parameter has on the system since this study 
varied external Sea Base factors and not specific platforms. 
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Appendix B: Architecture Variable Specifications 
 The Systems Engineering Analysis Baseline Architecture System Evaluator Six  
(SEABASE-6) model uses parameters to represent the variables of the different 
architectures.  These parameters are derived from research and analysis.  The connector  
taxonomy decomposes into Inter-theatre, Intra-theatre, Sea Base, and Assault.  Each of  
these categories decomposes into Surface and Air.  In addition to connectors,  
Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Six (SEA-6) conducted an analysis of the 
variables associated with the time delays at the Sea Base and objective ashore for 
Inventory and Storage and Transfer mechanisms. 
 
B.1 Surface Connectors 
Parameters are derived for the following: 
 
• Maritime Prepositioning Force, Future (MPF(F)) 
¾ “Unconstrained-Size,” Distributed Capability Ship 
¾ Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) 
¾ Aviation Variant 
• Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS) 
• Joint ACCESS (High Speed Assault Connector) 
• Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 
• Landing Craft Unit, Replacement (LCU(R)) 
• Heavy, Landing Craft, Air Cushion (HLCAC) 
 
Payload capacities are determined for the surface connectors using  
standardized payloads. 
 
Capacity for Food is based on the Joint Inter-Modal Container (JMIC)303 of  
Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MRE)304.  Each JMIC has a volume of 56.5 ft3.  Each case of MREs 
has a volume of 1.02 ft3 and weighs 22 lbs; therefore, each JMIC can carry 1,218.8 lbs of 
MREs (56.2/1.02 ft3 * 22 lbs).  Each JMIC has a footprint of 16.5 ft2. 
 
Liquid Cargo Values for Fuel or Water are based on the capacity of the  
XM1091 Fuel/Water Tanker Truck.  The XM1091 has a liquid capacity of 1,500 gallons.  
External dimensions of the XM1091305 are 26.4’ long x 8.8’ wide, for a total footprint  
of 232.2 ft2. 
                                                 
303 Linkowitz, Nick, HQMC/LPV, “Joint Inter-Modal Container (JMIC), 07 July 2004, pp. 4-6. 
304 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
305 “XM1091 Truck,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1091.htm. 
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Class V Artillery cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM306 round and charges 
loaded on standard military ammunition skids307 within JMIC.  Each JMIC has a footprint 
of 16.5 ft2.  Weight and area figures were calculated from a composition of three skids of 
DPICM, each carrying eight rounds and one skid of charges containing 24 charges called 
a JIMC quad.  Each skid of DPICM weighs 798 lbs.  Each skid of charges weighs  
1,370 lbs.308  Therefore, each group of 3 DPICM skids with 1 charge skid weighs  
3,764 lbs and has a footprint of 66 ft2. 
 
Class V Small Arms cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard military 
skids within JMIC.  Each JMIC has a footprint of 16.5 ft2.  One box of 200 rounds of 
7.62mm weighs309 16.8 lbs, with dimensions of 11 inches long x 7 inches high x 4 inches 
wide310.  Each skid (40 in x 48 in) can hold 40 boxes per layer with five stacked layers, 
yielding 200 boxes of ammunition per skid.  Therefore, each JMIC of 7.62mm weighs  
200 boxes * 16.8 lbs = 3,360 lbs. 
 
Reliability of Platforms (Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)): For the full factorial 
experimental design, MTBF is set to 9,999 hrs (perfect reliability).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the scenario simulation, the following 
equation is used to determine MTBF where A∞  is asymptotic average availability,  












 B.1.1 “Unconstrained-Size,” Distributed-Capability MPF(F)  
Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes the selection of the Unconstrained Size, Distributed 
Capabilities design ship as detailed in the Center for Naval Analysis MPF(F) Analysis  
of Alternatives.311 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
                                                 
306 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001, 
(UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 20 April 2001). 
307 “Ordnance Pallets, Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
308 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001, 
(UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 20 April 2001). 
309 “Small Arms, 7.62mm Coax MG,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @http://armor/kiev/ua/fofanov/Tanks/ARM/pkt.html. 
310 “7.62mm Ammo Box,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web 
@ http://www.surpluscenter.com. 
311 Robert M. Sounders, Suzanne Schulze, Yana Ginburg, and John Goetke, “MPF(F) Analysis of 
Alternatives: Final Report,” (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CNR D00009814.A2/Final,  
April 2004), pp. 29-48. 
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Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
 
MTBF: For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the MPF(F) never 
fails in a 40-day operation.  MTBF = 9,999 hrs. 
 
MTTR: Since it is assumed that MPF(F) does not fail, MTTR is not estimated. 
 
Air Spots (IA): Five per MPF(F) per Unconstrained Size, Distributed Capabilities 
design.312  Two VERTREP spots due to pallet staging, sling space, etc. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): One per MPF(F) per Unconstrained Size, Distributed Capabilities 
design.313 
 
Capacity (C): Approximated from full and lightship displacements of  
Unconstrained Size, Distributed Capabilities design. 
 
82,850 tons (full) – 61,179 tons (light) = 21,671 tons 
cargo weight capacity = 21,671 tons – 5,316 tons (JEB equipment) – 5,781 tons 
(cargo fuel) – 5,207 tons (own ship fuel) 
= 5,367 tons 
= 11,807,400 lbs 
 
Class I Cargo is based on the JMIC of MREs.314  Assuming a percentage of 
26.5% (Combat Logistics Force T-AOE(X) distribution315), each MPF(F) can 
store 3,130,699 lbs of MREs. 
 
Liquid Cargo Values for Class III and Water are based on the design capacity 
of the fuel/water holding tanks of MPF(F).316 
 
Class V Artillery Cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM round and 
charges loaded on standard military ammunition skids317 within a JMIC.  
Assuming an historical percentage318 of 60.8%, each MPF(F) can carry  
7,183,000 lbs of artillery. 
 
                                                 
312 Ibid., pp. 28-37. 
313 Ibid. 
314 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
315 “T-AOE,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/taoe-specs.htm. 
316 Sounders et al., pp. 9-19. 
317 “Ammo Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web 
@Ammo Skids http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
318 CAPT Jim Stewart, USN, LCDR Frank Futcher, USN, and Mr. Will Macht, “72nd Military Operations 
Research Society (MORS) Symposium, Seabasing Logistics Concept of Operations,” (Arlington, VA:  
CNO N421 (OPNAV N421), 1997-2004 Military Operations Research Society, 26 July 2004. 
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Class V Small Arms Cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard 
military skids within a JMIC.  Assuming a historical percentage319 of 12.6%, each 
MPF(F) can carry 1,493,800 lbs of small arms. 
 
Speed (V): 20 kts listed as maximum intermittent speed, 17 kts listed as cruise.320  
Assume all transits at 17 kts. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 1,687,200 gallons total self, not cargo fuel capacity.321 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity and design endurance.  
Assuming a continuous transit at 17 kts for design endurance of 29.5 days  
(705.8 hrs): 1,687,200 gal/705.8 hrs = 2,383 gal/hrs = 140 gal/NM.  During MODLOC, 
assume MPF(F) maintains station at approximately 7 kts.  This is approximately 40% of 
cruise speed.  Correlating this to fuel usage results in a MODLOC fuel usage rate of  
56 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range322 of 12,000 NM at 17 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 29.5 days.323 
 
 B.1.2 AFSB Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes the selection of the AFSB design ship as detailed in the 
CNA MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives.324 
 
Initial Quantity (No): The employment of High Speed Assault Connector Joint ACCESS 
reduced the number of MPF(F) ships required and Alternative Architecture I used  
2 baseline MPF(Fs) and 2 AFSBs.  The AFSB is chosen because it contains the required 
number of air spots to support sustainment operations. 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation, the following values are used: 
 
MTBF: For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the MPF(F) never 
fails in a 40-day operation.  MTBF = 9,999 hrs. 
 
                                                 
319 Ibid. 
320 Sounders et al., pp. 55-57. 
321 Ibid., pp. 9-19. 
322 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
323 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
324 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
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MTTR: Since it is assumed that MPF(F) does not fail, MTTR is not estimated. 
 
Air Spots (IA): 11 per MPF(F) per AFSB design.325  Seven are actually used in the 
modeling because the other four are required for parking spots. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): None per MPF(F) per AFSB design.326 
 
Capacity (C): Approximated from full and lightship displacements of AFSB design. 
 
Class I Cargo is based on the JMIC of the MRE.327  Assuming a percentage of 
26.5% (Combat Logistics Force AOE(X) distribution),328 each MPF(F) can store  
3,130,699 lbs of MREs. 
 
Liquid Cargo Values for Class III and Water are based on the design capacity 
of the fuel/water holding tanks of the AFSB MPF(F).329 
 
Class V Artillery Cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM round and 
charges loaded on standard military ammunition skids330 within a JMIC.  
Assuming an historical percentage331 of 60.8%, each MPF(F) can carry  
7,183,000 lbs of artillery. 
 
Class V Small Arms Cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard 
military skids within a JMIC.  Assuming a historical percentage332 of 12.6%, each 
MPF(F) can carry 1,493,800 lbs of small arms. 
 
Speed (V): 20 kts listed as maximum intermittent speed, 17 kts listed as cruise.333  
Assume all transits at 17 kts. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 1,687,200 gallons total fuel capacity.334 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity and design endurance.  
Assuming a continuous transit at 17 kts for design endurance of 29.5 days  
(705.8 hrs): 1,687,200 gallons/705.8 hrs = 2,383 gal/hr = 140 gal/NM.  During 
MODLOC, assume MPF(F) maintains station at approximately 7 kts.  This is 
                                                 
325 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
326 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
327 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
328 “T-AOE,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/taoe-specs.htm. 
329 Saunders et al., pp. 9-19. 
330 “Ammo Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
331 Stewart et al., pp. 9-19. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
334 Ibid., pp. 9-19. 
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approximately 40% of cruise speed.  Correlating this to fuel usage results in a MODLOC 
fuel usage rate of 56 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range335 of 12,000 NM at 17 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 29.5 days.336 
 
 B.1.3 Aviation Variant Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes the selection of the Unconstrained Size, Distributed 
Capabilities design ship as detailed in the CNA MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives.337  The 
design was modified by Design Team III with the removal the superstructure to provide a 
flat carrier like deck with out an island. 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
 
MTBF: For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the MPF(F) never 
fails in a 40-day operation.  MTBF = 9,999 hrs. 
 
MTTR: Since it is assumed that MPFF does not fail, MTTR is not estimated. 
 
Air Spots (IA): Five per MPF(F) per Unconstrained Size, Distributed Capabilities 
design.338 
 
Surface Spots (IS): 0. 
 
Capacity (C): Approximated from full and lightship displacements of Unconstrained 
Size, Distributed Capabilities design. 
 
82,850 tons (full) – 61,179 tons (light) = 21,671 tons.  21,671 tons – 5,316 tons 
(equipment) – 5,781 tons (cargo fuel) – 5,207 tons (own ship fuel) = 5,367 tons cargo 
weight capacity = 11,807,400 lbs. 
 
Capacity for Class I Cargo is based on the JMIC of MREs.339  Assuming a 
percentage of 26.5% (Combat Logistics Force AOE(X) distribution),340 each 
MPF(F) can store 3,130,699 lbs of MREs. 
                                                 
335 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid., pp. 28-38. 
338 Ibid., pp. 20-28. 
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Liquid Cargo Values for Class III and Water are based on the design capacity 
of the fuel/water holding tanks of MPF(F).341 
 
Class V Artillery Cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM round and 
charges loaded on standard military ammunition skids342 within JMIC.  Assuming 
an historical percentage343 of 60.8%, each MPF(F) can carry 7,183,000 lbs  
of artillery. 
 
Class V Small Arms Cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard 
military skids within JMIC.  Assuming a historical percentage344 of 12.6%, each 
MPF(F) can carry 1,493,800 lbs of small arms. 
 
Speed (V): Thirty kts as maximum intermittent speed; 20 kts listed as cruise.345  Assume 
all transits at 17 kts. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 1,687,200 gallons total fuel capacity.346 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity and design endurance.  
Assuming a continuous transit at 17 kts for design endurance of 29.5 days  
(705.8 hrs): 1,687,200 gal/705.8 hrs = 2,383 gal/hr = 140 gal/NM.  During MODLOC, 
assume the MPF(F) ship maintains station at approximately 7 kts.  This is approximately 
40% of cruise speed.  Correlating this to fuel usage results in a MODLOC fuel usage rate 
of 56 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range347 of 12,000 NM at 17 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 29.5 days.348 
 B.1.4 RSLS Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes the use of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
Hangar Version of the RSLS.349  All numbers and calculations below come from the 
NAVSEA RSLS Feasibility Study report. 
                                                                                                                                                 
339 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
340 “T-AOE,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/taoe-specs.htm. 
341 Saunders et al., pp. 9-19. 
342 “Ammo Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
343 Stewart et al., pp. 9-19. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Saunders et al., pp. 55-57. 
346 Ibid., pp. 9-19. 
347 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
348 Ibid., pp. 9-19. 
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Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
 
MTBF: For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the MPF(F) never 
fails in a 40-day operation.  MTBF = 9,999 hrs. 
 
MTTR: Since it is assumed that MPF(F) does not fail, MTTR is not estimated. 
 
Air Spots (IA): 2. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable. 
 
Capacity (C): Approximated from full and lightship displacements of the RSLS Hangar 
version design: 32,219 tons (full) – 19,706 tons (light) = 12,513 tons.  12,513 tons –  
405 tons (cargo fuel) – 7,782 tons (own ship fuel) = 4,326 tons max cargo/containerized 
weight capacity = 8,652,000 lbs.  The RSLS has a container capacity of 250 TEUs; each 
TEU has a volume of 34 cu meters or 1,200 cu ft.  Total RSLS TEU volume: 250 TEU X  
1,200 cu ft/TEU = 326,400 cu ft.  Each JMIC has a volume of 56.5 cu ft.  The number of 
equivalent JMICs that can fit into this RSLSs TEU volume (4 holds): 300,000 cu ft/ 
56.5 cu ft = 5,309 JMICs.  Capacities to be carried are calculated based on one 
commodity at a time; as a mix of commodities will need to be carried for the RSLS (as a 
CLF ship) to properly replenish the Sea Base, capacity ratios of food versus water versus 
fuel, will have to be determined by planners at a later time. 
 
Capacity for Class I Cargo Food is based on the JMIC of MRE.350  Based on an 
RSLS hold capacity of 5,309 JMICs, each RSLS can store 6,470,609 lbs of 
MREs: 5,309 JMICs X 1,219 lbs MREs/JMIC = 6,471,671 lbs; 1 DOS for food = 
27,113 lbs; total RSLS MRE DOS: (1 DOS/27,113 lbs) = 6,471,671 lbs =  
238 DOS. 
 
Liquid Cargo Values for Class III Fuel is based on RSLS internal cargo JP5 
stowage tank capacity of 405 Short Tons = 810,000 lbs = 119,118 gal; as 1 DOS 
for fuel = 134,000 gal, the RSLS falls short of the JEB daily fuel  
replenishment requirement. 
 
Liquid Cargo Values for Class I Water is based on standard 40 in X 48 in pallet 
size of cases of 20 oz bottles of drinking water.  If max cargo weight is  
                                                                                                                                                 
349 Naval Sea Systems Command, “Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS) No-Hangar Version” chapter, in  
Rapid Strategic Lift Ship Feasibility Study, [NAVSEA report /database online] (Report 05D/097,  
29 September 2004, [cited 07 December 2004] ), pp. 20-29. 
350 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
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8,652,000 lbs, and 1 water DOS = 34,013 gal, then number of water DOS that the 
RSLS can carry: 8,652,000 lbs X 1 ton/2,000 lbs = 4,326 tons X 270 gal/ton = 
1,168,020 gal maximum capacity/34,013 gal = 34 DOS X 34,013 gal/1 DOS = 
1,156,442 gal. 
 
Class V Artillery Cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM round and 
charges loaded on standard military ammunition skids351 within JMIC.  Given the 
RSLS hold capacity of 5,309 JMICs or 1,327 JMIC quads.  Therefore, each RSLS 
can store 4,994,828 lbs of artillery cargo: 5,309 JMICs /4=1,327 JMIC quads X 
3,764 lbs = 4,994,828 lbs. 
 
Class V Small Arms Cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard 
military skids within JMIC.  Given the RSLS hold capacity of 5,309 JMICs, each 
RSLS can store 17,838,240 lbs of small arms ammunition, which is more than the 
ship can carry.  So, given a maximum capacity of 8,652,000 lbs/3,360 lbs =  
2,575 JMICs of small arms cargo or 8,652,000 lbs. 
 
Speed (V): 36; assume all transits at 36 kts. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 2,167,053 gallons total fuel capacity (7,782 tons X  
278.47 gal/ton = 2,167,053 gal). 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity and design endurance.  
Assuming a continuous transit at 36 kts for design endurance of 9.25 days (222 hrs): 
2,167,053 gal/222 hrs = 9,761 gal/hr = 286 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range of 8,000 NM at 36 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 9.25 days = 222 hrs. 
 
 B.1.5 Joint ACCESS Parameter Analysis 
 This analysis assumes that Total Ships Systems Engineering (TSSE) design for 
the Joint ACCESS [Appendix F]. 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation, the following values are used: 
 
                                                 
351 “Ammo Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
Ammo Skids http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
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MTBF: For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the MPF(F) never 
fails in a 40-day operation.  MTBF = 9,999 hrs. 
 
MTTR: Since it is assumed that MPF(F) does not fail, MTTR is not estimated. 
 
Air Spots (IA): One air spot capable of supporting SH-60R, MV-22 and CH-53E. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable. 
 
Capacity (C): The Joint ACCESS maximum afloat weight is assumed to be  
1,792,000 lbs.  Joint ACCESS design cargo area dimensions = 21,958 ft2. 
 
Food.  Each Joint ACCESS can carry 1,330 JMICs of MREs single stacked 
yielding 1,621,270 lbs.  Partial Double stacked JMIC yields 1,791,930 lbs. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
1,791,930 lbs/1,792,000 lbs = 99% 
Limit Weight = 1,792,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 1,791,930 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 21,495 ft2/ 
21,958 ft2 = 97.8% 
Area Limit = 21,958 ft2 
Area Actual = 1,330 JMIC * 16.5 ft2 = 21,495 ft2 
 
Fuel or Water.  1,792,000 lbs/24,194 lbs = 74 XM1091 per Joint ACCESS, 
therefore, 74*1,500 gallons = 111,000 gallons. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
1,790,356 lbs/1,792,000 lbs = 99.9% 
Limit Weight = 1,792,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 24,194 lbs per XM1091 * 74 XM1091 =  
1,790,356 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 17,182.8 ft2/ 
21,958 ft2 = 78% 
Area Limit = 21,958 ft2 
Area Actual = 232.2 ft2 per XM1091 * 74 XM1091 = 17,182.8 ft2 
 
Ammunition Artillery.  Each Joint ACCESS can carry 332 JMIC quads single 
stacked yielding 1,249,648 lbs.  Partial Double stacked yields 1,791,664 lbs. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
1,791,664 lbs/1,792,000 lbs = 99.9% 
Limit Weight = 1,792,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 1,791,664 lbs 
 
    387
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 21,912 ft2/ 
21,958 ft2 = 99.7% 
Area Limit = 21,958 ft2 
Area Actual = 21,958 ft2/66 ft2 per JMIC = 332 JMIC quad =  
21,912 ft2 (332 * 66) 
 
Ammunition Small Arms.  By area each Joint ACCESS can carry 1,330 JMICs 
(21,958ft2/16.5 ft2) yielding 4,468,800 lbs; however, this exceeds the weight limit 
of the Joint ACCESS.  Therefore, assuming Joint ACCESS is loaded below 
maximum weight with 7.62mm ammunition (1,792,000 lbs), and then the  
Joint ACCESS could carry 533 JMICs yielding 1,790,880 lbs of  
7.62mm ammunition (533 * 3,360 lbs). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
1,790,880 lbs/1,792,000 lbs = 99.9% 
Limit Weight = 1,792,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 1,790,880 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 8,794.5 ft2/ 
21,958 ft2 = 40% 
Area Limit = 21,958 ft2 
Area Actual = 16.5 ft2 per JMIC * 533 JMIC = 8,794.5 ft2 
 
Troops.  The Joint ACCESS can carry 260 combat troops. 
 
Speed (V): 43 kts listed as maximum intermittent speed, 34 kts listed as cruise. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 158,500 gallons total fuel capacity. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity minus remaining fuel 
and design endurance.  Assuming a continuous transit at 34 kts for design endurance of 
2,636 NM.  (158,500–26,417 gallons) 132,083 gal/2,636 NM = 0.019 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range of 2636 NM averaging 34 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 2,636 NM at 34 kts and 1,660 NM at 43 kts.  
Endurance is calculated with a remaining fuel capacity of 26,417 gallons. 
 B.1.6 LCAC Parameter Analysis 
Information is from www.globalsecurity.org Website, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
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Availability is modeled using estimated reliabilities and maintainabilities.  See 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability Analysis [Chapter 6]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
 
MTBF = (Ao*(MTTR + MLOG))/(1 – Ao) 
 
 Assuming that: 
 
  MTTR = 16 hrs (based on fleet experience) 
 




  MTBF = (Ao*(MTTR + MLOG))/(1 – Ao) 
 
   = (0.6(16 hrs + 1.33 hrs))/(1-0.6) 
 
   ≈ 26 hrs between failures 
 
Air Spots (IA): None. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): None. 
 
Capacity (C): LCAC cargo area dimensions, 1,809 sq ft.  Weight Capacity =  
120,000 lbs.352 
 
Food.  Each LCAC can carry 98 JMICs of MREs single stacked yielding 
119,442.4 lbs.  (120,000 lbs/1,218.8 lbs/JMIC (MRE) = 98 JMIC MREs)  
(1,218.8 lbs * 98 JMIC MRE = 119,442.4 lbs JMIC MRE). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
119,442 lbs/120,000 lbs = 99.5% 
Limit Weight = 120,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 119,442 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 1,617 ft2/ 
1,809 ft2 = 89% 
Area Limit = 1,809 ft2 
Area Actual = 98 JMIC * 16.5 ft2 = 1,617 ft2 
 
                                                 
352 “Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC),” (17 July 2004 [cited 02 October 2004]); available from the 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcac.htm. 
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Water.  1,809 ft2/232.2 ft2 = 7 XM1091 per LCAC, but the XM1091 has a total 
weight of 24,194 lbs and weight capacity of LCAC is 120,000; therefore, 
120,000/24,194 = 4 XM1091 *1,500 gallons per XM1091 = 6,000 gallons. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
96,776 lbs/120,000 lbs = 80.6% 
Limit Weight = 120,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 24,194 lbs per XM1091 * 4 XM1091 = 96,776 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 928.8 ft2/ 
1,809 ft2 = 51% 
Area Limit = 1,809 ft2 
Area Actual = 232.2 ft2 per XM1091 * 4 XM1091 = 928.8 ft2 
 
Artillery.  Each LCAC can carry 27 JMIC quads single stacked yielding  
101,628 lbs.  Partial double stacked yields 116,684 lbs (31 JMIC). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
116,684 lbs/120,000 lbs = 97% 
Limit Weight = 120,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 116,684 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
1,782 ft2/1,809 ft2 = 98.5% 
Area Limit = 1,809 ft2 
Area Actual = 1,809 ft2/66 ft2 per JMIC = 27 JMIC quad = 
1,782 ft2 (27 * 66) 
 
Small Arms.  LCAC can carry 35 JMICs yielding 117,600 lbs of  
7.62mm ammunition (35 * 3,360 lbs). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
117,600 lbs/120,000 lbs = 98% 
Limit Weight = 120,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 117,600 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
577.5 ft2/1,809 ft2 = 31.9% 
Area Limit = 1,809 ft2 
Area Actual = 16.5 ft2 per JMIC * 35 JMIC = 577.5 ft2 
 
Supply Capacity Distribution: Based on operational and commercial experience, it is 
assumed that there is some variability on the loads carried by the assault connectors.  
Specifically, each connector is assumed carry, on average, 85% of its maximum capacity 
(calculated in each platform write up).  It was further assumed that they would carry less 
than 95% of their capacity 95% of the time, giving a standard deviation of 5%.  
Therefore, the values listed for supply capacities are derived by: 
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• Calculating the maximum capacity of that particular supply class given 
palletized packaging. 
• Ammunition: the average of small arms (7.62mm) and artillery  
(155 DPICM) was used to calculate the distribution. 
• Multiplying that maximum by 0.85 to get the mean and 0.05 to get the 
standard deviation. 
• Ammunition: Norm (99,751, 5,657); Food: Norm (101,526, 5,972);  
Water: Norm (11,475, 675). 
 
Speed (V): 40 kts with payload, sea state 2.  Above sea state 2 planning speed is 25 kts 
fully loaded.  Empty without payload speed is 40 kts sea state 2 and below and 35 kts 
above sea state 2. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): 5,000 gals. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): SS 2≤  = 1000 gallons/hr at (40kts) = 25 gal/NM. 
SS 2≤  = Range of LCAC empty is 300 NM at 35 kts.  Endurance = 300 NM/35 kts =  
8.5 hrs 
5,000 gals/8.5 hrs = 588 gal/hr at (35 kts) empty = 16.8 gal/NM. 
SS ≥ 3 = Planning speed is 25 kts.  Assuming LCAC can travel fully loaded 200 NM at 
25 kts gives the following fuel usage rate: 
200 NM/25 kts = 8 hrs 
5,000 gal/8 hrs = 625 gal/hr at (25 kts) = 25 gal/NM 
 
Range: 
SS 2≤   
R = 200 NM at 40 kts Fully Loaded 
R = 300 NM at 35 kts Empty 
SS ≥ 3  
R = 300 NM at 25 kts Fully loaded 
 
Endurance (E): 5000 gals/1000 gal/hr = 5 hrs at 40 kts fully loaded 
300 NM/35 kts = 8.5 hrs empty 
200 NM/25 kts = 8 hrs (assuming LCAC can has range of 200 NM fully loaded at  
25 kts) 
 B.1.7 LCU(R) Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes that TEXTRON Marine and Land Systems Planning 
Landing Craft design for the LCU(R).353 
 
                                                 
353 “Landing Craft Utility (LCU),” (18 August 2004 [cited ]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.tmls.textron.com. 
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Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
 
The reliability of LCU(R) was calculated by assuming an improvement of 15% over the 
LCAC since the system is completely redesigned from the LCU 1600 class and LCAC 
was a better analogous system to the LCU(R).  Automation and simplicity of design 
features will make LCU(R) a craft that will be simple, rugged, and reliable and designed 
with low maintenance features to improve availability.354 
 
 This 15% improvement is expressed as a 15% increase in MTBF 
 
  MTBFLCU-R = (1.15)* MTBFLCAC 
    
    = (1.15)*(26 hrs) 
 
    = 29.9 ≈ 30 hrs 
 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for a surface assault connector. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for a surface assault connector. 
 
Capacity (C): The LCU(R) maximum afloat weight is assumed to be 495,000 lbs.355  
LCU(R) design cargo area dimensions,356 106’ long x 26.4’ wide = 2,800 ft2. 
 
Food: Each LCU(R) can carry 169 JMICs of MREs single stacked yielding 205,977 lbs. 
Double stacked JMIC yields 411,954 lbs. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
411,954 lbs/495,000 lbs = 83% 
Limit Weight = 495,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 411,954 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,788.5 ft2/2,800 ft2 = 99.5% 
Area Limit = 2,800 ft2 
Area Actual = 169 JMIC * 16.5 ft2 = 2,788.5 ft2 
 
                                                 
354 Global Security.org, “Landing Craft Utility, Replacement LCU(R),” (18 August 2004) available on the 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcu-x.htm, (cited 04 October, 2004). 
355 “Landing Craft Utility (LCU),” (18 August 2004 [cited ]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.tmls.textron.com. 
356 Ibid. 
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Fuel or Water.  2,800 ft2/232.2 ft2 = 12.1 XM1091 per LCU(R); therefore,  
12*1,500 gallons = 18,000 gallons. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
290,328 lbs/495,000 lbs = 58.6% 
Limit Weight = 495,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 24,194 lbs per XM1091 * 12 XM1091 = 290,328 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit = 2,784.4 ft2/ 
2,800 ft2 = 99.5% 
Area Limit = 2,800 ft2 
Area Actual = 232.2 ft2 per XM1091 * 12 XM1091 = 2,784.4 ft2 
 
Ammunition Artillery.  Each LCU(R) can carry 42 JMIC quads single stacked 
yielding 158,088 lbs.  Double stacked yields 316,176 lbs. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight / Limit Weight =  
316,176 lbs/495,000 lbs = 63.8% 
Limit Weight = 495,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 316,176 lbs 
 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,772 ft2/2,800 ft2 = 99% 
Area Limit = 2,800 ft2 
Area Actual = 2,800 ft2/66 ft2 per JMIC = 42 JMIC quad =  
2,772 ft2 (42 * 66) 
 
Ammunition Small Arms.  By area each LCU(R) can carry 169 JMICs  
(2,800 ft2/16.5 ft2) yielding 567,840 lbs; however, this exceeds the weight limit of 
the LCU(R).  Therefore, assuming LCU(R) is loaded below maximum weight 
with 7.62mm ammunition (495,000 lbs), and then the LCU(R) could carry  
147 JMICs yielding 493,920 lbs of 7.62mm ammunition (147 * 3,360 lbs). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
493,920 lbs/495,000 lbs = 99% 
Limit Weight = 495,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 493,920 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,425.5 ft2/2,800 ft2 = 86.6% 
Area Limit = 2,800 ft2 
Area Actual = 16.5 ft2 per JMIC * 147 JMIC = 2,425.5 ft2 
 
Supply Capacity Distribution: Based on operational and commercial experience, it is 
assumed that there is some variability on the loads carried by the assault connectors.  
Specifically, each connector is assumed carry, on average, 85% of its maximum capacity 
(calculated in each platform write up).  It was further assumed that they would carry less 
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than 95% of their capacity 95% of the time, giving a standard deviation of 5%.  So, the 
values listed for supply capacities are derived by: 
 
• Calculating the maximum capacity of that particular supply class given 
palletized packaging. 
• Ammunition: the average of small arms (7.62mm) and artillery  
(155 DPICM) was used to calculate the distribution. 
• Multiplying that maximum by 0.85 to get the mean and 0.05 to get the 
standard deviation. 
• Ammunition: Norm(405,048, 20,253); Food: Norm(350,101, 20,597);  
Water: Norm(47,736, 2,808). 
 
Troops: The LCU(R) is not designed to transport personnel aside from those in the 
transported vehicles. 
 
Speed (V): 36 kts listed as maximum intermittent speed, 30 kts listed as cruise.357  
Assume all loads moved at 30 kts.  Speed in sea state 2 = 30 kts, sea state 3 = 25 and  
sea state 4 = 0. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): Designed for 17,000 gallons total fuel capacity.358  Assault fuel load 
reduced to 4,250 gallons. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Derived from design starting fuel capacity and design endurance.  
Assuming a continuous transit at 30 kts for design endurance of 10 days (240 hrs):  
17,000 gal/240 hrs = 70.8 gal/hr = 2.36 gal/NM. 
 
Range (R): Design range359 of 900 NM averaging 28 kts. 
 
Endurance (E): Design endurance of 10 days.360 
 B.1.8 HLCAC Parameter Analysis 
Most information came from the Global Security Website, Globalsecurity.org, 
unless otherwise noted. 
 
Probability of Survival (PS): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the 
effects of the external factors to show through.  For the Southeast Asia Scenario values, 
see the analysis in the Scenario Description [Chapter 7]. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
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MTBF = (Ao*(MTTR + MLOG))/ (1 – Ao) 
 
 Assuming that: 
 
  MTTR = 16 hrs (based on fleet experience) 
 
  MLOG = 1.333 hrs 
 then 
 
  MTBF = (Ao*(MTTR + MLOG))/(1 – Ao) 
 
   = (0.6(16 hrs + 1.33 hrs))/(1-0.6) 
 
   ≈ 26 hrs between failures 
 
Air Spots (IA): None. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): None. 
 
Weight Capacity (C): HLCAC cargo area dimension, 2,406 sq ft.  Weight Capacity = 
288,000 lbs.361 
 
Food cargo is based on the JMIC362 of MRE.363.  The HLCAC is area limited.  If enough 
area was available, based on payload, the HLCAC could carry 236 JMICs of MREs 
single stacked (288,000 lbs/1,218.8 lbs/JMIC (MRE) = 236 JMIC MREs).  Due to area 
limitation, each HLCAC can carry 145 JMICs (2,406 ft2/16.5 ft2 = 145 JMICs)  
(145 JMIC MREs*1,218.8 lbs = 176,682.5 lbs JMIC MRE). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
176,682.5 lbs/288,000 lbs = 61.3% 
Limit Weight = 288,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 176,682.5 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,393 ft2/2,406 ft2 = 99.5% 
Area Limit = 2,406 ft2 
Area Actual = 145 JMIC * 16.5 ft2 = 2,393 ft2 
 
Water:  To represent the least efficient (worst case) for water, it was assumed that water 
was transported as commercial bottled water.  Representative bottled water numbers were 
                                                 
361 Ibid. 
362Linkowitz, Nick, HQMC/LPV, “Joint Inter-Modal Container (JMIC), 07 July 2004, pp. 4-6. 
363 “Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE),” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm. 
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obtained from the Web364.  From that data, it seemed that the 20 oz. bottles were the best 
choice (20 oz. per bottle, 24 bottles per case, 33 lbs per case, 72 cases per pallet). 
 
For the purpose of water, all water was considered palletized.  The “standard” pallet size 
was borrowed from industry and from the JMIC program.  This size is 48” x 40” x 39” 
(length, width, height) which translates to 4.00’ x 3.33’ x 3.25’.  These give a pallet 
footprint of 13.3 ft2 and a volume of 43.3 ft3.  The pallets are assumed to be stacked two 
high.  All of the following calculations were based on this standard pallet size.  HLCAC 
has an area of 2,406 ft2; therefore, it can carry (2,406 ft2/13.3 ft2) = 180 pallets single 
stacked and 360 double stacked. 
 
 Water pallet weight = (22 lbs/case)*(72 cases/pallet) = 2,376 lbs/pallet 
 
# Pallets = round down ((288,000 lbs/HLCAC)/(2,376 lbs/pallet)) =  
121 pallets/HLCAC 
 
Weight = (121 pallets)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 287,496 lbs/HLCAC 
 
Gallons = (20 oz/bottle)*(0.00781 gal/oz.)*(24 bottles/case)* 
(72 cases/pallet) = 270 gallons/pallet 
 
 (121 pallets/ HLCAC*(270 gal/pallet) = 32,670 gal/HLCAC 
 
Weight fraction (W%) = Actual/limit = (287,496 lbs)/(288,000 lbs) = 
99.8% 
Area = (121 pallets)*(13.3 ft2) = 1609.3 ft2; Area Fraction = (A%) =  
(1,609.3 ft2)/(2,406 ft2) = 66.9% 
 
Fuel is based on the capacity of the XM1091 Fuel/Water Tanker Truck.  XM1091 has a 
liquid capacity of 1,500 gallons.  External dimensions of the XM1091365 are 26.4 ft long 
x 8.8 ft wide for a total footprint of 232.2 ft2.  2,406 ft2/232.2 ft2 = 10 XM1091 per 
HLCAC.  10 XM1091 *1,500 gallons per XM1091 = 15,000 gallons. 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
241,940 lbs/288,000 lbs = 84% 
Limit Weight = 288,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 24,194 lbs per XM1091 * 10 XM1091 = 241,940 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,322 ft2/2,406 ft2 = 96.5% 
Area Limit = 2,406 ft2 
Area Actual = 232.2 ft2 per XM1091 * 10 XM1091 = 2,322 ft2 
                                                 
364 “Bottled Water,” (30 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
www.plwc.net/faq.htm. 
365 “XM1091 Truck,” (25 September 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web 
@  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1091.htm. 
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Ammunition Artillery cargo is based on the Light Weight 155 DPICM366 round and 
charges loaded on standard military ammunition skids367 within JMIC.  Each HLCAC 
can carry 36 JMIC quads single stacked yielding 135,504 lbs.  Double stacked yields 
271,008 lbs (72 JMIC). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
271,008 lbs/288,000 lbs = 94.1% 
Limit Weight = 288,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 271,008 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
2,376 ft2/2,406 ft2 = 98.7% 
Area Limit = 2,406 ft2 
Area Actual = 2,406 ft2/66 ft2 per JMIC = 36 JMIC quad = 2,376 ft2   
(36 * 66) 
 
Ammunition Small Arms cargo is based on the 7.62mm round loaded on standard 
military skids within JMIC.  HLCAC can carry 85 JMICs yielding 285,600 lbs of 
7.62mm ammunition (85 * 3,360 lbs). 
 
 Weight Fraction (W%) = Actual Weight/Limit Weight =  
285,600 lbs/288,000 lbs = 99% 
Limit Weight = 288,000 lbs 
Actual Weight = 285,600 lbs 
 Area Fraction (A%) = Area Actual/Area Limit =  
1,402.5 ft2/2,406 ft2 = 58.3% 
Area Limit = 2,406 ft2 
Area Actual = 16.5 ft2 per JMIC * 85 JMIC = 1,402.5 ft2 
 
Supply Capacity Distribution: Based on operational and commercial experience, it is 
assumed that there is some variability on the loads carried by the assault connectors.  
Specifically, each connector is assumed carry, on average, 85% of its maximum capacity 
(calculated in each platform write up).  It was further assumed that they would carry less 
than 95% of their capacity 95% of the time, giving a standard deviation of 5%.  So, the 
values listed for supply capacities are derived by: 
 
• Calculating the maximum capacity of that particular supply class given 
palletized packaging. 
• Ammunition: the average of small arms (7.62mm) and artillery  
(155 DPICM) was used to calculate the distribution. 
• Multiplying that maximum by 0.85 to get the mean and 0.05 to get the 
standard deviation. 
                                                 
366 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual,” April 2001, 
(UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 54) MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 20 April 2001). 
367 “Ammo Skids,” (25 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm. 
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• Ammunition: Norm(230,356, 13,550); Food: Norm(150,180, 8,834); 
Water: Norm(244,371, 14,374); Fuel: Norm(205,649, 12,097);  
Small arms: Norm(242,760, 14,280). 
 
Speed (V): 40 kts kts with payload, sea state 2.  Above sea state 2 planning speed is  
25 kts fully loaded. 
 
Speed Distribution: Based on operational experience and the literature, an average speed 
was estimated.  For the surface craft, 2.5 kts was considered the standard deviation based 
on normal craft operator deviations. 
 
• SS ≤  2: Norm(40, 2.5) fully loaded/empty 
• SS ≥  3: Norm(25, 2.5) fully loaded 
• SS ≥  3: Norm(35, 2.5) empty 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): 5,000 gals. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): SS 2≤  = 1,000 gallons/hr at (40 kts) = 25 gal/NM. 
SS 2≤  = Range of HLCAC empty is 300 NM at 35 kts.  Endurance = 300 NM/35 kts = 
8.5 hrs 
5,000 gals/8.5 hrs = 588 gal/hr at (35 kts) empty = 16.8 gal/NM. 
SS ≥ 3 = Planning speed is 25 kts.  Assuming HLCAC can travel fully loaded 200 NM at 
25 kts gives the following fuel usage rate: 
200 NM/25 kts = 8 hrs 




• SS 2≤  = 200 NM at 40 kts fully Loaded 
• 300 NM at 35 kts Empty 
• SS≥3 = 300 NM at 25 kts fully loaded 
 
Endurance (E): 5,000 gal/1,000 gal/hr = 5 hrs at 40 kts fully loaded 
300 NM/35 kts = 8.5 hrs empty 
200 NM/25 kts = 8 hrs (assuming HLCAC can has range of 200 NM fully loaded at  
25 kts) 
B.2 Air Connectors 





• Advanced Air Transport (ATT) 
• SkyCat ™ 1000 (SkyCat) 
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Standardized payloads are used to determine capacities for the connectors.  For each of 
the capacities a weight fraction, area fraction, and volume fraction is calculated to give a 
measure to the packaging efficiency.  These fractions are the ratio of the actual load 
considering packaging to the maximum capability of the platform: 
 
Fraction = (actual/maximum) 
 
To account for the variability in loads that comes from the friction of war, the lift 
capacities used to model each connector were calculated by applying this maximum to a 
unit normal distribution with a mean of 0.85 and a standard deviation of 0.05. 
 
To account for the variability in pilots’ ability to fly a precise airspeed, the speed values 
for each connector is modeled using a normal distribution with 5 kts of  
standard deviation. 
 




For the purpose of this analysis, all cargo is considered palletized.  The “standard” pallet 
size was borrowed from industry and from the JMIC program.  The standard pallet is 
considered to be 48 inches x 40 inches x 39 inches (length, width, height) or 4.00 ft x 
3.33 ft x 3.25 ft.  This pallet has a footprint of 13.3 sq ft and a volume of 43.3 cu ft.  All 
of the following calculations were based on this standard pallet size. 
 
Class I (food).  Food capacity is based on a standard pallet of MRE.  MREs are packaged 
in cases.  Each case of 12 MREs weighs 22 lbs.  Each pallet can carry 48 cases.368 
 
(48 cases/pallet)*(22 lbs/case) = 1,098 lbs/pallet 
 
 (48 cases/pallet)*(12 MRE/case) = 576 MREs/pallet 
 
Class I (water).  This capacity estimate assumes that water is transported as commercial 
bottled water; this represents the least efficient (worst case) because of the inefficient 
packaging.  Representative bottled water numbers were obtained from the Web.369  From 
that data, the 20 oz. bottles are used because they gave the most water per case.  These  
20 oz. bottles come 24 per case; 72 cases per pallet.  Each case weighs 33 lbs per case. 
 
(33 lbs/case)*(72 cases/pallet) = 2,376 lbs/pallet 
 
 (20 oz/bottle)*(1gal/128oz)*(24 bottles/case)*(72 cases/pallet) = 270 gal/pallet 
                                                 
368 Defense Logistics Agency, “Meals Ready to Eat MRE Transportation Data,” available on the  
World Wide Web at http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/rations/meals/mres.htm [cited on 25 September 2004]. 
369 Premier Label Water Company Website, available on the World Wide Web @ www.plwc.net/faq.htm,  
[cited 27 September 2004]. 
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Class III (Fuel).  This capacity is based on an externally carried, 500-gal fuel bladder 
filled with JP-5 fuel. 
 
 (500 gal/bladder)*(6.8 lb/gal JP-5) = 3,400 lbs/bladder of JP-5 
 
Class V Artillery.  Based on the MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual370 estimates of 
artillery rounds required, the Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) 
round and the M203A Red Bag charge (RBC) were considered representative.  These 
rounds are assumed to be loaded on a standard military ammunition skids.371  Each skid 
of DPICM has 8 shells and weighs 798 lbs.  Each skid of M203A has 24 charges and 
weighs 1,370 lbs.  Because they are both required to fire the 155mm howitzer, it is 
assumed those 3 skids of shells and 1 skid of charges are shipped together.  This package 
is considered a “pallet” of 155mm ammunition. 
 
 3*(798 lbs/DPICM skid) + (1,370 lbs/charge skid) = 3,764 lbs/pallet 
 
Small Arms.  To account for the increased density of small arms ammunition, Class V 
capacity is also calculated for the standard 7.62 mm round.372  200 rounds come in a 
standard NATO steel ammunition box373.  Each loaded ammunition box weighs 16.8 lbs 
and is 11 inches long by 7 inches high by 4 inches wide.  200 ammunition boxes fit on  
a pallet. 
 
(16.8 lb/box)*(200 boxes/RBC) = 3,360 lbs/RBC 
 
Average Ammunition.  These two values were averaged to arrive at a representative 
average pallet was used for modeling purposes: 
 
 Average = (Artillery + Small Arms)/2 = (3,764 + 3,360)/2 = 3,562 lbs/pallet  
of ammunition 
 
 B.2.1 MV-22 Parameter Analysis 
This analysis assumes that the MV-22 is a basic airframe with  
2 AE1107C Rolls-Royce Allison 6,150 shaft horse-power engines, the higher-rated 
transmissions, and the 2-point external lift system.374  Except where noted, the MV-22 
NATOPS manual was used to calculate the following parameters. 
                                                 
370 U.S. Marine Corps, “MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual” MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3, April 2001,  
pp. 75-80. 
371 Aviation Ordnancemen Website, “Ammo Skids” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.ordnance.org/pallets.htm [cited 20 September 2004]. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Flectarn Company, “Standard NATO Steel Ammo Box” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.flecktarn.co.uk/spoab1ux.html [cited 08 December 2004]. 
374 NAVAIRSYSCOM, MV-22B NATOPS Flight Manual, Preliminary, Change 3, A1-V22AB-NFM-000,  
June 2000. p. I-4-10. 
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Survivability (Ps): For the full factorial simulation runs, Ps = 1.0 (no combat loss).  This 
allows the effects of the external factors to show through.  See Chapter 9 for the 
derivation of the Ps = 0.99 for assault. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following assumptions375 are used: 
 A∞ = 0.8 MTTR = 12 hrs  MLOG = 1.3 hrs 











yields an MTBF ≈ 52 hrs.  See Chapter 6 for the full derivation of  
MV-22 reliability. 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Cargo Area: Based on the MV-22 cargo floor dimensions.376 
 
area = (16.84 ft long )*(5.7 ft wide) = 96 sq ft 
 
Cargo Volume: Based on the MV-22 cargo bay height.377 
 
volume = (96 sq ft)*(5.4 ft high) = 518 cu ft 
 
Internal Weight Capacity 
 
Aircraft balance limits are not considered.  The MV-22 maximum VTOL takeoff weight  
(Sea Level, Standard Day) is 52,600 lbs.378  It has an empty weight of 33,140 lbs and  
own-fuel weight of 9,850 lbs.  The maximum internal cargo weight capacity is  
the difference: 
 
Maximum cargo weight = Takeoff weight – (empty weight + full fuel weight) 
 
   = 52,600 lbs – (33,140 lbs + 9,850 lbs) = 9,610 lbs 
                                                 
375 A “reasonable estimate” based on the expert opinion of three field-grade Naval Aviators and two 
Aviation Limited Duty Officers. 
376 MV-22 NATOPS, p. I-1-11. 
377 Ibid. 
378 MV-22 NATOPS, p. I-4-8. 
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However, assuming fuel is light-loaded 400 lbs (60 gals) less than maximum capacity 
moves the maximum lift capacity to 10,000 lbs.  This makes the internal lift limits the 
same as the NATOPS external lift limit of 10,000 lbs.  Additionally, the cargo floor has a 
load limit of 300 lbs/sq ft. 
 
Food.  The MV-22 is area-limited to five pallets in the cargo bay. 
 
(5 pallets/MV-22)*(1,098 lbs/pallet) = 5,490 lbs/MV-22 
 
(5 pallets/MV-22)*(576 MREs/pallet) = 2,880 MREs/MV-22 
 
The cargo floor load is less than the 300 lbs/sq ft limit: 
 
(5,490 lb)/(66.6 sq ft) = 82 sq ft 
 
Weight fraction = (5,490 lbs)/(10,510 lbs) = 0.52 = 52% 
 
Area fraction = (5*13.3 sq ft)/(96 sq ft) = 0.69 = 69% 
 
Volume fraction = (5*43 cu ft)/(518 cu ft) = 0.42 = 42% 
 
Fuel.  The MV-22 only carries fuel externally.  See External Capacity for  
estimated performance. 
 
Water.  The MV-22 is weight-limited to four pallets of bottled water. 
 
(4 pallets/MV-22)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 9,504 lbs/MV-22 
 
(4 pallets/MV-22)*(270 gal/pallet) = 1,080 gal/MV-22 
 
The cargo floor load is less than the 300 lbs/sq ft limit: 
 
(9,504 lbs)/(53.3 sq ft) = 178 lbs/sq ft 
 
Weight fraction = (9,504 lbs)/(10,000 lbs) = 0.95 = 95% 
 
Area fraction = (4*13.3 sq ft)/(96 sq ft) = 0.55 = 55% 
 
Volume fraction = (4*43.3 cu ft)/(518 cu ft) = 0.33 = 33% 
 
Ammunition.  For safety reasons, the MV-22 carries ammunition externally.  See 
External Capacity for estimated performance. 
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Troops.  Each MV-22 carries a maximum of 24 combat-loaded troops379 and does not 
carry (internal or external) cargo with them for loading/unloading considerations. 
 
(24 troops/MV-22)*(240 lbs/troop) = 5,760 lbs/MV-22 
 
Weight fraction = 5,460 lbs/10,000 lbs = 0.58 = 58% 
 
Litters.  Each MV-22 carries 12 litters380 and associated medical crew. 
 
External Lift Capacity 
 
Area or volume limitations were not considered since cargo is carried in a sling; 
only weight fraction is calculated.  The MV-22 has a maximum external lift capacity 
(single or dual-hook) of 10,000 lbs.381  However, this lift capacity is a function of mission 
radius (R).  Based on a mission profile flying at 110 kts with an external load to the 
objective and flying at 230 kts with no load back gives the following generalized 
payload-radius profile: 
 
10,000 lbs for 0 ≤ R ≤ 145 NM 
 
5,000 lbs for 145 < R ≤ 165 NM 
 
0 lbs for R > 165 NM 
 
This generalized profile is applied to the capacities for each commodity. 
 
Food.  The MV-22 is weight-limited to 9 pallets of food: 
 
 (9 pallets/MV-22)*(1,098 lbs/pallet) = 9,882 lbs/MV-22 
(9 pallets/MV-22)*(576 MRE/pallet) = 5,184 MREs. 
 
Weight fraction = 9,882 lbs/10,000 lbs = 99% 
 
The food capacity is modeled by the following parameters: 
 
NORM (8,400, 490) lbs for 0 ≤ R ≤ 145 NM 
 
NORM (3,700, 220) lbs for 145 < R ≤ 165 NM 
 
0 lbs for R > 165 NM 
 
Water.  The MV-22 is weight-limited to 4 pallets. 
                                                 
379 MV-22 Website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22.htm. 
380 Ibid. 
381 MV-22 NATOPS, p. I-4-6. 
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 (4 pallets/MV-22)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 9,504 lbs/MV-22 
 
 (270 gal/pallet)*(4 pallets/MV-22) = 1,080 gal/MV-22 
Weight fraction = (9,504 lbs)/(10,000 lbs) = 95% 
 
The water capacity is modeled by the following parameters: 
 
NORM (920, 55) gal for 0 ≤ R ≤ 145 NM 
 
NORM (460, 30) gal for 145 < R ≤ 165 NM 
 
0 gal for R > 165 NM 
 
Fuel.  Assuming that the MV-22 carries only one 500-gallon fuel bladder per hook, with 
2 hooks it can carry 2 fuel bladders. 
 
  (500 gal/bladder)*(6.8 lbs/gal JP-5) = 3,400 lbs/bladder 
 
  (2 bladders/MV-22)*(3,400 lbs/bladder) = 6,800 lbs/MV-22 
 
  (2 bladders/MV-22)* (500 gal/bladder) = 1,000 gal/MV-22 
 
 Weight Fraction = 6,800 lbs/10,000 lbs = 68% 
 
 No distribution is used since there is virtually no variability in bladder loading. 
 
Ammunition.  The MV-22 is weight-limited to carrying only 2 pallets, which equates to 
approximately 48 155mm rounds or 80,000 7.62mm rounds. 
 
  (2 pallets/MV-22)*(3,562 lbs/pallet) = 7,528 lbs/MV-22 
 Weight Fraction = 7,528 lbs/10,000 lbs = 75% 
 
The ammunition capacity is modeled by the following parameters: 
 
NORM (6,100, 360) lbs for 0 ≤ R ≤ 145 NM 
 
NORM (3,030, 180) lbs for 145 < R ≤ 165 NM 
 
0 lbs for R > 165 NM 
 
Speed.  Two MV-22 speed values are assigned; one for carrying external loads, and one 
for internal loads. 
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External Loads.  The MV-22 carries vehicles at 110 kts with 60-degree nacelle 
angle.  It carries pallet loads at 120-150 kts with 30-degree nacelle angle.  A normal 
distribution of (130, 5) in kts is used to model both loads and pilot airspeed variability. 
   
 Internal Loads.  For modeling purposes, only troops are carried internally.  For 
maneuver warfare, speed is important, so it is assumed that when carrying internal loads 
only, the MV-22 is traveling in airplane mode at its maximum sustained level-flight 
speed.  At 50,000 lbs gross weight, the maximum level flight speed is 230-240 kts.  To 
represent pilot variability, NORM (230, 5) in kts is used to model internal load  
transit speed. 
 
Start Fuel (Fo): From the NATOPS fuel system descriptions382, the maximum fuel 
capacity is calculated: 
 
2*(88.2 gal/feed tank + 478 gal/fwd sponson) = 2*(566.2 gal) = 1,132.4 gal 
 
Plus a single 316-gal alternate sponson for a total of 1,448.4 gal ≈ 1,450 gal 
 
(1,450 gal)*(6.8 lb/gal) = 9,860 lbs 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Usage rates are calculated for external and internal loads at  
Sea Level on a standard day for a 50,000-lb aircraft. 
 
Fuel burn with external loads is calculated for 110 kts, nacelle angle of  
60 degrees, with a drag count of 80.  Figure 25-6 “Specific Range with External Load,”  
p. XI-25-10 in the MV-22 NATOPS Manual indicates a specific range of 0.031 NM/lb or 
specific fuel consumption of 32.3 lbs/NM.  Converting to a time rate of consumption: 
 
(0.031 NM/lb)*(6.8 lb/gal) = 0.21 NM/gal which is 4.7 gal/NM. 
 
At 110 NM/hr, fuel burn is approximately 520 gal/hr. 
 
Fuel burn with internal loads is calculated for 230 kts, airplane mode, with a base 
aircraft drag count.  Figure 25-4 “Maximum Range Performance, Airplane Mode,”  
p. XI-25-9 in the MV-22 NATOPS Manual indicates a fuel usage rate of 0.07 NM/lb or a 
specific fuel consumption of 14.3 lb/NM.  Converting to time rate of consumption: 
 
(0.07 NM/lb)*(6.8 lb/gal) = 0.48 NM/gal, which is 2.1 gal/NM. 
 
At 230 NM/hr, fuel burn is approximately 480 gal/hr. 
 
Endurance.  Calculated from the fuel flows and speeds used above and assumes no air 
refueling.  20% of the fuel capacity is held in reserve. 
 
 Endurance = (MAX FUEL)*(0.8)/(BURN RATE) 
 
                                                 
382 MV-22 NATOPS, p. I-2-56. 
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External load: (1450 gal)*(0.8)/(520 gal/hr) = 2.2 hrs at 110 kts 
 
Internal load: (1450 gal)*(0.8)/(480 gal/hr) = 2.4 hrs at 23 kts 
 
Un-refueled Ferry Range.  For an average aircraft weight of 45,000 lb flying at  
20,000 ft on a standard day, Figure 25-4 “Maximum Range Performance, Airplane 
Mode,” p. XI-25-9 in the MV-22 NATOPS Manual indicates a specific range =  
0.1 NM/lb.  Assuming no auxiliary tanks, the total fuel is 9,850 lbs.  Subtracting 20% for 
fuel reserve leaves: 
 
un-refueled ferry range = (0.8)*(9,850 lb)*(0.1 NM/lb) ≈ 790 NM 
 
 B.2.2 CH-53X Parameter Analysis 
 This analysis assumes that the CH-53X is a CH-53E Super Stallion basic airframe 
with a new 6,150 shaft horse-power engines (like the Rolls-Royce AE-1170C), the  
higher-rated transmissions, and the associated airframe modifications, including the 
improved 3-point lift system.383  From this assumption, the CH-53X fuel capacity and 
payload bay dimensions are estimated by the CH-53E.  It is assumed that the CH-53X 
carries 15 tons a combat radius of 100 NM flying at 3,000 ft in 33oC air.384 
 
Survivability (Ps): For the full factorial model runs, Ps = 1.0 (no combat loss).  This 
allows the effects of the external factors to show through.  Ps = 0.99 for the scenario 
simulation; see Chapter 9 for the derivation. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation the following values are used: 
MTBF = 40 A∞ = 0.7 MTTR = 16 hrs  MLOG = 1.3 hrs. 










 yields MTBF ≈ 40 hrs. 
 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
                                                 
383  Helms, Douglas W., “A Bigger, Better Giant,” from Rotor & Wing (http://defensedaily.com)  
(cited 26 September 2004). 
384 Ibid. 
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Cargo Area: Based on the CH-53E cargo area dimensions.385 
 
area = (30 ft long)*(7.5 ft wide) = 225 sq ft. 
Cargo Volume: Based on the CH-53E cargo bay height.386 
 
volume = (225 sq ft area)*(6.5 ft high) = 1,460 cu ft. 
 
Internal and External Weight Capacity 
 
Aircraft balance limits are not considered.  The CH-53X maximum takeoff weight 
is assumed to be approximately 80,000 lbs387 (Sea Level, Standard Day).  Assuming that 
the CH-53X will be slightly heavier than the CH-53E,388 an aircraft empty weight of 
35,000 lbs gives the CH-53X a maximum takeoff load of 45,000 lbs (20 tons).  Up to 
15,000 lbs of this 45,000 is own-ship fuel.  Fully fueled, the maximum takeoff payload 
would be 30,000 lbs.  Assuming similar capability as the CH-53E, the CH-53X is 
assumed to be able to lift another CH-53X389 (17.5 tons) a distance of 20 NM.  For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the maximum payload is 30,000 lbs, internal or external, out 
to a mission radius of 200 NM. 
 
Pallet Loads.  Internally, the CH-53X cargo bay floor is area limited to 14 pallets; 
stacked two-high gives a maximum 28 pallets by volume. 
 
The footprint of these 14 pallets is (14 pallets)*(13.3 sq ft/pallet) = 186.2 sq ft 
Area Fraction = (186.2 sq ft)/(225 sq ft) = 83%. 
 
 Volume Fraction = (28 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft)/(1,460 cu ft) 
 
= (1,212 cu ft)/(1,460 cu ft) = 83% 
 
 Again, for simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that the maximum external payload 
is also 28 pallets.  This number of pallets requires additional packaging.  It is assumed 
that four pallet loads can be bundled together into a “quadcon,” which can be lifted as a 
single item. 
 
Food.  The CH-53X is weight limited, able to carry only 27 pallets. 
 
(27 pallets)*(1,098 lbs/pallet) = 29,646 lbs/CH-53X 
 
                                                 
385 Sikorsky Aircraft Company, “Sikorsky CH-53E/S-80E Super Stallion” characteristics sheet 
http://www.sikorsky.com/file/popup/1,,185,00.pdf (cited 23 September 2004). 
386 Ibid. 
387 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, “CH-53E,” electronic resource accessed thru the Dudley Knox Library, 
NPS (Cited 26 September 2004). 
388 Sikorsky, CH-53E/S-80E Super Stallion fact sheet. 
389 Federation of American Scientists, “CH-35E Super Stallion” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/h-53.htm (cited 26 September 2004). 
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(27 pallets)*(576 MREs/pallet) = 15,552 MREs/CH-53X 
 
Weight fraction = (29,646 lbs)/(30,000 lbs) = 99% 
 
Volume fraction = ((27 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft/pallet))/(1,460 cu ft) 
 
= (1,169.1 cu ft)/(1,460cu ft) = 80% 
 
Area Fraction, as mentioned above, is 83% 
 
Water.  The CH-53X is weight-limited to 12 pallets of bottled water. 
 
(12 pallets)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 28,512 lbs/CH-53X 
 
(12 pallets/CH-53X)*(270 gal/pallet) = 3,240 gals/CH-53X 
 
Weight fraction = (28,512 lbs)/(30,000 lbs) = 95% 
 
Volume fraction = ((12 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft/pallet))/(1,460 cu ft) 
 
= (519.6 cu ft)/(1,460 cu ft) = 36% 
 
Area Fraction = (12 pallets)*(13.3 sq ft)/(225 sq ft) 
 
= (159.6 sq ft)/(225 sq ft) = 71% 
 
Fuel.  The CH-53X only carries fuel externally.  Based on the CH-53E externally 
carrying three 500-gallon fuel bladders,390 it is assumed that that the CH-53X will be able 
to carry four bladders with its improved 3-point lift system.391 
 
 (4 bladders/CH-53X)*(3,400 lbs/bladder) = 13,600 lbs/CH-53X 
 
(4 bladders/CH-53X)*(500 gal/bladder) = 2,000 gal/CH-53X 
 
 Weight fraction = (13,600 lbs)/(30,000 lbs) = 45% 
 
 Area and volume fractions do not apply. 
  
Ammunition.  The CH-53X is weight-limited to carrying 8 pallets of ammunition. These 
8 are assumed to be packaged in two, 4-pallet quadcons.  These 8 pallets equate 
approximately to 190 artillery rounds or 320,000 7.62mm rounds. 
  
                                                 
390 USMC, 15th MEU Official Photo 2001620225452 shows a CH-53E carrying three fuel bladders.  
Available online @ www.15meu.usmc.mil/marinelink/image1.nsf/lookup/2001620225452 (cited  
27 September 2004). 
391 Helms, “A Bigger, Better Giant.” 
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 Weight fraction = (28,496 lbs)/(30,000 lbs) = 95% 
 
Troops.  Some Web resources list the troop capacity for the CH-53E at 55 personnel; 
however the USMC MAGTF Planning Guide uses 24.392 
 
 Weight = (24 troops)*(240 lbs/troop) = 5,760 lbs 
  
Weight fraction = (5,760 lbs)/(30,000 lbs) = 19% 
 
Litters.  When dedicated to Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), each CH-53X carries  
24 litters393 and associated medical crew. 
 
Speed.  Speed characteristics are assumed to be similar to the CH-53E.  External loads 
are carried at 110 kts.  The return trip, with no or an internal load, is flown at  
150 kts.394  The trip to the objective is modeled as NORM(110; 5) and the trip back to the 
ship is modeled as NORM (135; 5). 
 
Start Fuel.  Assumed to be the same as CH-53E, 15,000 lbs (2,270 gal/JP5)395at 
maximum capacity. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate.  The fuel usage rate is derived by analogy with the MV-22 because of 
similar engine characteristics.  CH-53E has three 4,250-shaft horsepower (shp) engines.  
According to the literature, the CH-53X will need three 6,100-shp engines to meet lift 
requirements.396  This same article suggests that perhaps the MV-22 power plant will be 
used.  Fuel flow for the CH-53X was estimated by calculating the per-engine fuel flow of 
MV-22 and multiplying by 3 for the CH-53Xs three engines.  The estimate is based on 
the MV-22 external load and internal load estimates performed above. 
 
For an externally loaded MV-22, the specific range is 0.031 NM/lb or 32.3 lb/NM.  
Multiplying by the associated speed of 110 NM/hr approximates fuel consumption: 
 
 (32.3 lb/NM)*(110 NM/hr) ≈ 3,550 lb/hr 
 
Assuming both engines are performing similarly, the burn of each engine is 
approximately half this total, or 1,780 lb/hr.  It is generally known that a conventional 
rotor system is more efficient than a tilt rotor system.  Assuming 10% increase in 
                                                 
392 USMC, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Guide, p. 24. 
393 FAS, CH-53 Website http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/h-53.htm. 
394 Sikorsky CH-53 Fact Sheet. 
395 FAS, CH-53 Website http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/h-53.htm. 
396 Helms, “A Bigger Better Giant.” 
    409
efficiency, each CH-53X engine would burn approximately 1,600 lb/hr.  For all three 
CH-53X engines, this would equate to a combined fuel flow of approximately  
4,800 lb/hr. 
 
Again, using the MV-22 as an analogies system an internally loaded MV-22, the specific 
range is 0.07 NM/lb or 14.3 lb/NM.  Multiplying by the associated speed of 230 NM/hr 
approximates fuel consumption: 
 
 (14.3 lb/NM)*(230 NM/hr) ≈ 3,300 lb/hr 
 
Again, assuming both engines are performing similarly, the burn of each engine is 
approximately half this total, or 1,650 lbs/hr.  Assuming 10% increase in efficiency, each 
CH-53X engine would burn approximately 1,500 lb/hr.  For all three CH-53X engines, 
this would equate to a combined fuel flow of approximately 4,500 lbs/hr. 
 
Endurance.  Calculated from the fuel flows and speeds used above. This endurance 
estimate is only for the mission profile mentioned above, not the maximum endurance of 
the basic airframe.  This estimate assumes neither air refueling nor a Forward Advanced 
Refueling Base (FARP).  Assuming a 20% fuel reserve leaves only 80% maximum  
fuel capacity. 
 
 Endurance = ((MAX FUEL CAPACITY)*(0.8))/(BURN RATE)) 
 
  loaded = ((15,000 lbs*0.8)/(4,800 lbs/hr)) = 2.5 hrs 
 
  empty = ((15,000 lbs*0.8)/(4,500 lbs/hr)) = 2.7 hrs 
 
Un-refueled Ferry Range.  Also derived by analogy with the MV-22.  From the MV-22 
NATOPS manual, the specific range of a fully-fueled MV-22 carrying no cargo,  
220 kts, 5,000 ft, standard day, is approximately 0.085 NM/lb. Using the same 20% fuel 
reserve as above: 
 
 Ferry Range ≈ (specific range)*(available fuel) 
 
  = (0.085 NM/lb)*((15,000 lbs)*(0.8)) = 1,020 NM 
 
This estimate is very comparable with the CH-53E un-refueled ferry range of 990 NM.397 
 B.2.3 UH-1Y Parameter Analysis 
 UH-1Y has flown.  Preliminary performance data shows it to be significantly 
more capable than the UH-1N.398  Although multi-mission capable, it is only modeled as 
a MEDEVAC platform. 
                                                 
397 FAS CH-53 Website, http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/h-53.htm. 
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Survivability (Ps): For full factorial, 1.0 (no combat loss).  This allows the effects of the 
external factors to show through.  See Chapter 9, Scenario for the derivation of the  
Ps = 0.99 for assault. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): For the scenario simulation it is modeled as the same as a CH-53X. 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Cargo Area: Based on estimated cargo area dimensions: 
 
area = (8 ft long)*(8 ft wide) = 64 sq ft. 
 
Cargo Volume: Based on estimated cargo bay height: 
 
volume = (64 sq ft area)*(5 ft high) = 320 cu ft. 
 
Internal and External Weight Capacity 
 
12,000 lb empty weight, 2,600 lb fuel, and 3,200 lb payload.399  Aircraft balance 
limits are not considered. 
 
Pallet loads.  The UH-1Y is not designed to carry palletized cargo.  No cargo loads  
are calculated. 
 
Troops.  Four, besides the pilots.400 
 
Litters.  Two wounded.401 
 
Speed.  The UH-1Y top speed is listed a 158 kts.402  MAGTF Planners Reference Guide 
shows the UH-1N flying at 110 kts.403  Speed modeled at NORM (100; 5)  
in kts. 
 
Start Fuel.  380 gal (2,580 lbs JP-5), 457 gal (3,110 lbs JP-5) w/auxiliary tanks.404 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
398 Bell Helicopter, “UH-1Y Pocket Guide,” (September 2004 (cited 04 December 2004)) available on the 
World Wide Web @ 
http://www.bellhelicopter.textron.com/en/aircraft/military/pdf/UH1Y_PG_04_web.pdf. 
399 Bell Helicopter, “UH-1Y Pocket Guide.” 
400 MAGTF Planner’s Reference, p. 24. 
401 “UH-1Y Iroquios, Huey,” (September 2004 (cited 04 December 2004) available on the World Wide 
Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/uh-1.htm. 
402 Bell Helicopter, “UH-1Y Pocket Guide.” 
403 MAGTF Planner’s Reference, p. 24. 
404 Bell Helicopter, “UH-1Y Pocket Guide.” 
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Fuel Usage Rate (FF): Specific range is estimated from the UH-1Y preliminary 
performance results for a troop insertion at 3,000 ft at 33 deg C: 
 
Mission range = 2*mission radius = 2*130 NM = 260 NM 
 
Useable fuel = 80% of maximum capacity = 0.8 * 2,680 lbs= 2,140 lbs 
 
Specific range = range/fuel used = 260 NM/2,140 lbs = 0.12 NM/lb or 8.2 lb/NM 
 
Specific fuel consumption is estimated by multiplying specific range by speed: 
  
(8.2 lb/NM)*(135 NM/hr) ≈ 1,100 lbs/hr 
 
Endurance.  3 hrs.405 
 
Un-refueled Ferry Range.  200 NM as a conservative estimate based on Bell 
preliminary performance data and subsequent tests.406 
 B.2.4 ATT Parameter Analysis 
 This analysis assumes that the ATT is a four-engine turbo prop/tilt wing aircraft. 
The tilt wings produce an advertised super short takeoff and landing capability.  This  
C-130-sized air transport operates form the MPF(F) Aviation ship.  Much of the ATT’s 
performance is based on the basic C-130 airframe.  However, the concept is for a payload 
of twice the C-130J.407 
 
Survivability (Ps): The same Ps of 0.99 is used for ATT as for the other air connectors.  
See Chapter 9 for the derivation. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): Because the ATT is modeled as a replacement for the CH-53X, its 
reliability is assumed to be the same as the CH-53X, ≈ 40 hrs. 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
Cargo Area: Based on the C-130J cargo floor dimensions408 lengthened to accommodate 
3 HUMVEEs: 
                                                 
405 Ibid. 
406 Global Security, “UH-1N Specifications” (28 November 2001) available @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/uh-1-specs.htm (cited 26 September 2004). 
407 Global Security, “Advanced Theater Transport (ATT)” (01 December 2002 [cited 04 December 2004]) 
available on the World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/att.htm. 
408 Global Security, “C-130J Specifications” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-130j-specs.htm [cited on 04 October 2004]. 
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area = (48 ft long)*(10.25 ft wide) ≈ 490 sq ft 
 
Cargo Volume: Based on the C-130J cargo bay height.409 
 
volume = (410 sq ft)*(9 ft high) = 4,428 cu ft 
 
Internal Weight Capacity 
 
Aircraft balance limits are not considered.  By analogy with the C-130J, the ATT 
empty aircraft weight is assumed to be 75,600 lbs.  The maximum cargo weight capacity 
is estimated to be 80,000 lbs.410  The ATT’s maximum payload for “Super Short Takeoff 
and Landing.” is 60,000 lbs (Sea Level, Standard Day).  Because shipboard operations 
and combat landing strip operations are the concept of operations, 60,000 lbs is 
considered the useable payload.  Although the capacities for all commodities are shown 
below, the ATT is only used to transport three HUMVEE vehicles in the  
Alternative Architecture III concept of operations.  To use the minimum amount of flight 
deck and of expeditionary runway, the ATT is modeled during the sustainment phase 
with only 14,960 lbs of own-fuel. 
 
HUMVEEs.  A representative HUMVEE is 16 ft long, 7 ft wide, 6 ft high and weighs  
9,500 lbs.411  Its footprint is 114 sq ft, and volume is 685 cu ft.  The ATT is  
length-limited to 3 HUMVEEs in the cargo bay. 
 
 Weight fraction = (3 *(9,500 lbs))/(60,000 lbs) = 48% 
 
Area fraction = ((3*114 sq ft))/(490 sq ft) = 70% 
 
 Volume fraction = ((3)*(685 cu ft))/(4,428 sq ft) = 46% 
 
Pallets.  Based on the dimensions of the standard pallet and the cargo bay dimensions, 
only 36 pallets will fit on the floor and can only be stacked two-high, for a maximum of 
72 pallets. 
 
 Area fraction = (36 pallets/ATT)*(13.4 sq ft/pallet))/(490 sq ft) = 98% 
 
 Volume fraction = (72 pallets/ATT)*(43.3 cu ft /pallet))/(44,28 cu ft) = 70% 
 
Food.  The ATT is weight-limited to 54 pallets of MREs. 
 
# of pallets = round down(60,000 lbs)/(1,098 lb/pallet) = 54 pallets 
 
(54 pallets/ATT)*(1,098 lbs/pallet) ≈ 59,300 lbs/ATT 
                                                 
409 Ibid. 
410 Global Security ATT Website. 
411 Global Security, “HMWW Specifications,” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/images/hmmwv-basic-dim.jpg (January 2003)  
[cited 09 December 2004]. 
    413
 (54 pallets/ATT)*(576 MREs/pallet) = 31,104 MREs/ATT 
 
Weight fraction = 59,300 lbs/60,000 lbs = 99% 
 
Area fraction, assuming whole floor is filled first, is 98% 
 
Volume fraction = (54*43.3 cu ft)/(4,428 cu ft) = 53% 
 
Water.  The ATT is weight-limited to 25 pallets of bottled water. 
 
 (25 pallets/ATT)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 59,400 lbs/ATT 
 
 (25 pallets/ATT)*(270 gal/pallet) = 6,750 gal/ATT 
 
Weight fraction = 59,400 lbs/60,000 lbs = 99% 
 
Area fraction = (25*13.3 sq ft)/(490 sq ft) = 68% 
 
Volume fraction = (25*43.3 cu ft)/(4,428 cu ft) = 24% 
 
Fuel.  115,000 lbs available give,412 subtracting 23,000 lbs as a 20% reserve and  
4,000 lbs as the single trip fuel, ATT can offload approximately 80,000 lbs at the 
objective area. 
 
Ammunition.  The ATT is weight-limited to carrying 16 pallets of ammunition. 
 
# of pallets = round down(60,000 lbs)/(3,562 lb/pallet) = 16 pallets 
 
(16 pallets/ATT)*(3,562 lb/pallet) = 56,992 lbs/ATT 
 
This is equivalent to approximately 380 155-mm rounds or 640,000  
7.62mm rounds. 
 
Weight fraction = 56,992 lbs/60,000 lbs = 95% 
 
Area fraction = (16*13.3 sq ft)/(490 sq ft) = 43% 
 
Volume fraction = (16*43.3 cu ft)/(4,428 cu ft) = 16% 
 
Troops.  Each ATT carries a maximum of 100 combat-loaded troops413 and does not 
carry cargo with them for loading/unloading considerations. 
 
Weight = (100 troops)*(240 lbs/troop) = 24,000 lbs 
 
  Weight Fraction = 24,000 lbs/60,000 lbs = 40% 
                                                 
412 Global Security, available on the World Wide Web @ globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ATT.htm. 
413 Ibid. 
    414
Litters.  Each ATT carries 74 litters414 and associated medical crew. 
 
Speed.  Except during takeoff and landing, the ATT is envisioned to fly with zero wing 
angle.  In this configuration, it is much like a C-130J.  By analogy with the C-130J, the 
ATT transits around its best range speed, 300-330 kts.415  To represent pilot variability 
and to reflect the change in speed with payload, NORM (300, 5) in kts is used to model 
ATT transit speed. 
 
Start Fuel.  The ATT has a maximum internal fuel capacity of 115,000 lbs/16,911 gal.416 
As mentioned above, the start fuel is modeled at 14,960 lbs/2,200 gal to permit the  
super-short takeoff and land at sea and at the objective. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate (FF): ATT fuel flow is estimated by analogy with the C-130H.  The  
C-130H flies 2,049 NM417 on 60,000 lbs of fuel at maximum payload. This equates to a 
specific range of approximately 0.034 NM/lb or a specific fuel consumption of  
29.3 lb/NM (4.3 gal/NM).  Assuming that the ATT engines will achieve a 25% increase 
in efficiency over the C-130H, the modeled fuel usage rate is 3.3 gal/NM.  At 300 kts, 
this is approximately 990 gal/hr. 
 
Endurance.  Calculated from the fuel flows and speeds used above.  This endurance 
estimate is only for the mission profile mentioned above, not the maximum endurance of 
the basic airframe.  This estimate assumes neither air refueling nor a FARP.   
Twenty percent of the fuel capacity is held in reserve. 
 
 Endurance = (MAX FUEL AVAILABLE)*(0.8)*(BURN RATE) 
 
At sea load: ((2,200 gal)*(0.8))/(990 gal/hr) = 1.8 hrs at 300 kts 
 
Un-refueled Ferry Range.  Assumed to be the maximum range of the C-130H at 
maximum payload with 60,000 lbs fuel = 2,049 NM 
 B.2.5 SkyCat ™ 1000 (SkyCat) Parameter Analysis 
The SkyCat is a hybrid air vehicle in development by Advanced Technologies 
Group, UK.418  It could be used as either an inter-theater or intra-theater transport and can 
be configured to carry passengers and/or heavy cargo (only cargo will be evaluated 
below).  This vehicle combines lighter-than-air airship technology and air-cushioned 




417 Global Security, “C-130H Specifications,” available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-130-specs.htm, updated 08 November 2001 [cited  
10 November 2004]. 
418 Advanced Technologies Group, “SkyCat Hybid Air Vehicle, United Kingdom,” (22 October 2004 (cited 
04 December 2004), available at the World Wide Web @ http://www.aerospace-
technology.com/projects/skycat. 
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hovercraft technology which makes it capable of landing on flat land, grass, swamp, 
water (including the open ocean)419 or snow.420  Utilizing reverse thrust on the hovercraft 
engines (suck-down mode) will allow it to remain stationary.421  This feature will enable 
it to operate without a ground crew or ground infrastructure.  It will be able to unload 
ashore and is assumed to be able to unload at the MPF(F) after a water landing.  Although 
not specifically stated, the smaller SkyCat versions have both vertical and short take off 
and landing capability, it is assumed that this model would also have that capability.  
Since, payload and range are decreased for vertical operations (approximately 30% less 
payload and approximately 50% less range) only the short take off and landing method is 
addressed below (maximum payload). 
 
 For Architecture III, SkyCat is modeled as carrying MV-22 and the other tactical 
helicopters from CONUS to the FLS.  For this reason, vehicle load capacity is estimated.  
Additionally, a single SkyCat deploys to the Sea Base and conducts resupply mission 
between the remains with the Sea Base and the FLS, carrying only palletized cargo.  For 
these missions, payload for each commodity is estimated based on the standard air 
connector pallets mentioned above, recognizing that a platform this large would likely 
use a larger form of packaging. 
 
Max Operating Altitude: 9,005 ft (2,745 m).422 
 
Dimensions: 1,007 ft in length, 446 ft wide and 252 ft high.423 
 
Survivability (Ps): The SkyCat traveled from CONUS to the FLS and between the  
Sea Base and the FLS; it did not proceed to the objective.  The modeled Ps value of 1.0 
assumes no threat in transit. 
 
Reliability (MTBF): Similar to the MPF(F) vessels, the SkyCat MTBF 
was modeled as 9,999 hrs, which assumes near-perfect reliability. 
Air Spots (IA): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
Surface Spots (IS): Not applicable for an air assault connector. 
 
                                                 
419 E-mail conversation with Paul Macey, Design Engineer, ATG Ltd. on 29 October 2004. 
420 Advanced Technologies Group “SkyCat Hybid Air Vehicle, United Kingdom,” (22 October 2004 (cited 
04 December 2004), available at the World Wide Web @ http://www.aerospace-
technology.com/projects/skycat. 
421 E-mail conversation with Paul Macey, Design Engineer, ATG Ltd. on 27 October 2004. 
422 Advanced Technologies Group, “SkyCat Hybid Air Vehicle, United Kingdom,” (22 October 2004 (cited  
04 December 2004), available at the World Wide Web @ http://www.aerospace-
technology.com/projects/skycat. 
423 Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft, 2004-2005, p. 509. 
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Cargo Area: Based on the design cargo hold floor dimensions.424 
 
area = (49 ft wide)*(328 ft long) ≈ 16,000 sq ft 
 
The payload bay is designed to accommodate removable mezzanine decks that 
allow smaller items to be stacked.  Up to three mezzanines may be installed to permit 
many levels inside the cargo pay.  These mezzanines reduce the floor area of each by 
approximately 10% to 14,400 sq ft. 
 
Cargo Volume: Based on the design cargo bay height.425 
 
volume = (16,072 sq ft)*(26.4 ft high) = 424,300 cu ft 
 
Internal Weight Capacity 
 
Aircraft balance limits are not considered.  The design Maximum Payload 
Capacity is 1,000,000 kg or an equivalent  2,205,000 lbs.426  Each mezzanine can carry 
approximately 1,058 pallets by area, 2,116 stacked two-high. 
 
Vehicles: The SkyCat could be used to transport vehicles in the following quantities 
(limits for both area and weight are calculated; however, the smaller of the two numbers 
is highlighted and must be utilized).  Although only large air vehicles are computed, all 
of the small helicopters could also be carried.  For a mixture of vehicles the weight and 
area numbers can be utilized to compute specific values. 
                                                 
424 E-mail conversation with Paul Macey, Design Engineer, ATG Ltd. on 27 October 2004. 
425 Ibid. 
426 Ibid. 
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Table B-1 shows which equipment is area limited and which is weight limited. 
 









CH-53 33,226 1719.2 1* 9 66 
MV-22 33,140 1160.5 1* 13 66 
M1A1 133,815 387 1 41 16 
EFV-P 72,879 360 1 44 30 
ABV 1,350 468 3 92 1633 
AVLB 93,194 468 1 34 23 
M88A2 141,173 340.5 1 47 15 
M9 ACE 37,799 215.3 1 74 58 
HMMWV 998 8,918 109.3 2 264 247 
LAV 25 28,685 173.3 1 92 76 
MTVR 45,008 214.4 1 74 48 
4K Forklift 12,004 106.2 2 272 183 
Contact Truck 22,200 214.4 2 134 99 
EFSS 5,300 88.6 3 489 415 
HIMARS 47,118 214.4 1 74 46 
LVS MK48 w MK14 114,050 322.7 1 49 19 
 
Table B-1: MEB Equipment load for SkyCat. 
*Note: Limited to one deck due to height of vehicle. 
 
Pallets.  Assuming that mezzanines are installed to permit many levels of pallets, each 
level is 10% smaller than the value above, or 14,400 sq ft.  Using this value, each 
mezzanine can carry approximately 1,058 pallets by area, 2,116 stacked two-high.  For 
two mezzanines, available area is 28,800 sq ft; for three it’s 43,200 sq ft. 
 
Food.  The SkyCat is weight-limited to 2,008 pallets. 
 
 (2,008 pallets)*(1,098 lb/pallet) = 2,204,784 lb 
 
 (2,008 pallets)*(576 MREs/pallet) = 11,566,078 MREs 
 Weight fraction = (2,204,784 lbs)/( 2,205,000 lbs) = 99% 
 Area fraction = ((1,058 pallets)*(13.3 sq ft/pallet))/(43,200 sq ft) = 33% 
 
 volume fraction = (2,008 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft))/(424,300 cu ft) = 23% 
 
Water.  The SkyCat is weight-limited to 927 pallets of water. 
 
927 pallets)*(2,376 lbs/pallet) = 2,202,552 lbs 
 
(927 pallets * 270 gal/pallet) = 250,290 gallons 
 
Weight fraction = (2,202,552 lbs)/(2,205,000 lbs) = 99% 
 
Area Fraction = (927 pallets)*(13.3 sq ft/pallet))/(43,200 sq ft) = 29% 
 
Volume fraction = (2,008 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft))/(424,300 cu ft) = 23% 
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Fuel.  SkyCat is not considered as an alternative to refueling at sea.  However, if the 
SkyCat were to be used to bring fuel direct to the objective, the unit for moving fuel 
would be the standard tanker truck, as with the LCAC.  This estimate is based on the 
capacity of the XM1091 Fuel/Water Tanker Truck.  This truck has a liquid capacity of 
1,500 gallons.  External dimensions of the XM1091427 are 26.4 ft. long x 8.8 ft. wide for 
a total footprint of 232.2 sq ft. and a total weight of 24,194 lbs. 
 
The SkyCat, is weight-limited to carrying 91 trucks.  They can only be carried with a 
single mezzanine loaded. 
 
(91 trucks)*(24,194 lbs/truck) = 2,201,654 lbs 
 
(91 trucks)*(1,500 gal/truck) = 136,500 gals 
 
(91 trucks)*(232.2 sq ft/truck) = 21,130 sq ft 
 
Weight Fraction = (2,201,654 lbs)/(2,205,000 lbs) = 99.8% 
 
Area Fraction = (21,130.2 sq ft)/(28,800 sq ft) = 73.0% 
 
Ammunition.  SkyCat is weight-limited to approximately 619 pallets of ammunition.  
This is approximately 14,856 155mm rounds or 24,460,000 7.62mm rounds. 
 
(619 pallets)*(3,562 lbs/pallet) = 2,204,878 lbs 
 
weight fraction = (2,204,878 lbs)/(2,205,000 lbs) = 99.9% 
area fraction = ((619 pallets)*(13.3 sq ft/pallet))/(16,000 sq ft) = 5% 
 
volume fraction = ((619 pallets)*(43.3 cu ft/pallet))/(424,300 cu ft) = 6% 
 
Commodity capacities are modeled with the following distributions to account for  
load variability. 
 
Food: Norm(1,873,780; 110,222) lbs 
 
Water: Norm(212,746; 12,515) gal 
 
Ammunition: Norm(1,872,593; 93,630) lbs  
 
Speed (V): 114 miles/hr listed as cruising speed (99 kts).  Speed for all loads modeled as 
NORM(100, 5) in kts. 
 
                                                 
427Global Security, “HUMWW XM1091 Specifications,” available online @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1091.htm, (cited 27 September 2004). 
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Start Fuel (Fo): By analogy with the SkyShip 600 B (SkyShip).428  The SkyCat is 
designed to be approximately 6 times bigger than the SkyShip.  Assuming that the fuel 
tank scales up linearly, the estimated fuel capacity is 1,000 to 1,100 gal or  
6,800 to 7,200 lbs. 
 
Fuel Usage Rate: Airship will utilize six 11,185 kW (15,000 shp) engines (Kuznetsov 
NK-12M turboprops)429 and fuel consumption is expected to be 0.38 lb/hp-hr. 
 
Range: SkyCat range is estimated at cruising altitude of 4,000 ft. from the theoretical 








10,000 NM @ 40 kts with 990 ton payload 
6,000 NM @ 100 kts with 990 ton payload 
4,000 NM @ 100 kts with 1,100 ton payload 
 
                                                 
428 Global Skyship Industries, Inc., “SKYSHIP 600B BLIMB/AIRSHIP SPECIFICATIONS,” available on 
the World Wide Web @ http://www.globalskyships.com/gss2.htm, (cited 04 December 2004). 
429 E-mail conversation with Paul Macey, Design Engineer, ATG Ltd. on 29 October 2004. 
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Endurance (E): Based on a 4,000 NM range at 100 kts with a 1,100 ton payload. 
 
Specific range is estimated by dividing range by estimated fuel capacity. 
 
(4,000 NM)/(7,000 lb fuel) = 0.57 NM/lb, which equates to 1.75 lb/NM 
 
Specific fuel consumption is estimated by multiplying this value by the speed. 
 
(1.75 lb/NM)*(100 NM/hr) = 175 lb/hr 
 
Dividing estimated fuel capacity by estimated specific fuel consumption equates to 
approximately 40 hrs of endurance at 100 kts. 
 
B.3 Transfers Parameter Analysis 
Transfers are modeled as time delays associated with loading a connector with the 
payload it has been assigned to deliver.  SEA-6 modeled two types of transfer delays.  
The surface connector delays are associated with the use on an Integrated Landing 
Platform (ILP) and the air connector delays are associated with the loading of internal 
and external loads. 
 B.3.1 ILP Parameter Analysis 
The primary assumption for ILP operations is that the MPF(F) will maintain 
position to keep the operational ILP(s) on the leeward side.  The assumption further states 
that the MPF(F) vessel provides enough shelter to effectively reduce the sea state by  
1 state.  Therefore, in sea state 4 conditions, the ILP will effectively be subjected to  
sea state 3 conditions on the leeward side. 
 
 Transfer delay values are calculated from a combination of both current 
operational values for LCAC transfer delays.  In this study, they are representative of 
both the HLCAC and LCU(R).  LCAC transfer delays as well as experimental  
Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) data for skin-to-skin vehicle transfers.  Current 
operational LCAC transfer delays for well-deck operations are listed as 62 minutes for 
vehicles and 120 minutes for cargo.430  Off-load delays at the beach are estimated to be 
30 minutes for vehicles and 120 minutes for cargo.431  For the baseline delay calculations, 
vehicle on-load and off-load times are referenced.  Very limited JLOTS data for vehicle 
transfer rates is available for sea states greater than two.  JLOTS transfer rate data for  
sea states 0-2 is very scattered with observations between 1 and 50 vehicles per hr 
possible.  However, in sea state 3 conditions, the data is very limited.  The highest 
                                                 
430“Landing Craft, Air Cushion,” (09 August 2004 [cited 05 October 2004]); available on the  
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcac-specs.htm. 
431 Ibid. 
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transfer rate achievable so far in sea state 3 conditions is 1-2 vehicles per hr.  No data is 
available for sea states greater than 3.432 
 
 Another assumption for ILP transfer delays is that the storage and inventory 
system that feeds the ILP is more advanced than a well-deck.  No data was found to 
quantify this advantage, so a modest 20% efficiency is assumed for ILP operations. 
 
ILP Transfer Delay Sea State 2: Assumption is that the effective sea state on the 
leeward side is one and that transfer rates are 20% faster than current LCAC well-deck 
operations due to inventory and storage efficiencies.  This provides a mean value of  
0.8 hrs per transfer.  Additional percentiles for the transfer delay are depicted in  
Table B-2.  These values represent the probability of delay based on vehicle loadout on 
LCAC missions (shorter delays for loads with only a few vehicles and longer delays for 
loads with more vehicles).  The data is then fitted to a distribution using ReliaSoft 
Weibull ++ Softare version 6.0.  The distribution for sea state 2 is best represented by a 











Table B-2: Sea state 2 ILP transfer delay data. 
 
ILP Transfer Delay Sea State 3: Assumption is that the effective sea state on the 
leeward side of the MPF(F) is two.  Current well-deck operational transfer rates are used 
as the mean.  Additional percentiles for the transfer delay are depicted in Table B-3.  
These values represent the probability of delay based on the vehicle loadout on LCAC 
missions.  The data was then fitted to a distribution using ReliaSoft Weibull ++ Softare 
version 6.0.  The distribution for sea state 3 is best represented by a Weibull distribution 










Table B-3: Sea State 3 ILP transfer delay data. 
                                                 
432 Personal conversation with Guinevere Boyd of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
(NSWCCD) on 20 October 2004. 
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ILP Transfer Delay Sea State 4: Assumption is that the effective sea state on the 
leeward side of the MPF(F) is three.  Experimental JLOTS skin-to-skin transfer rates of 
1-2 vehicles per hr are used to derive delay values.  Percentiles for the transfer delay are 
depicted in Table B-4.  These values represent the probability of delay based on the 
number vehicle loadout on LCAC missions.  The data was then fitted to a distribution 
using ReliaSoft Weibull ++ Softare version 6.0 (ReliaSoft).  The distribution for  
sea state 4 is best represented by a Weibull distribution with a Beta of 2.0286, Eta of 










Table B-4: Sea State 3 ILP transfer delay data. 
 B.3.2 Air Connector Loading Parameter Analysis 
The primary assumption for CH-53 and MV-22 transfer-at-sea is that the transfer 
delay is not a function of sea state due to the large size of the proposed MPF(F) ships.  
The MPF(F) ships are considered stable with identical transfer delays for sea states 2, 3, 
and 4.  The transfer delay consists of the time required to commence a maneuver from 
port or starboard observation to a hover over the operational deck spot, pick-up the 
external load, and then depart and clear the deck spot.  The baseline CH-53X transfer 
delay value is 1 minute.  It is calculated based on actual observations of current CH-53 
Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) operations from fleet experience.433  The MV-22 
transfer delay is predicted to be longer than the CH-53 due to larger downwash forces 
present underneath the MV-22.  Due to the larger downwash forces, the MV-22 is 
predicted to hover at a higher altitude producing a more challenging external hook-up.  
The combination of the higher downwash forces and the higher hover altitude during the 
transfer operation are estimated to add an additional minute to the transfer delay 
compared to the CH-53.  The MV-22 transfer delay is 2 minutes.434 
 
B.4 Inventory and Storage Parameter Analysis 
The primary assumption for the inventory and storage operations is that the 
MPF(F) will have a more advanced inventory and storage system.  The assumption 
further states that the MPF(F) vessel have the ability to strike-up and strike-down cargo 
                                                 
433 Hoivik, Thomas, Professor, Test and Evaluation, Operations Analysis Curriculum, [personal interview], 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2004. 
434 Ibid. 
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in conditions up to sea state 4.  Sea states 0-2 are modeled the same with separate times 
for sea state 3 and 4. 
 
 Inventory and storage delay values are calculated from a combination of both 
current operational strike-up/strike-down transfer delays as well as published Supply 
logistics requirement times.  Current DoD logistics are moving toward use of  
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and are assumed will be completely 
implemented by 2015.  Faster computers and more advanced software coupled with  
near-real time visibility of logistics will enable the Sea Base to prepare cargo for the next 
days needs.  The MPF(F) ships will operate using a 12-hrs on and a 12-hrs off concept, of 
which the 12 hrs off will provide time to UNREP/VERTREP and prestage cargo for the 
following day’s mission.  Additionally, the MPF(F) vessels built with selective offload 
will enable more efficient movement of cargo between staging areas and the cargo holds.  
Unfortunately, material handling equipment is not expected to be different than what is 
used currently. 
 
 Overall, little or no data was found to model strike-up or strike-down functions.  
However some data was provided by a Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) study435 
that listed strike-down times onboard a LHD and a CVN.  This data was obtained during 
pier side operations and was used to extrapolate times during sea states 0-2. 
 B.4.1 Strike-Up 
Strike-Up Delay Sea State 0-2: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have no 
impact on the inventory and storage functions to include movement and packaging of 
cargo to staging areas.  Using published supply response times436 and that the cargo 
would be prestaged with only minor changes a strike-up delay of 10 minutes was used.  
This provides a mean value of 0.1667 hrs per strike-up.  Additional percentiles for the 
transfer delay are depicted in Table B-5.  These values represent the probability of delay 
based on speed of moving prestaged cargo or last minute changes.  The data is then fitted 
to a distribution using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 2 is best represented by a 










Table B-5: Sea state 0-2 Strike-up delay data. 
                                                 
435 McCammon, Tom, Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD), LHD and CVN 
Time Study, conducted by Naval Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHST) Center, 
November 2002. 
436 Afloat Supply Procedures, NAVSUP Publication 485. 
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Strike-Up Delay Sea State 3: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have little 
impact on the inventory and storage functions to include movement and packaging of 
cargo to staging areas.  Using above response times and adding a 10% increase due to  
sea state effects a mean value is 0.1883 hrs per strike-up.  Additional percentiles for the 
transfer delay are depicted in Table B-6.  These values represent the probability of delay 
based on speed of moving pre-staged cargo or last minute changes.  The data is then 
fitted to a distribution using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 3 is best represented 










Table B-6: Sea State 3 Strike-up delay data. 
Strike-Up Delay Sea State 4: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have an 
impact on the inventory and storage functions to include movement and packaging of 
cargo to staging areas.  Using above response times and adding a 50% increase due to  
sea state effects a  mean value is 0.2 hrs per strike-up.  Additional percentiles for the 
transfer delay are depicted in Table B-7.  These values represent the probability of delay 
based on speed of moving pre-staged cargo or last minute changes.  The data is then 
fitted to a distribution using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 4 is best represented 










Table B-7: Sea State 4 Strike-up delay data. 
 B.4.2 Strike-Down 
Strike-Down Delay Sea States 0-2: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have 
no impact on the inventory and storage functions to include movement of cargo from 
staging areas to storage area.  Using the NSWC study times437 and the fact that cargo is  
on-loaded faster than it can be put away, a strike-down delay of 31 minutes was used.  
This provides a mean value of 0.52 hrs per strike-down.  Additional percentiles for the 
                                                 
437 McCammon, November 2002. 
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transfer delay are depicted in Table B-8.  These values represent the probability of delay 
based on the speed of moving and storing cargo.  The data is then fitted to a distribution 
using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 2 is best represented by a lognormal 










Table B-8: Sea state 0-2 Strike-down delay data. 
Strike-Down Delay Sea State 3: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have little 
impact on the inventory and storage functions, to include movement of cargo from 
staging area to storage area.  Using above response times and adding a 10% increase due 
to sea state effects a mean value is 0.57 hrs per strike-down.  Additional percentiles for 
the strike-down delay are depicted in Table B-9.  These values represent the probability 
of delay based on the speed of moving and storing cargo.  The data is then fitted to a 
distribution using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 3 is best represented by a 










Table B-9: Sea state 3 Strike-down delay data. 
Strike-Down Delay Sea State 4: Assumption is that the effective sea state will have an 
impact on the inventory and storage functions to include movement of cargo from staging 
area to storage area.  Using above response times and adding a 50% increase due to  
sea state effects a mean value is 0.65 hrs per strike-down.  Additional percentiles for the 
transfer delay are depicted in Table B-10.  These values represent the probability of delay 
based on the speed of moving and storing cargo.  The data is then fitted to a distribution 
using ReliaSoft.  The distribution for sea state 4 is best represented by a lognormal 
distribution with a mean of 0.65 and a standard deviation of 0.16. 










Table B-10: Sea State 4 Strike-down delay data. 
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Appendix C: Cost Analysis Data 
C.1 Introduction 
Appendix C contains the calculations used to generate the cost estimation 
contained in this report and includes samples of each formula used for computations.  For 
costing purposes, this appendix contains two sections: acquisition cost data and operating 
and support (O & S) cost data.  Calculations are demonstrated for each category in the 
overall Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of the cost estimation. 
The calculations in this appendix highlight the steps taken to perform the cost 
estimate of the 2015 Baseline Architecture [Chapter 8].  Cost estimates for each platform 
contain the acquisition and O & S costs in order to generate the LCC for each platform.  
In addition to performing a cost estimate for the 2015 Baseline Architecture, a cost 
estimate for each alternative architecture is prepared.  The methodology used in the  
2015 Baseline Architecture includes the same steps taken to generate the alternative 
architecture cost estimates found in Chapter 15. 
C.2 2015 Baseline Architecture Summary 
Microsoft™ Excel is the primary tool used to record and track all cost data and is 
instrumental in forming the LCC for each platform.  Table C-1 shows a sample  
Excel spreadsheet. 
 
   























QTY Total Baseline LCC 
(FY04$) 
Total Baseline LCC 
(FY2015$) 
MPF(F) - (1) $2,435,000,000 2008 1.0655 $2,285,221,709 1.2240 $2,797,049,601 $420,743,069 $514,978,143 $2,705,964,777 $3,312,027,744 1 $2,705,964,777 $3,312,027,744 
MPF(F) - (2) $1,865,000,000 2009 1.0869 $1,715,963,476 1.2240 $2,100,292,912 $364,433,704 $446,057,003 $2,080,397,181 $2,546,349,915 1 $2,080,397,181 $2,546,349,915 
MPF(F) - (3) $1,825,000,000 2010 1.1086 $1,646,235,265 1.2240 $2,014,947,466 $309,228,445 $378,487,258 $1,955,463,710 $2,393,434,724 1 $1,955,463,710 $2,393,434,724 
MPF(F) - (4) $1,825,000,000 2010 1.1086 $1,646,235,265 1.2240 $2,014,947,466 $309,228,445 $378,487,258 $1,955,463,710 $2,393,434,724 1 $1,955,463,710 $2,393,434,724 
MPF(F) - (5) $1,825,000,000 2011 1.1308 $1,613,956,142 1.2240 $1,975,438,692 $255,105,642 $312,242,410 $1,869,061,784 $2,287,681,102 1 $1,869,061,784 $2,287,681,102 
MPF(F) - (6) $1,825,000,000 2011 1.1308 $1,613,956,142 1.2240 $1,975,438,692 $255,105,642 $312,242,410 $1,869,061,784 $2,287,681,102 1 $1,869,061,784 $2,287,681,102 
MPF(F) - (7) $1,825,000,000 2012 1.1534 $1,582,309,943 1.2240 $1,936,704,600 $202,044,070 $247,296,480 $1,784,354,013 $2,184,001,080 1 $1,784,354,013 $2,184,001,080 
MPF(F) - (8) $1,825,000,000 2012 1.1534 $1,582,309,943 1.2240 $1,936,704,600 $202,044,070 $247,296,480 $1,784,354,013 $2,184,001,080 1 $1,784,354,013 $2,184,001,080 
                            
T-AOE  $358,229,844 2004 1.0000 $358,229,844 1.2240 $438,463,646 $1,194,170,756 $1,461,665,005 $1,552,400,599 $1,900,128,650 1 $1,552,400,599 $1,900,128,650 
                            
MV-22 $79,007,000 2004 1.0000 $79,007,000 1.2240 $96,702,432 $82,266,008 $100,693,593 $161,273,008 $197,396,026 48 $7,741,104,368 $9,475,009,238 
                            
CH-53X $26,100,000 1981 0.4749 $54,953,661 1.2240 $67,261,796 $86,339,657 $105,679,740 $141,293,318 $172,941,536 20 $2,825,866,361 $3,458,830,717 
                            
SH-60R $36,476,155 2004 1.0000 $36,476,155 1.2240 $44,645,827 $54,810,544 $67,088,106 $91,286,699 $111,733,934 12 $1,095,440,391 $1,340,807,207 
                            
AH-1Z $20,150,096 2004 1.0000 $20,150,096 1.2240 $24,663,173 $40,035,941 $49,003,992 $60,186,037 $73,667,165 18 $1,083,348,674 $1,326,008,973 
                            
F-35 JSF $81,292,796 2002 0.9774 $83,173,098 1.2240 $101,801,624 $66,749,670 $81,701,597 $149,922,769 $183,503,221 36 $5,397,219,681 $6,606,115,954 
                            
VTUAV $1,800,000 2002 0.9774 $1,841,634 1.2240 $2,254,110 $1,289,147 $1,577,881 $3,130,781 $3,831,991 6 $18,784,685 $22,991,946 
                            
UH-1Y $27,875,556 2005 1.0130 $27,517,824 1.2240 $33,681,073 $27,485,866 $33,642,701 $55,003,691 $67,323,774 9 $495,033,217 $605,913,963 
                            
LCAC $24,574,247 2004 1.0000 $24,574,247 1.2240 $30,078,214 $20,376,056 $24,939,742 $44,950,303 $55,017,956 24 $1,078,807,272 $1,320,430,940 
                            
LCU(R) $17,152,632 2004 1.0000 $17,152,632 1.2240 $20,994,357 N/A N/A $17,152,632 $20,994,357 2 $34,305,263 $41,988,715 
                
          TOTAL:  $37,326,431,481 $45,686,837,773 
            (BY04$) (FY2015$) 
 
Table C-1: 2015 Baseline Architecture Summary 
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C.2.1 Summary Model Variables 
Table C-2 summarizes the variables and formulas that generate the data in Table C-1. 
Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Platform Type P The type of platform from the baseline composition. N/A 
Acquisition Cost A The open source acquisition cost.  Each unit acquisition cost is a per unit cost that is 
assumed to include all procurement and acquisition cost components.  Source reference 
data is located in Chapter 8. 
N/A 
Acq. Year YA The year the acquisition cost is based upon. N/A 
BY04 Indice I2004 The inflation indice valve as provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division, used to 
normalize all costs to FY2004$. 
N/A 
Acq. Cost (BY04$) Ab The normalized acquisition cost to BY04$. Ab = A*I2004  ;  Ab = A/I2004 
FY2015 Indice I2015 The inflation indice valve as provided by the Naval Cost Analysis Division, used to 
normalize all costs to FY2015$. 
N/A 
Acq. Cost (FY2015) A15 The normalized acquisition cost to FY2015. A15 = Ab* I2015  
BY04$ O&S Cost O&Sb The per unit annual O&S cost for each platform normalized to BY04$.  Each year of O&S 
costs was normalized to BY04$ and summed for the total. 
O&SB = ∑(FYn / I2015) 
FY2015$ O&S Costs O&S2015 The per unit annual O&S cost for each platform normalized to FY2015$. O&S2015 = (∑FYn)*I2015 
FY04$ Life Cycle Cost LCC04 The Life Cycle Cost of each unit in FY04$. LCC04 = Ab + O&Sb 
FY2015$ Life Cycle Cost LCC15 The Life Cycle Cost of each unit in FY2015$. LCC15 = A15 + O&S2015 
QTY Q The number of each platform in the 2015 Baseline Architecture. N/A 
Total Baseline LCC (FY04$) Tb The Life Cycle Cost of all platforms in the baseline composition in FY04$. Tb = LCC04 * Q 
Total Baseline LCC (FY2015$) T2015 The Life Cycle Cost of all platforms in the baseline composition in FY2015$. T2015 = LCC15 * Q 
Total T The total of the baseline composition in FY04$ and FY2015$. T = ∑Tb   ;    T = ∑T2015 
 
Table C-2: 2015 Baseline Architecture Summary Variables
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 C.2.2 Summary Model Calculation Example 
To demonstrate the methodology utilized in the summary table, an example of 
how to generate the LCC for the lead MPF(F) is presented below. 
Normalizing Acquisition Cost Data to BY04$: 
 Ab = A/I2004 
 Ab = ($2,435,000,000 (FY08$)/(1.0655) = $2,285,221,709   (BY04$) 
Normalizing Acquisition Cost Data from BY04$ to FY15$: 
 A15 = Ab* I2015 
 A15 = ($2,285,221,709   (BY04$)) * (1.2240) = $2,797,049,601 
Normalizing O & S Cost to BY04$: (From FY08 to FY04) 
 O & SB = ∑(FYn/I2015) 
O & SB = ($60M(FY08$)/(1.065) + ($60M(FY09$)/(1.069) + ….. + 
($60M(FY15))/(1.2240) = $420,743,069 FY04$ 
Normalizing O & S Cost To FY15$: 
 O & S2015 = (∑FYn)*I2015 
O & S2015 = ($420,743,069 (FY04$)) * (1.2240) =  
$514, 978, 143 (FY15$) 
Calculating FY04$ LCC: 
 LCC04 = Ab + O & Sb 
 LCC04 = $2,285,221,709 (BY04$)    + $420,743,069 (FY04$) =  
          $2,705,964,777 (FY04$) 
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Calculating FY15$ LCC: 
 LCC15 = A15 + O & S2015 
 LCC15 = $2,797,049,601 (FY15$) + $514, 978, 143 (FY15$) =  
        $3,312,027,744 (FY15$) 
Calculating Total Baseline LCC (FY04$): 
 Tb = LCC04 * Q 
 Tb = $2,705,964,777 (FY04$) * 1 = $2,705,964,777 (FY04$) 
Calculating Total Baseline LCC (FY15$): 
 T2015 = LCC15 * Q 
 T2015 = $3,312,027,744 (FY15$) * 1 = $3,312,027,744 (FY15$) 
C.3 Acquisition Cost Methodology 
To perform cost estimates for the acquisition costs of each component of the  
2015 Baseline Architecture, three categories define the methodology: 
Platforms that require an average procurement unit cost (APUC) 
calculation based on available open-source data 
Platforms that only require cost normalization be performed 
Platforms whose acquisition cost data is available in the  
FY05 President’s Budget 
The steps to compute the cost estimate for each category along with the  
2015 Baseline Architecture components in each category follow. 
 C.3.1 APUC from Open-Source Data 
Two components, the T-AOE and LCAC, of the 2015 Baseline Architecture have 
available cost data for each platform manufactured.  Since it is unknown which individual 
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platforms might comprise the 2015 Baseline Architecture, the available cost data for each 
platform forms an average procurement unit cost (APUC).  To demonstrate the 
methodology used, cost data for the T-AOE is provide in Table C-3.  The table includes 
the year in which the cost was incurred, the acquisition cost of that year, what inflation 
indice was utilized, the normalized cost to FY04$, and the APUC. 
Acq. Cost FY$ Index FY04$ Cost 
1987 $290,000,000 0.6976 $415,711,009.17 
1989 $243,000,000 0.7487 $324,562,575.13 
1990 $198,000,000 0.7787 $254,269,937.07 
1992 $366,000,000 0.8349 $438,375,853.40 
        
    Total: (FY04$) $1,432,919,374.77 
    APUC: (FY04$) $358,229,843.69 
 
Table C-3: T-AOE APUC  Data. 
 C.3.2 APUC from Open-Source Data Model Variables 
Table C-4 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-3. 
Variable Symbol Description Calculations
Year Y Year T-AOE was procured. N/A 
Acq. Cost A Acquisition cost of the T-AOE, source reference data is 
located in Chapter 8. 
N/A 
FY$ Index I2004 The inflation indice valve as provided by the Naval Cost 
Analysis, used to normalize all costs to FY04$ (BY04$). 
N/A 
FY04$ Cost Ab The normalized acquisition cost to FY2004. Ab = A/I2004 
Total (FY04$) AT The total acquisition for all T-AOE’s in 2004$. AT = ∑Ab 
APUC APUC The average procurement unit cost for all T-AOEs. APUC = AT/n
Number of Platforms n The number of platforms included in the APUC calculation. N/A 
 
Table C-4: APUC Model Variables. 
 C.3.3 APUC from Open-Source Data Calculation Example 
To demonstrate the methodology utilized to calculate the APUC, an example of 
how to calculate the APUC for the T-AOE is provided. 
  Normalizing Acquisition Cost per T-AOE to FY04$: 
 
   Ab = A/I2004 
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   Ab = $290,000,000 (FY87$)/0.6976 = $415,711,009.17 (FY04$) 
 Ab = $243,000,000 (FY89$)/0.7487 = $324,562,575.13 (FY04$)  
(Methodology continues for other T-AOEs) 
Calculating Total Acquisition Costs in FY04$: 
 
   AT = ∑Ab 
AT = $415,711,009.17 (FY04$) + $324,562,575.13 (FY04$) +  
         $254,269,937.07 (FY04$) + $438,375,853.40 (FY04$) =  
            $1,432,919,374.77 (FY04$) 
 Calculating T-AOE APUC: 
   APUC = AT/n 
   APUC = $1,432,919,374.77 (FY04$)/4 = $358,229,844 (FY04$) 
 C.3.4 Acquisition Cost Data Normalization 
Several components of the 2015 Baseline Architecture have open source cost data 
available that only require cost normalization.  Such components include the MV-22, 
CH-53, VTUAV, and the MPF(F).  To demonstrate the methodology utilized for 




Table C-5: MV-22 Acquistion Cost Data. 
 C.3.5 Acquisition Cost Data Normalization Model Variables 
Table C-6 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-5. 
Acquisition 
Cost Year Index BY04$ Index BY04$ Cost
FY$ 
Index FY15$ 
$79,007,000  2004 APN 1.0000 $79,007,000 1.2240 $96,702,432
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Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Acquisition Cost A The open source acquisition cost value, source 
reference data is located in Chapter 8. 
N/A 
Year Y The year of the acquisition cost value. N/A 
Index I The type of inflation indice used.  For this 
example, APN is the indice for aircraft 
procurement. 
 
BY04$ Index I2004 The inflation indice valve as provided by the  
Naval Cost Analysis Division, used to normalize 
all costs to FY04$ (BY04$). 
N/A 
BY04$ Cost Ab The normalized acquisition cost to FY04. Ab = A * I2004 
FY$ Index I2015 The inflation indice valve as provided by the  
Naval Cost Analysis Division inflation calculator 
used to normalize all costs to FY15$. 
N/A 
FY15$ A15 The normalized acquisition cost to FY15. A15 = Ab * I2015 
 
Table C-6: Acquisition Cost Data Normalization Variables. 
 C.3.6 Acquisition Cost Data Normalization Calculation Example 
To demonstrate the methodology utilized to normalize open-source cost data, an 
example of how to normalize the open-source acquisition cost data for the MV-22  
is provided. 
Normalizing Acquisition Cost Data to BY04$: 
Ab = A * I2004 
 Ab = $79,007,000(FY04$) * 1.000 = $79,007,000 (FY04$) 
Normalizing Acquisition Cost Data from BY04$ to FY15$: 
 A15 = Ab* I2015 
 A15 = $79,007,000 (FY04$) * 1.2240 = $96,702,432 (FY15$) 
 C.3.7 Acquisition Cost Data from FY05 Budget 
Several components of the 2015 Baseline Architecture are future capabilities that 
have full funding in the FY05 President’s Budget.  These components include the  
SH-60R, AH-1Z, JSF, LCU(R), and UH-1Y.  To demonstrate the methodology utilized 
for the normalization, Table C-7 provides the cost data used to generate the acquisition 
cost for the LCU(R). 
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  Total Program (FY04$) FY15 Index FY15$ 
Quantity 19     
End Cost $324,500,000.00 1.2240 $397,179,228.6 
Less Adv Procurement $0.00 1.2240 $0.0 
Less Escalation $0.00 1.2240 $0.0 
Full Funding TOA $324,500,000.00 1.2240 $397,179,228.6 
Plus Advance Procurement $0.00 1.2240 $0.0 
Total Obligation Authority $324,500,000.00 1.2240 $397,179,228.6 
Plus Outfitting and Post Delivery $1,400,000.00 1.2240 $1,713,562.2 
Plus Escalation $0.00 1.2240 $0.0 
Total Obligation Authority $325,900,000.00 1.2240 $398,892,790.8 
Avg. Unit End Cost $17,152,631.58 1.2240 $20,994,357 
 
Table C-7: LCU(R) Acquisition Cost. 
 C.3.8 Acquisition Cost Data from FY05 Budget Model Variables 
Table C-8 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-7. 
 
Table C-8: LCU(R) Acquisition Cost Model Variables. 
Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Total Program (FY04$) TPA The total funded costing data for LCU(R) program. N/A 
FY15 Index I2015 The inflation indice valve as provided by the Naval Cost 
Analysis, used to normalize all costs to FY15$. 
N/A 
FY15$ A15 The normalized acquisition cost to FY15. A15 = TPA * I2015 
Quantity Q The number of planned LCU(R) procurements. N/A 
End Cost EC The projected end cost prior to additional cost requirements. N/A 
Less Adv Procurement PA Authority provided in an appropriation act to obligate and 
disburse during a FY from the succeeding year’s 
appropriation.  This funds are added to the previous year’s 
budget and deducted from the next year. 
N/A 
Less Escalation E The use of a index to convert past to present prices 
(normalize) previously spent program costs. 
N/A 
Full Funding TOA TOA1 The total program value less advance procurement and 
outfitting and post delivery costs. 
TOA1 = EC - PA - E 
Plus Advance Procurement PA Authority provided in an appropriation act to obligate and 
disburse during a FY from the succeeding year’s 
appropriation.  This funds are added to the previous year’s 
budget and deducted from the next year. 
N/A 
Total Obligation Authority TOA2 Total program value plus advance procurement costs. TOA2 = TOA1 + PA 
Plus Outfitting and Post Delivery CA A cost that only applies to Navy ship building programs.  Is 
the cost required to make a ship ready for delivery and 
accounts for unforeseen cost requirements. 
N/A 
Plus Escalation E The use of an index to convert past to present prices 
(normalize) previously sent program costs 
N/A 
Total Obligation Authority TOAT Total program value. TOAT = TOA2 + CA + E
Avg. Unit End Cost APUC The average cost per unit of each planned ship procurement. APUC = TOAT / Q 
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 C.3.9 Acquisition Cost Data from FY05 Budget Calculation Example 
The methodology utilized to calculate acquisition cost data from the  
FY05 Budget, is demonstrated in the following example using data from the LCU(R). 
Normalizing Cost Data to FY15$: 
A15 = TPA * I2015 
A15 = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) * 1.2240 = $397,179,228.6 (FY15$)  
(Same methodology for each cost element) 
Calculating Full Funding TOA: 
TOA1 = EC - PA – E 
TOA1 = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) - $0 - $0 = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) 
Calculating Total Obligation Authority: 
 TOA2 = TOA1 + PA 
 TOA2 = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) + $0 = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) 
Calculating Total Obligation Authority for total program: 
 TOAT = TOA2 + CA + E 
 TOAT = $324,500,000.00 (FY04$) + $1,400,000 (FY04$) + $0 =  
         $325,900,000.00 (FY04$) 
Calculating APUC: 
 APUC = TOAT/Q 
 APUC = $325,900,000.00 (FY04$)/19 = $17,152,631.58 (FY04$) 
   
    437
C.4 Operating and Support (O & S) Cost Methodology 
For each 2015 Baseline Architecture component, the VAMOSC database values 
for O & S costs are primarily used to predict the historic and future O & S costs.  Similar 
to the acquisition costing methodology, there are four categories of O & S cost estimates: 
O & S predictions using only historical costs 
O & S predictions using analogous systems with historical cost data 
O & S predictions using the FY05 President’s Budget 
O & S data that only require cost normalization 
Each category is described below along with the 2015 Baseline Architecture 
components in each category. 
 C.4.1 O & S Predictions Using Historical Data 
To estimate the O & S cost data strictly from historical data, the VAMOSC 
database contains the necessary data to compute the costs for every component with the 
exception of the MPF(F), LCAC, LCU(R), and VTUAV.  Table C-9 demonstrates the 
methodology used to calculate the O & S costs for the T-AOE. 
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Historic Avg. Ship Class O & S costs (from VAMOSC) for T-AOE     
Year O & S Cost (FY04$) 




Avg. O & S per year 
(FY04$) 
2003 $48,112,815 22.0697% 9.5801% $37,493,939 
2002 $37,494,467 -0.1635%     
2001 $37,555,780 12.3333%     
2000 $32,923,914 0.8775%     
1999 $32,635,019 4.5097%     
1998 $31,163,293 -17.9447%     
1997 $36,755,437 -13.1085%     
1996 $41,573,518 5.6341%     
1995 $39,231,205       
Total: $337,445,448     
Future Avg Ship Class O & S Cost     Past O & S Cost (for LCC) 
Year FY04$   Year O & S Cost (FY04$)
2004 41,085,901   2003 $48,112,815 
2005 45,021,976   2002 $37,494,467 
2006 49,335,133   2001 $37,555,780 
2007 54,061,495   2000 $32,923,914 
2008 59,240,647   1999 $32,635,019 
2009 64,915,968   1998 $31,163,293 
2010 71,134,992   1997 $36,755,437 
2011 77,949,805   1996 $41,573,518 
2012 85,417,485   1995 $39,231,205 
2013 93,600,576       
2014 102,567,618   Total: $337,445,448 
2015 112,393,712   FY15 Index 2015.0000 
      FY15$ $679,952,577,720 
          
TOTAL (FY04$) $856,725,308 Total O & S $1,048,631,776 FY2015$ 
FY15 Index 1.2240       
 
Table C-9: T-AOE O & S Predictions using Historical Data. 
 C.4.2 O & S Predictions Using Historical Data Model Variables 
Table C-10 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-9. 
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Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Year YH The year in which historic O & S cost 
applies.  
N/A 
O&S Cost (FY04$) O&S04 The historical O & S cost in FY04$ provided 
by VAMOSC. 
N/A 
% Change from Prior 
Year 
∆% The percentage O & S cost change observed 
for each year of historic data.  This 
percentage change is beyond the annual 
increase due to inflation. 
∆% = 1 - (YH2 / YH1);  
∆% = 1 - (YH3 / YH2);  
Etc. 
Avg. % Change A∆% The average percentage O & S cost change 
based on number of years of available 
historic O & S cost data. 
A∆% = ∑ABSYHn / 8
Avg. O&S per Year 
(FY04$) 
O&SA04 The average O & S cost per year based on 
historical data across the T-AOE class in 
FY04$. 
O&SA04 = ∑O&S04 / 
Ny 
Years’ Worth of Data Ny The number of years worth of O & S data 
from VAMOSC database. 
N/A 
Future Avg. Ship Class 
O & S Cost 
--  The predicted future O & S cost per year up 
to 2015.  Based on historical average and 
average annual percentage increase. 
N/A 
Year YF The future year up to 2015. N/A 
FY04$ O&S04(1,2,,,n) The O & S cost in FY04$ for future year 
with average % change applied. 
O&S04(1) = O&S04(1) 
(1+ A∆%); O&S04(2) = 
O&S04(2) (1+ A∆%); 
etc. 
Total (FY04$) O&ST04 The total O & S cost for the LCC from the 
years 1995 to 2015 in FY04$. 
O&ST04 = ∑O&S04 
FY$ Index IF The future year inflation indice valve as 
provided by the Naval Cost Analysis 
Division inflation calculator used to 
normalize all costs to FY15$. 
N/A 
Total O & S (FY2015$) O & SF$ The normalized O & S cost to FY2015 O&SF$.= O&ST04 * IF
 
Table C-10: O & S Historical Calculation Variables. 
 C.4.3 O & S Prediction Using Historical Data Calculation Example 
To demonstrate the methodology utilized to calculate O & S costs based on 
historic cost data, an example of how the O & S costs for the T-AOE are  
calculated follows. 
Calculating the annual percentage change of the historical cost data: 
  ∆% = 1 – (YH2/YH1); ∆% = 1 - (YH3/YH2); etc. 
  ∆% = 1 – ($77.4M/$48.1M) = 22% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($37.5M/$37.4M) = -.16% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($32.9M/$37.5M) = 12.33% 
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  ∆% = 1 – ($32.6M/$32.9M) = .87% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($31.1M/$32.6M) = 4.5% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($36.7M/$31.1M) = -17.9% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($41.5M/$36.7M) = -13.10% 
  ∆% = 1 – ($39.2M/$41.5M) = 5.63% 
Calculating the average annual percentage change: 
  A∆% = ∑ABSYHn/8 
  A∆% = 76.6%/8 = 9.58% 
Calculating the average historical O & S cost per year (FY04$): 
  O&SA04 = ∑O&S04/9 
  O&SA04 = $337,445,448/9 = $37,493,939 (FY04$) 
Calculating future year O & S cost predications: 
  O&S04(1) = O&S04(1) (1+ A∆%); O&S04(2) = O&S04(2) (1+ A∆%); etc. 
O&S04(1) = $37,493,939 (FY04$) * (1 + .0958) =  
                  $41,085,901 (FY04$) (Prediction for 2004) 
O&S04(2) = $41,085,901 (FY04$) * (1 + .0958) =  
                  $45,021,976 (FY04$) (Prediction for 2005) 
O&S04(3) = $45,021,976 (FY04$) * (1 + .0958) =  
                  $49,335,133 (FY04$) (Predication for 2006); 
Continues until 2015: 
Normalizing O & S Cost Data to FY2015$: 
  O&SF$ = O&ST04 * IF 
  O&SF$ = $1,194,170,756 (FY04$) * 1.2240 = $1,461,665,005 
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 C.4.4 O & S Predictions Using Analogous Systems 
Generating the O & S costs for several systems requires the use of analogous 
systems to complete the estimation.  The following platforms, along with their analogous 
system, require using an analogy approach: 
2015 Baseline Component Analogous System 
JSF F/A-18F 
MV-22 AV-8B;       EA-6B;      F-14D;        F/A-18E 
SH-60R SH-60B 
AH-1Z AH-1W 




Table C-11: Analgous Systems. 
 
In addition to analogies, several platforms require the use of cost factors.  For the 
cost factor, assume the JSF and the UH-1W will require a 5% increase of O & S support 
over its analogous system.  This becomes the cost factor.  Also, the CH-53X will have a 
25% decrease in O & S costs over its analogous system once the system reaches 
deployment.  To demonstrate the methodology used to estimate the O & S costs for this 
category, the cost data of the JSF is in Table C-12. 
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O & S Costing 
Historic O&S costs (from VAMOSC) for F/A-18F - used as analogous system 
Year O & S Cost (FY04$) 
# of 
Aircraft 








Absolute Avg. % Change 
Avg. O & S 
per Year 
(FY04$) 
Predicted O & S 
(5% Greater) 
2003 $160,539,602 69 $2,326,661   20.28% $1,712,451 $1,798,074 
2002 $90,031,869 47 $1,915,572 20.28%       
2001 $41,230,519 27 $1,527,056 42.13% (Considered an outlier and excluded)     
2000 $11,488,698 13 $883,746 NA       
1999 $7,636,887 4 $1,909,222         
Future Avg. Aircraft O&S Cost  
Year FY04$             
2004 $1,798,074             
2005 $2,162,758             
2006 $2,601,408             
2007 $3,129,025             
2008 $3,763,652             
2009 $4,526,994             
2010 $5,445,157             
2011 $6,549,542             
2012 $7,877,917             
2013 $9,475,713             
2014 $11,397,573             
2015 $13,709,224             
Total (FY04$) $72,437,038 Total O & S $88,662,935 FY15$       
 
Table C-12: O & S Prediction for JSF. 
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C.4.5 O & S Predictions Using Analogy and Cost Factor Model Variables 
Table C-13 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-12. 
 
Table C-13: O & S Prediction for JSF Variables. 
Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Year YH The in which historic O & S cost applies.  N/A 
O & S Cost (FY04$) O&S04 The historical O & S cost in FY04$ provided 
by VAMOSC. 
N/A 
# of Aircraft QAC The number of aircraft included in the O & S 
cost data as reported in VAMOSC. 
N/A 
O & S Cost per A/C 
(FY04$) 
O&SAC The allocated O & S cost per aircraft in 
FY04$. 
O&SAC = O&S04/QAC
% Change from Prior 
Year 
∆% The percentage O & S cost change observed 
for each year of historic data.  This percentage 
change is beyond the annual increase due to 
inflation. 
∆% = 1 - (YH2/YH1);      
∆% = 1 - (YH3/YH2);  
etc. 
Avg. % Change A∆% The average percentage O &S cost change 
based on number of years of available historic 
O & S cost data. 
A∆% = ∑YHn/5 
Avg. O & S per Year 
(FY04$) 
O&SA04 The average O & S cost per year based on 
historical data across the F/A-18F in FY04$. 
O&SA04 = ∑O&S04/5 
Predicted O & S (5% 
Greater) 
O&SCF It was assumed the JSF would require 5% 
more O & S support than the F/A-18F.  This 
5% cost factor was added to the average O&S 
per year. 
O&SCF = O&SA04 * 
(1+.05) 
Future Avg. Aircraft  
O & S Cost 
  The predicted future O & S cost per year up to 
2015.  Based on historical average and 
average annual percentage increase. 
N/A 
Year YF The future year up to 2015. N/A 
FY04$ O&S04(1,2,,,n) The O & S cost in FY04$ with cost factor 
applied for future year with average % change 
applied. 
O&S04(2) = O&S04(1) 
(1+ A∆%); O&S04(3) = 
O&S04(2) (1+ A∆%); 
etc. 
Total (FY04$) O&ST04 The total O & S cost for the LCC from the 
years 1995 to 2015 in FY04$. 
O&ST04 = ∑O&S04 
FY$ Index IF The future year inflation indice valve as 
provided by the Naval Cost, used to normalize 
all costs to FY15$. 
N/A 
Total O & S (FY15$) O&SF$ The normalized O & S cost to FY15. O&SF$ = O&S04(1,2,,,n) 
* IF 
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 C.4.6 O & S Predictions Using Analogy and Cost Factors  
Calculation Example 
The calculations performed during this section are identical to the steps taken in 
Section 2.3.3 with the exception of the application of the 5% cost factor.  The example 
below demonstrates the use of the cost factor for the JSF. 
Predicting future O & S costs (FY04$) for the JSF using a cost factor and 
analogous historical cost data: 
 
 O&SCF = O&SA04 * (1+.05) 
 O&SCF = $1,712,451 (FY04$) * (1+.05) = $1,798,074 (FY04$) 
 C.4.7 O & S Predictions Using FY05 Budget Data 
Cost data from the FY05 President’s Budget O & S cost data is used to determine 
the O & S costs for the LCAC and VTUAV.  For the VTUAV, the USAF Predator is the 
analogous system.  VAMOSC does not track the historic cost of the LCAC.  However, 
any cost that is incurred after production is classified as an O & S cost.  The LCAC is 
currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).  The President’s Budget 
contains the costs for the SLEP.  Table C-14 displays the cost data. 
 Total Program (FY04$) 
Quantity 71 
End Cost $1,368,600,000 
Less Advance Proc $27,900,000 
Less FY03 Transfer $1,500,000 
Less Escalation $0 
Full Funding TOA $1,339,200,000 
Plus Advance Proc $27,900,000 
Plus Transfer Cost $1,500,000 
Total Obligation Authority $1,368,600,000 
Plus Outfitting and Post Delivery $78,100,000 
Plus Escalation $0 
Total $1,446,700,000 
Unit Cost (Avg. End Cost) $20,376,056 
2015 Index 1.2240 
FY15$ $24,939,742 
 
Table C-14: O & S Budget Cost Data for LCAC. 
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 C.4.8 O & S Predictions Using FY05 Budget Data Variables 
Table C-15 summarizes the variables and formulas used to calculate the data in 
Table C-14. 
 
Variable Symbol Description Calculations 
Total Program (FY04$) TPA 
The total funded costing data for LCAC SLEP 
program. N/A 
Quantity Q The number of planned LCAC programmed for SLEP N/A 
End Cost EC 
The projected end cost prior to additional cost 
requirements. N/A 
Less Adv Procurement PA 
Authority provided in an appropriation act to obligate 
and disburse during a FY from the succeeding year’s 
appropriation.  This funds are added to the previous 
year's budget and deducted from the next year's budget. 
N/A 
Less FY03 Transfer T03 The funding spent in FY03. N/A 
Less Escalation E The use of a index to convert past to present prices (normalize) previously sent program costs. N/A 
Full Funding TOA TOA1 
The total program value less advance procurement and 
outfitting and post delivery costs. TOA1 = EC - PA - T03 - E 
Plus Advance Procurement PA 
Authority provided in an appropriation act to obligate 
and disburse during a FY from the succeeding year’s 
appropriation.  This funds are added to the previous 
year’s budget and deducted from the next year's budget. 
N/A 
Plus Transfer Cost TY The costs expended in previous years. N/A 
Total Obligation Authority TOA2 Total program value plus advance procurement costs. TOA2 = TOA1 + TY + PA 
Plus Outfitting and Post Delivery 
CA 
This cost only applies to Navy ship building programs.   
It is the cost required to make a ship ready for delivery 




This is the use of an index to convert past to present 
prices (normalize) previously sent program costs. N/A 
Total  TOAT Total program value. TOAT = TOA2 + CA + E 
Unit Cost (Avg. End Cost) APUC The average cost per unit of each planned LCAC SLEP. APUC = TOAT / Q 
FY2015 Index 
I2015 
The inflation indice valve as provided by the  
Naval Cost Analysis Division inflation calculator used 
to normalize all costs to FY15$. 
N/A 
FY15$ A15 The normalized acquisition cost to FY15. A15 = APUC * I2015 
 
Table C-15: LCAC O & S Variables. 
 C.4.9 O & S Predictions Using FY2005 Budget Data Calculation Example 
Calculating the O & S cost of the LCAC from the Budget only requires the 
normalization of data.  Previous examples demonstrate the necessary actions. 
 
Last Edited on 10/25/04 
446 Appendix D 
Appendix D: WarGaming Results/Insights 
D.1 Introduction 
Wargaming has “probably existed as long as war itself.”438  The purpose of 
wargaming is to add insight into strategy, plans, and tactics that can be used on the 
battlefield and in other military maneuvers.  Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 
Six (SEA-6) uses a wargame to gather further insights and to increase campus-wide 
collaboration in their Seabasing and Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) project.  SEA-6 
students and students from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Joint Wargaming 
Analysis Class (OA 4604), consisting mainly of students from the Operations Research 
and Operational Logistics curricula, conducts a wargame set in the year 2016 against the 
near-peer competitor,  Peoples Republic of China (PRC).  Use of the Joint Conflict and 
Tactical Simulation (JCATS) model allows the participants to engage in real-time 
“personnel-in-the-loop” decision making.  This facilitates the examination of a Sea Base 
and its associated logistics from a different perspective in order to gain insights and  
re-challenge assumptions. 
In the wargame, the Sea Base is considered a center of gravity (COG) by both the 
Blue and Red forces.  Wargame results produce two major insights; the need to secure 
lines of communications (LOCs), particularly the survivability of the  
Maritime Propositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ships, and the incompatibility of  
re-supplying non-expeditionary forces with certain joint equipment through the Sea Base. 
D.2 Scenario: China – Philippine in 2016 
Following China’s integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
her economy continues its rapid growth from the 20th Century’s last ten years.  In 
addition to enhancing educational and social programs, the PRC invests its funds in 
military forces, focusing on strategic and naval forces capable of establishing a greater 
“sphere of influence” from its shores.  In 2012, Taiwan and China sign a treaty formally 
recognizing each party’s government and they set a timetable for unification by 2018. 
                                                 
438 Peter O. Perla, The Art of Wargaming, (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, MD: 1990), p. 1. 
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The growth of strategic and naval forces is seen by China as a strategic necessity 
to affirm rights to the offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea.  Justifying through 
historical rights and economic requirements, in 2015 China publicly claims hegemony 
over the entire South China Sea and guarantees the freedom of innocent merchant 
shipping through its economic zone.  That same year, the Peoples Liberation Army 
(PLA) Navy (PLAN) reinforces its presence in the Spratly Islands (especially on 
Mischief and Alison Reef) by creating three paved runways, pier and maintenance 
facilities, air defense artillery (ADA) batteries, and by installing ballistic missile sites.  
The Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, Japan, and the 
United States all condemn China’s announcement and the Spratly development, but fall 
short of consensus on a combined response.  Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, 
however, do form a hasty common defense treaty and again protest China’s aggressive 
behavior in the area.  The United States and Philippines had established a similar treaty  
in 2010. 
China increases its naval presence in the South China Sea by deploying ships and 
aircraft from its northern fleets to augment the South Sea (Naihai) Fleet (SSF).  Despite 
repeated protests, Chinese naval exercises frequently disregard the territorial seas of the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.  Early in 2016, a Philippine military jet, after being 
warned to clear, strafes a Chinese destroyer that fires its gun within two miles of  
Palawan Island’s coast (Philippines).  The Chinese destroyer returns fire but fails to hit 
the aircraft.  Ten Chinese sailors die in the attack. 
Two months later, claiming self-defense and the need to establish a “safety” 
perimeter around the South China Sea, the PRC invades Kepulalian Natuna, Indonesia 
with a division of Chinese infantry supported by an air defense regiment, and  
10 shore-based, anti-ship missile batteries.  They further threaten to invade Palawan 
Island (Philippines) if any of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
nations react.  In coordination, the PLAN sets up a quarantine of Puerto Princesa port 
(Palawan).  The PRC government immediately calls for a treaty with the Philippines and 
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Indonesia to establish a New Era of South China Sea Cooperation among  
perimeter nations. 
Led by the United States, ASEAN nations condemn China’s action and submit a 
joint United Nations (UN) resolution to establish sanctions against the PRC.  The 
Security Council vetoes this resolution.  The President of the United States, through the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), directs Commander Pacific Command (PACCOM) to 
establish a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) SEA TIGER with Indonesia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Australia in order to prepare alternative courses of action to deter Chinese 
aggression and protect Philippine and Indonesian sovereignty.  If deterrence fails, the 
CJTF Commander must prepare to repel an invasion of Palawan Island with follow-on 
operations to re-establish Indonesian sovereignty over Kepulalian Natuna.  Strikes on the 
Chinese mainland or Taiwan require prior approval. 
Allied cooperation is a necessity.  With the decommissioning of  
USS KITTY HAWK, no conventional carrier is available to replace her in Japan.  
Instead, a Naval Expeditionary Strike Group composed of two 80,000-ton  
Expeditionary Warfare (EXWAR) Ships (Yokosuka), 2 LPD-17s (Sasebo), 5 LCS 
(Sasebo), 2 older Aegis CGs (Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capable), and  
3 DDGs (not TBMD capable) remain forward-deployed in Japan along with  
1 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)-sized Marine force in Okinawa.  The amphibious 
lift for these Marines comes from the EXWAR ships and LPD-17s in Japan.  All other 
United States forces, including those in Korea, withdraw to the United States and make 
up an Expeditionary Force. 
Time is critical as the PLA continues to reinforce their invasion forces, mobilize 
forces to invade Pawalan, and build world support for their actions.  Figure D-1 shows 
the initial force disposition of Allied and PRC forces in the South China Seas Region. 
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Figure D-1: Initial Force Locations of Allied and PRC Forces. 
 
In the wargame, CJTF SEATIGER will have the assets and capabilities of  
SEA-6’s 2015 Baseline Architecture (2015 BLA) discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this 
Technical Report.  The MPF(F) will be located at the Forward Logistics Site (FLS) 
which, in this scenario, is Apra Harbor, Guam.  The area of operations for the Sea Base 
will consist of Palawan Island and the Sulu Sea.  The Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB) 
onboard the Sea Base is used as a deterrent force against PRC aggression.  If the PRC 
does invade Palawan, the JEB will remove the PRC from Palawan. 
 D.2.1 Methodology 
In this wargame, the students use many of the techniques taught by the Naval War 
College Program, Monterey, in the Joint Maritime Operations (NW 3275 & NW 3276) 
classes.  A specific technique involves the Joint Operation Planning and Executing 
System (JOPES) to develop the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (CES) for the 
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game.  Another technique is course of action (COA) development.  Two COAs are 
developed and analyzed based on principles of war, operational art, risk, timing, 
infrastructure damage and force protection.  The most likely COA scenario is selected 
and variables associated to it are entered in JCATS.  The simulation is conducted and 
results analyzed to identify patterns and outcomes. 
JCATS is a self-contained, high-resolution joint simulation model managed by the 
Joint Warfighting Center at U.S. Joint Forces Command.  It is used for training, 
exercises, analysis, experimentation, mission planning and rehearsals.  JCATS provides 
multisided air, ground and sea combat models in a digitized terrain. 
Two competing teams, the Blue Team representing the United States and 
Coalition partners, and the Red Team representing the PRC, are formed.  SEA-6 
participants serve as Logistics and Materiel (J-4) staff on the Blue Team and provide 
input related to supply, maintenance, attrition rates, and tonnage lift capacity as well as 
combat service support operations in the area of operations (AO). 
 D.2.2 Wargaming Insights 
The wargame demonstrates the need to secure LOCs, and the vulnerability of the 
MPF(F) as it transits from the FLS to the AO.  Although the exploration of vulnerability 
is out of scope in this study, the wargame shows that a thoughtful enemy with blue-water 
capability is a definite threat to the MPF(F).  This highlights a need for MPF(F) escort 
vessels during its transit from the FLS to the AO.  In the wargame, the Red Forces  
pre-stage their 20 diesel submarines on the MPF(F)s route from the FLS to the AO.  
Since the MPF(F) ship is only designed to commercial survivability standards instead of 
warship standards, the PRC submarines annihilate the unescorted MPF(F) ships during 
their transit.  In addition to escorts, the MPF(F) may need to be designed with  
higher survivability. 
Securing the LOCs also includes securing the FLS and airports of debarkation 
(APOD).  The International Airport of Manila is an APOD in support of initial  
Army Airborne troops who are assigned to take the objective in this wargame.  The PRC 
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sends fighters and tankers to the Manila airport to test the air defenses.  The air defense 
corridors are able to kill the first wave of the PRC assault; however, bombers follow in 
the second wave after the majority of the air defenses are depleted.  The Red Team 
annihilates the awaiting troops destined to proceed to the objective via air connectors. 
The wargame also exposes another insight and possible gap in the Seabasing 
JELo system involving use of the Sea Base as a resupply node for non-expeditionary 
forces while simultaneously acting as a re-supply node for organic forces.  SEA-6’s study 
focuses primarily on the United States Marine Corps’ 2015 Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB) to build the baseline architecture.  In the wargame, the Sea Base is not a 
“stand alone” entity but is part of a larger force structure.  One othe gaps exposed in the 
wargame involves the use of the Sea Base to resupply nonexpeditionary forces in the 
battlespace.  In the scenario, Blue forces plan to place Patriot and Theater High-Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) batteries at the objective by air.  Patriot and THAAD batteries 
are airlifted into theater to an APOD where the missiles are transported to the battery by 
truck.  The missiles cannot be resupplied via helicopter due to the missile container 
design.  If Red forces destroy the APOD at the objective, then Blue forces only have the 
remaining missiles at the battery.  Resupplying the missile batteries requires one of the 
MPF(F) ships to transit back to the FLS and then transit back, taking it out of the AO for 
a significant period of time. 
D.3 Alternative Uses for the Sea Base 
During the planning phases of the wargame, the MPF(F) was shown to provide 
the Commander Joint Task Force a wider range of capabilities to increase his combat 
power.  One possible COA that was not selected for use in the subsequent JCATS phase 
of the wargame involved using the MPF(F) to act as a deceptive force by feigning an 
invasion of Taiwan.  The JEB poses a viable threat to the Red Forces in this COA.  In the 
tabletop wargame,439 the resulting Red action is to reposition the PLAN aircraft carrier 
(CV) near Taiwan.  This prompts Blue forces to launch the organic Joint Strike Fighters 
                                                 
439 A tabletop wargame was conducted prior to the JCATS wargame to examine the feasibility of  
the COAs. 
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(JSFs), embarked within the MPF(F), to attack the PLAN CV.440  The 36 organic  
fifth-generation JSFs441 are superior to the 39 fourth-generation fighters embarked on the 
PLAN’s CV.  This action weakens the PRCs regional air superiority near Palawan and 
highlights an alternative use of the Sea Base and its expeditionary forces. 
D.4 Conclusion 
The OA 4604 wargame allows players from both forces to interact with the  
Sea Base and its logistics system in an operational setting, providing additional insights 
and opportunities to challenge architecture design assumptions.  The wargame results 
produce two major insights; the need to secure lines of communications (LOCs), 
particularly the survivability of the MPF(F) ships, and the incompatibility of resupplying 
nonexpeditionary forces with certain joint equipment through the Sea Base.  Wargaming 
is a promising venue for gaining an understanding of the Sea Base and its logistics by 
providing insights on how future Seabased operations might be conducted.  Additionally, 
it also allows for examination of the Sea Base in the context of a larger  
system of systems. 
 
                                                 
440 The PLAN has determined that they will design and build an aircraft carrier of their own design.  
However based on research and historical analysis it is assumed that the PLAN carrier will resemble  
ex-Soviet designs.  The assumption is that the PLAN carrier will resemble the never built Orel Ul'yanovsk 
Class in its capabilities and aircraft compliment. 
441 Richard Aboulafia, “Rethinking U.S. Air Power,” Aerospace America Online, March 2001, 
<http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=66&ArchiveIssueID=11> (12 November 2004). 
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Appendix E: High Speed Assault Connector 
E.1 Overview 
Appendix F summarizes the results of the Total Ship Systems Engineering 
(TSSE) design for a High Speed Assault Connector (HSAC) to meet the employment 
requirements for 2025 Joint Expeditionary Logistics.  Full analysis and results are 
available in the TSSE Joint ACCESS Final Report.442 
E.2 Purpose 
Current amphibious transport technology,  including Programs of Record, are 
unable to deliver the required two surface Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) from the  
Sea Base to shore within the required 10 hrs.  To meet this requirement, the TSSE project 
team designed a High Speed Surface Connector for operation to, within and from the  
Sea Base.  This HSAC, designated the Joint ACCESS (Amphibious Combat Cargo 
Expeditionary Support Ship), is a self deployable, load-once, roll-on/roll-off, landing 
vessel with integrated combat systems for mission specific offensive capabilities and full 
spectrum self-defense. 
E.3 Primary Characteristics 
The Joint ACCESS is designed to operate from a Forward Logistics Site (FLS) 
that may be up to 2,000 NM from the designated Sea Base area of operations.  As such, 
the Joint ACCESS is a substantially larger vessel than the typical connectors used by the 
Navy of 2004 (e.g., LCACs and LCUs).  It is also designed to operate at greater speeds 
and with reduced manning from ships of similar size.  The primary characteristics of the  
Joint ACCESS are listed in Table E-1. 
 
 
                                                 
442 Total Ship Systems Engineering Team (2004), “Joint ACCESS: A High Speed Assault Connector for 
Amphibious Seabasing Operations and Joint Expeditionary Logistics,” Naval Postgraduate School 
Technical Report, Monterey, CA, December 2004. 
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Overall Length 149 m
Overall Beam 49 m
Maximum Draft 4.5 m
Full Load Displacement 4966 LT
Light Ship Displacement 3124 LT
Metacentric Height 7 m
Maximum Speed 43 kts
Shaft Horsepower 78,000 HP
Cruise Range (at 34 kts) 2300 NM
Crew Compliment 66 persons
Table E-1: ACCESS Characteristics. 
E.4 Capabilities 
The HSAC leverages off advances in material and construction techniques to 
create a trimaran hull-form capable of beaching for offload of the embarked troops and 
equipment.  For its primary mission of delivering the surface BLTs, the ACCESS has 
capabilities as listed in Table E-2. 
Maximum Payload 800 LT 
Combat Loaded Troop Berthing 260 troops 
Cargo Area 2060 m2 
Onload Time (port facility) 4 hrs 
Offload Time (SS1, beached) 2 hrs 
Table E-2: ACCESS Primary Mission Capabilities. 
Onload of equipment is via roll-on through the stern gate while moored in port as 
shown in Figure E-1.  This same method could potentially be utilized at the Sea Base in 
acceptable sea states.  The stern gate serves a secondary purpose of launching and 
recovering Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV) as shown in Figure E-2.  A dozen 
Joint ACCESSs are needed to embark and employ the two surface BLTs. 
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Figure E-1: Stern Gate Loading.   Figure E-2: EFV Launching. 
 
The primary method for offloading cargo and equipment to the beach is via the 
extendable bow ramp and floating causeway system shown in Figures E-3 and E-4.  This 
system supports the maximum simultaneous offload of two M1A1 Main Battle Tanks of 
to a maximum distance of 35 meters. 
             
 
Figure E-3: Bow Doors Open.   Figure E-4: Bow Ramp Offload. 
 
The ACCESS flight deck is capable of handling rotary and Vertical Take Off and 
Landing (VTOL) aircraft including the MV-22, CH-53X, and SH-60R.  Integrated hanger 
facilities are available for one SH-60R, while a flight deck elevator allows movement of 
cargo and equipment from the upper cargo deck to the flight deck.  This elevator is 
designed to support the movement of vehicles up to a Light Armored Vehicle, from the 
cargo deck to the flight deck for further transfer via vertical lift assets.  Additionally,  
it allows the transfer of additional SH-60Rs below decks when conducting  
secondary missions. 
Joint ACCESS is multimission capable, primarily due to the modularity of the 
internal cargo deck (Figure E-5) and the available flight deck.  Secondary missions 
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include Theater Support Vessel for resupply of logistics to the Sea Base, Humanitarian 
Assistance and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Special Operations, and 
Unmanned Vehicle basing.  TSSE Joint ACCESS Final Report describes the design 
process in detail. 
 
Figure E-5: Modularity of Cargo Deck. 
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Appendix F: Airlift Analysis: C-17 Globemaster III 
F.1 Overview 
As described in the Methodology portion of Chapter 1, the  
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process emphasizes  
non-material solutions.  This analysis evaluates the doctrine change of deploying the JEB 
purely by C-17 airlift, which assumes that there is a secure, C-17 compatible airfield 
available at the objective. 
The C-17 Globemaster III is a multi-functional aircraft that is a crucial air 
transport element in military operations, and is the newest airlift aircraft to enter the  
Air Force's inventory.  Specifically, the C-17 is capable of prompt strategic delivery of 
troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or direct to forward deployment 
area bases.  The aircraft is also able to perform theater airlift missions when required. 
The C-17 measures 174 ft long with a 170-ft wingspan.  Four  
Pratt and Whitney F117-PW-100 engines power the aircraft.  Each engine has a thrust 
rating of 40,900 lbs. A crew of three operates the aircraft; this includes the pilot, copilot, 
and loadmaster.  Cargo is loaded onto the C-17 through an aft door that accommodates 
military vehicles and palletized cargo.  The C-17 can carry nearly all of the Army or 
Marine’s air-transportable, combat equipment.  The C-17 is also able to airdrop 
paratroopers and cargo. 
Maximum cargo load capacity of the C-17 is 170,900 lbs, 172,200 lbs is 
maximum rolling stock load capacity and maximum gross takeoff weight is  
585,000 lbs.  The C-17 has unlimited range with in-flight refueling, and a cruise speed of 
450 kts.  This aircraft is able to operate on small, austere airfields; the C-17 can take off 
and land on runways as short as 3,000 ft and as narrow as 90 ft wide.  Even on such 
narrow runways, the C-17 can turn around by using its backing capability while 
performing a tight 3-point turn. 
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This analysis determines how many aircraft trips or loads would be required to 
carry the Sea Based Maneuver Element (SBME), three Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs), 
to the objective (Southeast Asia).  Additionally, the C-17 is also evaluated to determine 
the time it would take this asset to provide a Day of Supply (DOS) and a 
Day-and-a-Half of Supply, of the basic commodities of food, water, ammunition and fuel 
to forces in theater.  This analysis assumes that a suitable airfield is available in the 
objective area. 
The following discussion, consisting of C-17 characteristics analysis and transport 
capability calculations, provides an insightful look into this aircraft’s potential for 
supporting the Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) effort.  Analysis is performed via 
evaluation of a C-17 Flight Limitations chart and aircraft dimension figures  
(Figure F-4 through 8), as well as C-17 characteristics.443 
C-17 Characteristics: 
• Max Range: Unlimited with in-flight refueling 
• Empty Weight: 277,000 lbs 
• Max Take-off Weight: 585,000 lbs 
• Max speed: 450 kts 
• Max Payload Capacity: 170,900 lbs for palletized cargo.  Refer to load 
capacities for rolling stock, in the Flight Limitations chart 
• Ramp Capacity: 40,000 lbs 
• Fuel Capacity: 181,055 lbs or at 6.8 lbs/gal = approx. 26,626 gal 
• Fuel usage: 19,643 lbs/hr444 or at 6.8 lbs/gal = 2889 gal/hr 
• Usable Cargo Floor Area (minus ramp): 1176 sq ft (65.33 ft long x  
18 ft wide) 
• Length: (784 in/12 in) = 65.33 ft 
• Width: (216 in/12 in) = 18 ft 
• Ramp Area: 357 sq ft (19.8 ft long x 18 ft wide) 
• Length: (238 in/12 in) = 19.8 ft 
• Width: (216 in/12 in) = 18 ft 
• Total usable area (floor and ramp): 1533 sq ft 
• Usable Volume: 10.2 ft high x 85.2 ft long (includes ramp) x 18 ft wide = 
15,642 cu ft 
                                                 
443 www.globalsecurity.org, [online database] (October 2004 [cited 03 December 2004]). 
444 U.S. Air Force, “U.S. Air Force Cost and Planning Factors,” September 2002, in AFPAM 23-221, 
Fuel Logistics Planning, 01 May 98/AF1 65-503, (using 6.8 lbs/gal fuel conversion factor). 
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F.2 SBME Ground Vehicle/Helicopter Specifications445 and C-17 Vehicle  
Load Capability 
All calculations are based on individual SBME vehicle characteristics as per the 
MCCDC SBME Equipment Breakdown (Surface and Vertical lift).446  The C-17 analysis 
uses area and rolling stock weight capacities to calculate total number of trips required. 
The main vehicles and helicopters listed in Table F-1 and F-2 represent those 
items present in the SBME (surface and vertical-lifted vehicles and equipment).  The full 
list of SBME vehicles/helicopters and their individual weight and area characteristics is 
delineated in Chapter 5.  Percentages used in area and subsequent vehicle capacity 
calculations for each C-17 cargo bay floor section, are approximated from the  
C-17 Flight Limitations Chart.447 
• Section I is 25% of floor area for Sections I-III (total area of 1,176 sq ft):  
.25 x 1,176 sq ft = 294 sq ft 
• Section I max allowable weight: 70,000 lbs 
• Section II is 65% of 1176 sq ft: .65 x 1,176 sq ft = 764 sq ft 
• Section II max allowable weight: 172,200 lbs (if no other sections loaded) 
• Section III is 10% of 1176 sq ft: .10 x 1,176 sq ft = 117 sq ft 
• Max allowable weight for Section III: 38,000 lbs 
• Section IV (ramp) area is 357 sq ft (19.8 ft long x 18 ft wide) 
• Max allowable stationary weight for Section IV: 40,000 lbs 
 
For the C-17 vehicle transport calculations, with respect to capability by weight 
and area, choose the lower of the two numbers for weight and area, as this is the limiting 
transport factor.  If the vehicle capacity is the same by both weight and area, this is the 
value used.  Table F-1 summarizes these calculations for the major vehicles. 
                                                 
445 www.globalsecurity.org, [online database] (October 2004 [cited 03 December 2004]). 
446 MCCDC Concepts Branch Futures Division, “Baseline 2015 MEB,” 24 January 2003, p. 37. 
447 U.S. Army Air Mobility Command, C-17 Flight Limitations Chart, Figure 2-42, in  
Chapter 2, Air Mobility Command Aircraft, p 46; available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/miitrsy/library/policy/army/fm/55-9/ch2.htm. 
   
    460
 












M1A1 Tank 28 506.8 141,075 W 1 28 45 
EFV 106 360 72,879 T 2 53 76 
LAV 84 200 31,103 W 5 17 190 
LW-155 12 442 10,500 W 1 12 30 
HIMARS 6 215 42,118 W 4 2 152 
HMMWV 457 185 12,000 W 6 77 180 
Contact Truck 18 214 21,300 W 5 4 150 
LVS 36 333 50,500 W 2 18 76 
Forklift 8 212 12,004 W 5 2 150 
D7 Bulldozer 4 208 49,020 T 4 1 152 
M88A2 Hercules 
Recovery Vehicle 
4 341 141,173 T 1 4 45 
MTVR 90 310 44,708 W 2 45 76 
ABV 4 468 1,350 T 1 4 30 
M60A1 AVLB 2 372 29,300 T 2 1 60 
LSV 16 92.5 2,700 W 21 1 300 
M9 ACE 8 264 53,800 T 3 3 114 
Totals 883     272  
 
Table F-1: C-17 Transport Capability Table for Major End Items of the 2015 MEB SBME. 
 
A C-17 transporting a M1A1 tank or M88A2 Hercules Recovery Vehicle will 
only be possible with less than maximum C-17 fuel capacity.  The C-17 cannot exceed 
maximum takeoff weight of 585,000 lbs (can only take 166,925 lbs of fuel).  More C-17s 
will be required, and in-flight refueling will need to occur, to ensure all tanks get to the 
objective.  A total of 272 C-17 trips are required to transport SBME Ground vehicles and 
equipment to the objective. 
For the C-17 helicopter transport calculations, with respect to capability by weight 
and area, choose the lower of the two numbers for weight and area, as this is the limiting 
transport factor.  If the aircraft capacity is the same by both weight and area, this is the 
value used.  Table F-2 summarizes these calculations for the helicopters. 
   











Number of C-17 
Trips Required 
CH-53 20 661.5 36,336 1 20 
UH-1Y 9 627 11,836 1 9 
AH-1 18 500.5 10,216 1 18 
SH-60 10 410 13,650 1 10 
Totals 57    57 
 
Table F-2: C-17 Transport Capability Table for Helicopters of the 2015 MEB Air Combat Element. 
 
Combining the 272 C-17 trips for the vehicles with the 57 C-17 trips for the 
helicopters yields a total of 329 C-17 trips required to transport all helicopters and 
vehicles to the objective.  As a comparison with other future force concepts, the Army 
states that it will take 350 C-17 sorties448 to get the Stryker Brigade to the objective.  No 
separate C-17 transport time calculations were done for these Stryker Brigade loads. 
F.3 Time to Get Entire SBME (Ground Vehicles and Helicopters) to  
the Objective 
For the following C-17 transport time calculations, 329 C-17 total trips were 
required to get entire SBME to objective, including all ground vehicles and helicopters.  
The C-17 flight route used in transporting these loads from San Diego (CONUS) to 
Guam to Singapore to the objective (Burma) is shown in Figure F-1.  The first set of trips 
from San Diego and Okinawa will be helicopter loads to allow for helicopter buildup. 
                                                 
448 Department of the Army, “Joint Military operations” brief, 26 August 2004, Slide 32. 
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Figure F-1: C-17 Flight Path from San Diego to Objective.449 
 F.3.1 Equipment Transport Times (San Diego to Objective) 
The load time for equipment is based on the average load time450 for 1 M1A1 tank 
(45 minutes) and 1 HUMVEE truck (30 minutes).  Average load time per vehicle 
calculates to 38 minutes.  From this calculation, an average load time per C-17 is 
approximately 2 hrs. 
The aircraft transit time from San Diego to Guam to Singapore to the objective 
(w/ 3 in-flight refueling) covers 20.5 hrs at a range of 8,872 NM.  The total C-17  
roundtrip time from San Diego to the objective will take approximately 45 hrs. 
Currently, 120 C-17451 aircraft are in active inventory.  For different numbers of 
aircraft below, assume all aircraft launch and recover the same day and that airfield can 
process all aircraft the same day.  This is an unrealistically optimistic assumption, but 
provides a “best-case” boundary.  For 20 C-17s leaving at the same time from San Diego, 
                                                 
449 Great Circle Website, Website distance calculations, available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://gc.kls2.com. 
450 Timothy R. Wakefield, MSgt, AMC/A37VG, e-mail discussion over equipment load times, 
Timothy.Wakefield@scott.af.mil. 
451 Boeing Corporation, C-17 production data, available on the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-17-prod.htm. 
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16 round-trips are required.  The total time requirement for 20 C-17s to get all loads to 
objective is 31 days.  For 50 C-17s leaving at the same time from San Diego,  
7 roundtrips are required.  The total time requirement for 50 C-17s to get all loads to the 
objective is 14 days. 
To get the SBME to the objective within the 10-day (240-hr) requirement, it will 
take 55 C-17 aircraft.  However, with assuming 70% C-17 availability, 72 aircraft will 
actually be required to carry out this task.  In order to see a trend in performance per 
aircraft quantity, a few additional transport calculations are made.  For 100 C-17s leaving 
at the same time from San Diego, 4 round-trips are required.  The total time requirement 
for 100 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 8 days.  For 150 C-17s leaving at the 
same time from San Diego, 3 round-trips are required.  The total time requirement for  
150 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 6 days.  Finally, for 200 C-17s leaving at the 
same time from San Diego, 2 round-trips are required.  The total time requirement for  
200 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 4 days.  Figure F-2 shows a comparison 
between the number of C-17 trips with the amount of time to complete the closure phase 
of operations. 






























Figure F-2: C-17 SBME Transport Time Between San Diego and the Objective (Burma). 
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 F.3.2 Equipment Transport Times (Okinawa to Objective) 
The calculations are repeated for the case of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) being garrisoned in Okinawa vice Camp Pendleton.  Using the same assumptions 
as in calculations from San Diego, C-17 transit time from Okinawa to Singapore to the 
objective takes 9 hrs at a range of 4,000 NM.  The total round-trip time per C-17 is  
22 hrs. 
For 20 C-17s leaving at the same time from Okinawa, 16 round-trips are required.  
The total time requirement for 20 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 15 days.  For 
50 C-17s leaving at the same time from Okinawa, 7 round-trips are required.  The total 
time requirement for 50 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 7 days. 
To get the SBME to the objective within the 10-day (240-hr) requirement, it will 
take a total of 30 C-17 aircraft.  However, with assuming 70% C-17 availability,  
39 aircraft are required to carry out this task.  In order to see a trend in performance per 
aircraft quantity, a few additional transport calculations are made. 
For 100 C-17s leaving at the same time from Okinawa, 4 round-trips are required.  
The total time requirement for 100 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 4 days.  For 
150 C-17s leaving at the same time from Okinawa, 3 round-trips are required.  The total 
time requirement for 150 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 3 days.  Finally, for  
200 C-17s leaving at the same time from Okinawa, 2 round-trips are required.  The total 
time requirement for 200 C-17s to get all loads to the objective is 2 days.  Figure F-3 
shows a comparison between the number of C-17 trips with the amount of time to 
complete the closure phase of operations. 
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Figure F-3: C-17 SBME Transport from Okinawa to the Objective (Burma). 
F.4 Sustainment Phase 
One Day of Supply (DOS) for the troops ashore is equal to 767 short tons 
(1,534,000 lbs).  This value is derived in Chapter 6 [2015 Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
Baseline Architecture Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Analysis].  Using the 
C-17 maximum palletized cargo load capacity of 170,900 lbs, 9 C-17 trips are required to 
get 1 DOS to the objective.  If C-17s are used to resupply the object, the same transit 
calculations as in section F.3 apply.  It will take 22.5 hrs for 9 C-17s to make this  
one-way transit. 
The C-17s do not simultaneously launch for sustainment phase of operations.  In 
order to stagger the arrival of aircraft, each C-17 needs to launch approximately every  
2 hrs to disperse the 9 aircraft over a 24-hr period.  It is also assumed that at least a  
24-hr lead-time is needed due to the long transit time.  Assuming 70% availability per  
C-17, 12 aircraft will be needed to achieve one DOS delivery.  This is 10% of the current 
active C-17 fleet.  Similarly, to get 14 C-17 loads (1 1/2 DOS) to the objective within  
24 hrs, a 1 hr and 40 minute arrival schedule is needed.  Similarly, assuming  
70% availability per C-17, 19 aircraft will be needed to achieve 1 1/2 DOS delivery.  This 
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is 16% of the total active C-17 fleet taken away from all other world mission 
requirements. 
F.5 Troop Lift Capability 
The C-17 has the capability to carry 102 troops (with no cargo or equipment), 
with centerline seats installed on the cargo floor and side-facing seats on each side of the 
cargo bay.  With this, the C-17 will have to make 48 C-17 trips to carry the entire SBME 
force size of approximately 4,859 troops to the objective.  Similarly, if Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) aircraft are used, at 300 troops per aircraft, it will take 17 CRAF to get 
them to the objective. 
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Figure F-4: C-17 Rolling Stock Load Limitations. 
   
    468
 
 




Figure F-6: C-17 Cargo Compartment Height Dimensions. 453 
                                                 
452 U.S. Army Air Mobility Command, C-17 Cargo Compartment Floor Dimensions, Figure 2-40, in  
Chapter 2, Air Mobility Command Aircraft, p. 44; available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/miitrsy/library/policy/army/fm/55-9/ch2.htm. 
453 Ibid., p 43. 
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Figure F-7: C-17 Cargo Area Dimensions.454 
 
                                                 
454 Ibid. 
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Figure F-8: C-17 Cargo Bay Schematic.455 
 
                                                 
455 Ibid., p. 44. 
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471 Appendix G 
Appendix G: Glossary 
Acquisition Costs: The cost equal to the sum of the development cost for prime mission 
equipment and support items; the procurement cost for prime mission equipment, support 
items and initial spares; and the system specific facilities cost.  (DAU Glossary of 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Architecture: The structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and 
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.  (DoD Integrated Architecture 
Panel) 
 
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC): APUC is calculated by dividing total 
procurement cost by the number of articles to be procured.  Total procurement cost 
includes flyaway (which includes the recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with 
production of the item such as hardware/software, Systems Engineering (SE), 
engineering changes and warranties) plus the costs of procuring Technical Data (TD), 
training, support equipment and initial spares.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition 
Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Base Year (BY): A reference period which determines a fixed price level for comparison 
in economic escalation calculations and cost estimates.  The price level index for BY is 
1.000.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Box Plot Symbology:  
 
Outlier - an unusually large or 
small observation. Values 
beyond the whiskers are 
outliers.
By default, the top of the 
box is the third quartile 
(Q3) - 75% of the data 
values are less than or 
equal to this value.
By default, the bottom of 
the box is the first quartile 
(Q1) - 25% of the data 
values are less than or 
equal to this value. 
By default, the upper whisker 
extends to this adjacent value -
the highest data value within the 
upper limit. 
Upper limit = Q3 + 1.5 (Q3 - Q1)
Median - the middle of the data. 
Half of the observations are less 
than or equal to it indicated by 
the line across the box and an 
encircled ‘x’.
By default, the lower whisker 
extends to this adjacent value -
the lowest value within the 
lower limit.
Lower limit = Q1- 1.5 (Q3 - Q1)
Mean - the arithmetic mean of all 
the values in a sample indicated 
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Center of Gravity: That source of massed strength—physical or moral, or a source of 
leverage—whose degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the 
most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given  
military objective.456 
 
Combat power: The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military 
unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.  (JP 1-02, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) 
 
Combined force: A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a 
temporary alliance for some specific purpose.457  (JP 1-02) 
 
Combined operations: An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations 
acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.458  (JP 1-02) 
 
Combined: Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies.  When not all 
allies or services are involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified 
(e.g., Combined Navies).459  See also Joint.  (JP 1-02) 
 
Command and Control (C2): C2 is the information system that is established to 
facilitate the coordination of the operations performed by Connectors, Inventory and 
Storage, and Transfers. 
 
Connector: Any vehicle/platform/or combination of them that can: translate (move) 
itself; navigate; transport more people, materiel, and/or capability than it needs to 
translate and navigate; transfer the excess materiel to a needing platform or objective. 
 
Cost Analysis Requirement Description (CARD): A description of the salient features 
of the acquisition program and of the system itself.  It is the common description of the 
technical and programmatic features of the program that is used by the teams preparing 
the Program Office (PO), Component Cost Analysis (CCA) and independent Life Cycle 
Cost Estimates (LCCE).  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Critical Vulnerabilities: Weakness, and sometimes strengths, that are open to the 
enemy’s attack or can be exploited by the enemy.460 
 
Expedition: A military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific 
objective in a foreign country.461  (DoD) 
                                                 
456 Vego, Milan N., “Operational Warfare,” (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000) p. 634. 
457 National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officers Guide. (Norfolk: 2000),  
p. G-24. 
458 Ibid., p. G-25. 
459 Ibid., p. G-25. 
460 Vego, p. 636. 
461 Defense Technical Information Center, Expedition. 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/01953.html> (15 July 2004). 
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Expeditionary force: An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a 
foreign country.462  (DoD) 
 
Inventory and Storage: Inventory and Storage consists of strike-up/strike-down, which 
includes storerooms, inventory management systems and all equipment and space 
necessary to manage, store, repackage and move cargo.  Additionally, for the purpose of 
this study, Inventory and Storage will include assembly, assembly spaces, equipment 
storage spaces, ground vehicle and aircraft maintenance spaces, hangar spaces, medical 
facilities and all other spaces and services required for a brigade-sized force distributed 
between the squadron ships. 
 
Joint force: A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned 
or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force 
commander.463  (JP 1-02) 
 
Joint: Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or 
more Military Departments participate.464  (JP 1-02) 
 
LAPES: An aerial delivery method of up to 38,000 lbs of cargo is pulled from the 
aircraft by large cargo parachutes while the aircraft is 5 to 10 ft above the ground.  The 
load then slides to a stop within a very short distance. 
 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC): The total cost to the government of acquisition and ownership 
of that system over its useful life.  It includes the cost of development, acquisition, 
operations, and support (to include manpower), and where applicable, disposal.  For 
defense systems, LCC is also called Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  (DAU Glossary of 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
forces.  In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal 
with: 1. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; 2. movement, evacuation, and 
hospitalization of personnel; 3. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and 
disposition of facilities; 4. acquisition or furnishing of services.  (Defense Technical 
Information Center, “logistics,” DOD Dictionary of Military Terms) 
 
Needline: A requirement that is the logical expression of the need to transfer information 
among nodes.  (DODAF Volume I) 
 
Node: A representation of an element of architecture that produces, consumes, or 
processes data.  (DODAF Volume I) 
                                                 
462 Defense Technical Information Center, Expeditionary Force. 
< http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/01954.html> (15 July 2004). 
463 The Joint Staff Officers Guide, p. G-43. 
464 Ibid., p. G-42. 
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Non-Recurring Costs: Those costs that are not repetitive, even though the total 
expenditure may be cumulative over a relatively short period of time.  Non-recurring 
costs typically involve developing or establishing a capacity to operate.  (DAU Glossary 
of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Operational Node: A node that performs a role or mission.  (DODAF Volume I) 
 
Oversized: Does not fit in a standard container. 
 
Procurement Costs: The cost equal to the sum of the procurement cost for prime 
mission equipment, the procurement cost for support items, and the procurement cost for 
initial spares.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Recurring Costs: Those costs that are repetitive and occur when a company produces 
similar goods or services on a continuing basis.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition 
Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Sea Base: A maritime vessel or group of maritime vessels with sufficient  
Command and Control (C2) and logistical systems available to support  
Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO). 
 
Seabasing: A national capability; is the overarching transformational operating concept 
for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces, which assures joint access by 
leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces 
operating globally from the sea.  (Naval Warfare Development Command,  
“Sea Basing SharePoint Site) 
 
Selective Acquisition Report (SAR): Standard, comprehensive, summary status report 
of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) (Acquisition Category (ACAT)I) 
required for periodic submission to Congress.  It includes key cost, schedule and 
technical information.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms) 
 
Supply class: The grouping of supplies by type into ten categories to facilitate supply 




I. Subsistence items (Meals, Ready-to-Eat, T-rations, and fresh fruits and 
vegetables) and gratuitous-issue health and comfort items. 
II. Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, 
hand tools, maps, and administrative and housekeeping supplies  
and equipment. 
III. Petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, 
liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze 
                                                 
465 Ibid., pp.G-22 - G-23. 
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compounds, components and additives of petroleum and chemical 
products, and coal. 
IV. Construction materials including installed equipment, and all fortification 
and obstacle materials. 
V. Ammunition of all types including chemical, bombs, explosives, mines, 
fuzes, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other 
associated items. 
VI. Personal demand items such as health and hygiene products, writing 
material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries and cameras 
(nonmilitary items). 
VII. Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops  
and vehicles. 
VIII. Medical material, including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment and 
management of blood. 
IX. Repair parts and components, to include kits, assemblies, and 
subassemblies (repairable or nonrepairable), that are required for 
maintenance support of all equipment. 
X. Material required to support nonmilitary programs such as agricultural and 
economic development projects (not included in classes I through IX).  
MISC. Water, captured enemy material, salvage material. 
 
Sustainment: The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to 
maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision 
of the mission or of the national objective.466  (JP 1-02) 
 
Synchronization: Process of arranging or initiating actions aimed at generating 
maximum relative (combat or non-combat) power at a decisive place and time; sound 
synchronization must ensure that all elements of one’s force, collectively, generate 
synergistic effects that exceed the sum of their individual effects; depending on the 
purpose, tactical, operational and strategic synchronization is differentiated.467 
 
Systems Node: A node with the identification and allocation of resources  
(e.g., platforms, units, facilities and locations) required to implement specific roles and 
missions.  (DODAF Volume I) 
 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC): A concept designed to determine the true cost of design, 
development, ownership and support of DoD weapons systems.  At the DoD level, TOC 
is comprised of the costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate, and dispose of 
defense systems, other equipment, and real property; the cost to recruit, retain, separate, 
and otherwise support military and civilian personnel; and all other costs of the business 
operations of the DoD.  At the individual program level, TOC is synonymous with the 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of the system.  (DAU Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms 
and Terms) 
                                                 
466 Ibid., p. G-76. 
467 Vego, p. 648. 
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Transfer: A process and/or mechanism that moves personnel and materiel between 
connectors and/or between a connector and an objective.  The transfer mechanism is 
composed of all components required to enable the transfer mechanism to operate.  This 
may include components that are either temporarily transported on or a permanent fixture 
of a Connector. 
 
Vectored Thrust: Directional thrust from swiveling propeller ducts, permitting an 
airship to take off with heavier than neutral buoyancy or land with lighter than  
neutral buoyancy. 
 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS): An organized method to break down a project into 
logical subdivisions or subprojects at lower and lower levels of details.  It is very useful 
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Appendix H: Acronyms 
2015 BLA  2015 Baseline Architecture 
4th ID   Fourth Infantry Division 
A/C Aircraft 
AA1   2025 Alternative Architecture 1 
AA2   2025 Alternative Architecture 2 
AA3   2025 Alternative Architecture 3 
AAA   Anti – Air Artillery 
AAFARS Advanced Aviation Forward Area Refueling System 
AAV   Amphibious Assault Vehicles 
ABV Assault Breaching Vehicle 
ACAT   Acquisition Category 
ACCESS Amphibious Combat Cargo Expeditionary Support Ship 
ACD   Advanced Concept Demonstrations 
ACE Air Combat Element 
ACE Armored Combat Earthmover 
ACQ   Acquisition 
ACTD   Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 
ADA   Air Defense Artillery 
AE Assault Echelon 
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFOE Assault Follow-On Echelon 
AFSB   Afloat Forward Staging base 
AGAS Affordable Guided Airdrop System 
AIS Automated Information System 
AIT Automatic Information Technology 
ALG Acquisition Logistics Guide 
AMB Ambulance 
AMC Air Mobility Command 
AMSU   Aeronautical Material Screening Unit 
ANOVA  Analysis of Variance 
ANSI   American National Standards Institute 
AO   Area of Operations 
AoA   Analysis of Alternatives 
AOR   Area of Responsibility 
APOD   Air Port of Debarkation 
APUC   Average Procurement Unit Cost 
ARG   Amphibious Readiness Group 
ARV-A (L)  Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault (Light) 
ARV-A  Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault 
ARV-RSTA  ARV-Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
ASCM   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
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ASN(RD&A) Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition) 
ATG Advanced Technologies Group 
ATGM  Anti-Tank Guided Munitions  
ATT Advanced Theater Transport 
AV   All-Views 
AVLB   Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge 
AVN   Aviation 
bbls   Barrels 
BCT   Brigade Combat Team 
BIC   Brigade Intelligence and Communication 
BLA Baseline Architecture 
BLT   Battalion Landing Team 
BY   Base Year 
C2   Command and Control 
C2V   Command and Control Vehicle 
CA   Combined Arms 
CARD   Cost Analysis Requirements Description 
CAS   Close Air Support 
CCA   Component Cost Analysis 
C-DAY  Operation Commencement Day 
CE   Combat Element 
CER   Cost Estimating Relationships 
CES   Commander’s Estimate of the Situation 
CF   Complexity Factors 
CFLCC  Combined Forces Land Component Command 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CIC   Command Integration Cell 
CJCS    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
CJTF   Combined Joint Task Force 
CL   Class 
CLF   Combat Logistics Force 
CLP   Common Logistics Picture 
CMS   Controlled Material Security 
CNA   Center for Naval Analysis 
CNO   Chief of Naval Operations 
CO Commanding Officer 
COA   Courses of Action 
COG   Center of Gravity 
COI   Critical Operational Issue 
COMCDR  Commander of a Combatant Command 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
CONUS  Continental United States 
COP Common Operational Picture 
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CRAF   Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
CSB   Commander, Sea Base 
CSBME  Commander, Sea Base Maneuver Element 
CSG   Carrier Strike Group 
CSSE   Combat Service Support Element 
CTF CDR Combined Task Force Commander 
CTF Combined Task Force 
CV   Carrier 
DART   Defense Adaptive Red Team 
DAU   Defense Acquisition University 
DLA   Defense Logistics Agency 
DoD Department of Defense 
DODAF  Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DOS   Days of Supply 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and 
education, Personnel, and Facilities 
DPICM  Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition 
DR   Data Requirement 
E.U.   European Union 
EFSS   Expeditionary Fire Support System 
EFV   Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
EOQ    Economic Order Quantity 
EPC   Electronic Product CodeTM 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
ESS   Expeditionary Strike Ship 
EUCOM  European Command 
EXFOR Expeditionary Forces 
EXPWARTRAGRUPAC Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific 
EXWAR  Expeditionary Warfare 
FAA   Functional Area Analysis 
FARP   Forward Advanced Refueling Base 
FAS   Federation of American Scientists 
FBE   Forward Base Echelon 
FCF   Functional Check Flight 
FCS   Future Combat System 
FIE Fly-In Echelon 
FLS   Forward Logistics Site 
FNA   Functional Needs Analysis 
FRMV   Future Recovery Maintenance Vehicle 
FSA   Functional Solution Analysis 
FSB   Forward Support Battalion 
FTR   V-44 Future Transport Rotorcraft 
FY   Fiscal Year 
GCCS-J  Global Command & Control System-Joint 
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GCE   Ground Combat Element 
GFE   Government-Furnished Equipment 
GIG   Global Information Grid 
GSTAMIDS  Ground Standoff Minefield Detection System 
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism 
Helo   Helicopter 
HEMMT  Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 
HEMMT-LHS HEMMT-Load Handling System 
HHC   Headquarters and Headquarters Company 
HIMARS  High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
HLCAC Heavy Landing Craft, Air Cushion 
HMH   Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 
HMLA  Marine Light Attack Squadron 
HMM   Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 
HMMWV  High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
HQMC  Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps 
HSAC   High Speed Assault Connector 
HSV   High Speed Vessel 
HTARS  HEMMT Tanker Aviation Refueling System 
HULA   Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft 
I&S Inventory and Storage 
ICV   Infantry Carrier Vehicle 
ID    Infantry Division 
IED   Improvised Explosive Device 
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
I-Level  Intermediate Level 
ILP   Integrated Landing Platform 
IM   Intermediate Maintenance 
IMA   Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
IMS   Inventory Management System 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
IPT   Integrated Product Team 
ISO   International Standards Organization 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance 
ITV   Internally Transportable Vehicle 
JAOC Joint Air Operations Center 
JCATS  Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation 
JCIDS   Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JEB   Joint Expeditionary Brigade 
JEF Joint Expeditionary Force 
JELo Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
JEO Joint Expeditionary Operations 
JFEO Joint Forcible Entry Operations 
JFLCC  Joint Force Land Component Commander 
JFMCC  Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander 
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JLOTS Joint Logistics Over The Shore 
JMIC   Joint Inter-Modal Container 
JOA   Joint Operations Area 
JOC Joint Operational Concepts 
JOPES   Joint Operation Planning and Executing System 
JP   Jet Propellants 
JP   Joint Publication 
JSF   Joint Strike Fighter 
JTAV   Joint Total Asset Visibility 
JTF   Joint Task Force 
JTFC   Joint Task Force Commander 
JTFEX   Joint Task Force Exercise 
kts   Knots 
L/C   Launcher/Control 
LAAD   Low Altitude Air Defense 
LAPES Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System 
LAV   Light Armored Vehicle 
lbs   Pounds 
LCAC   Landing Craft, Air Cushion 
LCC   Amphibious Command Ship 
LCC   Life Cycle Cost 
LCCE   Life Cycle Cost Estimation 
LCCE   Life Cycle Cost Estimation 
LCU   Landing Craft Utility 
LCU(R)  Landing Craft Utility, Replacement 
LFORM  Landing Force Operational Readiness Material 
L-HOUR  Operation Launch Time 
LHS   Load Handling System 
LID   Light Infantry Divisions 
LMSR   Large, Medium Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship 
LOC   Lines of Communitcation 
LRIP   Low Rate Initial Production 
LVS   Logistics Vehicle System 
M Materiel 
M9 ACE  M9 Armored Combat Earthmover 
MACG  Marine Air Control Group 
MAGTF  Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MAX   Maximum 
MCCDC  Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
MCM   Mine Counter Measure 
MCO   Major Combat Operation 
MCS   Mounted Combat System 
MDA   Milestone Decision Authority 
MDA   Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP   Major Defense Acquisition Program 
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MEB   Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation 
MET   Meteorological 
MEU   Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MHE   Materiel Handling Equipment 
MILCON  Military Construction 
MILPERS  Military Personnel 
MISC   Miscellaneous 
MIW   Mine Interdiction Warfare 
MLOG  Mean Logistics Delay 
MLRS   Multiple Launch Rocket System 
MODLOC  Modified Location 
MOE   Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP   Measure of Performance 
MORSS  Military Operations Research Society Symposium 
MPF   Maritime Prepositioning Force 
MPF(F) Maritime Preposition Force (Future) 
MPG   Maritime Prepositioning Group 
M-POOL  Materiel Pool 
MPS Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 
MRE   Meal, Ready to Eat 
MSC   Military Sealift Command 
MSSG   MEU Service Support Element 
MT   Metric Ton 
MTBF   Mean Time Between Failure 
Mtd   Mounted 
MTTR   Mean Time to Repair 
MTVR   Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
MULE   Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equipment 
MV-E   Medical Vehicle-Evacuation 
MV-T   Medical Vehicle-Treatment 
MWSG  Marine Wing Support Group 
n.d. No date 
N/A Not Applicable 
NAMP   Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATOPS  Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
NAVAIR  Naval Air Warfare Center 
NAVSEA  Naval Sea Systems Command 
NAVSTORS  Navy Storage and Retrieval System 
NCAD   Naval Cost Analysis Division 
NDI   Non-Destructive Inspection 
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
NETOPS  Network Operations 
NLOS   Non-Line of Sight 
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NLOS-LS  Non-Line of Sight -Launch System 
NM   Nautical Mile 
NORM  Normal 
NORMDIST  Microsoft’s Excel Function: Normal Distribution 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NRAC   Naval Research Advisory Committee 
NSDA Non Self-Deploying Aircraft 
NSE   Naval Support Element 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center 
NSWCCD  Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
O & O   Operational and Organizational 
O to D   Organizational to Depot Level 
O&M   Operation and Maintenance 
O&S   Operating and Support 
OBJ   Objective 
OBS   Operation Burmese Sanctuary 
OH   On Hand 
O-Level  Organizational Level 
OMFTS  Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
OOB Order of Battle 
OP Operational level of war 
OPLAN  Operational Plan 
OPNAV N7 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and 
Programs 
OPNAVINST  Operational Naval Instruction 
OPSCON Operating Concept 
OPT   Operation Piranha Treasure 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OV   Operational View 
PACOM  Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 
PACSAT Partial Air Cushion Support Catamaran 
PEO   Program Executive Office 
PHST   Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation 
Pk   Probability of Kill 
PLA   Peoples Liberation Army 
PLAN   Peoples Liberation Army Navy 
PLS   Palletized Loading System 
PME   Prime Mission Equipment 
PMP Project Management Plan 
PO   Program Office 
POD   Period of Darkness 
POL   Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 
PR Program of Record 
PRC   Peoples Republic of China 
PS   Probability of Survival 
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PTM   Personnel Transport Module 
Q1   First Quartile 
Q3   Third Quartile 
QA   Quality Assurance 
QTY   Quantity 
R&D   Research and Development 
R&SV   Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle 
R/W   Rotary-wing 
R1   Sea Base-to-shore range 
R2   Shore-to-objective range 
RDT&E  Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 
RFID   Radio Frequency Identification 
RFP Request for Proposals 
RO/RO  Roll-on/Roll-off 
RON   Remain Over Night 
RSLS Rapid Strategic Lift Ship 
SAM   Surface – Air Missile 
SAR   Selected Acquisition Report 
SB   Sea base 
SBME   Sea Base Maneuver Element 
SBSE   Sea Base Support Element 
SE   Support Equipment 
SE   Systems Engineering 
SEA   Systems Engineering and Analysis 
SEA-4   Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Four 
SEA-5 Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Five 
SEA-6   Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Six 
SEABASE-6  Systems Engineering Analysis Baseline Architecture System  
   Evaluator Six 
SEAD   Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SECDEF  Secretary of Defense 
SEI-3 Systems Engineering and Integration Cohort Three 
SLEP   Service Life Extension Program 
Sm   Small 
SOA   Speed of Advance 
SOAE   Sustained Operations Ashore Echelon 
SOC   Special Operations Command 
SOF   Special Operations Force 
SPT   Support 
Sq ft   Square feet 
SS   Sea State 
SSF   South Sea Fleet 
SSM   Surface – Surface Missile 
ST Strategic level of war 
STOM   Ship to Objective Maneuver 
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STOVL  Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing 
STREAM  Standard Tensioned Replenishment Along-Side Method 
SV   Systems View 
SV04 Sea Viking 2004 
T/R   Tilt-rotor 
TA Tactical level of war 
T-AOE  Fast Combat Support Ship 
T-AOE(X) Fast Combat Support Ship Future 
TBF   Time Between Failure 
TBMD   Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TCONUS_FLS  Time (in hrs) from CONUS to FLS 
TCRIT   Time (in hrs) critical 
TD   Technical Data 
TDEPLOY  Time (in hrs) for MPF(F) to deploy 
TEU   Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit (20-ft container) 
TGIVEN   Time (in hrs) given 
THAAD  Theater High-Altitude Area Defense 
TLOAD   Time (in hrs) to load 
TOA   Total Obligation Authority 
TOC   Total Ownership Cost 
TOR   Connector 
TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center 
TRADOC  Training and Doctrine Command 
Trlr Trailer 
TSSE Total Ships Systems Engineering 
TSTORE   Time (in hrs) to store 
TSV   Theater Support Vessel 
TTR   Time To Repair 
TUNLOAD  Time (in hrs) to unload 
TUW   Time (in hrs) underway 
TV   Technical Standards View 
TWMP  Track Width Mine Plow 
TXIT   Time (in hrs) to conduct transit 
U.N.   United Nations 
U.S.   United States 
UA   Unit of Action 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UE   Units of Employment 
UGV   Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UID   Unique Identification 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
UNREP Underway Replenishments 
US   United States 
USA   United States Army 
USAF   United States Air Force 
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USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN   United States Navy 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 
UV Unmanned Vehicle 
VAMOSC  Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
Veh   Vehicle 
VERTREP  Vertical Replenishment 
VMA   Marine Attack Squadron 
VMGR  Marine Aerial Re-fueling/Transport Squadron 
VSTOL  Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing 
VTOL   Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
VTUAV  Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
WBS   Work Breakdown Structure 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
XFER   Transfer system 
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